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The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War

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THE ARMY'S ROUNDOUT CONCEPT AFTER THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

SUMMARY

In late 1990, three Army National Guard combat maneuver brigades were mobilized for Operation Desert Shield (later Desert Storm), the U.S. military effort against Iraq. All three brigades were "roundout" units, designated to bring an active Army division to full strength upon mobilization. However, the brigades were not activated until four months after Desert Shield began; the two whose parent divisions fought in the war did *not* deploy with those divisions; none of the brigades left the U.S.; and the only one to be "validated" as combat-ready was so judged on the day of the cease-fire. The brigades' experience generated much controversy about the viability of the roundout concept and the active Army's relationships with the National Guard. This report is about possible changes in the roundout concept after the Persian Gulf War.

The major criticism of the roundout brigades is that they were not ready to deploy with their parent divisions. However, roundout brigades were never intended to deploy without some postmobilization training, and it was never envisioned that they could deploy immediately in response to a no-notice crisis. Unfortunately, a combination of excessive optimism, overreliance on numerical readiness ratings, and high-level inattention to the actual readiness levels of the roundout brigades before Desert Shield/Storm led many to assume that they were as ready as similar active Army brigades.

Although the brigades had major readiness problems when first called up, they were able to be validated for deployment to the theater of war three months after activation. This was an unprecedented achievement compared with past callups of similar reserve component units.

There are varying views among the active Army and the Guard about who is to "blame" for the problems encountered in activating the roundout brigades. At the same time, there is general agreement about the need to implement the following changes related to the deployment and training of roundout units: (1) having realistic expectations about what roundout units can do -- not requiring them to deploy immediately for a rapid-response contingency; (2) integrating the premobilization training regime of roundout units with that planned for their postmobilization training; and (3) providing more and better training for roundout brigade personnel, especially in the areas of leadership and command.

Many believe that if these three reforms are effectively implemented, in the future the roundout brigades will be ready for deployment to a theater of war much more quickly than they were during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Some argue that these three reforms do not go far enough, and that more fundamental changes promise even more dramatic improvements in roundout unit readiness. However, it remains to be demonstrated that the social, political, and organizational costs of such fundamental reforms would necessarily be worth the gains in roundout unit readiness they might bring about -- or whether, in fact, such gains would be realized.

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THE ARMY'S ROUNDOUT CONCEPT AFTER THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

ROUNDOUT DEFINED AND PLACED IN CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

On November 30, 1990, two Army National Guard mechanized infantry brigades were ordered to active duty in support of Operation Desert Shield (later Operation Desert Storm), the United States effort to defend Saudi Arabia, and, eventually, eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and destroy Iraqi military potential. A third -- armored -- Army Guard brigade was activated on December 7, 1990. All three brigades were "roundout" units. "Roundout" refers to a program in which one of the three brigades of several active Army divisions is an Army National Guard brigade,¹ not an active Army brigade (there are also a few separate roundout battalions).² Theoretically, an active Army roundout division is brought to full war strength by mobilizing its National Guard roundout brigade (see the Appendix for a summary of Army combat unit size and organization). Each of the three brigades activated in late 1990, therefore, was designated to join a parent active Army division upon mobilization. However, the three roundout brigades were not activated until approximately four months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the beginning of Operation Desert Shield on August 6, 1990. The two that had parent divisions which deployed to Saudi Arabia, and eventually participated in the war against Iraq, did *not* deploy with those divisions. Indeed, none of the three brigades left the United States, and the only one to be "validated" as combat-ready by active Army trainers was so judged on February 28, 1991 -- the day of the initial cease-fire with Iraq.

The experience of the three roundout brigades during Desert Shield/Storm generated much criticism and controversy about the viability of the roundout concept and the active Army's relationships with the National Guard. This

¹ One active Army division, the 6th Infantry Division (Light) is rounded out by an Army Reserve, not an Army National Guard, brigade. However, this division -- if not necessarily its Army Reserve roundout brigade -- is scheduled for deactivation as part of the Army's post-Cold War downsizing, and all other roundout brigades and battalions are Army Guard units.

² The Army defines "roundout" units as reserve component units "designated to raise understructured Active Component divisions to standard mobilization deployment configurations." National Guard Bureau Information Paper. SUBJECT: Affiliation Program. May 1, 1981.

report is about the issue of what can or should be done to change the roundout concept and its execution in the wake of how roundout worked during the Persian Gulf War.³ It addresses the following key questions:

- What happened to the roundout brigades when they were mobilized for the Gulf War?
- How is the Army planning to change (1) the role of roundout units in the active Army's force structure and (2) the training, personnel management, and control of the roundout brigades, and how do these changes relate to the roundout experience during the Gulf War?
- What are the arguments for and against more radical changes in roundout, including (1) rounding out with units smaller than brigades, (2) filling key roundout brigade positions with active Army personnel, and (3) reducing or eliminating the National Guard role in roundout?
- What are the arguments for and against eliminating roundout?

Answers to these questions and policy changes based on the answers imply particular views about the military capabilities of the Army reserve components, particularly the Army National Guard, and the proper role of the reserve components in the total Army. Most Army Guard or Reserve units and personnel are not involved in roundout. However, roundout represents the closest possible integration of the central kind of unit the Army has -- a maneuver combat unit -- into the plans and operations of the total Army.⁴ Roundout is therefore a crucial symbol, and barometer, of the status and health of the relationship between the active Army and the Army reserve components.

³ This report relies heavily on discussions with active duty and retired military officers -- regular, reserve, and National Guard; civilian officials of the Department of Defense; staff members of professional associations; and congressional staff members involved in Army reserve component policymaking. Most discussions were held based on the understanding that the interviewees not be cited by name or affiliated agency; exceptions are noted in the text. Research for this study was conducted between April and September 1991.

⁴ Maneuver combat units are generally considered to be those units -- infantry, armor, and armored cavalry -- which fire on the enemy and directly engage him in combat on the ground or in the air. Other units may do some, but not all, of these things, and are therefore classified as combat units, but not maneuver units. Field artillery, air defense artillery, and combat aviation units, for example, fire on the enemy, but do not directly engage him in combat and do not maneuver on the ground as units. Members of Special Forces and combat engineer units may both fire on the enemy and engage in close combat, but do not maneuver as units while doing so. It is the maneuver combat units -- their personnel and equipment -- that form the core of Army combat power. Fundamentally, the rest of the Army exists to support and assist them in the conduct of ground combat operations.

The Congress, though it has not been, and may not become, directly involved in legislating roundout units' force structure, is likely to be attentive to the status of the roundout concept.

THE ROUNDOUT BRIGADES AND THE OVERALL DESERT STORM RESERVE CALLUP

The roundout brigades comprised only a very small proportion of all reserve units mobilized during the Persian Gulf War.⁵ Mobilized reserve strength reached a maximum of 228,000 during Operation Desert Storm, of which 140,000 were Army Reserve and Army National Guard. Approximately 13,000 of these -- less than 6% of the total from all reserve components, and 9% of the Army Guard and Reserve total -- were members of the three roundout brigades. The positives and negatives, successes and failures, of the roundout brigades, and any range of potential solutions for the problems, cannot automatically be assumed to apply to other Army National Guard or Army Reserve units, or to units of the reserve components of the other military services.⁶

⁵ All references to the "reserve components," "reservists," "reserve units," and "reserves" include the Army and Air National Guard and/or Guard members, unless otherwise specified.

⁶ For a preliminary survey of the overall Desert Shield/Storm reserve mobilization, see Robert L. Goldich. *Persian Gulf War: U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the Reserves*. Issue Brief 90144, updated periodically; and "Reliance on the Reserves," in Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator. *Persian Gulf War: Defense-Policy Implications for Congress*. Report no. 91-421 F. Washington, Congressional Research Service, May 15, 1991: 61-63.

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF ROUNDOUT

BEGINNINGS OF ROUNDOUT

Roundout began as one component of a broader policy change that took place as the Vietnam War drew to an end in the early 1970s. At that time, the United States began the transition from a draft to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), and in the absence of conscription the reserves became the principal source for rapid augmentation of the active forces in time of war or other military emergency. This reliance on reserve forces was arguably the most significant component of what became known as the "Total Force Policy."⁷

Specifically, roundout began as part of the Army's effort, immediately after the end of the Vietnam War in early 1973, to increase the total number of Army divisions from 13 to 16 (later increased to 18 in the mid-1980s), without increasing active Army manpower strength. One of the ways in which an increased number of divisions could be accommodated within constant manpower ceilings (active Army strength stayed at around 780,000 between 1974 and 1988) was to have the new divisions be less than full-strength units, and to rely on the reserve components -- roundout units -- to bring them to full strength upon mobilization.

There were several rationales for activating more divisions and structuring several of them with roundout brigades. First, proponents felt that more visible major combat units -- divisions -- would increase deterrence of potential enemies and confidence levels of allies; i.e., that an Army of 18 divisions conveyed an important psychological message to allies and adversaries alike that an Army of 13 divisions did not, regardless of the internal composition of these divisions.

Second, reserve forces cost less than active forces, although the cost savings may vary widely depending on the type of reserve unit and the resources invested in it. Some cost savings would certainly accrue from having one brigade of several active divisions be a reserve component brigade.

Third, the Total Force Policy was supported by many senior Army general officers (including the Army Chief of Staff from July 1972-October 1974, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.). They wanted to ensure that the Nation's political leadership would have to seek, or feel assured of, popular support for a major conflict, by requiring them to mobilize citizen-soldiers and remove them

⁷ As enunciated in the immediate post-Vietnam War era, the Total Force Policy, also known as the Total Force Concept, encompasses maximum reliance on DOD civilian personnel and the forces and capabilities of U.S. allies, as well as increased reliance on the reserves. See *Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the FY 1972 Defense Budget*. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., March 9, 1971: 21-24, 34-35, 100-01, for one of the first comprehensive official definitions of the Total Force Policy.

from their jobs, homes, and families. They believed that any large callup of the reserves would require a political consensus that would in turn allow the military flexibility to prosecute a conflict to military victory. If there were no such consensus, and a large callup was required to successfully wage the war, then the President (and perhaps Congress as well) would avoid entering into a major conflict in the first place. Requiring a reserve callup to bring several combat divisions to war strength, would be an especially significant implementation of this broad concept of reliance on the reserves, because combat divisions are the core of Army combat forces and sustain the overwhelming majority of casualties in any major war.⁸

A fourth reason for activating more divisions and rounding some of them out with Guard brigades involved attempts to improve the readiness and visibility of the Army reserve components. Reserve and Guard proponents felt that by closely integrating some National Guard brigades with active divisions and assigning them the high-profile mission of bringing those active divisions to full mobilization strength, the active Army would be forced to pay more attention to the roundout units. Equipment would have to be modernized and more and better training provided -- i.e., more Army budget dollars allocated accordingly -- if the roundout brigades were to have a realistic chance of being employed as part of their divisions after mobilization. Roundout would also have an indirect effect on enhancing reserve readiness, by creating a more positive and significant general image of all Army reserve component units and personnel.⁹

Finally, the reserve component separate brigades that existed in the early 1970s were units in search of a mission, and roundout -- for the reasons cited above -- provided one. Army doctrine calls for the division to be the basic large tactical unit. Separate brigades, while having specialized utility in some circumstances or with some types of forces, do not have either the versatility or sustainability of full divisions. In the early 1970s, the Army had a large number of Guard (and a few Army Reserve) separate infantry and armored brigades for which it did not have a precise or optimum mission. During the period 1963-1967, the Army deactivated a large number of grossly understrength Guard and Reserve divisions and activated, in their place, separate brigades that were generally at full strength. Nineteen of 27 Army National Guard divisions, and all six Army Reserve divisions, that existed in 1963 were replaced with 15 Guard and three Reserve combat brigades. Together with separate brigades that had existed before 1963, by 1967 there were 18 National Guard and three Army

⁸See Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime." *Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College*, Summer 1991: 35-50.

⁹ These points were made repeatedly by current and former senior officers and officials involved in Guard and Reserve policy.

Reserve separate brigades, and only eight Army Guard divisions remaining.¹⁰ "The Army now had more separate infantry brigades than it knew what to do with"¹¹ -- at least until the roundout concept was introduced.

GROWTH OF ROUNDOUT

The first roundout brigade was assigned to a division with two active brigades (the 25th Infantry Division, in Hawaii) in August 1973. At that time, it was one out of 13 active Army divisions.¹² By October 1, 1988, six out of 18 active Army divisions (six out of 12 in the United States) had roundout brigades. Three more U.S.-based divisions had a single roundout battalion. Only four U.S.-based divisions did not require at least a roundout battalion to bring them to full mobilization and deployment -- i.e., war -- strength. More significantly, *none* of the four full-strength U.S.-based divisions, in 1988, were "heavy" -- armored or mechanized infantry -- divisions. Furthermore, two of the three U.S.-based heavy divisions that relied on only a single roundout battalion to bring them to war strength had one active brigade forward-deployed in Germany. The U.S.-based increment of these latter two divisions thus consisted -- like a roundout division -- of only two active brigades.¹³ Through August 1990, when Desert Shield began, the basic outlines of how roundout was present in the force structure in 1988 did not change greatly. As of late 1990, the number of active Army divisions with roundout brigades had grown to seven out of 18 (12 in CONUS before six of them deployed to Saudi Arabia).¹⁴

The overwhelming pre-Gulf War emphasis on maintaining light divisions at full strength, while emphasizing roundout in the heavy divisions, is clearly related to the assumption that a rapid-response/no-notice contingency operation would require light forces. Heavy forces would be needed mainly for reinforcement of Europe, or Southwest Asia, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, for which it was assumed ample strategic warning, allowing time

¹⁰ *Is Roundout a Myth? A Case Study of the 48th Infantry Brigade.* Unpublished study prepared for DOD Total Force Policy Study Group, September-October 1990: 5-6. See also Lt. Col. Richard A. Crossland and Maj. James T. Currie, USAR. *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve.* Washington, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984: 177-78.

¹¹ *Ibid.*: 5.

¹² *Ibid.*: 6.

¹³ Figures calculated from an annotated chart entitled "The Divisions of the United States Army," effective October 1, 1988, prepared by the Association of the United States Army.

¹⁴ Figures calculated from an annotated chart entitled "The Divisions of the United States Army," effective October 1, 1990, prepared by the Association of the United States Army.

for the mobilization and training of the roundout brigades, would be available. Furthermore, deficiencies in strategic lift -- particularly sealift -- were cited by those who argued that a light force deployed to a crisis immediately was worth more than a heavier force that might arrive too late. If the strategic lift was not available, it was argued, the U.S. should maintain forces that could realistically be deployed with the lift that was available.¹⁵

To be sure, there were strong objections to this emphasis on light force by those who believed that an overwhelmingly light contingency force was inadequate in view of the widespread proliferation of high-performance armor, artillery, aircraft, and chemical munitions in the Third World.¹⁶ Clearly, by the time Operation Desert Shield -- a rapid-response, no-notice contingency with an overwhelming demand for armored and mechanized forces -- began in early August 1990, strategic developments had brought into question the assumptions on which the allocation of roundout brigades to light and heavy divisions were based.

¹⁵ The arguments for an emphasis on light forces were debated most intensively in the context of the Army's activation of light infantry divisions in the mid-1980s. See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Army's Light Division*. Hearing, 99th Congress, 1st session. June 20, 1985. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985, which primarily contains the testimony of then Army Chief of Staff Gen. John A. Wickham, who provided the driving force behind the light infantry division concept, as well as Gen. Wickham's annual testimony before the Armed Services Committees and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees during his tenure as chief of staff, 1983-1987. For critiques of the light infantry division, see Sam Damon and Ben Krisler (pseudonyms), "Army of Excellence? A Time to Take Stock," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1985: 86-94; Edwin W. Besch, "Are Our Light Divisions Too Light?" *Army*, February 1985: 42-48.

¹⁶ See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office. *U.S. Weapons: The Low-Intensity Threat Is Not Necessarily a Low-Technology Threat*. Report nos. PEMD-90-13, B-236947. Washington, March 2, 1990; Michael J. Mazarr. *Light Forces and the Future of U.S. Military Strategy*. Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990; David Segal, "Army Light Infantry Divisions: Are They Fit to Fight?" *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1988: 82-88; Peter F. Herrly, "Middleweight Forces and the Army's Deployability Dilemma," *Parameters*, September 1989: 46-59; and John A. Adams, "Balancing Strategic Mobility and Tactical Capability," *Military Review*, August 1988: 9-23.

ROUNDOUT UNITS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

A DELAYED MOBILIZATION

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Operation Desert Shield, the U.S. response to defend Saudi Arabia against a potential Iraqi attack, began on August 6, 1990. However, the roundout brigades of two active Army divisions [the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Cavalry Division] were not activated until November 30 and December 7, 1990, although their parent divisions began deploying to Saudi Arabia on August 13 and September 11, respectively. A third roundout brigade -- that of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which did not deploy to Southwest Asia -- was also activated on November 30.

There were several reasons why the roundout brigades of the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions were not activated until four months after their parent divisions were alerted for deployment to Southwest Asia. The four cited by the Army and DOD are as follows:¹⁷

- First, the immediate objective of Desert Shield was to deter and defend against an Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia. Deployment decisions, therefore, had to be made with the possibility of immediate combat upon arrival in the theater of operations. Only active forces could meet the requirement for immediate deployment and full readiness upon arrival in Southwest Asia.
- Second, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, requested two full-strength heavy divisions when Desert Shield began. There was no time for postmobilization training of the roundout brigades of both heavy divisions either in the United States or in Saudi Arabia.¹⁸ Therefore, active brigades had to be substituted for the roundout brigades.

¹⁷ See, for example, Letter, General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, to Hon. Sam Nunn, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, June 10, 1991: 6-2. Gen. Sullivan replaced Gen. Carl E. Vuono as Army Chief of Staff on July 1, 1991; and U.S. Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to the Congress*. Pursuant to Title V, Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25): 11-3/4.

¹⁸ This issue of perception and reality regarding the requirement for postmobilization training of roundout brigades is central to any analysis of their performance in Desert Shield/Storm, and in investigating possible options for improving roundout. Accordingly, it is treated in much greater detail below.

- Third, the request for the full-strength heavy divisions was received 16 days prior to the Presidential approval of reserve callup authority on August 22, 1990 (in addition, the directive of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney regarding the nature and scope of the initial reserve callup *specifically excluded Army combat reserves*).
- Fourth, the reserve callup authority invoked by the President on August 22, 1990, and in effect until January 19, 1991, allowed reservists to be kept on active duty for a maximum of 180 days (an initial 90-day period, followed by a 90-day extension at the discretion of the President). The 180-day maximum, it was felt, precluded the effective use of the roundout brigades. By the time they finished necessary postmobilization training and deployed to Saudi Arabia, they would have very little time remaining before they would have to either be demobilized or have their active duty extended under other statutory authority.

In retrospect, it seems that two interrelated factors operated to preclude the brigades' activation before late November-early December 1990, and to preclude the President from invoking reserve mobilization statutes that would have provided for a longer maximum active duty time for mobilized reservists. The first was that the military force ultimately required to fulfill evolving U.S. objectives in Southwest Asia was much larger than that required to fulfill much more limited initial objectives. The broadening scope of the mission resulted from events that developed unpredictably. Specifically, the President took time to conclude that non-military sanctions against Iraq would, in his judgment, be insufficient to force Iraq out of Kuwait, and that a U.S.-led offensive would be required to do so.

Furthermore, and most significantly, in August 1990 it could not be predicted that the original Iraqi invading force of an estimated 100,000 soldiers would increase to over 300,000 by October 1990 and to an estimated 500,000 by the time hostilities began in mid-January 1991.¹⁹ This increasing Iraqi strength steadily increased the requirements for U.S. forces needed to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. It seems plausible to assume that, if the Army, DOD, and the President had known in the late summer and early fall of 1990 that the equivalent of eight Army and two Marine divisions would have been committed to offensive ground combat to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait in late February 1991, a decision might well have been made to activate the roundout brigades earlier.

As a consequence, therefore, the initial reserve callup authority provided by the Secretary of Defense in August -- only 25,000 Army Reserve and National Guard personnel, excluding combat reserves -- was very limited. It was focused on those combat support and combat service support skills that the Army needed immediately for the initial deployment as envisioned in August 1990, because of

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to the Congress: 2-4.*

the paucity of such support units in the active Army force structure.²⁰ As structured before Operation Desert Shield, the Army required reserve support if four or more divisions were to be deployed for 60 days or more, or if more than two divisions were to be deployed for an indefinite period.²¹

Understandably, DOD and the Army wanted to avoid activating reserve units for which no real requirement was evident. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, when 150,000 reservists were activated, large numbers were both not needed and not ready, and their resentment at being activated for no apparent reason, plus their poor state of readiness, had major political repercussions.²² DOD policymakers appeared determined to avoid calling up anybody for whom meaningful military missions might not be available right away.

The exclusion of Army combat reserves, and hence the roundout brigades, from the initial callup suggests that the President was not going to incur the political and psychological burden that a more massive reserve callup, including the brigades, would entail, unless absolutely necessary. As of late summer and early fall 1990, it could be postulated that it *might* be necessary to activate the roundout brigades, but there was no immediate military requirement to do so. Until such a requirement was clear, the brigades would not be activated. More broadly, the longer callup authority that the Army and DOD thought imperative to obtain meaningful military utility from activating the brigades would not be invoked by the President until absolutely necessary.

ACTIVATING THE ROUNDOUT BRIGADES AND PREPARING THEM FOR WAR

As noted above, the brigades eventually were activated on November 30 and December 7. Several reasons have been cited for the delayed decision to activate them at this time. Three have been cited by the Army and DOD:

²⁰ I am indebted to my colleague James P. Wootten for pointing this out. For background on the Army's reliance on reserve component support units, see Robert L. Goldich. *U.S. Army Combat-to-Support Ratios: A Framework for Analysis*. Report no. 89-386 F. Washington, Congressional Research Service, June 26, 1989.

²¹ Department of Defense. *Total Force Policy Report to the Congress*. December 1990: 49.

²² For a documented summary of these issues, see Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann. *U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks*. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1989: 44-47.

First, "In November [1990], the strategic objective changed from deterrence and defense to that of ejecting the Iraqis from Kuwait, by force if necessary."²³ Activation of the three brigades provided an option to reinforce CENTCOM, if a protracted ground war developed.

Second, bringing the three brigades to full combat readiness partially reconstituted the general strategic reserve in the United States for other contingencies that might require U.S. ground force deployments concurrently with Operation Desert Shield.

Third, on November 5, 1990, the FY 1991 DOD Appropriation Act (P.L. 101-511) was enacted into law, including a section (sec. 8132), which authorized the President, during FY 1991, to order Selected Reserve combat units to active duty without their consent for a maximum of 360 days (180 days plus a 180-day extension at Presidential discretion), for the purpose of supporting Operation Desert Shield. This was double the 180-day maximum specified in the statutes then governing the ongoing reserve callup.

However, this latter authority -- apparently never requested by the Administration -- was never used. Furthermore, the willingness of the President to invoke statutes containing even broader reserve callup authority in mid-January 1991, after hostilities began,²⁴ may cast doubt on whether enactment of the authority contained in the FY 1991 DOD Appropriation Act in fact had much to do with activating the roundout brigades.²⁵

²³Letter, General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, to Hon. Sam Nunn, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, June 10, 1991: 6-2. Gen. Sullivan replaced Gen. Carl E. Vuono as Army Chief of Staff on July 1, 1991.

²⁴ On January 18, 1991, President Bush invoked Section 673 of title 10, U.S. Code, which provides much broader reserve activation authority than section 673b, which he had originally invoked in August 1990. Section 673 provides that units and individual members of the Ready Reserve (i.e., both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve), may be ordered to active duty without their consent for up to 24 months by the President if he declares a national emergency (the President had in fact declared such an emergency in early August 1990 to implement various economic sanctions against Iraq). DOD did state, however, that as a matter of policy no reservist would be kept on active duty without the reservist's consent for more than 12 months. Up to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists may be on active duty at any one time under this provision of law.

²⁵ This is implied in U.S. Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*. Pursuant to Title V, Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25). July 1991: 11-3/4.

Although enactment of the expanded callup authority may not have directly affected DOD and Army policy, it certainly was part of expanded institutional and political pressure to activate the roundout brigades. Throughout the summer and fall of 1990, many people, including influential members of Congress, called for activation of the roundout brigades.²⁶ The FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision (sec. 1112, Title XI, P.L. 101-510, Nov. 5, 1990) expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should "order to active Federal service at least one Army National Guard combat brigade for deployment to the Persian Gulf region in connection with Operation Desert Shield."

Some analysts suggested that the President should have immediately authorized the activation of reserves when Desert Shield began on August 6, without any restriction on Army combat reserves, given the known size and scope of the Desert Shield deployment, the degree of the services' dependence on reserve augmentation for such a contingency, and the utility of operationally testing the roundout concept.²⁷ Others suggested that the roundout brigades did not need elaborate postmobilization training,²⁸ that their familiarity with their active divisions' procedures and potential war plans more than compensated for somewhat lower individual and unit readiness, and that the active Army leadership was exaggerating the readiness problems of the brigades so as to strengthen their case against reliance on the reserves.²⁹

After being called up in late November-early December, the 48th, 155th, and 256th Brigades received three, four, and five months of postmobilization training respectively. Only one brigade -- the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army National Guard, originally the roundout brigade of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), was formally validated by the active Army as being ready for deployment. This validation occurred on

²⁶ See, for example, Reps. Les Aspin [Chairman, House Armed Services Committee], Beverly Byron [Chairwoman, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel], and G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery [Chairman, House Veterans Affairs Committee]. *Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons for a Future Force Structure*. October 15, 1990; Rick Maze, "Some in House May Push Call-Up of Combat Reserves," *Army Times*, Sept. 17, 1990: 9.

²⁷ Reps. Aspin, Byron, and Montgomery: 5-7.

²⁸ For example, Lt. Gen. Herbert R. Temple, Army National Guard (Ret.) *Desert Shield: Retraining is Not Needed*. National Guard, February 1991: 17-18. General Temple was Chief of the National Guard Bureau (senior Guard officer in DOD) during 1986-1990.

²⁹ Bernard E. Trainor, "Guard vs. Army: Bad blood is boiling," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, May 5, 1991: C-1; David C. Morrison, "Guard Units Not Ready?" *National Journal*, Feb. 23, 1991: 460; Maj. Gen. Robert F. Ensslin, Jr., "It's a Question of Resources and Turf," *National Guard*, May 1991: 2.

February 28, 1991, the date of the ceasefire with Iraq. Thus, for the 48th Brigade, approximately 90 days of postmobilization training were required before it was considered ready for war. The validation process for the other two brigades was interrupted by the end of hostilities. However, the 155th Armored Brigade of the Mississippi Army Guard, roundout to the 1st Cavalry Division, was scheduled for validation to be completed on March 22, 1991, about 105 days after it was activated. The 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Louisiana Army Guard, roundout to the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), was scheduled for validation on April 13, 135 days after activation.

The longer periods of time between mobilization and validation for the 155th and 256th Brigades appear to have been due more to exogenous factors such as availability of training facilities and personnel, and -- in the case of the 256th Brigade -- the need to train large numbers of brigade personnel in their newly issued Bradley Fighting Vehicles -- rather than intrinsic variations in the caliber of personnel or general premobilization readiness of the brigades.³⁰ There appears to be no doubt in the minds of active Army leaders that the 155th and 256th Brigades would have been validated for combat had the war lasted long enough for the validation process to take place.

CORE PROBLEMS AND SUCCESSES

Availability of the roundout brigades for deployment

The major criticism levelled at the performance of the roundout brigades, and hence of the entire roundout concept, in the wake of Operation Desert Storm is simple: *the brigades, for whatever reasons, were not ready to deploy with their parent divisions.* The brigades required between 90 to 135 days of postmobilization training,³¹ although the reasons for the longer periods appear to have been due to problems of the availability of training facilities and familiarization with new equipment rather than to personnel readiness problems.³² The parent divisions of two of the brigades had to begin deploying well before 90 days after mobilization, so even if the brigades *had* been mobilized immediately, they *still* would not have been able to deploy with the divisions. In the case of the 48th Brigade, its parent 24th Division had to deploy even before the President authorized *any* reserve callup. Both the 24th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (rounded out by the 155th Brigade) had to be brought to full, three-brigade strength by the attachment of active Army brigades.

³⁰ Department of the Army Inspector General. *Special Assessment of National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment.* Briefing Summary, n.d., but apparently May 1991 (hereafter cited as Army IG Report).

³¹ Army IG Report: 11-13.

³² Army IG Report: *passim.*

However, an indictment of the roundout concept because the roundout brigades did not deploy with their parent divisions in August-September 1990 appears to be questionable. A review of the historical record suggests that such criticism misses several salient points about the roundout concept prior to Desert Shield/Storm:

Roundout brigades were never intended to deploy without at least several weeks of postmobilization training

Pre-Gulf War estimates as to how much training would be required vary greatly. An Army response to questions from the House Armed Services Committee written after hostilities ended stated that "There were no scenarios under which roundout brigades deployed before post-mobilization training; whether the training time was minimal or substantial dependent on the unit's combat readiness."³³ The Army National Guard has argued that "The roundout brigades met Department of the Army standards for deployability when federalized and could easily have been deployed within the 30-60 day period. Only after they were federalized were the deployability criteria changed to reflect a much higher standard."³⁴ Similarly, based on the fact that all three roundout brigades were rated either C-2 or C-3 in the joint readiness reporting system of DOD,³⁵ they should have required between 15-28 days (C-2) or 29-42 days (C-3) of postmobilization training to be ready for deployment, according to 1987 testimony from the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces Command.³⁶ One

³³ Information Paper on Roundout Brigades, provided to House Armed Services Committee by Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), U.S. Army, n.d., but apparently June 1991. Copy provided to CRS by HASC staff.

³⁴ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1992. Part 4*. Hearings, 102nd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991: 420. See also *Army National Guard After Action Report (2 August 1990-28 February 1991): Operation Desert Shield; Operation Desert Storm*. [Washington], National Guard Bureau, June 1991: 6-7 (hereafter cited as *ARNG AAR*). Senior Guard officers have made the same point in numerous other fora as well.

³⁵ See below, pp. 35-39, for a further discussion of readiness reporting issues.

³⁶ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988. Part 1*. Hearings, 100th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1987: 299. Forces Command was actually the Army Forces Command until 1987, when it became a specified command under the joint unified and specified combatant command structure. U.S. Congress. House. *Unified and Specified Commands. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Notification of Changes to the Unified and Specified Combatant Structure, Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 161(b)*. April 23, 1987. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1987 (100th Congress, 1st session. House. Document no. 100-69).

National Guard official interviewed for this report, in general strongly critical of active Army policies and attitudes regarding the roundout brigades, agreed that it was unrealistic to expect the brigades to "mobilize, get on the planes, and get off the planes shooting" without some postmobilization training.³⁷

Others were less sanguine. Maj. Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) -- the parent division of the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army Guard -- throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm, described his prewar beliefs regarding postmobilization training plans as follows:³⁸

...I believed that it would have taken 120 days to get the brigade ready for combat. I had intended to infuse active component officers into the brigade and to replace battalion and company executive officers with officers from the active component. The brigade should not have been deployed immediately. National Guard combat maneuver brigades can deploy and fight immediately, but with enormously high risk and at the cost of many casualties.

Manifestly, this range of figures for the number of postmobilization training days required indicates that the Army -- active and Guard -- did not have a clear, agreed-upon understanding of exactly what the postmobilization training requirements of the roundout brigades would be prior to Desert Shield/Storm. Guard leaders, perhaps understandably, may well have been overly optimistic regarding the actual state of peacetime readiness of the brigades. In large part, they appear to have based their optimism on readiness reports which indicated a higher degree of readiness than the active Army actually found when the brigades were activated in late 1990. This, however, is more an indictment of the joint DOD readiness reporting system, and the way it was applied to reserve units, than of the roundout brigades.³⁹

Some active Army general officers shared in this untested optimism as well, or made remarks that were easily subject to misinterpretation. In 1987, the Commanding General of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), stated that "I would take my roundout units to war tomorrow, if necessary."⁴⁰ This remark is not inconsistent with that of General McCaffrey regarding the capabilities, and costs, of an immediate deployment of Guard maneuver brigades, but it could easily be construed by all as an unqualified endorsement of roundout brigade

³⁷ Interview, June 1991.

³⁸ House Armed Services Committee Desert Storm Postmortem. Interview with Gen. McCaffrey and his two assistant division commanders, June 20, 1991, Fort Stewart, Georgia. Excerpts provided to CRS from HASC staff.

³⁹ See below, pp. 35-39, for a further discussion of readiness reporting and the roundout brigades.

⁴⁰ *FY1988 DOD Appropriations Hearings*, Part 1: 340.

readiness. The same is true of a statement made by General Schwarzkopf when he was Commanding General of the 24th Division (he was division commander during 1983-1985):⁴¹

Roundout is a fact of life...the 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, is the third brigade of my division...I expect them to fight alongside us. They have demonstrated (their capability) through three demanding rotations at the National Training Center...they are, in fact, combat ready.

General Schwarzkopf did not say exactly *when* the 48th Brigade was expected to fight alongside the remainder of the 24th Division, or *how* combat ready the brigade was -- but his statement could also be regarded as a blanket affirmation of the idea that the 48th Brigade was as ready as the active components of the 24th Division.

It is possible that some active Army senior officers underestimated the capabilities of the roundout brigades as well; the 48th Brigade was validated for deployment in 90 days without the wholesale replacement of Guard officers with active Army officers that General McCaffrey felt would be necessary. As Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) Stephen M. Duncan said in post-Desert Storm congressional testimony, "The remarkable enthusiasm of the brigades permitted them to perform in training in ways that were not predicted on the basis of their actual experience."⁴²

In summary, virtually everybody, prior to Desert Shield/Storm, agreed that some postmobilization training of the roundout brigades would be required. Those who felt that far less would be required than ultimately took place appear to have placed more faith in the readiness reporting system, and the readiness ratings of the brigades, than was found to be justified when the brigades were activated.

It was never envisioned, prior to the Persian Gulf War, that a roundout brigade would be able to deploy as part of an immediate response to a no-notice/short-notice, rapid-response contingency

"The round-outs originated to increase the strength of active divisions for major, protracted combat in Europe. They were not meant to be used as

⁴¹ "The 48th Brigade: A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization." *National Guard*, May 1991: 12.

⁴² U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992. Part 2*. Hearings, 102nd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991: 738.

contingency forces for immediate, short duration deployments.⁴³ Specifically, Army war plans assumed that:

- Roundout brigades would not deploy with those active units which had to deploy within 10 days of mobilization (the "M+10 Force"), because of both requirements for postmobilization training and an insufficiency of strategic sealift to move the roundout brigades' equipment (the equipment of the active units, for a European contingency, was already prepositioned in Europe).⁴⁴
- If divisions with roundout brigades had to deploy immediately, they would be rounded out with active Army brigades to bring them to full war strength, as actually happened with the 24th and 1st Cavalry Divisions in Operation Desert Shield.⁴⁵ For instance, in Exercise "Internal Look," a war game played in July 1990 by CENTCOM designed precisely to deal with a possible no-notice Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the roundout brigades were not deployed and the 24th and 1st Cavalry Divisions were rounded out with active Army brigades.⁴⁶
- Under certain circumstances, divisions would deploy without their roundout brigades. The latter would follow, and then "fight alongside their parent divisions," when postmobilization training was complete

⁴³ Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Address to the 113th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the United States. Honolulu, Hawaii, Sept. 4, 1991. Copy provided by Staff Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, to CRS, Sept. 20, 1991.

⁴⁴ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989. Part 2: Readiness, Sustainability, and Support*. Hearings, 100th Congress, 2nd session. March 23-April 13, 1988. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988: 448-49, 488; and Information Paper on Roundout Brigades, provided to House Armed Services Committee by Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), U.S. Army, n.d., but apparently June 1991. Copy provided to CRS by HASC staff.

⁴⁵ *FY 1989 DOD Authorization Hearings, Part 2: Readiness, Sustainability, and Support*: 448-49, 488.

⁴⁶ Comments on a draft of this report by a congressional analyst with extensive active Army, Army Guard, and Army Reserve combat unit experience, including battalion command, August 1991.

and/or sufficient strategic lift was available to deploy the brigades with their equipment.⁴⁷

- "The 48th was not scheduled to deploy with the 24th [Division] on any contingencies unless mobilization was declared."⁴⁸ The same, it can be inferred, was true for the other roundout brigades. "Mobilization," in DOD terminology and in statutory bases, differs from a "presidential callup" of up to 200,000 Selected Reserve members involuntarily for not more than 90 days, with a 90 day extension possible. Reserves were activated for Desert Shield/Storm under the presidential callup authority in August 1990. A partial mobilization -- a broader category of reserve activation -- was not declared by the President until January 1991.⁴⁹
- Roundout brigades might well deploy simultaneously with their divisions, but only if the divisions did not deploy until several weeks or months after mobilization.⁵⁰

There can be little doubt that, in the 17 years that the roundout concept existed prior to August 1990, both active Army and Army National Guard leadership left the impression in public comments and congressional testimony, that the roundout brigades would and could deploy with their parent divisions under all circumstances, without any explicit reference to the time that might elapse between mobilization and deployment. There appears to have been a great deal of "can do" comment and response to questions delivered with much less qualification than was justified.

Specifically, some statements cited immediately above regarding postmobilization training requirements could be interpreted, unless carefully studied, as indicating that there were no constraints on the immediate deployment of the roundout brigades in war plans. Numerous congressional hearings touching on the roundout concept during the 1970s and 1980s contain statements similar to the following, made by the Chief of the National Guard

⁴⁷ Ibid.; Interviews and comments on a draft of this paper from a former senior general officer on the Army staff and an officer currently on the Army Staff.

⁴⁸ Information Paper on Roundout Brigades, provided to House Armed Services Committee by Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), U.S. Army, n.d., but apparently June 1991. Copy provided to CRS by HASC staff.

⁴⁹ See *Reserve Component Programs. Fiscal Year 1990 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board*. Washington, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2, 1991: 100-01; and CRS Issue Brief 90144, *Persian Gulf War: U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the Reserves*, for more detail on this distinction.

⁵⁰ FY1988 DOD Appropriation Hearings, Part 1: 325-28.

Bureau in 1978: "Roundout units are scheduled to deploy with their active Army division sponsor upon mobilization as a part of that divisional force to raise the understructured division to a desired configuration."⁶¹ Does this statement imply that a roundout unit will literally deploy at the same time as its active division? Does it mean that deployment will take place immediately after mobilization, with little or no postmobilization training? Upon close analysis, the remark leaves considerable scope for interpretation, yet it can easily be taken to mean that the answer to both questions is "yes."

In short, it appears that a variety of factors combined to create two fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of the roundout brigades in Army war plans prior to Desert Shield/Storm. First, many believed, or were led to believe by insufficient rigor in pre-Desert Shield war and mobilization planning, that roundout brigades could deploy without at least several weeks of postmobilization training. In fact, the issue appears to have received virtually no systematic and rigorous examination at high levels in either the active Army or the National Guard.⁶² Arguably, it took a war for such an examination to be forced on the Army.

Second, many believed that roundout units were as available for short-notice, rapid-response contingencies as for any other. In fact, the war plans involving the mobilization and deployment of the roundout brigades were not those for responding to a short-notice, rapid-response contingency. When Desert Shield actually began, these ambiguities and inexactitudes, and the policy problems they caused, were placed in the spotlight for the first time. The resultant controversies have tended, on the part of both the active Army and the Army National Guard, to obscure some real achievements and successes of the roundout brigades in Desert Shield/Storm.

Readiness problems in the roundout brigades when mobilized⁶³

Despite some comments to the contrary by members of the Guard and reserve community, there appears to be little doubt that the postmobilization

⁶¹ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979. Part 4--Manpower and Personnel*. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2nd session. March 21-April 6, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978: 3394.

⁶² Interview comments by a retired Army general officer who was very involved in evaluating both active and reserve unit readiness and capability while on active duty.

⁶³ For a lengthy discussion of these issues based on extensive field research and observation, see U.S. General Accounting Office. *National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War*. Reports no. B-244872 and NSIAD-91-263. Washington, Sept. 24, 1991. This GAO analysis was published while this CRS report was in final preparation and therefore is not fully incorporated into this report.

training received by the roundout brigades was much needed. Numerous and serious training and readiness deficiencies were found in all three brigades when they were activated. Perhaps the most serious was in adequate technical, tactical, and leadership competence among officers and noncommissioned officers at all levels. One observer quoted active Army trainers as stating that "none of the brigade and battalion staffs were capable of functioning in a combat environment initially..."⁵⁴ Many of the brigade's staffs "suffered from the condition that they had not worked together enough as a collective whole," necessitating the creation by the Army of an ad hoc "Tactical Commander's Decision Course" to give them that experience.⁵⁵

Individual officers and soldiers were either not capable of performing, or in many cases were not even aware of the range of, tasks they had to perform as part of a combat unit in the field, as opposed to the part-time environment in which they had been soldiering before mobilization. "They didn't know what they didn't know" was a comment made by one analyst and observer of the brigades' training, who had extensive active duty and Army reserve component experience as an infantry officer.⁵⁶ Given the constrained training time and facilities of a Guard unit, there was virtually no way for them to be able to do, and know of, all their duties upon mobilization. Many of these problems were not a reflection on the intrinsic abilities and potential of most of the brigades' personnel. However, a large number of officers and NCOs had to be removed from their units and sent to formal school courses after mobilization. As well as taking time, this removed them from their units precisely when those units were themselves training to meet deployment standards, creating further leadership and training problems that took more time and effort to resolve.⁵⁷

Many key leaders were also physically unfit for the demands that full-time soldiering -- either in the field or in garrison -- placed on them. This was especially true of older NCOs, many of whom were in their mid-40s or even 50s. Related to physical fitness and endurance problems are the difficulties many Guardsmen had in making the transition from a "9-to-5" civilian environment to constant, 24-hour a day soldiering, without respite except at irregular intervals.

⁵⁴ Interview with an analyst with active Army and Army National Guard infantry experience, including battalion command, May 1991.

⁵⁵ Comments on a draft of this report by a congressional defense policy staffer who was extensively briefed in the field on the roundout brigades' experience, August 1991.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ See Army IG Report: 10, 21, and *passim*; interview with an analyst with active Army and Army National Guard infantry experience, including battalion command, May 1991.

There were other problems requiring postmobilization fixes. One was a lack of qualification on equipment and weapons under field conditions, as opposed to ideal conditions in an oft-repeated "friendly" training environment.⁵⁸

One of the three National Guard roundout brigades had recently been evaluated as mission ready when tested on the [tank gunnery] range which is normally used for training in its home state, only to find that it was not ready when it was first tested on the range at Fort Hood. The apparent inconsistency was at least partially explained by the fact that the unit was very familiar with the local range, since it trained there often and that the range at Fort Hood was capable of testing the unit under conditions more similar to those likely to be encountered in combat.

Other problems included inadequate expertise in field maintenance and administration; and, very importantly -- and not at all related to Guard personnel readiness -- wholesale incompatibility of active Army and Guard logistical and administrative equipment, management procedures, and automated information systems.⁵⁹

Finally, the active Army was required to dedicate thousands of soldiers (3,600 from two active mechanized infantry divisions which did not deploy for Desert Shield/Storm, and even more at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and at other posts) to support the roundout brigades' postmobilization training. In a larger mobilization, these units and their soldiers might not be available for training roundout units -- they might themselves have been deployed or been preparing for deployment.⁶⁰

The Army National Guard's After Action Report for Desert Storm asserts that:⁶¹

The overwhelming support provided the Roundout Brigades and Battalions by the active component personnel had a counterproductive effect on unit training. Although well intentioned the large number of Active Army observer-controllers tended to take over the leadership of the units and short circuit the Roundout Brigades' chain of command.

⁵⁸ FY1992 DOD Senate Appropriation Hearings, Part 2: 739.

⁵⁹ Army IG Report: 30-32, 43; ARNG AAR: 13-14, 47-52, and *passim*. Also, see below, p. 31.

⁶⁰ Army IG Report: 14, 42; interview with an analyst with active Army and Army National Guard infantry experience, including battalion command, May 1991.

⁶¹ ARNG AAR: 12.

However, the consensus among the sources consulted for this report appears to be that, given the training requirements facing the brigades, the amount of active duty personnel dedicated to the validated process was generally appropriate to the task. "Brigade and battalion commanders I spoke to were unstinting in their praise of active Army assistance and were frank in their appraisal of the need for additional training to achieve standards."⁶² Assistant Secretary Duncan stated that in his visits to the roundout brigades "I found no instance where the brigades were receiving training that was unnecessary for the missions they were being readied to perform..."⁶³

Perhaps the most salient fact about all of these readiness problems is that, although the roundout brigade mobilization process had never been tested before, the brigades proved capable of being validated for deployment within 3-4 months after being activated. *This is an unprecedented achievement, when compared to the previous historical experience of mobilizing National Guard combat units of brigade or division size.*

Comparing the amount of time required to validate the combat readiness of the roundout brigades for Desert Storm with past 20th Century mobilizations is complex and difficult. Factors such as national deployment strategy, transportation shortages, and equipment shortfalls constrained the readiness of Guard brigades and divisions mobilized for the Vietnam War, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Korean War, and both World Wars. Nonetheless, a rough estimate suggests that the pre-Desert Shield/Storm average time between activation and combat readiness for Guard brigades and divisions was about 12-15 months at minimum.⁶⁴ Having the roundout brigades validated for deployment within 3-4 months indicates a quantum leap in personnel readiness compared to their predecessors in past mobilizations.

⁶² Interview with an analyst with active Army and Army National Guard infantry experience, including battalion command, May 1991.

⁶³ *FY1992 DOD Senate Appropriation Hearings, Part 2: 738.*

⁶⁴ Based on information obtained from I. Heymont and E. W. McGregor. *Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of US Army Reserve Components.* Study No. RAC-CR-67. McLean, Virginia, Research Analysis Corporation, October 1972. This report does indicate that two Army National Guard infantry brigades mobilized in 1968, during the Vietnam War, were considered combat-ready after 7-8 months of training. However, there does not appear to have been a particularly rigorous formal validation process that resulted in this conclusion. Furthermore, some argue that by 1968-1969 most major combat units not in Vietnam had seen their presumed missions of maintaining their own readiness subordinated to the need to furnish replacements for, and accept returnees from, units in Vietnam. The "combat-readiness" of brigades or divisions in the Continental United States (with the possible exception of the 82nd Airborne Division, the Army's major rapid-response contingency-oriented division then as now), therefore, may have been questionable.

By all accounts, the active Army trainers of the brigades prescribed an extraordinarily rigorous training regimen for the brigades. "They were training for war and demanded high standards," according to one observer. The ability of the brigades to meet these standards within 90-120 days, under an ad hoc training schedule, with both the active Army and the Guard scrambling to meet unforeseen problems, indicates a quantum improvement over past mobilizations. Some of the reasons for this are:

- First, whatever institutional rivalries may exist between the active Army and the Army National Guard, a close working relationship was quickly established between active and Guard personnel at the unit training level. This, arguably, was based on a much more positive longer-term relationship between the active Army and the Guard that the Total Force Concept has brought about since the end of the Vietnam War.⁶⁵
- Second, the heavy investment of active Army resources -- personnel and installations -- in the postmobilization training process was unprecedented when compared to past mobilizations.
- Third, investment in modern equipment for the Guard, especially for the roundout brigades, meant that a wholesale modernization and reequipment of the brigades did not have to take place after mobilization -- also unprecedented when compared to past reserve callups.⁶⁶ Although one of the roundout brigades had to receive new equipment training on a major weapon system -- the Bradley Fighting Vehicle for its mechanized infantry units -- this was more the exception than the rule.
- Fourth, the intrinsic capabilities of most Guardsmen and small units in the brigades were quite high, and required only a rigorous reorientation to a full-time military environment, a technical "brushup," and some intensive training for battalion and brigade leaders and staffs, to be ready for war.

It can be argued in retrospect that the active Army would not have had to devote so much time and effort, on an improvised basis, to the brigades' postmobilization training, if (1) events had resulted in the roundout brigades being mobilized immediately, rather than four months after Desert Shield began; (2) sufficient training resources and equipment had been provided both pre- and post-mobilization; and (3) adequate and realistic postmobilization training plans had been available and executed -- i.e., if the active Army and the Guard had known before the fact what they know now that the mobilization is over.

⁶⁵ Interview comments by a retired Army general officer who was very involved in evaluating both active and reserve unit readiness and capability while on active duty.

⁶⁶ My thanks to my colleague James P. Wooten for pointing this out.

It might be suggested that active Army partisans who have asserted that the amount of time required to validate the brigades for deployment into combat was excessive, and National Guard critics who allege that the brigades did not require the amount of training they received, should both focus more on the historical context of the amount of postmobilization training time required. Such a focus might bring extreme, and negative, comments from contending camps back toward what appears to be a much more reasoned middle ground.

ARMY PLANS FOR CHANGING ROUNDOUT

ARMY PLANS FOR THE ROLE OF ROUNDOUT IN THE POST-COLD WAR FORCE STRUCTURE: A MAJOR FIX

The Army's plans for its post-Cold War force structure call for explicit correlation between an active Army division's roundout status and its likely deployment schedule. Divisions with a short-notice, rapid-response mission will be fully-structured -- no roundout units -- in peacetime.

Specifically, the 12-division active Army of FY 1995 and later, as now envisioned by Army planners, will include nine divisions in the United States and three forward-deployed overseas (two in a reduced U.S. Army, Europe and one in Korea). The three forward-deployed divisions, as has always been the case, will be fully structured. Of the nine U.S.-based divisions, six (two heavy - - armored or mechanized infantry, and four light -- airborne, airmobile, or light infantry) will be designated for a "crisis response" mission. These six divisions will also be fully structured, without roundout brigades.⁶⁷ The three remaining divisions in the U.S., all heavy divisions, will be designated as "early reinforcement" divisions; each will have a National Guard roundout brigade.⁶⁸

The contrasts between this proposed force structure and that which existed prior to and during Desert Shield/Storm are striking. First, a substantially smaller proportion of all Army divisions, and of U.S.-based divisions forming the Army's strategic reserve, would be roundout divisions. One-third of the nine U.S.-based divisions, and one-quarter of all 12 active Army divisions would be rounded out with a Guard brigade in FY 1995, compared to one-half of 12 U.S.-based divisions, and one-third of all 18 active Army divisions in FY 1988. Tables 1 and 2, below, display these changes:

⁶⁷ Two of these fully-structured divisions will be "rounded up" -- not rounded out -- with a National Guard brigade, closely affiliated with the division for training purposes, given priority for equipment modernization, and possibly capable of deploying as a fourth maneuver brigade with the division. Army National Guard. Army on Call. Briefing Summary, March 19, 1991. See below, pp. 45-46 for more discussion of the roundup concept.

⁶⁸ Army National Guard. "Army on Call." Briefing Summary, March 19, 1991.

Table 1. Total Active Army Divisions and Roundout

| Divisions | FY 1988 | FY 1995 (Planned) |
|-----------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|
| With Roundout Brigades | 6 (33%) | 3 (25%) |
| Fully Structured | 12 (67%) | 9 (75%) |
| Total Active Army Divisions | 18 (100%) | 12 (100%) |

Table 2. U.S.-Based Active Army Divisions and Roundout

| Divisions | FY 1988 | FY 1995 (Planned) |
|--|----------------|--------------------------|
| With Roundout Brigades | 6 (50%) | 3 (33%) |
| Fully Structured | 6 (50%) | 6 (67%) |
| Total U.S.-Based Active Army Divisions | 12 (100%) | 9 (100%) |

Second, the post-Cold War force of fully-structured divisions, without roundout brigades, would include both light *and heavy* divisions, unlike the situation when Desert Shield began, in which all U.S.-based heavy divisions were roundout units. If "Desert Shield" had been "Mountain Shield" or "Jungle Shield," then no roundout divisions would have been needed on short notice, because mountain or jungle terrain would not have required armored or mechanized infantry divisions, and four fully-structured light divisions were available for crisis deployment.

This proposed balance of heavy and light divisions in the fully-structured, crisis-response division inventory would insure that roundout divisions and brigades are not tasked with a rapid response mission, regardless of variables of terrain, region, or type of forces needed. By the time the six fully-structured "crisis-response" divisions planned for FY 1995 have deployed to a theater of operations, enough time should have elapsed for postmobilization training of the roundout brigades before their parent divisions deploy, if more than the six crisis-response divisions are needed.

ARMY PLANS FOR INTEGRATION OF PREMOBILIZATION AND POSTMOBILIZATION TRAINING: ANOTHER MAJOR FIX

Existing postmobilization training plans for the three roundout brigades were basically scrapped after the brigades were activated for Desert Shield. The active Army authorities responsible for evaluating the readiness of the brigades

and their condition upon mobilization quickly came to the conclusion that readiness deficiencies were much greater than anybody, either active Army or National Guard, had openly acknowledged or factored into pre-Desert Shield mobilization planning.

An Army Inspector General's (IG) report on the mobilization concluded that "expectations of initial level of training [of the brigades] were too high," largely because premobilization readiness reports on the brigades overstated their actual readiness status; the readiness reports used were not specific enough regarding readiness criteria; and the requirement for massive postmobilization training of leaders -- officers and NCOs at all levels -- "was not anticipated."⁶⁹ Because of these unanticipated training and readiness problems, an ad hoc postmobilization training program had to be devised, which required -- as noted above -- a massive commitment of active Army training personnel and resources, and which led to a much longer period of postmobilization training than most pre-Desert Shield planners had thought would be required, to the extent that the issue had been rigorously analyzed at all.

The Army has concluded that a major reduction in the amount of postmobilization training required for roundout brigades can be achieved by integrating peacetime and postmobilization training plans and regimes. The Army Inspector General's report concludes that "the post-mobilization training process for Roundout units can be shortened by realigning current training focus to prescribed training strategies that complement a deliberately planned post-mobilization training readiness improvement process."⁷⁰ This would involve focusing premobilization, peacetime training on those tasks and standards for which realistic training can in fact be provided in peacetime, and not devoting scarce peacetime training time to things which are best done after mobilization

An example from the armored and mechanized infantry brigades activated for Desert Shield/Storm would be premobilization concentration on individual tank and armored fighting vehicle crew qualification, rather than more advanced platoon and company-level gunnery and maneuver tactics, which require facilities and a level of intensity difficult to achieve in a peacetime environment, on weekends, or during 2-3 weeks of annual training. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan recently addressed this issue:⁷¹

The Forces Command (FORSCOM) Commander will specify that the primary training focus of the combat units prior to mobilization be on individual soldier qualification and at the crew, squad, and platoon

⁶⁹ Army IG Report: 15.

⁷⁰ Army IG Report: 25.

⁷¹ Address to the 113th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the United States. Honolulu, Hawaii, Sept. 4, 1991. Copy provided by Staff Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, to CRS, Sept. 20, 1991.

levels. Tank crews and platoons must be proficient because they are the building blocks for larger parent unit operations. When that is accomplished and as resources permit, higher level collective training can be conducted ... Full-scale company, battalion, and brigade operations will be the focus during post-mobilization training. The training time available before call-up is insufficient to master the complex and highly perishable skills required at these levels. Training standards for small units are well defined -- they are the standards of the Total Army -- the mission training plans.

A related training reform involves reducing the number of tasks and standards that a Guard brigade is required to train in and meet before mobilization, facilitating concentration on a few that really matter. Several weeks of postmobilization training, the Army feels, could inculcate various skills in soldiers that years of intermittent, spotty premobilization training could not, particularly skills that involve large-unit maneuvers and operations in the field.

One problem that the active Army and Guard will have to be aware of in implementing training-management reforms of this kind is that the boundary between "mission-essential" and "non mission-essential" training is not always clear, or does not always exist. For example, field maintenance and repair can be just as "mission essential" for a tank or mechanized infantry unit as gunnery, and the addition of one mission-essential task to a training regime that lasts, generally, 60-65 days each year⁷² may just result in pushing another out of the regime.

FIXING ROUNDOUT BRIGADE PERSONNEL READINESS

There appear to be few doubts among both active Army and Guard leaders that both of the major reforms in roundout described above would assist greatly in increasing roundout brigade readiness and, hence, reducing postmobilization training time, as well as clarifying the actual requirements placed on the brigades. Other changes that the Army -- and others -- have suggested, however, while theoretically desirable, may be both less feasible and more complicated than they might at first appear. These other changes are primarily in the area of personnel readiness and training.

⁷² National Guard units are required to annually perform, by statute (32 USC 502), 15 days of annual training (some Guard units, including roundout brigades, receive 21-22 days of annual training every few years) and 24 days (12 weekends) of inactive duty training -- "drill," or a minimum of 39 days. However, many units -- and key personnel in units -- train much more. In FY 1990, for instance, the three roundout brigades activated for Desert Shield/Storm performed 60, 64, and 65 days of training each. *FY1992 Senate Defense Appropriation Hearings, Part 2: 798.*

Increased training of roundout unit officers and NCOs at active Army schools and other training programs

Many observers of the roundout brigades' postmobilization training feel that had their officers and NCOs had more opportunity for, and/or requirements to, attend active Army schools to obtain necessary technical, tactical, and leadership training, then fewer deficiencies would have needed to be remedied after mobilization. Attendance at either resident or non-resident (i.e., correspondence, sometimes supplemented by short residence attendance) courses is required for promotion to various officer and enlisted grades or for service in various assignments (such as a unit commander).

However, according to some analysts, including those with Army Guard experience, these requirements are frequently waived or honored more in the breach than in fact. The lack of formal school training in a wide variety of skills, techniques, and attitudes was probably one of the major reasons why large numbers of roundout brigade and battalion commanders and staff officers had to be detached from their units upon mobilization and sent to various command and staff courses to enable them to lead and manage their units in the field. Ad hoc courses had to be established for NCOs requiring similar training. This was destructive of unit cohesion, in that these key personnel were not available for 10-14 days during the training of their units, and took valuable time as well.

Specific suggestions for expanding active schooling include the following:

- Requiring junior officers to complete the Officer Basic Course (OBC) in the branch of the Army in which they are serving (i.e., insuring that an infantry officer has completed the Infantry OBC, and not allowing completion of any other branch OBC -- Signal Corps, Finance, or Armor, for example -- to suffice).⁷³
- Expanding opportunities for, and/or requiring more National Guard officers and NCOs to attend active Army technical schools, command

⁷³ In its report on the FY 1992 National Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee addressed this issue, requiring the Secretary of the Army to report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees "about the desirability of increasing the number of Army-paid positions at the Officer Basic Course for officers from the Army National Guard. The committee intends that this report address the feasibility of sending all Army National Guard officers to the same course attended by active duty officers and whether existing course administration could be improved or better tailored to accommodate the needs of the Army National Guard." U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993; report to accompany H.R. 2100*. May 13, 1991. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991 (102nd Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 102-60): 245.

and staff courses, and war games and exercises (both in the field and those based on sophisticated, computer-aided simulations).

- Requiring new Guard brigade and battalion commanders to complete active duty pre-command courses.
- Requiring Guard battalion and brigade commanders (lieutenant colonels and colonels respectively) to be "branch-qualified," a term which actually applies to officers in the grade of captain, and denotes "successful completion of company command, an officer advanced course, and at least 12 months of duty in a troop unit as a company grade officer."⁷⁴
- Obtaining more new National Guard officers commissioned by active Army Officer Candidate School (OCS) or college Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), rather than individual state OCS programs. The latter are conducted during several consecutive years of two-week annual training increments, plus non-resident study.⁷⁵

While theoretically desirable, these proposed reforms could well founder on the difficulty National Guard officers (and officer candidates) and NCOs could have in attending lengthy Army school courses away from their homes, and civilian jobs, in addition to their existing Guard obligations. If a soldier was not promoted or separated from active reserve status for not attending various active Army schools in a resident status, then the soldier might well leave the Guard. The Guard would then be without the services of an individual who otherwise might have stayed, and may have had considerable potential.

Care would have to be taken to insure that a substantial infusion of Guard officers into active Army schools did not result in a diminution of school standards and rigor. Adequate non-resident preparation for attendance at active Army schools could deal with this potential problem.

⁷⁴ "Officers Career Notes. Clarification of Branch Qualification." *Infantry*, September-October 1991: 48.

⁷⁵ In its report on the FY 1992 National Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee also stated its concern over "the variance in the quality of the state administered officer candidate school courses through which individuals may be qualified as commissioned officers in the Army National Guard. Although the curriculum for these schools is prescribed by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and is standardized, the caliber of the nonprior service officers produced by the individual state officer candidate schools is the subject of considerable debate. Section 535 [of the committee's version of the bill] would require the Secretary of the Army to report to the [House and Senate Armed Services Committees] on the desirability of requiring all persons to be commissioned through officer candidate school to attend the Army Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia."

More and better full-time support (FTS) personnel

Few people involved in the roundout concept question the desirability of assigning more FTS personnel to Guard roundout units. Full-time support, it is universally acknowledged, can remove peacetime administrative and logistical burdens from part-time reservists so the latter can concentrate on mission-essential training. It can also bring a familiarity with current active force procedures and techniques to reserve units.

The Army Inspector General report on the roundout mobilization also contains the injunction to not only increase the number of FTS personnel in roundout units but "increase *quality* as well."⁷⁶ This would apply, it can be posited, to both placing the right types of FTS personnel in Guard units (those who can contribute as much to improving mobilization readiness in mission-essential tasks, as well as handling mundane administrative responsibilities), and to insuring that FTS personnel are capable individuals.

Improving manning levels in critical military occupational specialties (MOS)

A variety of other suggestions have been advanced from within the Army to insure that when roundout brigades are mobilized, they do not have shortages of key personnel -- or such shortages are quickly remedied. Army Chief of Staff General Sullivan recently endorsed (1) authorizing manning of key slots, or even throughout the brigades, at over 100% of authorized strength, to account for the inevitable "people who aren't there" when mobilization occurs -- those who are not activated for medical, occupational, compassionate, or disciplinary reasons;⁷⁷ (2) premobilization planning to fill shortages with personnel from lower-priority National Guard units, or the Individual Ready Reserve; and (3) better premobilization medical and dental screening and preventive care of Guardsmen in roundout units.⁷⁸ These are clearly managerial and planning changes that could be made without much difficulty or expenditure of resources.

Other proposals include tailoring compensation incentives (presumably bonuses and/or educational assistance) specifically to roundout brigades and

⁷⁶ Army IG Briefing Summary: 28.

⁷⁷ Address to the 113th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the United States. Honolulu, Hawaii, Sept. 4, 1991. Copy provided by Staff Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, to CRS, Sept. 20, 1991; Army IG Report: 27-28.

⁷⁸ Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Address to the 113th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the United States. Honolulu, Hawaii, Sept. 4, 1991. Copy provided by Staff Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, to CRS, Sept. 20, 1991; Army IG Report: 29; ARNG AAR: 68, 91-92.

recruiting more prior-service personnel with needed skills.⁷⁹ These would both cost money; however, the cost might well be worth it, given the priority accorded the roundout brigades.

Reducing personnel turbulence in Guard small units and key positions

This laudable goal is an outgrowth of the active Army's discovery, when the three roundout brigades were mobilized, that many small units -- tank crews, mechanized rifle squads -- had indeed experienced a great deal of personnel turnover, contrary to the positive stereotype of Guard units as being composed of people from the same community who had served together for many years and knew each other -- and each other's capabilities -- intimately. There is certainly a great deal of this continuity in Guard and Reserve units in all services and reserve components. However, in retrospect it should have come as no surprise that Guard tank crews and rifle squads experienced a great deal of turnover.⁸⁰ The young men in their twenties serving in these small units tend to be single and mobile, in the middle of educational and job changes, and -- more to the point -- as civilians they can and do move frequently. Hence, while preventing small-unit turbulence in the roundout brigades is desirable, it is unclear what the Army and the Guard as institutions can do about it.

FIXING ROUNDOUT BRIGADE READINESS MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

Compatible logistical procedures and mechanisms

One way of improving the readiness and reducing the postmobilization training requirements of the roundout brigades requires money and time but does not involve tinkering with fundamental institutional relationships. It would establish a commonality of active Army and Guard equipment, terms, procedures, and management information systems for unit administration and logistics. Such common procedures and systems would greatly facilitate the transition to active duty when roundout units are mobilized. When the three brigades were called up in November-December 1990, much *ad hoc* effort had to be devoted to bringing the Guard's policies and procedures for the administration and control of personnel, supplies, and maintenance into line with those in the active Army -- of which the Guard brigades had become members. Incompatibility of automated information systems -- computer software and hardware -- was a major problem.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Army IG Report: 28.

⁸⁰ It should also be noted that active Army small units of this size experience much personnel turnover, due to separations from active duty, transfers, medical absences, disciplinary action, and other aspects of the Army personnel system.

⁸¹ Army IG Report: 30-32, 43; ARNG AAR: 13-14, 47-52, and *passim*.

Making readiness reporting more realistic and comprehensive

The DOD joint readiness reporting system, according to many, is both (1) inadequately suited to differentiating between reserve and active units, and (2) too superficial in evaluating actual readiness, especially as applied to major ground combat maneuver units.⁸² The following excerpt from the FY 1990 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, although lengthy, is worth quoting because it clearly describes the readiness reporting system and its limitations:⁸³

The Status of Resources and Training System was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of providing Selected Reserve and active component units with uniform policy and criteria for reporting the level and condition of unit resources and the level of training. Each service has developed its own implementing instructions as to what should be reported, based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy. Under the Status of Resources and Training System, units report four resource areas: personnel, equipment and supplies on-hand, equipment condition, and training. An overall unit resource area, based only on resources organic to and training under the operational control of the reporting unit, is also provided.

One of five category levels is assigned each resource area under the Status of Resources and Training System. These levels are used as a management tool and indicate a unit's peacetime resource status, at the time of the report, relative to the wartime requirement. *Category levels do not project a unit's combat capability after mobilization* [CRS italics]. The category levels are defined as:

- C-1. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-2. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-3. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

⁸² For a lengthy discussion of these issues based on extensive field research and observation, see U.S. General Accounting Office. *National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War*. Reports no. B-244872 and NSIAD-91-263. Washington, Sept. 24, 1991. This GAO analysis was published while this CRS report was in press. Its material could not, therefore, be fully incorporated into this report.

⁸³ *FY 1990 Reserve Forces Policy Board Report*: 134-35.

- C-4. Unit requires additional resources and/or training in order to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with resources on-hand.
- C-5. Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

A Status of Resources and Training System report indicates a unit's resources and training status on a particular date, in the areas evaluated. A unit's readiness cannot be reflected in a Status of Resources and Training System category level alone. The report is only one of the indicators employed to determine unit readiness. Tangible factors such as numbers of personnel, training, equipment, facilities, and funding all effect readiness. Intangible factors, such as leadership, morale, cohesiveness, skill retention as well as physical fitness, strength, and stamina of the individual members also affect the combat readiness of a unit.

In addition to the Status of Resources and Training System, the results of mobilization tests, combat readiness evaluations, operational readiness inspections, and other criteria must be considered when determining the actual combat readiness of a unit. There is no single indicator that can be pointed to that truly represents the readiness of a unit, or an entire component. Measuring the readiness of a Reserve component unit or an active component unit remains a complex issue.

Active Army brigades and Guard roundout brigades, for instance, were both rated as "C-2" during Desert Shield -- "unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed" -- but the active Army brigades deployed immediately, and the Guard roundout brigades received several months of postmobilization training. This has led to massive confusion and recriminations. The Army Guard's After Action Report for Desert Shield and Desert Storm stated that:⁸⁴

All of the Roundout Brigades and Battalions met the readiness deployability criteria established by the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) on the first day of federalization. The deployment readiness requirements were significantly increased for the Roundout units after they were federalized. The other two ARNG combat [field artillery, not maneuver] brigades and the nine [Guard combat support and combat service support] groups were not required to achieve the higher readiness levels before they deployed. A significant number of active units did not meet AMOPS criteria before they deployed but their

⁸⁴ ARNG AAR: 7.

readiness ratings were subjectively upgraded to meet deployment requirements.

Numerous Guard observers have cited this postmobilization changing of deployment standards in alleging active Army bias, prejudice, and discrimination against the reserve components generally, and the National Guard in particular. They have asserted that these "double standards," rather than real readiness deficiencies, led the three roundout brigades to be subjected to their postmobilization training regime, whereas active Army brigades and divisions with equivalent C-ratings were deployed immediately as part of Desert Shield/Storm.⁸⁵

The problem of readiness evaluation and reporting actually appears to be much more complicated than charges of "double standards" may indicate. It may be that active Army senior officers are more inclined to be skeptical about the readiness of Guard than active Army combat maneuver units, and about the speed with which Guard maneuver units can remedy their readiness problems compared to active units, regardless of whether quantitative readiness indicators for active and Guard units are the same or not. However, their skepticism may, in most cases, be well-founded. As noted above, the readiness reports are, of necessity, based mostly on quantitative evaluations of equipment on hand, equipment status, and personnel (broken down by MOS and grade) on hand.

Arguably, though, subjective distinctions between active and reserve component units are critical in evaluating the differing ability of active and reserve component units can respond quickly to contingencies and remedy readiness deficiencies, and in determining how much postmobilization training the reserve units may need. An active Army unit, like a Guard unit, may well have some quantitative readiness deficiencies in terms of equipment and personnel when it is alerted for deployment. However, the qualitative atmosphere of 24-hour-a-day soldiering, the presence of officers and NCOs in units with current and ongoing active duty experience, and the ability to undertake constant small-unit training, even with limited opportunity for large-scale field activity, may make all the difference between the active unit and an equivalent reserve component unit.

"The active Army trains to standards; the Guard trains to events," is the way one first-hand observer of the roundout brigades' training process put it, stating further that "part of the problem is that training time constraints often force the Guard to accept performance of an event as the accomplishment,

⁸⁵ See, for example, "The 48th Brigade: A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization." *National Guard*, May 1991; Maj. Gen. Robert F. Ensslin, Jr., Army Roundout Policy and Desert Storm." Unpublished paper, June 1991 [Gen. Ensslin is President of the National Guard Association.]; Robert Unger, "Army Guard digs in for battle as federal budget cuts loom," *Kansas City Star*, Sept, 23, 1991: 1 [quoting Gen. Ensslin at length]; and Sean D. Naylor, "Guard Was 'Ready to Go,' Report Says." *Army Times*, Oct. 7, 1991: 12. This point was also made in an interview with a National Guard official, June 1991.

rather than proper performance of the event."⁸⁶ Another analyst who had participated, as an active Army officer, as a pre-Desert Shield/Storm evaluator of one of the roundout brigades' annual training periods, noted that the active Army is constantly forced to train to deal with the unexpected, while the limitations on training time faced by Guard units forces them to concentrate on perfecting that which they know will be expected.⁸⁷ The issue is not, according to all concerned, the intrinsic potential of the Guard roundout brigades and their personnel; it is the inevitable limitations faced by part-time soldiers, no matter how dedicated and capable, in preparing for war.

For these reasons, it would appear to be misleading, and possibly counterproductive, to frame a discussion over Guard roundout unit readiness -- or the readiness of any U.S. military unit, for that matter -- in terms of the C-ratings. Too much emphasis on one gross management tool may detract from sound training management.⁸⁸

As the above description of the readiness reporting system states, it is not *the* index, or even *an* index, of a unit's combat readiness after mobilization. Therefore, it indicates a misunderstanding of the limits of the C-ratings to assume that Guard units having a particular C-rating should have had their actual deployment status determined solely by that C-rating. However, it was equally misleading, in the years before Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for both Guard and active Army leaders to overstate the actual readiness of the roundout brigades by pointing to their C-ratings, frequently as high as those of similar active Army units. As Martin Binkin of the Brookings Institution put it:⁸⁹

I think what the military (both active and National Guard) was doing was misleading the Congress and the American people all along ... If the round-outs weren't ready to go to the Persian Gulf after all that buildup, why were we being told that they were ready to go on much shorter notice to fight a war in Europe?

Well, obviously they were not.

Arguably, however, Guard and active Army leaders were misleading themselves, and each other, about the true readiness of the roundout brigades more than they misled other branches of government and the public. The results are the recriminations just described.

⁸⁶ Interview with an analyst with active Army and Army National Guard infantry experience, including battalion command, May 1991.

⁸⁷ Comments on a draft of this report by a retired active Army officer, Armor branch, August 1991.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Robert Unger, "Army Guard Digs in for Battle as Cuts in Federal Budget Loom." *Kansas City Star*, Sept. 23, 1991: 1.

It would appear that if reserve units are to be evaluated according to different criteria, then the terminology used to evaluate them and state their degree of readiness should in fact be different from those applied to active units. Conversely, if they are not to be evaluated according to different criteria, then the readiness ratings should probably reflect substantially lower degrees of readiness on the part of reserve units if in fact they are less ready.

A variety of specific solutions to the problem of accuracy in reserve readiness reporting have been suggested. These include incorporating an estimate of how much postmobilization training time a reserve unit will need to achieve deployability; applying the same predeployment validation process to both active and reserve units before deployment; and applying to Guard roundout units a system of unannounced peacetime Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs), by active force readiness evaluators, such as the active Air Force has been applying to both active and Air Reserve Component flying units since the 1950s. While the latter idea -- the Air Force ORIs -- are much more difficult to apply to ground combat units than those operating around a single major system such as aircraft, the other solutions seem workable.

Providing more authority for active Army roundout divisions and their commanders over their National Guard roundout brigades

Some, especially in the active Army, have suggested that one way to improve the quality of training of the roundout brigades, and to insure that they are not given short shrift by their active Army parent divisions, is to more closely tie the brigades to their divisions through various organizational and command changes. These proposals include making the roundout division commanders responsible for (1) planning and conducting their roundout brigades' training, and evaluating their readiness status; (2) preparing and approving the brigades' postmobilization training plans; and (3) perhaps most controversial, selecting and evaluating the roundout brigade commanders and/or other senior officers. A corollary of this increased responsibility of the active division commanders for their roundout brigades would be evaluating the division commanders' performance, in part, based on the performance and readiness of the roundout brigades.

Most of these proposals could probably be formally implemented on an advisory basis, perhaps with larger numbers of full-time support personnel added to the roundout units. Implementing them with coercion, however, might be another story. Various statutes regarding the relationship of the active Army to the Guard could probably be so construed as to provide a legal basis for vastly expanding active Army control over Guard units and personnel.⁹⁰ However,

⁹⁰ For example, 32 USC 315 provides for the detail of Regular Army and Air Force officers to serve in -- not simply serve with in an advisory or training capacity -- the National Guards of the several States and territories without vacating their regular commissions (see below, p. 42). 32 USC 323 provides for the withdrawal of Federal recognition of the commission of a National Guard officer under certain conditions, including the officer's "capacity and general

actually using such powers could present formidable institutional problems. Much counterproductive resentment could be generated, and the time and energy spent in dealing with it could well exceed the benefits gained.

Finally, there could well be an increased role for roundout division commanders and staffs in supervising the training and mobilization planning for roundout brigades. The logic of having roundout division commanders know, review, and assess regularly their roundout brigades' capabilities, to a greater extent than has been the case, is compelling. However, the lack of physical colocation of the active divisions with the brigades places real limits on the ability of the active units to fulfill such an increased role. Moreover, in the current climate of base closures and downsizing the force, it does not seem realistic to assume that additional facilities could be built at existing active Army bases to accommodate Guard roundout brigades.

fitness" for continued Federal recognition and the officer's "ceas[ing] to be a member of a federally recognized unit or organization of the National Guard."

MORE RADICAL CHANGES?

All of the proposed modifications to the roundout concept mentioned so far in this report assume the continuation of the basic structure and characteristics of the concept. These basic characteristics include the following:

- The maneuver brigade (3,000-4,500 soldiers, commanded by a colonel, three to a division) remains the basic roundout unit.
- Roundout brigades are manned, staffed, and commanded exclusively by Army National Guard personnel. Any active Army personnel present are there as peacetime, premobilization advisers only.
- Roundout brigades, like most other Guard and reserve units, train roughly one weekend a month and usually two additional weeks every year -- a total of 39 days annually -- even if some key officers and NCOs put in anywhere from 30 to even 100 additional days.
- All roundout brigades come from the Army National Guard, none from the purely Federal Army Reserve.

The Army Inspector General's study of the roundout brigades' mobilization, already cited, concludes that instituting most or all of the changes in roundout already discussed in this report could lead to a postmobilization training time requirement for the brigades of 50-110 days (i.e., almost two to almost four months). The Inspector General's report concludes, therefore, that these changes will, in the worst case, lead to a repeat of the Desert Shield/Storm performance, and in the best case, could halve it, depending mostly on where the postmobilization training takes place and the time consumed in moving among various posts and stations after mobilization.⁹¹ The question arises, therefore, whether or not more radical changes in the roundout concept could further decrease the amount of postmobilization training they require. Could the figure be cut to 30-60 days, or even less in some cases? Or -- the most radical change of all -- should roundout be eliminated as fundamentally unworkable, with or without any of the reforms enumerated in this report?

ROUND OUT WITH BATTALIONS OR COMPANIES RATHER THAN BRIGADES: PROS AND CONS

Under this option, roundout would be implemented with smaller units. Rather than having two active brigades and one Guard roundout brigade in an active division, there could be two active battalions and one Guard roundout battalion in an active brigade. At a lower echelon, there might be two active

⁹¹ Army IG Report: 46.

companies and one Guard roundout company in an active battalion.⁹² The Marine Corps Reserve has done this with the maneuver combat arms for many years. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, active Marine combat regiments and battalions of infantry and armor were in effect "rounded out" (although the Marine Corps does not use the term) with Reserve battalions and companies respectively (a Marine regiment is the equivalent of an Army brigade).

The Marine Corps system appears to have worked well in Desert Shield/Storm, although some have suggested that more prolonged and better-led Iraqi opposition might have exposed some problems with the Marine Corps Reserve maneuver units.⁹³ For some, the apparent success of the Marine Corps Reserve method of augmenting its active combat units with reserve units has reinforced suggestions that the Army's roundout concept be kept, but applied to smaller units than brigades. For instance, Maj. Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Desert Shield/Storm, said after the war that "Activation and use of reserve component company-size units and crews is appropriate."⁹⁴ However, while rounding out with smaller units might have advantages, it is not a panacea, and there are arguments against doing so -- especially with National Guard units, possessing a state affiliation -- rather than purely Federal Reserve units of either the Army or the Marine Corps.

Major advantages of rounding out with smaller units

The biggest single advantage of rounding out with battalions and companies is that the degree of complexity involved in reaching and maintaining unit readiness, and the requirement for the synchronization of the various arms and services of the Army, decreases as unit size decreases. It is easier and quicker for battalions to attain prescribed readiness standards, both pre- and postmobilization, and easier still for companies than battalions. More might be accomplished before mobilization, and postmobilization training might be much shorter.

The problem of training reserve component maneuver combat units of company size and larger was articulated by General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces Command, in testimony before the

⁹² See the Appendix for the approximate strength of battalions and companies and their place in the hierarchy of Army tactical units.

⁹³ Comments on a draft of this paper by DOD officials involved in reserve component policymaking, August 1991.

⁹⁴ House Armed Services Committee Desert Storm Postmortem. Interview with Gen. McCaffrey and his two assistant division commanders, June 20, 1991, Fort Stewart, Georgia. Excerpts provided to CRS from HASC staff.

Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 1991:⁹⁵

Why couldn't we have had the roundout units at sufficient readiness posture to have deployed quickly with their parent divisions? Why is it so challenging to keep our reserve combat units at high readiness posture when we have reasonable good success with our support units?

The answer is these latter combat support and combat service support units generally have uncomplicated unit functions, even though many of their individual skills are complex. They include units with civilian equivalencies, such as medical, maintenance, transportation and supply as well as equipment-oriented unitary task specialties that can be accommodated during weekend training such as aviation, artillery, air defense, and engineers.

On the other hand, combat units, such as [armored] cavalry, infantry, and armor have maneuver skills and complex synchronization skills at company level and higher that are difficult to train during weekend drill periods. The training of these combat units at company level and higher integrates not only maneuver skills, but those of Army aviation and Air Force lift and fire support, artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, signal, military intelligence, maintenance, supply, transportation, medical, military police, chemical, and a whole host of others.

They have to synchronize everything that we do on the battlefield. The tasks and standards associated with these synchronized skills change at all levels as battlefield conditions change. Their execution is more an art than a science, and they take considerable time and effort to master.

Others have noted that the real "firebreak" between comparatively simpler and much more complicated battlefield tasks occurs between the company and the battalion level.⁹⁶ The rifle or tank company of 90-180 soldiers, commanded by a captain, has much more unitary and less disparate tasks than the infantry or tank battalion of 500-800 soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The conceptual difference between the responsibilities of the battalion commander

⁹⁵ Oral summary of written testimony from hearing transcript. Slightly different versions of General Burba's remarks can be found in his formal written statement prepared for these hearings, and in a formal written statement prepared for similar hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 6, 1991.

⁹⁶ Comments made in interviews with Regular Army and Army Guard officers -- active duty and retired -- in grades from second lieutenant through lieutenant general.

and his staff, and that of the brigade commander and his staff, is much less -- the brigade is simply larger. In either case, however, there seems little reason to doubt that, in terms of internal readiness, a roundout company or battalion would be a much more easily and quickly trained unit than a roundout brigade. The problem of external dynamics, however -- learning how to coordinate with other units, arms, and services -- would remain.

Another argument advanced for rounding out with smaller units involves the levels of competence that unit commanders and staffs can reasonably be expected to achieve, and maintain, in a part-time reserve status. Rounding out with Guard battalions (commanded by lieutenant colonels, staffed with majors and captains) or companies (commanded by captains or first lieutenants, with another first lieutenant as an executive officer -- second-in-command), would by definition drastically decrease the presence of Guard colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors in roundout unit command and staff billets.

Many such officers, it is argued, for a variety of reasons are less competent and capable than active Army officers in the same grades holding the same positions, for a variety of reasons. These include the lack of sufficient training time to master the skills needed, obtain requisite professional military education and training commensurate with their billets, and maintain sufficient physical and mental toughness prior to mobilization.

Some active Army officers argue that the lower grade of roundout company and battalion commanders and staffs, as contrasted with brigade leadership, would decrease their independent political and bureaucratic clout related to the Guard's state affiliations and chain of command. This would increase the chances of active Army commanders, advisers, and standards to prevail, and decrease the ability of more senior Guard officers to evade their application.

Major disadvantages of rounding out with smaller units

The major operational disadvantage of rounding out with smaller units was concisely stated by a DOD study released in December 1990: "The risk of combining active and reserve personnel [at echelons lower than brigade] is that the resulting units would have neither the cost advantage or continuity of experience of reserve units, nor the rapid deployment capability of standard active units."⁹⁷

Absent the political decision to mobilize reserves, a brigade minus one battalion, or a battalion minus one company, is a much less effective unit than a division minus one brigade. An active division with one roundout brigade can deploy without the brigade and still be reasonably tactically effective.⁹⁸ It is

⁹⁷ *Total Force Policy Report to the Congress*. Department of Defense, December 1990: 54.

⁹⁸ It could, of course, be augmented (as was the case of two divisions during Desert Shield/Storm) with an active brigade.

much more difficult for an active division with three roundout battalions (each being one of three battalions in an active brigade) or nine roundout companies (each one of three companies in an active battalion) to deploy with tactically effective units. A two-company battalion or two-battalion brigade is a much weaker and more inflexible ground combat unit than a two-brigade division. The requirement for the short-term tactical flexibility of having three, rather than two, subordinate units is greater for a battalion or brigade commander than for a division commander; and the immediate pressures on them can be greater, because they are more involved with directly engaging the enemy.

Rounding out at a smaller unit level would therefore place even more pressure than currently exists on the national political leadership to mobilize reserves, and would make the total Army even more dependent than it already is on that decision (although it could be argued that this was an advantage, in terms of insuring popular support for a mobilization and a war, as much as a disadvantage).

A second argued drawback to rounding out with smaller units is that drastically reducing the number of billets available for National Guard field grade officers (major through colonel), whatever its merits or lack thereof, would generate political problems disproportionate to the gains realized. One senior official stated bluntly that "the Guard will not put up with it." Better, it has been argued, to continue rounding out at brigade level, and treat Guard officers -- like active Army officers -- as individuals, rather than a class. If they prove incapable of performing their jobs, or show an inadequate postmobilization learning curve, then replace them, as is done in the active Army, which, many Guardsmen correctly note, relieves officers for cause as necessary. Furthermore, some active Army observers of the roundout brigades' training were pleasantly surprised that some of their stereotypes about Guard officers did not hold. They found that most of the Guard field-grade officers in the brigades were, after a period of psychological readjustment that was well within reasonable parameters, capable of learning their duties and performing them well, and capable of being "brought up to speed" like the rest of their personnel.

"Rounding up"

It has been suggested that the mobilization decision problem be dealt with by "rounding up" a three-company active battalion with a fourth, Guard or reserve company, or a three-battalion active brigade with a fourth roundout battalion. Rounding up from three to four subordinate tactical maneuver units would allow an active unit to go to war without mobilization. Three subordinate units would allow enough tactical flexibility and battlefield sustainability. Having a fourth such unit join its parent organization after mobilization would add even more combat power.

The Army is in fact planning to use this "roundup" concept at the brigade level in its post-Cold War force structuring, with two full-strength U.S.-based divisions, maintained as part of the "crisis response" force described above (p. 24), being rounded up with National Guard brigades. "Rounding up" might well

provide many of the advantages with fewer of the disadvantages of rounding out with smaller units. What is not clear, however, is whether the diminished essentiality of a "roundup" versus a "roundout" Guard unit would result in the unit's being relegated to second-class status in terms of equipment, training, manning, and command attention from not only its parent active unit, but the active Army generally. Some Army Guard brigades were linked to fully-structured active divisions in the 1970s, to be a fourth brigade for each division upon mobilization,⁹⁹ and it is not clear that this resulted in any lasting gains in the allocation of resources, time, and effort to the brigades from the active Army.

Eliminate roundout at brigade level, it has been argued, and National Guard officers will have less opportunity for promotion past the grade of captain (company commander) through lieutenant colonel (battalion commander). This would remove an incentive for capable Guard officers to serve in these grades. Exactly, says a counterargument. It is virtually impossible for Guard officers in the maneuver combat arms to maintain proficiency in field grades anyway. If an incentive is required for officers to continue a Guard career into the field grades, then incentives should be devised and tailored for that purpose, rather than maintaining Guard colonel and lieutenant colonel command and staff slots solely to stimulate the ambitions of Guard lieutenants, captains, and majors.

A similar set of points and counterpoints relates to the state missions of Guard units. Some say that Guard brigade structures are needed for administration and State missions, which the Guard is constitutionally bound to execute. Others, however, assert that higher headquarters -- called brigades or otherwise -- could be created or maintained for administrative or State mission purposes, but that these headquarters do not have to be those of the relatively few Guard brigades which also have a roundout mission.

FILL KEY COMMAND AND STAFF POSITIONS IN ROUNDOUT UNITS WITH ACTIVE ARMY OFFICERS AND NCOS: PROS AND CONS

Following closely behind proposals to round out with companies and battalions rather than brigades, in the wake of Desert Shield/Storm, have been suggestions to fill key command and staff jobs -- not advisers or instructors -- in roundout units with active Army personnel.

There is no legal or constitutional barrier to filling key roundout positions with active duty officers and enlisted members, contrary to what many believe. Specifically, 32 USC 315 provides that the the secretaries of the Army and the Air Force may detail officers and enlisted personnel of the Regular Army and the Regular Air Force to duty with the Army or Air National Guard of each State and territory. Officers so detailed, with the President's permission, may accept a commission in the Army or Air National Guard, "terminable in the President's

⁹⁹ *Is Roundout a Myth? A Case Study of the 48th Infantry Brigade.* Study Prepared for DOD Total Force Policy Study Group, September-October 1990: 6.

discretion, without prejudicing his rank and without vacating his regular appointment." Thus, a Regular Army officer could serve in an Army Guard unit, and accept a commission as a Guard officer, for a particular tour of duty, and then proceed with the officer's Regular Army career after the tour of duty in a Guard unit had ended.

Arguments in favor of putting active Army personnel into roundout command and staff jobs

Such action, it is argued, would inject active Army personnel with recent unit experience on modern equipment and current professional military education and school training, into key positions in roundout units. Large numbers of comparatively less-capable (if only because of training time limitations) Guard officers and NCOs would be replaced by, in theory, more dynamic individuals. Finally, there is no doubt that active duty "advisers" are useful, and indeed invaluable, to the reserve components of all the services. However, there is a limit to what advisers can do if the advisees reject the advice.

Arguments against putting active Army personnel into roundout command and staff jobs

Conceivably, an active duty officer or NCO, serving a standard tour length of two to four years, might have great difficulty in meshing effectively with Guard members who were permanent residents of their local communities, depending entirely on the personality of the individual. While it may well make sense for reserve component units to be held to active duty standards when mobilized, it could be counterproductive or impossible for active duty personnel to hold them to such standards in peacetime. Guard unit members could simply "wait them out" if the active duty people applied pressure for "reforms." Or, if the active duty members applied too much pressure -- perhaps based on their having been used to active Army standards throughout their careers -- then the Guard unit members might vote with their feet and leave the unit.

REDUCE OR ELIMINATE THE NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN ROUNDOUT?

Some have argued that many, if not most, of the problems outlined in this report result from most roundout brigades and battalions being National Guard units, and hence not entirely under Federal control. They consequently suggest replacing Army Guard brigades (or battalions, or companies) with Army Reserve units in roundout roles. This, they argue, would improve the responsiveness of these units and their personnel to active Army control and direction, thereby greatly improving their readiness.¹⁰⁰ The issues of state political control or

¹⁰⁰ Interview with an analyst with active Army and Army National Guard infantry experience, including battalion command, May 1991.

interference in Guard affairs would be moot. Force structure could be reorganized at will.

However, the three Army Reserve combat infantry brigades that do exist have severe recruiting and retention problems, and, according to some, are in a much lower state of readiness than most Guard brigades, roundout or not.¹⁰¹ There is little direct evidence, therefore, that Army Reserve status would help roundout units. It may well be that the lack of State orientation in the Army Reserve hampers it in developing the esprit and cohesion that are so needed in maneuver combat units. Such qualities were reportedly very evident in enabling the three Guard roundout brigades activated for Desert Shield/Storm to achieve combat readiness in such a comparatively short period of time.

THE MOST RADICAL CHANGE: GET RID OF ROUNDOUT?

In the wake of the controversy surrounding the mobilization of the three roundout brigades for Desert Shield/Storm, arguments for abolishing the roundout program which have been advanced by some over the past 15 years have become more salient. In general, the thrust of anti-roundout sentiment and analysis runs as follows:

- Roundout brigades can never reach equivalent proficiency to active Army units without substantial postmobilization training. The obstacles to doing so, and the tasks required of maneuver combat brigades are simply too complex, especially with the unavoidably limited amount of peacetime training a reserve unit can receive.
- Roundout battalions and/or companies might achieve sufficient premobilization readiness to require much less postmobilization training than brigades -- comparatively little, in the case of companies. However, absent the crucial political decision to mobilize, a rounded-out battalion or brigade without its roundout company or battalion would be crippled -- far more so than a roundout division minus its roundout brigade.
- Even under the most favorable circumstances, there will always be a political reluctance, perhaps combined with military and strategic uncertainty, to mobilize reserves. These factors will interfere with the rapid deployment of roundout units, regardless of how ready they are and how little postmobilization training they may require. The Desert Shield/Storm mobilization provides examples of such delay.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Interviews with a National Guard official, a senior DOD civilian involved in reserve component policymaking, and a senior retired Regular Army officer formerly involved in monitoring the readiness of Army Guard and Reserve units.

¹⁰² See above, pp. 9-14.

- Roundout generates an illusion of combat power and immediate deployability, regardless of peacetime caveats and pronouncements about the limitations of roundout divisions, which may lead to greater illusions among decisionmakers and an otherwise informed audience about the military power at the disposal of the United States in a crisis.¹⁰³
- Roundout is peripheral to the total Army force structure, and will be even more so in the planned post-Cold War Army. Only a small proportion of total Army Reserve and Army National Guard maneuver combat units -- separate brigades and divisions -- are involved in roundout. Two active divisions, each fully structured with three active brigades, could be created in lieu of the three roundout divisions (each with two active brigades) planned for the post-Cold War 12-division active Army. The Army would gain flexibility, and both the active Army and the Army National Guard would not have to devote an excessive amount of time and resources to a program which does not really result in increased Army combat capability.

KEEP ROUNDOUT, BUT FIX IT

The arguments in favor of keeping roundout, and fixing some of its problems as revealed during Desert Shield/Storm, are at least as persuasive as those in favor of ending it:

- The downsized active Army of the 1990s will be forced to rely on massive reserve component augmentation for a major contingency whether its leadership likes the idea or not. Eliminating roundout will in no way affect the overall degree of this reliance, in terms of numbers and proportions of Army Reserve and Army Guard personnel needed for a partial mobilization in support of a contingency of Desert Shield/Storm size -- i.e., also of Korean or Vietnam War size.
- The Persian Gulf War has validated the political and social basis of a reserve mobilization, making it a much more viable option for future Presidents, and Congresses, facing future crises.
- There is considerable agreement among all actors involved that most of the roundout brigades' problems, as revealed by the Desert Shield/Storm mobilization, can be fixed, and postmobilization training time considerably shortened, *without* changing the conceptual basis of roundout.
- Roundout forces the active Army leadership to provide more resources to the Army reserve components generally -- not just the roundout units themselves -- and to pay more organizational attention and

¹⁰³ See above, pp. 15-20.

command emphasis to them. Get rid of roundout, it is argued, and the Army Guard and Reserve as a whole may suffer from less active Army priority and attention, and consequently decrease in readiness and responsiveness.

- Retaining roundout allows more active Army divisions to exist, providing a larger basis for active Army commanders and senior staff officers to develop and maintain command and staff expertise at the division and echelon above division level. This will become even more important in the small active Army of the post-1995 era, in terms of maintaining a reservoir of doctrinal and tactical expertise for future mobilizations.
- Any reserve unit, including roundout, costs less. Savings certainly decrease as more money is committed to reserve units to buy increased readiness, but significant savings are still there.¹⁰⁴
- Roundout may well be peripheral to the total Army force structure, but it has crucial political and social significance which far outweighs the numerical strength of roundout units or the proportion of all Guard and Reserve units they comprise. The reserve components provide a crucial link between the Army and the people -- as was vividly demonstrated during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Roundout reinforces that link because it involves the central reason for the Army's existence -- the conduct of ground combat operations.
- *Roundout, and the existence of major Army National Guard maneuver combat units of brigade or division size, is a political reality.* The Army cannot get rid of these units, or the dual state-Federal status of the National Guard, which is constitutionally mandated. Therefore, it is best for the Army to integrate Guard brigades with active divisions, which will increase active Army influence and control over the brigades, increase the total budgetary resources devoted to them (precisely because of congressional willingness to fund the Guard, if nothing else), and in general make the best of the situation.

¹⁰⁴ DOD concluded in late 1990 that the long-term average yearly costs (recurring personnel and operating costs, plus an amortization of equipment costs) of an Army National Guard armored division are about 40% of those of an active Army armored division. Figures for Guard and active armored or mechanized infantry brigades are probably very similar. See Department of Defense. *Total Force Policy Report to the Congress. December 1990: 41.*

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

There appears to be considerable bitterness, recrimination, and sharply varying views among the institutional participants -- active Army, Army National Guard, and others -- about who is to "blame" for what happened, or did not happen, during the Desert Shield/Storm activation of the roundout brigades. However, the same institutions, and their individual members, appear to generally agree about what should be done to improve the roundout concept. Frequently, this consensus is obscured by the recriminations. It revolves around the following changes related to the deployment and training of roundout units:

- Realistic expectations among both the active Army and the National Guard regarding what roundout units can do -- i.e., not requiring them to deploy as part of an immediate response to a rapid-response contingency.
- Integrating the premobilization training regime of roundout units with that planned for their postmobilization training
- Providing more and better training for roundout brigade personnel, especially in the areas of leadership, command, and control.

Many believe that if these three reforms are effectively implemented, in the future the roundout brigades will be ready for deployment to a theater of war much more quickly than they were during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Some argue that these three reforms do not go far enough, and that more fundamental changes promise even more dramatic improvements in roundout unit readiness. However, it remains to be demonstrated that the social, political, and organizational costs of such fundamental reforms would necessarily be worth the gains in roundout unit readiness they might bring about -- or whether, in fact, such gains would even be realized.

APPENDIX: ARMY COMBAT UNIT SIZE AND ORGANIZATION¹⁰⁵

| Unit | Number of Soldiers | Grade of Comdr or Leader | Age of Comdr or Leader | Years of Service of Comdr or Leader |
|---|--------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Squad or Vehicle Crew | 8-12 | Sergeant or Staff Sergeant | 22-28 | 4-8 |
| Platoon ¹⁰⁶ (3-4 squads; 4-5 tanks or armored vehicles) | 20-45 | Second or First Lieutenant | 22-26 | 0-4 |
| Company ¹⁰⁷ (3-4 platoons) | 100-180 | Captain | 26-30 | 4-8 |
| Battalion ¹⁰⁸ (3-4 companies) | 500-850 | Lieutenant Colonel | 36-46 (average 40) | 15-21 (average 17) |
| Brigade ¹⁰⁹ (3-4 battalions) | 3,000-4,500 | Colonel ¹¹⁰ | 40-50 (average 44) | 18-29 (average 21) |
| Division ¹¹¹ (3 brigades) | 10,000-17,000 | Major General | 48-54 (average 50) | 27-32 (average 29) |

¹⁰⁵This table is a slightly modified version of one in Robert L. Goldich. The U.S. Army's New Manning System. CRS Report no. 83-129 F. Washington, Congressional Research Service, June 28, 1983: 2. Information on the ages and years of service of battalion, brigade, and division commanders obtained for the author from the Total Army Personnel Command on August 20, 1991.

¹⁰⁶Tank and armored cavalry platoons are not composed of a specified number of squads, but a specified number of armored vehicles -- usually four or five tanks or armored fighting vehicles).

¹⁰⁷An artillery unit of company size is called a *battery*; an armored or air cavalry unit of company size is called a *troop*.

¹⁰⁸An armored or air cavalry unit of battalion size is called a *squadron*. A battalion also has several organic platoons, not part of any company, for performing specialized combat and support functions.

¹⁰⁹A brigade may also have several organic companies, not part of any battalion, for performing specialized combat and support functions. Certain brigades also have organic support battalions, which are not combat maneuver units.

¹¹⁰A brigade which is part of a division is commanded by a colonel; a separate brigade, not part of any division, is frequently commanded by a brigadier general.

¹¹¹A division may also have a separate aviation brigade, and a brigade-sized division support command and division artillery organization, as well as numerous organic specialized combat and support units of platoon, company, and battalion size.