


LIMITING REGRET


Building the Army We Will
Need




QDR 2014 Force Planning



National Strategy and Commitments




QDR 2014 Force Planning




National Strategy and Commitments

QDR 2014 Force Planning



NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY

FEBRUARY 2015



Can Planned Ground Forces Meet Commitments?

How are we using the Army we have?


What commitments has the U.S. made?

What would be the regret of not meeting those commitments?

How large a ground force could be needed to meet our commitments?

NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY

FEBRUARY 2015



QUADRENNIAL
DEFENSE
REVIEW

2014

U.S. maintains forces around the world

92K: Global Response Force
Regionally Aligned Forces
Available mission forces

16K: CONUS Spt

63K: new recruits

40K: organize, train,
equip, future force

40K: support to DoD

143K: generating/strategic

44K: conducting operations

44K: just back

44K: getting ready to go


132K: rotational deployments

28K: Europe

55K: Asia Pacific

83K: forward stationed

Supporting force generation and strategic needs



National Strategy and Commitments

Combat persistent threat of terrorism
"We will degrade and destroy ISIL"

QDR 2014 Force Planning

National Strategy and Commitments

Combat persistent threat of terrorism
"We will degrade and destroy ISIL"

QDR 2014 Force Planning

ISIL not anticipated

National Strategy and Commitments

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“We will degrade and destroy ISIL”

Assure allies, deter aggression
Defeat, deny aggression in multiple theaters
Baltics: “You lost your independence once, you never will again”

QDR 2014 Force Planning

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Counter provocations, prevent the spread, use of WMD
"Refuse to accept nuclear North Korea"

QDR 2014 Force Planning

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QDR 2014 Force Planning

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Scope and scale of countering provocations and eliminating WMD program larger than anticipated

Potential regret: an enduring ISIL terror state



- Destabilizes neighbors
- Harms captured peoples
- Exploits sanctuary, sustainable economic base, global recruiting pipeline
- Exports violence to U.S., allies, and friends

Potential regret: fractured NATO or war



- Russian “volunteers” could destabilize Baltics
- Rapid invasion could present fait accompli
- Would leave few and bad choices for U.S.

Potential regret: fractured NATO or war



- NATO heavy ground forces needed to prevent overrun
 - Permanent forward stationing
 - Rotational deployment


Potential regret: fractured NATO or war



- Mix of U.S. and NATO ally reinforcements needed to deny or reverse Russian advance

US contribution to deter and defeat aggression

No. of soldiers




Potential regret: loose nuclear weapons



- Current planning focused upon invasion threat to South Korea

Potential regret: loose nuclear weapons



- Current planning focused upon invasion threat to South Korea
- Threat changing
 - Provocation could lead to artillery barrage
 - Collapse leaves many nuclear facilities unsecured


Potential regret: loose nuclear weapons



- Current planning focused upon invasion threat to South Korea
- Threat changing
 - Provocation could lead to artillery barrage
 - Collapse leaves many nuclear facilities unsecured
- Both missions require significant U.S. ground forces
 - President will need ready options


Countering provocation or collapse

No. of soldiers




Army must generate ready and sustained force

No. of soldiers




... using bulk of Army active component

No. of soldiers




... Guard and Reserve

No. of soldiers




... and bulk of Marine Corps

No. of soldiers




But force and readiness may not be sustainable

No. of soldiers



Pausing drawdown provides needed depth

No. of soldiers



Planned Army too small to meet commitments ...

Leaving two choices:

Limit Response – Choose one fight to win

- If fully engaged in Korea, Army cannot successfully defend Baltics
- If fully engaged in Baltics, Army cannot stop artillery barrage or secure loose nukes in Korea
- Opportunistic aggression may become more likely

Limit Regret – Retain forces needed for both

- Pause drawdown until new threats fully addressed
- Increase Active and Reserve readiness – test on regular basis
- Improve defense posture in Baltics and Korea
- Force would be stressed, but would have capacity/some staying power

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Questions

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