

# NATIONAL GUARD



# GUARD

ALWAYS READY, ALWAYS THERE





This packet of information is a body of work shared by the entirety of the National Guard at the state's level that began in earnest the summer of 2014 and is still being staffed today.

The purpose of this packet is three-fold:

## **SELF-EDUCATION**

These documents contain information pertinent to Guardmembers as a whole: the Guard's founding principles, its intrinsic value, its missions and the like. These Push Cards and White Papers are packaged in a sequence designed to tell the whole Guard story.

## **ENGAGEMENTS**

These papers provide a good foundation for educating community leaders, local and federal elected officials and centers of influence on the ARNG, particularly with regard to issues that the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) will address. Each one-page Push Card serves as a good synopsis to address the main points of its category.

## **RESPONSE TO QUERY AND TESTIMONY PREPARATION**

The Push Cards and White Papers assist in consistency of messaging on behalf of the Army National Guard during community and CODEL engagements. Each Adjutant General is encouraged to add state-stories and narratives to support these documents.

If given the opportunity to testify before the Commission or respond to questions from Commissioners visiting the states, these Push Cards can serve as thorough and referenced preparatory materials.

Each section is attributed to various sources as indicated in the footnotes of the white papers.

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### **Section Two: The Army National Guard: Value**

Discussion, facts and figures regarding the inherent value of the Army National Guard.

### **Section Three: The Army National Guard: Accessibility**

Discussion, facts, figures and track record regarding the overall accessibility of the Army National Guard.

### **Section Four: The Army National Guard: Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)**

Discussion, facts and figures regarding the affordability and vitality of BCTs within the Army National Guard.

### **Section Five: The Army National Guard: Domestic Operations (DOMOPS)**

Discussion, facts and figures regarding how the denigration of the Army National Guard's end strength would directly correlate with homeland security and first response to disasters at the state and federal levels.

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Discussion, facts and figures regarding how properly managing Guard readiness directly translates into cost savings for the Army's Total Force.

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### **The Adjutants' General Vision for the Army National Guard**

This is the TAG vision shared by the 54 Adjutants General of the National Guard of what the Army National Guard is today and what it can be for our Nation tomorrow.

### **National Governor's Association to the President of the United States**

Letter to the POTUS from the National Governor's Association asking POTUS to "maintain the ARNG's personnel and combat aviation capacity until the [Army] commission has had time to complete its review."

### **National Lieutenant Governor's Association to the President of the United States**

Letter to the POTUS from the National Lieutenant Governor's Association asking POTUS to "maintain the ARNG's personnel and combat aviation capacity until the [Army] commission has had time to complete its review."

### **National Governor's Association to the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Service Committee**

Letter to the SASC Chairman and Ranking Member from the National Governor's Association asking the SASC and Congress to "prevent any further reductions of ARNG personnel, force structure and aircraft until at least the enactment of the FY 2017 defense authorization bill."

### **Army Force Structure Plan for Proportional Cuts**

Discuss the proportionality of the Army cuts from active component and Guard/Reserve.



The Army  
National Guard:  
Foundation of  
Liberty





# The Army National Guard: The Strength of Our Army – Foundation of Liberty

*“A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained in arms, is the best most natural defense of a free country”<sup>1</sup>*

— James Madison

## Legally Codified—Constitutionally Established – Historically Proven

<p>The determined and dedicated Militia that fired the “shot heard round the world” is now codified in law as the National Guard with three core missions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fighting America’s Wars</li> <li>• Responding in the Homeland</li> <li>• Building Partnerships</li> </ul>	<p>Grounded in the Constitution and our Laws</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Article I, Sec 8, Article II Sec 2 and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Amendment to the US Constitution</li> <li>• The Militia Act of 1792</li> <li>• The Militia Act of 1903</li> <li>• The Militia Act of 1908</li> <li>• The National Defense Acts of 1916, 1920, 1933, 1947</li> <li>• The Reserve Forces Act of 1955</li> <li>• Title 10, Title 32 US Code</li> </ul>	<p>Founded in our Heritage and Proven in our National Experience:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Colonial Wars</li> <li>• Revolutionary War</li> <li>• War of 1812, Western Expansion operations, US Civil War and Spanish-American War</li> <li>• World War I</li> <li>• World War II</li> <li>• Cold War</li> <li>• Korea</li> <li>• Vietnam</li> <li>• Desert Shield/Desert Storm</li> <li>• Global War on Terrorism</li> </ul>	<p>“There has never been a moment in the history of the United States when responsible leaders assumed that the professional military forces, existing in peacetime, would be able to wage war unassisted.”<sup>2</sup></p> <p>— John K. Mahon</p>
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## *The National Guard is the Nation’s Connection to the Military*

<p>The Guard’s nationwide presence brings the national will to military efforts through our connection to all American communities.</p>	<p>The Army National Guard is located in approximately 2600 communities across the country, in all 54 states, territories and DC:<sup>3</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guard Soldiers come from diverse backgrounds and professions</li> <li>• Guard Soldiers bring a myriad of civilian-acquired skills to our Army</li> </ul>	<p>“We need the Guard. We need them. We’ve proven that over the last 12 years... We’re going to continue to build an Army that is built on the Total Army concept.”<sup>4</sup></p> <p>-GEN Odierno, CSA</p>	<p>“The Armed Forces are an expression of the nation. If you take them out of the national context, you are likely to screw them up ...And part and parcel of that was that you couldn’t go to war without calling up the reserves.”<sup>5</sup></p> <p>-GEN (R) Vessey, CJCS, 1982-85</p>
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***Fighting America’s Wars — Responding in the Homeland — Building Partnerships***



# The Army National Guard: The Strength of Our Army – Foundation of Liberty

*“Since I’ve been here (as FEMA Administrator) we have gone from talking about dual-status commanders to having it embraced by the Secretary of Defense, to embraced and implemented by US NORTHCOM...This is only done because of the recognition of the competency of the Guard.”*

— Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator <sup>13</sup>

## Providing Depth to the Total Army as its Combat Reserve

<p>The Army National Guard is now and has always been the Army’s primary combat reserve</p>	<p>The ARNG adds depth to the Army’s Maneuver Combat Arms Capability – providing deterrence and flexibility:<sup>6</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 28 Brigade Combat Teams</li> <li>• 8 Combat Aviation Brigades</li> <li>• 8 Divisions</li> <li>• 2 Special Forces Groups</li> </ul>	<p>Conducting Expeditionary Maneuver &amp; Joint Combined Arms Operations since 2001 with over 535,000 Soldiers engaged in:<sup>8</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint combined arms operations (OEF,OIF, OND, ORS), from special Forces to Armor BCTs</li> <li>• Institutional and Operational synergy (USNORTHCOM)</li> <li>• Sustainment operations</li> </ul>	<p>“The National Guard and Reserve have proven to be a ready and effective force over the past 12 years of conflict...The National Guard and reserve provide the Department [of Defense] a cost effective means of maintaining required capability and capacity at reliable readiness with acceptable risk.”<sup>9</sup></p>
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## A Valuable Force for Protecting the Homeland and Building Partnerships

<p>Dual Mission Success – Maintain support to civil authorities while still engaged in combat overseas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 50,000 personnel deployed in support of Hurricane Katrina relief, while maintaining almost 50% of the combat forces in Iraq<sup>10</sup></li> <li>• On average over 6,000 personnel deployed daily supporting state / territorial Governors and DC</li> </ul>	<p>68 State Partnerships with 74 partner nations around the globe:<sup>11</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proven choice for Security Cooperation</li> <li>• Developing global security through civil-military engagement</li> </ul>	<p>Flexible Force:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No pre-determined rotational schedule</li> <li>• Ability to leverage civilian competencies to conduct non-doctrinal combat missions</li> <li>• Same maneuver combat capabilities as those residing in the Regular Army – ready to go as the second echelon operational reserve</li> </ul>	<p>“Putting more of the responsibilities for ground combat into the combat-proven reserve component is both consistent with the new demands of the evolving international order and justified by the superb performance of National Guard and reserve units in our recent wars.”<sup>12</sup></p>
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## End Notes

1. Madison, James. *1 Annals of Congress*. June 1789. p.451
2. Mahon, John. *History of the Militia and the National Guard*. New York: Macmillan, 1983. p.260
3. National Guard Bureau. “2015 National Guard Posture Statement”, p.15
4. Odierno, Raymond, General, Army Chief of Staff. “Squaring the Circle: General Raymond T. Odierno on American Military Strategy in a Time of Declining Resources.” Lecture, Joint Chiefs of Staff series from American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, July 29, 2013
5. Sorley, Lewis “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime.” *Parameters*, Summer, 1991, p.46
6. National Guard Bureau. “2015 National Guard Posture Statement”, p.15
7. Army National Guard. “FY 2013 Annual Financial Report,” p. 8
8. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. “Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense.” Arlington, VA, January 31, 2008, p.53-54
9. U.S. Department of Defense. Strategic Management Plan: The Business of Defense FY 2014-2015, p.14
10. Ellis, John, and Laura McKnight Mackenzie. *Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014, p.5
11. National Guard Bureau. “2015 National Guard Posture Statement”, p.15
12. Roughead, Gary, Adm. U.S. Navy (Ret.), and Kori Schake. “National Defense in a Time of Change.” The Hamilton Project, Brookings, Discussion Paper, 2013-01 (2013): p.13. Accessed January 15, 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/us-national-defense-changes>
13. Fugate, Craig, FEMA Administrator. Speech to attendees at Domestic Operations Course, Arlington, VA, January 18, 2013

# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper –Foundations

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## Overview

This white paper provides foundational information regarding the Army National Guard (ARNG). The paper first addresses how the Army Guard is codified in law and provides strategic depth as the combat reserve of the Active Army. Next, the paper shows how the ARNG builds national support for military campaigns through its connections with communities, fosters international and domestic partnerships, and is always ready as our nation's military first responder in the homeland. Finally, this paper provides examples of past misinformed and ultimately unsuccessful plans to reduce ARNG force structure.

## Legal Foundations

The Founding Fathers established the legal basis for state militias—what would later become the National Guard—in the Constitution by splitting control of the militias between the states and the federal government.<sup>1</sup> The *1903 Militia Act* codified the circumstances under which state militias could be federalized, and provided funds to pay for equipment and training, to include annual training. In return, the state adopted the same organizational structure and standards of discipline as found in the Active Army.<sup>2</sup>

The *National Defense Acts* (NDAs), starting in 1916, further codified the Army National Guard. Particularly significant are the NDAs of 1916 and 1933. NDA-1916 saw the organized militia of the United States officially dubbed the National Guard, and increased the duration Guard units trained at summer camp, now referred to as Annual Training.<sup>3</sup> NDA-1933 established the National Guard as a permanent reserve component of the Army, consisting of federally recognized units and cementing the role of the Guard as a permanent part of the Army, both in peacetime and in war.<sup>4</sup>

## Evolution of the Army National Guard

As our nation evolved, the role of the ARNG grew from the initial militia force established and ratified into the Constitution in 1789, into the combat reserve role the ARNG provides today. For most of its history, the Army maintained the vast majority of its personnel in the reserve component (especially in the National Guard), except during major conflicts such as the Civil War and World Wars I and II. During these wars, the comparatively small active duty force expanded for the duration of need, and then dramatically reduced its numbers at the end of conflict. This historical precedent of a larger reserve component changed with the start of the Korean War in 1950, when the Army doubled the size of its active forces. However, with the end of the war in 1953, the size of the active component did not decrease nearly as much as it did in earlier eras.<sup>5</sup>

After the Vietnam War the active component shifted its policy leading to a renewed focus on using National Guard forces to supplement the active duty forces. The Total Force Policy, established in 1973 by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger integrated the three different components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) into a total force package that moved away from conscription. Rather, Guard forces (along with Reserve forces) would be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the active component.<sup>6</sup>

## Army National Guard 2025 White Paper –Foundations

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The recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the ARNG's ability to function as an Operational Combat Reserve of the Army. A recent Brookings study sustains this evolutionary view of the ARNG and posits further development of ARNG forces stating:

“Putting more of the responsibilities for ground combat into the combat-proven reserve component is both consistent with the new demands of the evolving international order and justified by the superb performance of National Guard and reserve units in our recent wars.”<sup>7</sup>

The array of forces within the Guard in fiscal year 2014, consisting of 28 Brigade Combat Teams, 48 Multi-Functional Brigades, 8 Divisions and 2 Special Forces Groups, is leadership's deliberate recognition of the Guard's ability to provide the additional capacity America needs but cannot afford to retain in the cost-prohibitive Active Component.

### **The Army Guard's Connection to the Nation and the World**

With facilities in approximately 2600 communities and Guardsmen living in virtually every ZIP code,<sup>8</sup> the Army Guard provides connection to and commitment of the American public.<sup>9</sup> This design is not accidental; rather, it demonstrates an understanding that the Armed Forces are an expression of the nation and ensures the country will not engage in sustained combat without the support of the American people as expressed by their representatives in Congress.<sup>10</sup>

As our nation's military first responder in the homeland, the Guard has established trust and working relationships with civil leaders at every level of government. In every state and territory, the Guard works closely with state, city, and county officials to ensure the best possible response to disasters. This level of interagency coordination is unprecedented in any other component of the Department of Defense and enables enhanced connectivity between the military and America's citizens.

Through the State Partnership Program (SPP), the ARNG connects the Army with seventy-four partner nations. These partnerships establish long-term security and develop personal relationships that support the goals of our geographic combatant commanders and the State Department.<sup>11</sup> This program offers a unique means to enhance national security by applying military power to diplomatic objectives.

### **Dual State and Federal Role**

When an emergency proves beyond the capacity of local and state responders, the Guard's dual-status as both state militia and combat reserve of the Army ensures seamless integration of Army Guard soldiers and resources to support civilian incident commanders.<sup>12</sup> The same skills and equipment that enable a brigade to succeed in Iraq also enable them to respond to a natural disaster in the homeland. From medical tents and radios to high wheeled vehicles and helicopters, Army Guard resources contain thousands of assets that play a pivotal role in domestic operations.

This dual-use was vividly illustrated in 2005 when over 80,000 ARNG Soldiers performed the Guard's federal combat mission overseas, while another 50,000 Guardsmen deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina.<sup>13</sup> Since 9/11 the ARNG has filled every request for forces, at

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homes and overseas. The dual-use nature of the Army Guard’s highly skilled Soldiers and their equipment is one of the best returns on America’s defense dollar. Additionally, the establishment of dual-status commanders, embraced by the Secretary of Defense and implemented by US NORTHCOM, was accomplished as a result of the recognition of the competency and utility of the Guard in dealing with domestic operations.<sup>14</sup>

## **Historical Attempts to Reduce Army Guard Force Structure and Equipment**

Since World War II, there have been two specific proposals to merge the National Guard with other components (either the Army Reserve or the Active Army) and to rebalance capabilities between the reserve and active components.<sup>15</sup> In 1948, Congress stated, “it is essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard, both Ground and Air, as an integral part of the first line defenses of this Nation, be at all times maintained and assured.”<sup>16</sup> In 1962, a proposed reorganization plan was rejected because it appeared to be “conceived by Army planners who were apparently more concerned with the problem of remaining within budgetary guidelines than with basically satisfying military requirements for increased readiness.”<sup>17</sup> Future attempts to reorganize the Army Guard must focus on what is in the best interest of our nation at home and abroad, instead of short term or arbitrary constraints.<sup>18</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The Army National Guard was codified in the earliest days of our nation and has since evolved from the colonial militia into today’s combat reserve of the Army, providing strategic depth through added capacity at a fraction of the cost of the Active Component. The Guard was deliberately designed to foster a connection to and commitment from the American people when the nation enters sustained combat operations. The dual-role of the Guard makes it the ideal choice as our Nation’s military first responder in the homeland. The Guard also fosters international and domestic partnerships, and is always on duty, simultaneously defending the homeland and supporting our communities. History shows that despite repeated attempts to reduce force structure and under-equip the Army Guard, national leaders have always understood the importance of and supported a balanced, well-trained, dual-role National Guard.

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1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, clause 15 and 16 and Article 2, Section 2, clause 1.

2. Michael D. Doubler, *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, (Pamphlet No. 130-1: Department of the Army, 2001), U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2001, 144.

3. Doubler, 156-159. George C. Herring Jr., "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy, 1915-1916," *The Journal of Southern History* 30, no. 4 (1964), 395-402. Harold Lord, *How The Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2013-2014*. (29th ed. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College), 2013, 7-2.

4. Lord, 7-2. Doubler, 188-195.

5. Andrew Feikert and Lawrence Kapp, “Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, December 2014, 3-4.

6. Feikert and Kapp, 4.

7. Gary Roughead and Kori Schake, “National Defense in a Time of Change,” *The Hamilton Project*, Brookings, Discussion Paper, 2013-01 (2013): 13, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/us-national-defense-changes>, accessed January 15, 2015.

8. National Guard Bureau, *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement* (Washington, DC: NGB, 2014), 15.

9. U.S. Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, October 2008, Department of Defense Directive no. 1200.17, 2, para 4.d.

10. Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” *Parameters* (Summer 1991): 46.

11. NGB, *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement*, 8.

12. NGB, *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement*, 7.

## Army National Guard 2025 White Paper –Foundations

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13. John Ellis and Laura McKnight Mackenzie, *Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014): 5. See also Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 2006, 476 for Katrina relief information. For deployment information see William Ingram, Director, Army National Guard, written testimony for U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense (Washington D.C., April 17, 2013).

14. Craig Fugate, “Speech to attendees at Domestic Operations Course” (Speech, Arlington, VA, January 15, 2013), <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/100735/fema-administrator-fugate-speaks-national-guard-domestic-operations-class#.VQr1UVMyhV0>.

15. Alice R. Buchalter and Seth Elan, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 2007), i.

16. *Selective Service Act of 1948*, Public Law 80-759, 62 Stat 604 (June 24, 1948).

17. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, *Military Reserve Posture*, 87th Cong., 2d sess., August 17, 1962, 6670.

18. Note: The Committee on Civilian Components, also known as the *Gray Board*, convened in 1947 to examine the best use of the country’s reserve forces. The board concluded that the National Guard, with its dual nature, was inadequate for the needs of the Cold War and recommended merging both the National Guard and the Reserves in a unified force, titled the *National Guard of the United States* under federal control. Congress instantly repudiated this attempt at reorganization, and instead enacted the Selective Service Act in 1948, which in part stated, “it is essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard, both Ground and Air, as an integral part of the first line defenses of this Nation, be at all times maintained and assured.” In early 1962, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara proposed a plan that eliminated four National Guard divisions. A subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee conducted an evaluation of McNamara’s proposal and issued a report that criticized not only the testimony presented by Department of Defense and Army witnesses, but also the proposed reorganization plan, stating that the plan “was conceived by Army planners who were apparently more concerned with the problem of remaining within budgetary guidelines than with basically satisfying military requirements for increased readiness.” This repudiation caused McNamara to submit a proposal in September of 1962 to realign National Guard forces turning eight excess and low-readiness divisions into eight high-priority brigades. Additionally in 1981, The Congress of the United States recognized that active components do not procure all of the equipment required to resource their reserve components, especially in times of fiscal constraint. Thus, Congress established the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) to supplant that funding shortfall. Intended to supplement rather than replace the services’ base equipment procurement appropriations, NGREA funding ensures Guard (and Reserve) forces maintain a high level of equipment readiness. Of particular importance is the direction from Congress that the active components are still required to fund and equip their respective reserve components. However, consistent with the total force concept, the active components serve as the procurement contracting authority in support of the Army Guard and Army Reserve. Congress thus expects the Chiefs of the National Guard and Reserve components to enhance equipment readiness, thus increasing overall readiness by procuring items that the services’ base appropriations do not fund.



# The Army National Guard: Value





# The Army National Guard: Value

*“Given the ... looming fiscal challenges the nation confronts, the projected demands for forces, the unique capabilities resident in the reserve components, and their cost effectiveness, the Commission sees no reasonable alternative to an increased use of and reliance on the reserve components”*

— Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

## Best Value for America

<p>The life cycle costs of the ARNG are significantly less than the AC based on multiple factors including retired pay, health care, moving costs, education, family housing, infrastructure costs and other personal benefits.</p> <p>— Reserve Forces Policy Board</p>	<p>For less than 4 cents of every dollar spent on defense, the Army National Guard is a cost effective and affordable force.</p> <p>The Army Guard contributes 39% of the Army’s operational forces for 13 % of the Army’s budget.</p> <p>— ARNG FY 2013 Annual Financial Report</p>	<p>The National Guard and Reserve have proven to be a ready and effective force over the past 12 years of conflict...The National Guard and Reserve provide the Department [of Defense] a cost effective means of maintaining required capability and capacity at reliable readiness with acceptable risk.”</p> <p>— DoD Strat Management Plan</p>	<p>ARNG Ground Maneuver Brigades provide more surge capability with less cost and “the more we rely upon the RC, the more force structure we can afford.”</p> <p>—Institute for Defense Analysis</p> <p>A drilling Guard Soldier costs about 15% (80-95% when mobilized) as compared to his/her AC counterpart.</p> <p>—OSD Report to Congress</p>
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## Added value through nationwide community presence and global partnerships

<p><b>Value to Taxpayers</b></p> <p>“Significant taxpayer investments have been made to enable the Guard and reserve to become an integral part of the operational force, and they provide great value to the Armed Forces and for the taxpayer.”</p> <p>“The [House Appropriation] Committee supports the enduring vision of an operational reserve and encourages the Services to continue to utilize the Guard and reserve components as key members of the operational force.”</p> <p>—The House of Representatives Report 113-113</p>	<p><b>Value to Communities</b></p> <p>During FY 13 local businesses and economies received \$617.2M in Army National Guard military construction, \$776.2M in sustainment and operations, and \$347M in public works and municipal activities funds (including 6 damage repair projects due to Hurricane Sandy).</p> <p>— Army National Guard FY 2013 Annual Financial Report</p>	<p><b>Value to Global Partners</b></p> <p>ARNG relationships forged within the SPP provide COCOMs a cost effective solution for Regionally Aligned Forces to conduct training/exercises, and inclusion in CONPLANS/TSCP</p> <p>The ARNG provides a cost effective force for COCOMs to conduct Theater Security Cooperation in coordination with State Partnership Program</p>	<p>“The State Partnership Program is, dollar for dollar, my best EUCOM investment.”</p> <p>— ADM Stavridis, EUCOM Commander</p> <p>“Governors understand the need we have as a nation to make adjustments to meet financial realities, but this is the time to invest in value and the National Guard is the best bang for the taxpayers’ buck.”</p> <p>— Utah Gov. Gary Herbert</p>
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# The Army National Guard: Value

*“The Army estimates that the annual cost to maintain peacetime levels of readiness for an AC IBCT in dwell is \$277 million... The annual cost to maintain peacetime levels of readiness for an ARNG IBCT is \$66 million.”*

—OSD report to Congress

“Investment in the Reserve Component-particularly during the past decade-has been considerable and cost-effective. The challenge for the Army is how best to leverage.”

— GEN(R) Reimer, The Reimer Report

## Active Component

IBCT 

IBCT 

## ARNG

IBCT 

IBCT 

IBCT 

- Cost/year to maintain in peacetime (\$277M)
- Available to deploy as resourced – typically faster than the Guard
- Available for domestic response to natural disasters in extreme cases
- Live in close proximity of military installations
- Centralized economic impact

- Cost/year to maintain in peacetime (\$264 M) [4@\$66M]
- Converting an AC IBCT allows you to buy four ARNG IBCTs and still saves \$13 million a year
- Dispersed economic impact affecting an average of 29 communities and 10 congressional districts per ARNG BCT<sup>13</sup>
- Increased connection with the American public through community presence across the U.S.
- Provides surge capacity at local armories for domestic operations
- The force of greater stability-does not PCS
- Increase operational reach while reducing strategic risk
- When deployed still only costs 80-95% of an AC counterpart
- The more AC IBCTs you convert to ARNG; the more money you save; the more force structure you can buy; the more you reduce strategic risk; the greater shared economic impact across America




# The Army National Guard: Value

*“Both AC and RC units can support surge operations—though responsiveness considerations discussed below can mean AC units predominately supply early surge needs and RC units are more suitable for late surge or post-surge operations.”*

— OSD report to Congress

Bottom Line: A deployable Army National Guard capable of meeting operational contingency requirements after 50 days combined with an Active Component capable of meeting contingency requirements in the first 50 days is the most cost effective total force.



1. U.S. Department of Defense, *Unit Costs and Readiness for the AC and RC* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Report to Congress, December 20, 2013), 24



# The Army National Guard: Value

*"...U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. . . Wholesale divestment of the capability to conduct any mission would be unwise, based on historical and projected uses of U.S. military forces and our inability to predict the future."*

— Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense

## History proves we cannot ignore stability operations

### Major Operations Not Requiring Prolonged Stability Operations in the last 100 years

- Grenada – 1983
- Panama – 1989 (Country-based AC units did provide some post combat stabilization)

### Major Operations Requiring Prolonged Stability Operations/Forward Presence in the last 100 years

- Germany – 1945 to present
- Japan – 1945 to present
- Korea – 1953 to present
- Vietnam – 1965 to 1975
- Multi-National Force Observers (Sinai) – 1982 to present
- Bosnia and Herzegovina – 1996 to 2004
- Kosovo – 2001 to present
- Desert Storm / Desert Shield – 1991 (Theater Security Brigade still in Kuwait)
- Iraq – 2003 to 2011, 2014 to Present
- Afghanistan 2001 to present

## Guard structure provides a cost effective strategic hedge against potential future stability operations

### Army Force Size Authorizations since the Balkans

Year	Active Duty	Army National Guard
1995	510,000	400,000
2000	480,000	350,000
2005	503,400	350,000
2010	562,400	358,200
2015	490,000	350,200

– National Defense Authorization Acts 1995-2015

From Stabilization Operations in the Balkans (1995) through maximum OIF/OEF (2010) participation, Active Component manning increased 10.3%, while the Army National Guard decreased 10.5%.

- During OIF/OEF the nation could have maintained trained forces in the Guard at a lower overall cost to prevent such a dramatic increase in the active component.
- A reduction in Guard forces now suggests a large potential increase needed in more expensive Active Duty Forces to meet future contingency and stabilization force requirements.



# The Army National Guard: Value

*“As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere. . . . This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.”*

– Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense

## Potential Way to Leverage the Cost Effective ARNG in Today’s Fiscal Environment

“Every dollar invested in the National Guard allows for a dual use capacity that provides the Governors and the President capabilities to meet the demands both within and beyond U.S. borders... Today’s Guard is accessible, ready, and capable; and I might add, it provides a significant value to the American taxpayer.”

– GEN Grass, CNGB

### Stated BCT Enduring Requirements

- 1 BCT per geographic combatant command [9]
- NATO Response Force BCT
- Global Response Force BCT
- “Army force structure would be sustained in the Pacific, and a persistent presence would be maintained in the Middle East”  
– No allocated BCTs
- 11 AC BCTs required to meet the above enduring requirements

– CRS Report, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress*

### BCT Allocation

Another way to meet force requirements with less cost or increase capacity at the same cost.

#### Conceptual AC Requirement:

- 52 BCTs (28 AC / 24 ARNG BCTs) needed to “implement defense strategy.”
- 11 AC BCTs for enduring requirements
- 3 “Immediate Contingency” AC BCTs
- 6 “Rotational” forward presence and immediate force projection AC BCTs
- 20 AC BCTs total

#### Leads to:

- Reduce AC from 28 to 20 BCTs
- Increase ARNG from 24 to 32 BCTs
- 36,000 spaces move to ARNG
- AC Strength 415,000 / ARNG Strength 371,000

### Fiscal Impact

Assumes “deploy for the duration”

- OSD states ARNG IBCT roughly 24% (\$66 million vs \$277 million) of AC IBCT cost when not deployed.
- 8 more BCTs in the ARNG instead of AC results in \$1.7 Billion annual savings for same force structure.
- Reduces long-term retirement, health care, PCS, housing, dependent school, and commissary costs now and in the future.

– Reserve Forces Policy Board

- Allows increase of up to 84 BCTs (20 AC / 56 ARNG) for the same cost with a further reduction in strategic risk.



# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper – Great Value

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## **Overview**

This white paper addresses how the Army National Guard (ARNG) provides unsurpassed value for America. The paper begins with the fiscal and strategic benefits of Army Guard force structure and demonstrates how its dual-use nature benefits the nation. Next, the paper describes the intangible benefits of the ARNG, such as the personal connection to the nation, the civilian skills that Guardsmen bring to bear as our nation's military first-responder in the homeland, and the economic impact Army Guard units have on their local communities.

## **Affordable**

The Army Guard contributes 39% of the Army's operational forces for 13% of the Army's budget and accounts for less than four cents of every dollar America spends on defense.<sup>1</sup> Even accounting for the additional support from Active Component (AC) appropriated funds, the Guard still comprises less than one-fifth of the Army budget. At the individual Soldier level, a non-mobilized Guardsman costs just 15% as much as an AC Soldier. Even when mobilized, a Guardsman is still less expensive (80-95%) than an AC Soldier<sup>2</sup> due to multiple factors including retired pay, health care, moving costs, education, family housing, commissaries, infrastructure costs and other personal benefits.<sup>3</sup>

The average annual operating cost for a non-mobilized Infantry BCT is \$277M per year for the Active Component and just \$66M per year for the ARNG.<sup>4</sup> In peacetime, the Army can operate 4 ARNG Brigades for the cost of 1 Active Brigade and still realize an *additional* cost savings of \$13M per year. For each Active Brigade transferred to the ARNG, the Army would save \$211M per year that could be invested in research and development, new equipment, or enhanced training. Transferring eight Active Component BCTs to the ARNG would yield a savings of \$1.7 billion per year while maintaining the force structure required to mitigate strategic risk.

Because many contingency missions (e.g. Humanitarian, Peacekeeping) do not require full brigade combat team proficiency, ARNG units can achieve deployment readiness levels for these types of missions in less time than required for a combat mission. The ability to deploy Guard units more quickly reduces the need for Active Component forces because Active Component units that cannot be readied for deployment or received in theater before Army Guard units are ready to deploy might be more beneficial to the Nation in the ARNG where their capabilities would reside at significant savings.

## **Dual State and Federal Role**

The dual-use nature of the Army Guard's highly skilled soldiers and their equipment is one of the best returns on America's defense dollar. When an incident proves beyond the capacity of local and state responders, the Guard's dual-status as both state militia and combat reserve of the Army ensures seamless integration of Army Guard soldiers and resources to support civilian incident commanders.<sup>5</sup> The same skills and equipment that enable a brigade to succeed in Iraq also enable them to respond to a natural disaster in the homeland. From medical tents and radios to high wheeled vehicles and helicopters, Army Guard resources include thousands of assets that

# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper – Great Value

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play a pivotal role in domestic operations. This dual-use was vividly illustrated in 2005 when over 80,000 ARNG Soldiers performed the Guard's federal combat mission overseas, while another 50,000 Guardsmen deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina.<sup>6</sup> Since 9/11 the ARNG has filled every request for forces, at homes and overseas, and truly earned the motto "*Always Ready, Always There.*"

## **Connection to the Nation**

With facilities in approximately 2600 communities and Guardsmen living in virtually every ZIP code,<sup>7</sup> the Army Guard is the face of the U.S. military to the American people and "provides connection to and commitment of the American public."<sup>8</sup> Guard Soldiers come from every background and profession, and they bring a vast diversity of skills and experience while supporting the nation during crises, especially as our Nation's military first-responder in the homeland. These skills are also valuable in complex combat environments, increasingly faced by our forces, where establishing unity of effort with multiple partners is essential to win.

## **Impact to Communities**

The distributed presence of Army Guard units also delivers an economic benefit to the communities in which they reside. In addition to the obvious benefit of Guardsmen making and spending money in those communities, the Army Guard spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year in military construction, public works, and sustainment funds that funnel into those areas.<sup>9</sup> Army Guardsmen put their military skills to use benefitting local communities by performing engineering, medical, and construction missions as part of the Innovative Readiness Training program, which provides real-world training opportunities that prepare ARNG Soldiers for war while simultaneously assisting communities in need.<sup>10</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The Army National Guard offers a tremendous value for America. It provides our Nation with an on-demand, cost effective combat reserve; providing full spectrum capability in the war fight and as the Nation's military first-responder in the homeland. The Army National Guard is connected to the nation at the community level, securing the will of the American people and communicating the strategic value of the Army to the citizens we serve. In a time of fiscal constraint, it is the most cost effective solution against strategic risks faced by our nation.

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1. Army National Guard, *FY 2013 Annual Financial Report* (Washington, DC: ARNG, 2014), 2. DOD base budget \$492.9B; Army base budget \$125.2B; ARNG budget is 13% of Army base budget or 3.3% of DoD budget or less than 4 cents for every dollar spent. ARNG acknowledges the benefits from Total Army expenditures e.g. Research, Development and Procurement.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, *Unit Costs and Readiness for the AC and RC* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Report to Congress, December 20, 2013), 31.

3. Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Eliminating Major Gaps in DOD Data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should be Mandated by Policy* (Washington, DC: January 7, 2013), 5-6.

4. U.S. Department of Defense, *Unit Costs and Readiness for the AC and RC* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Report to Congress, December 20, 2013), 25.

5. National Guard Bureau, *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement* (Washington, DC: NGB, 2014), 7.

## Army National Guard 2025 White Paper – Great Value

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6. John Ellis and Laura McKnight Mackenzie, *Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014): 5. See also Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 2006, 476 for Katrina relief information. For deployment information see William Ingram, Director, Army National Guard, written testimony for U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense (Washington D.C., April 17, 2013).

7. NGB, *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement*, 15.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, October 2008, Department of Defense Directive no. 1200.17, 2, para 4.d.

9. Army National Guard, *FY 2013 Annual Financial Report*, 64-65.

10. National Guard Bureau, *2016 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement* (Wash., DC: NGB, 2015), 11.





# The Army National Guard: Accessibility





# The Army National Guard: Accessibility

*“Today’s National Guard is more accessible ... than ever in its 377 year history.”*

—Gen Frank Grass, CNGB

Existing statutes allow full access to the Army National Guard at both the unit and individual levels.

<p><b>PRESIDENT:</b></p> <p>Partial Mobilization and the Presidential Reserve Call-Up allow the federal government flexibility to activate troops without approval from Congress.</p> <p>— 10 USC 12302/1230</p>	<p><b>CONGRESS:</b></p> <p>In time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress, all reserve component units are eligible for involuntary call-up for the duration of the war or emergency plus six months.</p> <p>— 10 USC 12301</p>	<p><b>SERVICE SECRETARIES:</b></p> <p>Additional accessibility is available to the Service Secretaries to involuntarily activate up to 60K reservists for 365 days to support preplanned missions of combatant commanders.</p> <p>— 10 USC 12304b</p>	<p><b>GOVERNORS:</b></p> <p>Governors have direct and immediate access to National Guard Soldiers to respond to domestic emergencies and events.</p> <p>— 32 USC and State Laws</p>
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Existing policies provide for access to the National Guard for the duration of a crisis, above and beyond any rotational planning parameters.

<p>“...we commit the Guard to more frequent rotational use, up to the maximum limits of presidential or congressional authorities, when required to meet the needs of any national emergency.”</p> <p>— GEN Grass, CNGB</p>	<p>The DoD has policies in place to involuntarily activate members of the National Guard and Reserves with less than 30 days notice. This would most likely occur during a crisis response.</p> <p>— DoD Instruction 1235.12</p>	<p>The Adjutants General and NGB support a policy to create greater access to and utilization of the Army National Guard.</p>
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# The Army National Guard: Accessibility

*The ARNG has filled every Request for Forces since 9/11 while balancing DoD requirements to maintain forces for domestic response missions.*

## Overseas utilization of the ARNG goes far beyond combat operations.

<p>Through the State Partnership Program the National Guard has built alliances across the globe for 20 years while building U.S. and partner capacity to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges. The SPP now involves 74 nations and the National Guard of every U.S. state and territory.</p>	<p>In FY 2014 the National Guard conducted over 700 State Partnership Program events in support of all six geographic Combatant Commands. — 2015 NGB Posture Statement</p> <p>“The State Partnership Program is, dollar for dollar, my best EUCOM investment.” — ADM Stavridis</p>	<p>“The SPP has been the steady hand reaching across the Atlantic for the last two decades. The National Guard is a key part in the message of assurance to the U.S. commitment to the European continent and the [NATO] alliance.”  — MG Randy Kee U.S. European Command</p>	<p>Combatant Commanders utilized 234,776 National Guard man-days globally in FY 2013 to support all their Security Cooperation Initiatives.  — ARNG Internal Data</p>
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## The Nation utilizes the ARNG extensively at home.

<p>In FY 2014, ARNG used 250,922 mandays in support of 200 domestic response missions, to include Law Enforcement Support, Disasters, Search and Rescue, Southwest Border, Medical, and Structure Fires.  — NGB FY14 Domestic Response Rollup</p>	<p>The ARNG has 10,076 Soldiers dedicated to CBRNE response in 57 Civil Support Teams, 17 CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages, and 10 Homeland Response Forces. These forces were called on nearly 2,400 times in FY 2014.  — NGB FY14 Domestic Response Rollup</p>	<p>Annually, the National Guard Counterdrug Program supports drug supply and demand reduction. In FY 2014, Guard counterdrug analysts contributed to disrupting and dismantling over 1,879 drug trafficking organizations and supported over 36,000 cases nationwide. — 2015 NGB Posture Statement</p>	<p>1300 Guardsmen assisted American communities by performing engineering, medical, and construction missions as part of the Guards Innovative Readiness Training, which provides Guard members real-world training while preparing for wartime missions — 2015 NGB Posture Statement</p>
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### References:

- US Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012.
- US Department of Defense, Instruction 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)*, February 4, 2010.
- *2015 National Guard Posture Statement*
- *U.S. Army and Air National Guard FY14 Domestic Response Rollup*, 6 Nov 2014.
- Hansen, Michael L., Celeste Ward Gventer, John D. Winkler, Kristy N. Kamarck, RAND, *Reshaping the Army's Active and Reserve Components*, 2011.
- Freedberg Jr., Sydney J., “National Guard Commanders Rise In Revolt Against Active Army; MG Rossi Questions Guard Combat Role,” *Breaking Defense*, March 11, 2014.
- Ellis, John D. and Laura McKnight Mackenzie, *Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force*, June 2014.

# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper – Accessibility


## Overview

This white paper shows the Army National Guard (ARNG) is absolutely accessible. This paper first discusses the ARNG’s track record filling Requests for Forces, then summarizes Department of Defense policy pertaining to mobilization-to-dwell ratios and how that policy affects accessibility discussions. Next, it outlines the statutes that provide multiple avenues to access guardsmen. Finally, the paper lists the ARNG’s unrecognized contributions to global and domestic missions, contributions that further show the accessibility of the ARNG.

## Request for Forces

A Request for Forces (RFF) is an official request to provide soldiers or capabilities, and the reality is simple: Since 9/11 the Army National Guard has filled every Request for Forces and performed every assigned mission.<sup>1</sup> A graphic reflection of this is shown below, which shows ARNG mobilizations from September 2001 through December 2012. Of note, the ARNG reached a peak of 105,000 Soldiers mobilized in 2005 across ten different operations or events.

**ARNG Mobilization Timeline: September 2001 – December 2012**



\*Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre- and Post-Mobilization Training Presented by BG McCaffrey, HQDA G-3/5/7, DAMO-TRC 12 March 2013


# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper – Accessibility

## Department of Defense Policy

Assertions that the Department of Defense *Mobilization-to-Dwell Policy* limits accessibility to the ARNG are misleading. General Grass has committed the Guard to “more frequent rotational use, up to the maximum limits of presidential or congressional authorities, when required to meet the needs of any national emergency.”<sup>2</sup> Despite the DOD policy, Guardsmen often exceed the policy’s limits. Eighteen percent of Army Guardsmen exceeded the 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell planning objective, about fourteen percent exceeded 1:3, and six percent exceeded 1:2.<sup>3</sup> Those numbers tend to increase as years in service increases so that fully fifty percent of Army Guardsmen with six years of service exceed the 1:5 planning objective.<sup>4</sup> Finally, the policy does not assess mobilization credit to ARNG units for hundreds of domestic missions and voluntary overseas missions. Taken together, these facts render the accessibility argument moot.

## Statuses

Title 10 of the United States Code provides access to the Guard through a robust suite of activation authorities that enable political leaders to mobilize guardsmen onto federal or state active duty.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, Governors have constant direct access to Guardsmen through State Active Duty for immediate response to emergencies.



Levels of Access to the Reserve Component as of December 2013<sup>6</sup>

## Unrecognized Contributions

Army National Guard accessibility does not stop when mobilization ends and dwell begins. For the Guard, dwell does not imply inactivity. The contrary is actually true; even while in dwell status,

# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper – Accessibility

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ARNG units are continually engaged in vital global and domestic missions that are not captured in Mobilization-to-Dwell equations.<sup>7</sup>

Although disaster response is perhaps the ARNG's most visible homeland mission there are many others. The Army Guard responds in the homeland in a staggering array of other missions including ballistic missile defense, critical infrastructure assessment, air defense, cyber protection, and search and rescue among many others. Guardsmen support law enforcement and emergency response at all levels, which include counter-drug operations and support, border security and national special security events such as presidential inaugurations, Boy Scout Jamborees, and major sporting events like the Boston Marathon and the Super Bowl.

Perhaps the most globally relevant mission is the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP), which pairs individual States with 74 partner nations. These partnerships establish long-term security and personal relationships that support the goals of our geographic combatant commanders and the State Department.<sup>8</sup> The resulting partnerships deliver strategic benefits by providing training, sharing military and homeland defense expertise, and encouraging partner nations to participate in coalition operations.

## Conclusion

The Army National Guard is accessible to our federal and state governments. Since 9/11 the ARNG has filled every request for forces—at home and overseas—and is easily mobilized via existing statutes. Army Guardsmen frequently exceed the mobilization-to-dwell planning objectives outlined in DoD policy. The planning objective ratios are often cited when arguing against increased ARNG force structure—a method which ignores the fact that hundreds of thousands of ARNG Man Days are spent accomplishing global and domestic missions.

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1. U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, *Hearings on the Posture of the Army: Statement by General Frank J. Grass, Chief, National Guard Bureau*, 113th Congress, April 30, 2014.

2. National Guard Bureau, "Authorities and Assumptions Related to Rotational Use of the National Guard," (Washington, DC: NGB, Memorandum from GEN Grass to the Chief of Staff of the Army, May 31, 2013).

3. Michael Hansen, et al., *Reshaping the Army's Active and Reserve Components*, Rand Corporation, 2011, 20, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\\_MG961.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG961.pdf).

4. Hansen, 20.

5. U.S. Department of Defense, *Unit Costs and Readiness for the AC and RC* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Report to Congress, December 20, 2013), 28.

6. U.S. Department of Defense, *Unit Costs and Readiness for the AC and RC*, 28.

7. U.S. Department of Defense, "Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) Deployment-to-Dwell, Mobilization-to-Dwell Policy Revision" (Washington, DC: Memorandum by Under SECDEF (Personnel & Readiness) for Secretaries of the Military Departments/Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1, 2013), 2.

8. National Guard Bureau, *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement* (Washington, DC: NGB, 2014), 14.





# The Army National Guard: Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)





# The Army National Guard: Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)

*“Investment in the Reserve Component — particularly during the past decade — has been considerable and cost-effective. The challenge for the Army is how best to leverage.”*

— GEN(R) Reimer, The Reimer Report

## ARNG BCTs provide a Combat Reserve which maximizes capacity in a fiscally constrained environment

<u>ANNUAL COST RATIO</u>	<u>NUMBER of BCTs</u>	<u>OPERATING COST</u>	<u>SAVINGS</u>
<p>Annual Operating Cost</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AC Infantry BCT (IBCT) is \$277M per year</li> <li>ARNG IBCT is \$66M per year</li> <li>Average annual operating cost difference is \$211M per year</li> </ul> <p>— OSD report to Congress</p>	<p>60 total BCTs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 32 Active BCTs</li> <li>✓ 28 ARNG BCTs               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 20 IBCT</li> <li>- 7 ABCT</li> <li>- 1 Stryker</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>Non-mobilized ARNG BCTs costs about 24% of AC BCTs</p> <p>— OSD Report to Congress</p>	<p>To meet the nation’s current strategic requirements in an environment of constrained resources, converting an AC IBCT allows you to <u>operate 4 ARNG IBCTs and still save \$13M per year.</u></p>

## ARNG BCTs provide the Combat Reserve depth necessary to conduct Unified Land Operations

<u>PAST PERFORMANCE</u>	<u>RISK</u>	<u>VALUE</u>	<u>INVESTMENT RETURN</u>
<p>ARNG provided 47 BCT deployments in support of OIF/OEF over the past 12 years. In the Spring of 2005, ARNG provided over 50% (8 of 15) of the Maneuver Combat Brigades in Iraq</p> <p>— ARNG Internal Data</p>	<p>The risk associated with reducing AC BCTs can be offset through regular deployments of ARNG BCTs</p> <p>“The ARNG... provides predictable, recurring, and sustainable capabilities and strategic depth.”</p> <p>— GEN Odierno, CSA</p>	<p>Today’s operational ARNG provides 39% of the Total Army Operating Force for 13% of the DA budget</p> <p>— ARNG FY13 Annual Finance Report</p>	<p>“Today’s Total Army is a success and has performed well under very difficult circumstances. The return on RC investment is clear, as evidenced by the RC Soldier and unit contributions over the last 9 years...”</p> <p>— GEN(R) Reimer</p>



# The Army National Guard: Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)

*“The contributions of RC Soldiers and units have been magnificent since 9/11. They have blended seamlessly with their AC counterparts to the point that it can honestly be said we have the strongest Total Army in our history.”*

— GEN(R) Reimer, The Reimer Report

ARNG BCTs consistently attain deployable readiness levels within the time required to support Combatant Commanders’ mission requirements

## READY WHEN NEEDED

ARNG BCTs take 50-110 post-mobilization training days to achieve supported Combatant Commander deployment standards.

— OSD report to Congress

## ENDURING FORCE

“In many regions of the world, Army military-to-military relationships have enabled the U.S. to remain a trusted and welcome partner... The Army National Guard, through the State Partnership Program, maintains long-term partnerships worldwide”.

—GEN Odierno, CSA

## GOVERNOR SUPPORT

“Governors understand the need we have as a nation to make adjustments to meet financial realities, but this is the time to invest in value and the National Guard is the best bang for the taxpayers’ buck.”

—Utah Gov. Gary Herbert

ARNG BCTs are structured to provide forces under Title 10 and can provide Mission Command and C2 structure with the depth and scalability needed to support civilian authorities and governors under Title 32 U.S.C.

ARNG BCTs provide interaction in the Land Domain through existing programs of ODT, SPP and exercises in support of Geographic Combatant CDRs’ security cooperation.

- Land, Cyber and Human Domains
- Developing and sustaining relationships
- Preventing and containing conflict

## CIV/MIL: A WAY OF LIFE

CIV/MIL operations across 2600 communities

- State to State EMAC
- 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to coordinate Federal response
- Capable of providing support to Law Enforcement under Title 32

## VALUE ADDED SKILLS

“...Guardsmen and Reservists possess specialized skills that augment their military capabilities.”

—GEN(R) Gordon Sullivan

## STRATEGIC FORCE

“Army Reserve and Army National Guard units sustain long-term relationships and apply their unique civil-military expertise across military, government, economic, and social spheres.”

—TRADOC Pam 525-3-1

# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper—Brigade Combat Teams

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## Overview

This paper shows maintaining BCTs in the ARNG is a less expensive way to keep combat capacity in the Total Force. It first offers the notion that the nation can operate four Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams (ARNG BCTs) for the same cost as operating one Active Component (AC) BCT. Next, it reviews the role of Army Guard BCTs in recent conflicts and highlights the importance of Guard BCTs as our nation's military first-responder in the Homeland. In addition, it discusses BCT readiness and ways in which post-mobilization/pre-deployment training time can be reduced, thus decreasing the number of required AC Brigades.

## 4:1 Operating Cost

The average annual operating costs for a non-mobilized Infantry BCT is \$277M per year for the Active Component and just \$66M per year for the ARNG.<sup>1</sup> In peacetime, the Army can operate 4 ARNG Brigades for the cost of 1 Active Brigade and still realize an *additional* cost savings of \$13M per year. For each Active Brigade transferred to the ARNG, the Army would save \$211M per year that could be used to increase readiness across the Total Army. Transferring 8 Active Component BCTs to the ARNG would yield a savings of \$1.7 billion per year while maintaining the requisite force structure to mitigate strategic risk.

## ARNG Brigade Combat Teams in Recent Conflicts

The ARNG deployed forty-seven BCTs in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Twenty-three performed Security Force missions, seventeen focused on Counterinsurgency, and seven trained Afghan forces. In the spring of 2005, the ARNG provided over fifty percent of the Combat Brigades in Iraq.<sup>2</sup>

Despite these proven contributions, some have asserted that Army Guard “capabilities are not interchangeable”<sup>3</sup> with the active component; basing this unsubstantiated argument on the premise that the Guard was not called upon to perform the most complex missions. Not being *tasked* with performing a mission is completely different than being *incapable* of performing a mission.

The ARNG successfully executed every mission with which it was tasked. The truth lies in the words of the Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter who said, “You can never tell the difference between an active duty and reserve component unit, in terms of their proficiency and dedication.”<sup>4</sup>

## The ARNG BCT as our Nation's Military First-Responder in the Homeland

The dual-use capabilities of the BCT are ideally suited for supporting domestic response operations. The leadership, personnel and equipment can be readily adapted for missions as diverse as search and rescue, transportation, communication, security, and engineering. The robust command and control (C2) capability of a BCT makes it the ideal structure for overseeing a wide range of units and missions during domestic response. It is also an ideal structure for forming a Joint Task Force (JTF) when needed. In a disaster, an affected state lacking a brigade

# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper—Brigade Combat Teams

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of its own can quickly request and receive the help of a nearby ARNG BCT through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). This EMAC process ensures ARNG BCT leadership, planning, and expertise can be utilized across the entire nation. Another advantage ARNG Soldiers have in the Homeland is they are not bound by the Posse Comitatus Act, like AC Soldiers are, and can therefore provide support to civilian law enforcement agencies.<sup>5</sup>

## **BCT Readiness**

Another often cited argument against transferring Active Brigades to the ARNG revolves around readiness, which directly relates to how quickly the Guard can get to the fight. Simply put, the sooner that Guard brigades can prepare to deploy, the fewer Active Component brigades are required. Depending upon their readiness levels, Army Guard BCTs required between 50-110 days of pre-deployment training upon being mobilized.<sup>6</sup> Reducing that time would decrease the required number of Active Brigades. Fortunately, there are several methods that provide such an opportunity.

Although a detailed analysis of specific methods to reduce time requirements is beyond the scope of this paper, they include compressing pre-deployment training schedules, giving Adjutants General the authority to validate their BCTs' combat skills, eliminating redundant and/or unnecessary training, adjusting collective training requirements based on actual events, and maintaining BCTs at higher levels of baseline readiness. These suggestions make even more sense in the event of the no-notice, immediate response scenario the Army uses to calculate the required number of Active Component BCTs required.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, increasing ARNG access to Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations—currently limited at two per year—would serve to increase ARNG BCT readiness levels and reduce pre-deployment training time.

These reasons, and others not covered here specifically, show AC units that cannot be readied for deployment or received in theater before ARNG units are ready to deploy, or AC units that exceed rotational requirements, should be considered for placement in the ARNG. Placing force structure necessary to meet our Nation's strategic and homeland requirements where it still meets deployment timeline requirements, at a considerable cost savings, is best for our Nation and the most efficient use of our resources.

## **Conclusion**

Four Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams can operate at lower costs than one Active Component Brigade. ARNG BCTs were fully engaged in recent conflicts and are recognized by the Secretary of Defense as equally proficient during deployment as their active duty counterparts. In addition, ARNG BCTs are the best suited structure as our Nation's military first-responder in the Homeland due to its robust command and control resources, wide range of mission capabilities, equipment, and the ability to quickly transfer across state lines via an EMAC request. Multiple avenues exist to reduce pre-deployment training time for ARNG BCTs, rendering excess capacity in the Active Component an unnecessary expense. ARNG BCTs give

# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper—Brigade Combat Teams

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the nation an affordable option to mitigate strategic risk while also providing a robust dual-use capability in domestic response.

1. U.S. Department of Defense, *Unit Costs and Readiness for the AC and RC* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Report to Congress, December 20, 2013), 25.
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The Army  
National Guard:  
Domestic  
Operations  
(DOMOPS)





# The Army National Guard: Domestic Operations (DOMOPS)

*“The National Guard is the ‘fight tonight’ force in the homeland – ready to respond rapidly and decisively to the Governors’ requirement. ...The National Guard is forward-deployed in communities across America. This forward presence saves lives.”*

— GEN Grass, CNGB

**READY:** The skills and equipment that enable our service members to mobilize and succeed in our conflicts overseas also enable them to respond to manmade and natural disasters at home. No other force is able to rapidly provide military equipment and capabilities during a domestic emergency like the National Guard.

In FY 2014, the Army National Guard conducted 250,922 mandays supporting 200 domestic response missions.<sup>1</sup>

National Guard Civil Support Teams can respond within 90 minutes and were called upon nearly 2,400 times, including 137 active responses, in FY14.<sup>2</sup>

61% of FY 2014 domestic support provided by the ARNG were for time-sensitive incidents — natural disasters and search and rescue missions — where an agile and ready response is imperative.<sup>3</sup>

97% of Americans live within a 5-hour response window of a NG Homeland Response Force or CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages. The NG has 57 Civil Support Teams, available 24/7/365.<sup>4</sup>

*“People ask me what’s the real difference in what the Guard offers as opposed to what the active duty offers; Guardsmen live and work in their communities, they have connections.”*

— Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator

**BEST VALUE:** For 13% of the total Army budget, the ARNG provides 39% of the Army’s operational force.

— ARNG FY13 Annual Financial Report

One of the best returns on America’s defense investment: the National Guard’s highly skilled members and dual-use equipment enable us to seamlessly respond to natural or man-made disasters at home and to fight adversaries overseas.<sup>5</sup>

Significant savings are realized because the majority of National Guard members are only paid when needed, at home or overseas.<sup>6</sup>

For the cost of a single Active Duty service member, our nation can train and retain up to four National Guard members who are ready to respond to combat and federal or state emergencies.<sup>7</sup>

National Guardsmen serve longer and retire later than their Active Component counterparts, maintaining expertise and increasing the value of their training.<sup>8</sup>

*“Every dollar invested in the National Guard allows for a dual use capacity that provides the Governors and the President capabilities to meet the demands both within and beyond U.S. borders... Today’s Guard is accessible, ready, and capable; and I might add, it provides a significant value to the American taxpayer.”*

— GEN Grass, CNGB



# The Army National Guard: Domestic Operations (DOMOPS)

*“Our citizen-Soldiers were the first to respond. Within days — within hours — of the terrorist strikes, Operation Noble Eagle mobilized Guardsmen around the country to provide security on military installations, airports and other key infrastructure, as well as to patrol America's borders.”*

— GEN Odierno, CSA

**ACCESSIBLE:** The National Guard’s role, as provided in the Constitution, enables it to be more accessible than any other military force.

*“In some of our state’s darkest hours, you were there. On behalf of every New Jersey resident, I want to thank you.”*

— New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, thanking National Guardsmen for their response following Superstorm Sandy

98% of all domestic crisis events are handled at the State and Local level.<sup>9</sup>

Army National Guard units are located in approximately 2,600 communities, where they build strong training relationships with Local and State first responders.<sup>10</sup>

Governors have direct and immediate access to NG Soldiers responding to domestic emergencies.<sup>11</sup> Unlike the NG, Active Component (AC) formations are not located in every state, potentially requiring significant increase in cost and response time.

Use of AC Soldiers for Domestic Operations requires a Governor’s request for Federal assistance, funding and a Dual Status Command, unless they are responding under immediate response authority.<sup>12</sup>

*“The National Guard was probably our prime asset in response everywhere... they can do a lot of things for you.”*

— New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo

**UNIQUE ARNG CAPABILITIES:** Mission sets found in our Army Guard provide unmatched diversity of experience and knowledge that positively impact communities nationwide.

**CYBER EXPERTISE:** The National Guard provides a cost effective and uniquely capable force that can provide capabilities as the DoD expands its cyber security force.

The National Guard maintains unique civil support programs and response capabilities which do not reside elsewhere in the DoD. These capabilities include Border Security, Civil Support Teams, Counterdrug, Homeland Response Force and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP).<sup>13,14</sup>

Annually, the National Guard Counterdrug Program supports drug supply and demand reduction. In FY 2014, Guard counterdrug analysts contributed to disrupting and dismantling over 1,879 drug trafficking organizations and supported over 36,000 cases nationwide.<sup>15</sup>

Many NG members have civilian careers working as network defenders at top IT companies, banks and medical organizations. The Guard’s part-time structure helps recruit cyber warriors, and allows the ARNG to quickly tap into this unique expertise.<sup>16</sup>

Unique legal authorities when on State Active Duty allow Soldiers to work with law enforcement during an emergency.<sup>17</sup>

*“As the nation develops resiliency to cyber attacks, the Guard should be mobilized to support federal and state efforts to protect networks and respond to incidents.”*

— Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper



# The Army National Guard: Domestic Operations (DOMOPS)

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# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper — Domestic Operations (DOMOPS)

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## **Overview**

This white paper demonstrates how cutting Army National Guard (ARNG) end strength would degrade our nation's ability to respond to time sensitive, life-threatening emergencies in the homeland, because of the critical role the Army Guard plays as our nation's military first-responder for Domestic Operations. First, the paper examines the dual state/federal roles of Army Guard Soldiers and equipment and discusses the importance of the Guard's vast geographic presence across the country and the long-term relationships Guardsmen build within their communities. Next, the paper highlights the Guard's accessibility and the savings realized by having part-time Guardsmen available to respond immediately to events in the homeland.

## **Dual State and Federal Role**

When an incident proves beyond the capacity of local and state responders, the Guard's dual-status as both state militia and combat reserve of the Army ensures seamless integration of Army Guard soldiers and resources to support civilian incident commanders.<sup>1</sup> The same skills and equipment that enable a brigade to succeed in Iraq also enable them to respond to a natural disaster in the homeland. This dual-use capability was vividly illustrated in 2005 when over 80,000 ARNG Soldiers performed the Guard's federal combat mission overseas, while another 50,000 Guardsmen deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina.<sup>2</sup> Since 9/11, the ARNG has filled every request for forces, at home and overseas. The dual-use nature of the Army Guard's highly skilled Soldiers and their equipment is one of the best returns on America's defense dollar.

## **Proximity**

With facilities in approximately 2600 communities and Guardsmen living in virtually every ZIP code, the Army Guard provides an immediate response to local, state, and national emergencies as well as enduring domestic missions.<sup>3</sup> Ninety-seven percent of Americans live within the 5-hour response window of National Guard units specially trained to respond to catastrophic chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks.<sup>4</sup> These units can respond to a threat within 90 minutes, and did just that almost 2,400 times in fiscal year 2014.<sup>5</sup>

Because ninety-eight percent of all domestic response occurs at the state and local level,<sup>6</sup> the geographic dispersion of Guard Soldiers, equipment, and facilities provides an often-crucial proximity to emergencies. Sixty-one percent of domestic support provided by the Army Guard in fiscal year 2014 was for time-sensitive incidents—natural disasters and search and rescue missions—where an agile and ready response was imperative.<sup>7</sup> This nationwide quick response capability does not reside anywhere else in the Department of Defense.<sup>8</sup>

## **Long-term relationships**

Army Guard Soldiers live and work in the same communities they serve, forging long-term relationships with their public and private partners. These familiar, lasting relationships are in accord with the Founding Fathers' intent of a Citizen-Soldier ready to serve their community, state, or nation when the need arises. These relationships are solidified in exercises and

# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper — Domestic Operations (DOMOPS)

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rehearsals, and ensure military first responders and civic leaders are not meeting for the first time at the scene of a disaster. Regular exercises and joint interagency planning between the Guard, civilian leaders and local and state agencies have saved lives because the Guard is integrated as a trusted partner into unified command structures within the framework of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) across the nation.

## **Accessibility**

State governors have the authority as commanders-in-chief of their state's National Guard to solve issues locally without dependence on the federal government. They have direct and immediate access to ARNG Soldiers, facilities, and resources in order to respond to domestic emergencies. The limited geographic dispersion of active duty Soldiers—who could theoretically be utilized in an emergency under immediate response authority<sup>9</sup>—is a significant, potentially life-threatening constraint that would almost always result in significantly longer response times than what a nearby National Guard unit already provides. Additionally, unique legal authorities allow Guardsmen to work with law enforcement during an emergency in State Active Duty status, a capability the active duty Army cannot provide due to the Posse Comitatus Act.<sup>10</sup>

## **Value**

Getting the most value for our defense dollar is as important as getting the right people at the right place with the right equipment at the right time. For the cost of a single active component soldier, our nation can maintain six part-time Army Guardsmen.<sup>11</sup> Even when mobilized, an ARNG Soldier is still less expensive (80-95%) than an AC Soldier<sup>12</sup> due to multiple factors including retirement pay, health care, moving costs, education, family housing, commissaries, infrastructure costs and other personal benefits.<sup>13</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The Army National Guard is our Nation's military first-responder in the Homeland and is resident across the 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia. Current force structure and deliberate manning and stationing maintain a delicate balance of the elements necessary to meet the ARNG federal missions and respond effectively to natural and manmade disasters in the homeland. The dual-use nature of the Guard combined with its dispersion into thousands of communities where they build lasting, functional relationships, makes the Army National Guard critical to our requirements in the Homeland. Any decrease in Army Guard manning and capability would degrade our nation's ability to respond to time sensitive, life-threatening emergencies in the homeland.

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# The Army National Guard: Readiness





# The Army National Guard: Readiness

*Operationally ready today, but at risk of reduced future readiness, the ARNG risks losing combat experience with force structure cuts and low, planned sustained readiness.*

“Today’s National Guard is more accessible, adaptable, and affordable than ever in its 377–year history, and at historic levels of readiness.”

– GEN Grass, CNGB

## The Readiness Challenge

“Under sequestration, approximately 115,000 traditional National Guard Forces will not receive their annual medical or dental examinations. This reduction in examinations will bring total force medical readiness down 39%. Within one year, readiness will be degraded to pre war levels.”

–GEN Grass, CNGB

Current Readiness is higher in NG Units than ever before in its history.

– DPRO Data JAN 2015

“...RC Units are generally resourced at a lower level of readiness in peacetime and require additional time and resources to be ready for deployment. This is a low cost way to maintain additional capacity given there is sufficient time to train the unit to become ready for the mission.”

– OSD Report to Congress

2016 Personnel Readiness projected to drop to 38% if funding cuts remain.

## Reduce Post–Mobilization/Pre–Deployment Time And Utilize the Guard During Peacetime

Enabling the ARNG to self-validate individual tasks consistent with Army standards would provide considerable cost and time savings in post-mobilization, pre-deployment training

Requiring mobilizing Army Guard formations to retrain individual tasks in which they are proficient is a waste of money and time, extends post mobilization time, and suggests Guard units are “less ready” than they actually are

A key component of the operational reserve is that it is a force that sees regular use, through a progressive readiness model – such as Army Force Generation – that prepares Soldiers and units for deployment.

– MG Lyons, Acting Director ARNG

“Continued operational use of the Reserve Components offers at least three clear benefits. First, it helps maintain the experience, skills, and readiness gained through twelve years of war... Second, it frees up Active Component forces to ensure their availability to respond immediately to no–notice contingency warfighting requirements. Third, it reduces Active Component deployment tempo and aids in the preservation of the All–Volunteer Force.”

– Reserve Forces Policy Board

Investment in National Guard Readiness sustains the operational ARNG for pennies on the dollar



# The Army National Guard: Readiness

*Operationally ready today, but at risk of reduced future readiness, the ARNG risks losing combat experience with force structure cuts and low, planned sustained readiness.*

Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal—once in a while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time. If not, it is fleeting, and it goes away.

— GEN Odierno, CSA

The risk of not having the right AC/RC mix and total force availability is greater now than ever. In this austere budget environment, this risk can be substantially mitigated by sustaining the ARNG as a an operational reserve/follow-on force to the AC without increasing the total cost of the nation's critical land component force.

There are several ways to reduce the time it takes to get an ARNG BCT ready:

- Compressing pre-deployment training schedules
- Adjutants General validation
- Eliminating redundant and/or unnecessary training
- Adjusting collective training requirements based on actual events
- Maintaining BCTs at higher levels of baseline readiness

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# Army National Guard White Paper – Readiness

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## **Overview**

This paper addresses Army National Guard (ARNG) Readiness and how properly managing Guard readiness translates directly into cost savings for the Army. First, the paper defines readiness, its relationship to responsiveness, and current Army Guard readiness levels. Next, it examines ways to increase ARNG responsiveness and explains how increased responsiveness allows our Nation to meet its requirements more efficiently with a smaller Active Component (AC) Army. Finally, the paper shows the savings that will be realized by moving unnecessary AC force structure to the Army National Guard.

## **Readiness and Responsiveness**

The Army measures unit readiness in terms of personnel, equipment, and training. Simply put, if a unit has the proper number of Soldiers, trained on the appropriate tasks with the right equipment, they are considered ready for deployment. Shortfalls in any of these areas increase the time it takes a unit to deploy. Using a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as an example, Active Component and Army Guard BCTs maintain different levels of baseline readiness which allows the Army to balance responsiveness and strategic depth with risk and cost.<sup>1</sup>

*Responsiveness* is the speed with which a unit can demonstrate readiness to deploy upon mobilization. Typically and intuitively, the higher the readiness level, the quicker the responsiveness of a given unit. Increased readiness equals speedier response.

## **Increasing Responsiveness**

The average Army Guard BCT requires from 50-110 days of post-mobilization, pre-deployment training depending upon its readiness level.<sup>2</sup> ARNG units could prepare more quickly after mobilization, and thereby speed responsiveness, through a number of methods. Though a detailed analysis of those methods are beyond the scope of this paper, they include compressing pre-deployment training (including the elimination of redundant and/or unnecessary training), granting Adjutants General the authority to validate their units' combat skills, increasing ARNG access to Combat Training Center rotations, and adjusting collective training requirements based on actual events in the theater of operations. These suggestions for faster deployment availability make even more sense in the event of a no-notice response scenario, which is what the Army uses to justify the required number of Active Component BCTs.<sup>3</sup>

The above methods work because they increase post-mobilization/pre-deployment efficiency. Another method that would enable enhanced Army Guard responsiveness is to increase the baseline readiness of specific ARNG units. Although today's Army Guard stands at a historic level of readiness<sup>4</sup> due primarily to experiences and skills honed through over a decade of war,<sup>5</sup> that readiness may be short-lived if it is not sustained. The Army Chief of Staff stated, "Readiness is not something that we can just fund piecemeal—once in a while and year to year. It has to be funded consistently over time. If not, it is fleeting and it goes away."<sup>6</sup> The Chief of the National Guard Bureau agrees, indicating that sequestration threatens to bring both the Active Army and the Army Guard readiness down to or below pre-war levels.<sup>7</sup>

# Army National Guard White Paper – Readiness

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Instead of allowing current ARNG readiness levels to be degraded, these units should be kept at a baseline readiness level<sup>8</sup> which will ensure the Army Guard's continued availability and readiness as an operational force. A predictable, cyclic use of the Army Guard would free up Active Component forces to ensure their ability to respond immediately to short-notice, or no-notice deployments while simultaneously decreasing the deployment tempo of AC units and help preserve the All-Volunteer Force.<sup>9</sup> It also allows for better retention of Soldiers with hard-earned combat experience from the past thirteen years.<sup>10</sup>

## **Ramifications of Increased ARNG Responsiveness on Force Structure Mix and Cost**

The average annual operating cost for a non-mobilized Infantry BCT is \$277M per year for the Active Component versus just \$66M per year for the ARNG.<sup>11</sup> In peacetime, the Army can operate 4 ARNG Brigades for the cost of 1 Active Brigade and still realize an additional cost savings of \$13M per year. For each Active Brigade transferred to the ARNG, the Army would save \$211M per year that could be invested in research and development, new equipment, or improved training. Transferring 8 Active Component BCTs to the ARNG would yield a savings of \$1.7 billion per year while maintaining force structure to mitigate strategic risk.

The ability to deploy Guard units more quickly reduces the need for Active Component end strength because Active Component units (beyond the minimum required for steady-state operations) that cannot be readied for deployment or received in theater before Army Guard units are ready to deploy are an unnecessary expense and can be transferred to the Army Guard and operated there for a fraction of the cost.

## **Conclusion**

Maintaining the Army National Guard at appropriate peacetime readiness levels decreases post-mobilization/pre-deployment training time and thus makes the Army Guard more responsive when needed. In turn, this increased responsiveness translates into a more efficient Army where the ARNG can help fill requirements where active forces are not necessary, providing cost savings for the Total Army with reduced strategic risk.

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# Army National Guard White Paper – Combat Reserve

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## **Overview**

This paper explains why the Army National Guard (ARNG) is and should remain the Army's combat reserve. First, the paper discusses how DoD policy, Army directives, and recent history show the ARNG has performed as an operational combat reserve. Next, it shows how sustained utilization of the ARNG prepares the organization to continue to fulfill its role as a combat reserve and how the Army Guard can decrease post-mobilization/pre-deployment training time, helping the Army Guard to maintain current historically high level of readiness and experience gained at considerable cost over the past thirteen years.<sup>1,2</sup> Last, it suggests several ways to leverage the Army Guard in the future to support its role as an operational force in peacetime.

## **Operational Combat Reserve**

Employing the ARNG as an operational force is codified by DoD Directive 1200.17 and Department of the Army policy.<sup>3</sup> Further, as clarified by the Army and as demonstrated since 9/11, ARNG units “participate(d) in a full range of missions” and “provide(d) strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed” to support the national defense strategy.<sup>4</sup> Today's ARNG accounts for 39% of the Army's deployable units, or operating force, and 46% of the Army's combat capabilities.<sup>5</sup> Clearly reinforced by policy, Army force structure design and recent history, the ARNG is the operational combat reserve of the United States Army and the nation.

## **Sustained utilization**

A key tenet of the ARNG as an operational reserve is “RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services' force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers.”<sup>6</sup> Maintaining an operational combat reserve through continued use of ARNG formations for foundational (peacetime) missions, security cooperation, and building partnerships with foreign nations expands the Army's trained base of units for theater deterrence and supports the implementation of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) program.<sup>7</sup> These predictable missions provide valuable leader development opportunities and training for the ARNG.<sup>8,9</sup> The Chief of the National Guard Bureau's intent is to mobilize between five and ten thousand Soldiers per year to fulfill these types of Combatant Commander requirements.

## **Pre-mobilization training**

Another key aspect of maintaining an operational combat reserve is ensuring units and leaders receive appropriate levels of pre-mobilization training as part of a predictive, cyclical readiness plan.<sup>10</sup> Training of this type ensures rapid availability of ready ARNG units and reduces post-mobilization training timelines.<sup>11</sup> This simultaneously enables the Army to achieve higher readiness levels and provides quicker access to National Guard formations in support of surge mission requirements, all in a cost-effective manner.<sup>12</sup> The additional training requirements needed to maintain an operationally ready ARNG were included in the fiscal year 2013 and 2014

# Army National Guard White Paper – Combat Reserve

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budgets.<sup>13</sup> The National Guard assumed risk in equipment modernization to ensure continued resourcing of operational priorities during these budget years. Furthermore, maintaining a trained and ready ARNG maintains hard-earned combat experience from the past thirteen years for much longer within the Army Total Force.<sup>14</sup>

## **Combat Training Centers**

A key component of increasing readiness across the Total Force is to maximize participation in Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations. Allocating three CTC rotations annually for ARNG BCTs would greatly increase unit, and unit leadership readiness. The Army's CTCs have been the benchmark for Army training for decades. The key to interoperability and success of the Army Total Force in future missions is provided by the intensive collective training environment found at the CTCs.<sup>15</sup> Whenever possible, every CTC rotation should be multi-component so our Soldiers continue to work with their active counterparts as they have over the past thirteen years, and the ARNG

## **Institutional Training Support and pre-mobilization validation**

Individual skills training and Professional Military Education (PME) are foundational to the ARNG's ability to build trained and ready units. The percentage of formally trained individuals in ARNG units could drop to 79% by the end of Fiscal Year 2015 due to a significant reduction in pay and allowances for Guard Soldiers to attend schools.<sup>16</sup> This reduction does not consider additional training impacts of possible force structure changes. Adequate funding for individual training is paramount to maintaining the ARNG as an operational combat reserve. First Army resourcing to provide oversight of training and support to ARNG units is crucial to ensuring effectiveness of pre-mobilization training and compliance with Army training strategies and guidance. Proper manning and resourcing of First Army along with greater authority for the Adjutants General to validate individual training requirements prior to mobilization would provide considerable cost and time savings in post-mobilization training.

## **Additional considerations**

There are numerous additional opportunities that can ensure the Army remains a fully integrated multi-component operational force in peacetime. Re-establishment of habitual active/reserve unit relationships for training and operations aligns very well within the RAF construct. Active Component (AC) Soldiers serving in ARNG full-time Active Guard Reserve (AGR) positions would enhance readiness, interoperability and understanding of ARNG training challenges. Expansion of the ARNG Overseas Duty Training (ODT) program during Annual Training periods is a cost-effective means to support Combatant Command requirements, and it develops ARNG leadership and maintains expeditionary expertise in units.

## **Conclusion**

Including National Guard formations throughout the planning and employment cycle ensures the health of the Army total force beyond the stand-alone capacity of the AC. The execution of the

## Army National Guard White Paper – Combat Reserve

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Army Total Force Policy coupled with robust partnerships across all components allows the Army to provide a Ready force capable of addressing our national security needs and requirements in the Homeland while minimizing the financial burden on US taxpayers.

1. National Guard Bureau, *2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement* (Washington, DC: NGB, 2014), 5.
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3. Department of the Army, *Army Total Force Policy* (Washington, DC: Department of The Army Directive no. 2012-08, September 4, 2012).
4. Department of the Army, *Definition of the Operational Reserve* (Washington, DC: DAMO-SSW information paper, March 15, 2013).
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11. Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Readiness* (Washington, DC: Army Regulation 525-30, June 3, 2014).
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14. Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, DC: February 11, 2014) 11.
15. Department of the Army, , *Combat Training Center Program* (Washington, DC: Army Regulation 350-50, April 3, 2013) 1-3.
16. National Guard Bureau, “DMOSQ analysis supporting CNGB response to CJCS questions at Senior Leader Conference,” ARNG G-3 Training Division, September 2, 2014.





**The Army  
National Guard:  
Aviation  
Restructuring  
Initiative (ARI)**



# Army National Guard Aviation: Integral to the Total Force

*"In past eras of fiscal restraint, Pentagon officials reduced the U.S. military's operational reliance on the Guard and Reserves and cut their budgets... Such reflexive underutilization and downsizing today would squander the immense experience gained recently by the Guard and Reserves during their missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and the U.S. homeland."*<sup>1</sup>

— GEN(R) Sullivan, CSA 1991-1995

## Maintaining the integrity of the Army Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB), irrespective of component, maintains U.S. Army asymmetrical combat advantages<sup>2</sup>

The ARNG role as part of the Total Force requires its composition to be the same as those prescribed for the Army in order to provide adequate strategic capacity<sup>3</sup>

— 32 USC 104(b)

### ARI RESULTS IN LESS LETHAL FORMATIONS

- ARNG CABs will not meet COCOM requirements if configured without attack helicopters as Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigades (ECABs)
- ARNG CABs will be out of compliance with DOD-Dir 1200.17 and COCOM intent (without attack helicopters ECABs are non-lethal which restricts strategic depth)

### UNDER ARI, ARNG CABs, BCTs AND DIVISION STAFFS LOSE INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE BASE

- Knowledge of lethal employment capability severely degrades when ARNG units can no longer "train as we fight" with organic attack helicopters
- ARI will cause loss of experience and ability to employ attack helicopter formations

### ARI PRECLUDES EXPANSIBILITY AND REVERSIBILITY

- Under ARI the Army loses generations of ARNG AH-64 aircrew and maintenance experience ending the ability to regenerate attack aviation forces in a timely manner to meet future contingencies
- Attack helicopters are in high demand, ARI voluntarily reduces capacity with little cost savings

## The ARNG's alternative to ARI (18 active and 6 ARNG ARBs instead of ARIs 20 active ARBs) provides 20% more capability at a comparative cost<sup>4</sup>

The Army National Guard's alternative to ARI provides the Total Army and our Nation the best value to Combatant Commander requirements, increases capacity, and provides expansibility

### COST

- Guard ARBs are roughly 1/3 the cost of Active ARBs
- Under ARI, the ARNG incurs significant aircrew re-training cost while losing invaluable AH-64 experience
- ARNG ARBs allow seasoned Aviators leaving the active Army to continue serving and retains their experience - CAPE Study 2014

### EXPERIENCE

- ARNG ARBs bridge the continuity gap for the Total Army as ARNG Soldiers retain unit integrity and longevity longer than the active Army
- ARNG aircrews train together longer and do not move as often as their active counterparts

### TRAINING

- The Aircrew training program for the ARNG is the same as the active Army
- The ARNG executes the same Flying Hour Program as the active Army with one third of the funded training days (111 days per year)
- Post Mob training days: less than 60 days for BN and lower units

"Changing one's mind remains a critical, and often times elusive, skill for even the best Army strategic leaders."<sup>5</sup>



# Army National Guard Aviation: Integral to the Total Force

*“Taking the Apaches away from the Army National Guard is a huge change... The Guard has been a combat arms reserve force, and by taking the attack helicopters out of the [Guard], they have no more combat mission in aviation... It’s not the number of aircraft, [the problem is] losing the mission”*

—Senator Lindsey Graham

## Potential risk to National Security if the number of dedicated ground attack aircraft like the A-10, OH-58D and AH-64 continue to decrease

<p>ARI removes currently manned, trained, equipped and maintained airframes from the ARNG, and squanders our Nation’s investment in combat experienced and trained formations - ending both reversibility and expansibility now provided by the ARNG</p> <p>ARI eliminates the ARNG as a force provider for attack aircraft and as a strategic hedge against unknown future threats</p>	<p>ARI reduces the ability to support training, exercise and deployment requirements for active Army, Army Reserve, and ARNG ground forces at home and overseas</p>	<p>Loss of lethal attack helicopter capability in ARNG CAB formations if ARNG CABs are converted to Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigades (ECAB)</p> <p>Loss of manned, equipped, and trained attack helicopter formations that would take years to regenerate</p> <p>Not funded to retain AH-64 pilots for conversion training (AH-64 to UH-60), not a one for one swap</p>
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## ARNG Cost Comparison

<p>The OSD CAPE cost estimate of ARI compared to the ARNG proposal from OCT 2014 showed an estimated increase of 6-8% for the 20% increase in attack helicopter capacity</p>	<p>The Army ARI plan requires 690 AH64Es; The ARNG alternate plan calls for 701 AH64Es</p> <p>The ARNG is willing to man their 6 ARBs with 133 of the 144 required AH-64Es until the additional 11 aircraft can be purchased in the out years starting in 2021</p>	<p>Out of the 690 AH-64s in the ARI plan, 480 are assigned to active Army units, 80 for flight training, and 130 are not assigned to MTOE units.</p> <p>The Army plan for 690 will have 48 unused helicopters in storage while the ARNG alternative has these aircraft assigned to already trained units with aircrews and maintainers, ready for use when the Nation needs them</p>
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# Army National Guard 2025 White Paper – Aviation Restructuring Initiative Issues

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18 May 2015

**Purpose:** Provide the AGAUS Position on the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI).

**Overview:** The Army divestiture of 368 OH-58Ds and 72 AH-64s under ARI, and the potential divestiture of 349 A-10s by the Air Force, reduce the number of dedicated ground support aircraft by over 50%. Do not transfer more than the 48 AH-64s identified in NDAA 15 from the ARNG to the Active Army. This allows the ARNG to maintain 6 ARBs and 144 AH-64s, giving the Total Army 20% more attack aircraft and formations at a fractional cost above the current ARI costing. Recommend the Army explore the use of the AH6/MH6 platform for interim use until a new armed reconnaissance helicopter can be acquired.

## **Background Information:**

a. As a component of the Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG) provides the ability to maintain capability and capacity to meet our Nation’s military strategy at an acceptable cost and level of risk. In this role, the ARNG serves as the first line of defense and the combat reserve of the Army.

b. As the combat aviation reserve of the Army, the ARNG is directly and negatively impacted by several aspects of ARI. Specifically, removing all ARNG Attack Reconnaissance Battalions (ARBs) and Apache helicopters (AH-64s) and the Armed Reconnaissance Squadron and all OH-5Ds relegates the ARNG’s role to general support aviation missions and severely restricts the Army’s strategic depth in attack aviation capacity. In addition, it imposes significant risk in the number of dedicated ground support aircraft and formations based primarily on fiscal restraints.

c. Under ARI, the Army plan maintains 20 AH-64 ARBs, whereas the ARNG proposal maintains 24 ARBs. In light of the pending loss of the A-10 and the need for heavier capability to counter Russian moves in Europe, the prudent move is to have more ARBs/ARSs rather than less. ARI eliminates 368 OH-58D armed reconnaissance helicopters and the eight ARBs and 192 AH-64s in the ARNG. Combined with the proposed Air Force divestiture of 349 A-10 aircraft, the Joint Force will lose over half of its dedicated ground support aircraft and formations. It makes sense now more than ever to retain as many operational ARBs/ARSs and AH-64s as possible in the Joint Force.

d. Although parts of ARI have merit, some of what ARI proposes has not been thoroughly vetted, nor does it follow the precedents of earlier Army aviation reorganizations. Examples include: 1) The ARI proposed Armed Reconnaissance Squadrons of 24 AH-64s may be better suited with fewer aircraft (as identified in the “California Paper”). 2) The Army still intends to find a “scout” helicopter better suited than the AH-64 for reconnaissance, and options such as the proven AH-6/MH-6 aircraft already used by Army Special Forces may be a better and lower cost interim solution. 3) The Army abbreviated the acquisition process to establish the need for a new training helicopter and as a result did not conduct an adequate search or fly-off to determine the best aircraft, it simply used the aircraft it had available.

## Army National Guard 2025 White Paper – Aviation Restructuring Initiative Issues

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e. The absence of attack aviation in the ARNG will limit the ability of ARNG Divisions and Brigade Combat Teams to conduct the full range of doctrinal training, capping leader development, and will preclude the ability to conduct Air Ground Integration Training which has proved vital to the safety of our deployed forces.

f. There are alternative approaches to achieve the Army's goal of increasing the affordability of the Army's aviation portfolio. When examining alternatives, the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) should reject the mobilization policy assumptions underlying the Army's analysis. The Commission should also consider distributing Army capabilities across the AC and ARNG to balance short term operational demands, but also provide depth by placing more capacity and capability in less costly ARNG formations.

g. Additional considerations could include, but are not limited to: 1) Building fewer Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) between the AC and the ARNG. 2) Organizing smaller CABs with smaller ARBs/ARs to enhance deployability. 3) Establishing cadre companies to maintain critical Army aviation skills. 4) Equipping ARBs/ARs with fewer AH-64s. 5) Doing a thorough analysis if ARs should have 18 instead of 24 aircraft as addressed specifically under the ARNGs "California Plan", and 6) Consideration of the AH-6/MH-6 as a capable, least costly, and C-130 deployable interim armed reconnaissance helicopter.

h. The current and long-standing coordination between the Air Force and Air National Guard, and their ability to meet the same readiness standards, should be reviewed for applicability to the Army and Army National Guard. In addition, the National Guard had previously proposed multi-component (Active and ARNG) ARBs/ARs as a potential opportunity to increase readiness across the total force.

i. The Commission should study the benefits and impacts of forward stationing, lower frequency and duration of deployments, and Total Force benefits of a continued reliance on the ARNG as a combat aviation reserve of the Army.

NOTE: Under ARI the Army divests 368 OH-58Ds and 72 AH-64s. If the Air Force divests the A-10, 349 A-10s will be removed from service.



# Army National Guard Aviation: Integral to the Total Force

*“The reserve components of the armed forces will provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.”*

—DOD Directive 1200.17

## Desired End State

The ARNG complies with NDAA 2015 by transferring 48 AH-64s to the active Army, and retains no less than 6 ARBs and 144 AH-64s in the ARNG

ARNG CABs remain fully operational Combat Aviation Brigades with organic ARBs assigned, allowing ARNG combat formations to “train as we fight”

No further cuts in ARNG aircraft or force structure – ARI requirement is satisfied

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Nagl, John, and Travis Sharp. "An Indispensable Force: Investing in America's National Guard and Reserves." Center for New American Society, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 “The US Army Operating Concept”

<sup>3</sup> 32 USC 101(4)

<sup>4</sup> OSD-CAPE brief to Council of Governors

<sup>5</sup> Changing Minds In The Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What To Do About It, Stephen J. Gerras & Leonard Wong, October 2013, p.4)

<sup>6</sup> Neff, Blake. “Senators Float Study to Avert Guard Cuts.” *The Hill*. April 8, 2014. Accessed January 20, 2015.

### ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

Wong, Cristina. "Armed Services Panel Rejects Army Plan to Take National Guard's Apaches." *The Hill*. May 8, 2014. Accessed December 29, 2014.

"The Army's FY 2015 Budget Request." Overview of FY 2015 Budget Submittal to Congress from Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), Washington D.C., January 1, 2014.

*“We need to keep the Apaches in the Guard...Pilots and maintainers would have no place to use their skills... We as a nation would lose those critical and expensive skills.”*

— Rep. Bill Enyart (D-III.)<sup>6</sup>

## ANALYSIS OF GAO REPORT ON ARI

This paper provides ARNG leaders an analysis of the GAO's report, "Force Structure: Army's Analyses of Aviation Alternative." First, the paper provides background on the genesis of the report along with a synopsis of what the report was and was not designed to do. Next, it examines the report's findings and how the Active Army interpreted those findings. Finally, it discusses how NGB can counter the Active Army's claims regarding the report.

### **Background**

In 2013, the Army Chief of Staff approved the Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) which would, among other things, remove all AH-64 Apache helicopters from the Reserve Component. In January 2014, NGB proposed an alternate solution that retains Apaches in the Army National Guard. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to compare the assumptions, cost estimates, and support-personnel implications of ARI and the Bureau's proposal. The GAO report titled, "Force Structure: Army's Analyses of Aviation Alternatives" is the result.

### **Purpose of the GAO report**

In reviewing this Government Accounting Office report, one must keep in mind not only what the report was designed to do, but also what the report *was not* designed to do. The scope of the report was relatively narrow.

1. Compare the assumptions underlying ARI and the Bureau's proposal
2. Evaluate the Army's analyses of the two proposals' respective capabilities to meet projected combat requirements
3. Evaluate the Army's cost analyses and comparisons of both proposals
4. Identify how the two proposed force structures would affect personnel-support requirements

Essentially, the GAO Report is an evaluation of the Army's analysis methodology

### **What the report did not do**

Vital to a proper analysis of this report is an understanding of what the report did not do. Specifically the report did not:

1. Independently evaluate the relative merits of ARI versus the Bureau's proposal
2. Make a recommendation to support one plan over the other
3. *Challenge* the assumptions that informed the Army's analysis of the two plans<sup>i</sup>

### **What the report found**

1. The Active Army and NGB agree on assumptions concerning national military strategy, anticipated future demands for combat aviation, near-term training resources, and readiness requirements, but disagree on availability of resources (base budget), and how Army National Guard units would be used.<sup>ii</sup>

2. The Army's analysis of the two proposals' abilities to meet projected demand for forces was suitable for comparing the proposals but lacked further sensitivity analysis that could have been beneficial to decision makers. Specifically, the Army's analysis did not evaluate how varying the classified planning scenario—either by varying the rate at which units deploy or the duration of the deployment—would affect the performance of the proposals. Such information would have provided insight into how adaptable the competing proposals would be when confronting different combat requirements and would “help inform their decision making.”<sup>iii</sup>
3. The Army's cost analysis was sufficiently reliable for comparing the cost of the two proposals, but the estimates were of limited value for projecting the actual implementation or annual costs because the estimates did not account for manning, equipping, and operational uncertainties.
4. The Bureau's proposal requires more positions and costs more than the Army's proposal.<sup>iv</sup>

### **What the Active Army claims the report says**

Not surprisingly, the Active Army has tried to tout this report as an affirmation of ARI over NAP, which it unequivocally is not. Specifically, in a letter to the GAO they state that they concur with the report that “the Army's plan is less expensive and better meets mission demands.”<sup>v</sup> Further they state

Army leadership, as well as the leadership of the Department of Defense, agree with your assessment that the Army's Plan for ARI, which includes moving Apaches from the National Guard to the Regular Army, as well as Blackhawks from the Regular Army to the National Guard, is cost-effective, better supports Homeland Defense, and better meets the demands of our classified warfighting scenarios.<sup>vi</sup>

### **NGB Counter-points to Active Army claims regarding GAO report findings**

1. The Army's 2014 analysis to determine whether the Bureau's proposal could better meet the projected demands for units as compared to ARI revealed the following:
  - a. “The analytical results did not provide a meaningful basis for choosing between the two force-structure proposals.”
  - b. “The Bureau's proposal better address[ed] foundational mission requirements.”<sup>vii</sup>
  - c. In other words, by the Army's own admission, the NGB proposal met projected demand as well as ARI while doing a better job at addressing foundational missions such as homeland defense and disaster response.
  - d. It was not until the Army altered their assumptions that ARI showed a clear advantage over the Bureau's proposal

2. The Army's analysis is beset with flawed assumptions, which affect the conclusions. Change the assumptions and you change the outcome. Following are some of mistaken assumptions that informed the Army's analysis
  - a. Post-Mobilization Timeline—In their January 2015 sensitivity analysis, the Army assumed a 120 day post-mobilization timeline before deployment. We believe this to be unreasonably long for several reasons
    - i. UTFP is now accomplished at home, rendering historical data regarding post-mobilization training timing inaccurate for forecasting future timelines
    - ii. Anecdotal data shows many Apache units deployed much more quickly than 120 days.
    - iii. In a worst-case scenario, units could tailor/reduce training based on real-world need, further decreasing the training timeline
    - iv. All of these factors together argue for a shorter post-mobilization timeline in the future, not a longer one, and should have been included in any sensitivity analysis.<sup>viii</sup>
  - b. Deploy to Dwell
    - i. The Army used the Bureau's suggested two years of dwell for each year mobilized in support of unplanned combat operations
    - ii. However, since many of the scenarios that drive the analysis are "worst-case" type events, the analysis should not have included *any* deploy to dwell ratios. In the event of a national emergency Guard units are eligible for involuntary call-up for the duration of the emergency plus six months—*rendering deploy to dwell ratios inapplicable for those events.*
    - iii. GEN Grass vowed to "commit the Guard to more frequent rotational use, up to the maximum limits of presidential or congressional authorities, when required to meet the needs of any national emergency."
    - iv. Had this factor been used in sensitivity analysis, the result of that analysis would have been undoubtedly favorable toward the Bureau proposal.
3. Missing Data for Decision Makers
  - a. The GAO report found that the Army failed to include sensitivity analysis to evaluate how the proposals would have performed under a broader range of conditions.
  - b. Such analysis would have been "beneficial to decision makers."
  - c. This means decision makers did not have access to all the data needed to make a fully informed decision, which highlights the importance of the NCFR and ensuring Congress is provided adequate time to study the NCFR's report before making final decisions regarding further implementation of ARI.

4. Incomplete cost analysis
  - a. The GAO report found that the Army’s cost estimates were “of limited value for projecting the actual implementation or annual costs of the Army’s proposal” and “were limited as a means to project actual costs because the estimates did not account for manning, equipping, and operational uncertainties.”
  - b. Again, limited data for decision makers. See 3.c
  - c. Using the Army’s admittedly incomplete data, their estimate of the annual operating costs of the two proposals differs by less than eight-tenths of one percent—statistically insignificant.<sup>ix</sup>
5. Army claims of unacceptable risk
  - a. Essentially the Army claims the NGB proposal, which keeps 120 Apaches in the ARNG, results in “unacceptable risk” to the Active Army, and therefore they would have to buy back 115 helicopters to offset that risk.
  - b. This is a blatant attempt to skew the numbers. Divesting the Total Force of large numbers of helicopters—as both proposals do—entails risk by its very nature. NGB could just as easily claim the need to buy back all the Apaches lost in ARI to mitigate risk to ARNG formations.
  - c. This additional procurement of 115 Apaches is based on a fundamentally flawed premise that ARS will require 24 x AH64E. There is no existing study or analysis that justifies 24 Apaches in the ARS.
6. Why rush?
  - a. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the following all argue for allowing ample time for Congress to consider the NCFA’s final report and to define their wishes in NDAA 17 before continuing with ARI implementation of following another option
    - i. No cost to delay—the cost to implement is about the same cost as delaying implementation
    - ii. Irreversibility—removing force structure, manpower, and Apaches from the ARNG is difficult to undo
    - iii. The NCFA will likely suggest a spectrum of alternative options to ARI and the Bureau’s proposal. We should analyze all of those options before moving forward with ARI.

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<sup>i</sup> The report *compares* the assumptions but does not go so far as to challenge the validity of the assumptions. There is a critical difference in the two actions and some of the invalid assumptions are discussed in detail in later paragraphs

<sup>ii</sup> Specifics of differing assumptions:

**Base Budget:**

Army: Anticipates continuing budget pressure

NGB: Agrees on possibility of continuing budget pressure, but disagrees with the philosophy to make long-term force structure decisions on short-term funding challenges

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**Army National Guard Training**

Army: Might not have strategic warning / resources to provide post-mobilization training time to prepare ARNG CABs for deployment in major combat operations

NGB: Guard CABs will be able to meet future mission requirements and deployment timelines given sufficient training resources and adequate advance notice, which, historically, the Army has been able to provide.

**Guard dwell time**

Army: 4 years of dwell for each year mobilized

NGB: 2 years of dwell for each year mobilized

<sup>iii</sup> GAO Report, page 4

<sup>iv</sup> That was known from the beginning. Missing from the information is the 20% increase in fully-manned ARBs (not including equipment sets) that the Bureau's proposal provides as compared to ARI.

<sup>v</sup> Letter from MG Cheek to Mr. John Pendleton, GAO report page 46.

<sup>vi</sup> Ibid, page 47

<sup>vii</sup> GAO report, page 26.

<sup>viii</sup> A ninety day timeline was used in some scenarios, but an even shorter timeline should have been considered due to the reasons mentioned.

<sup>ix</sup> 6.75 Billion for ARI vs 6.80 Billion for the Bureau's proposal



## The National Guard – Foundational Principles for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

A strategic transition is underway -- a necessary transition driven by constrained resources and 13 years of sustained combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an era of change and uncertainty, today's operational National Guard stands as a cost effective strategic hedge that is an accessible, capable and ready force with citizen soldiers and airmen who possess the skills necessary to meet current and future challenges.

As we orient to the future, we do so facing what I term the "three realities" of the security environment – global reality, resource reality, and the reality of change.

- Global Reality - asymmetric threats, cyber terrorism, pandemics, transnational organized crime, climate change, arctic impacts, and regional instability issues such as those we are witnessing in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Asia are just some of the threats we face today and into the future.
- Resource Reality - decreased defense spending diminishes our military's capabilities, capacity, and readiness. Ever increasing compensation and entitlement costs increase the burden on the defense budget. Like the Army and Air Force, the National Guard has seen the readiness effects of budget challenges and will continue to see erosion as sequestration returns in 2016. Striking the right AC/RC mix now is more critical than ever.
- The Reality of Change - the rate at which the current security environment is changing is unprecedented. Issues such as ISIL, Ebola, and the conflict in Ukraine are just some of the examples that have surfaced in the past year. Additionally, advancements in technology and new modes of communication have created a world where borders are blurred with a U.S. population that expects more from its government at greater speed. Citizens in the homeland expect immediate and deliberate responses to natural and manmade disasters.

As we face these security challenges, the vision for the National Guard is one that ensures we remain well-postured to confront and deter current and emerging threats. Tomorrow's National Guard will be organized around the following key principles.

- Integral to the Total Force – Establish or revise policies that truly address Total Force concepts and are fully implemented to organize, man, train, equip, modernize and utilize the Army and Air National Guard as an operational force. These policies will include such measures as providing predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities to meet Combatant Command requirements.
- A Truly Operational Reserve - The National Guard will be resourced to remain an operational reserve. Army National Guard units will be resourced at a baseline of C3 within a progressive readiness model; units that have been assigned, apportioned or allocated for federal missions will be resourced to achieve the required levels of readiness for employment. Air National Guard units will be resourced at a baseline of C1 and provide forces in Unit Type Codes that have personnel and equipment that

are tailored and deployable enabling a complete warfighting package, not just augmentation personnel.

- Tremendous Value for America - National Guard forces provide our nation with an “as needed,” cost-effective, proven combat reserve of the Army and Air Force, providing full spectrum capability in the warfight and as the force of first choice for domestic emergencies. As our force shrinks due to budgetary challenges, the operational, dual-use National Guard provides the nation with reversibility through a rapidly scalable force.
- Building Partnerships - The National Guard provides Combatant Commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available forces for building partner capacity around the world. Due to a reduced forward presence, the Combatant Commanders will seek to increase their use of the National Guard for Theater Security Cooperation, leveraging the civilian-acquired skills of Guardsmen and the long term relationships developed through the National Guard’s State Partnership Program.
- Our Nation’s Combat Reserve - As the combat reserve of the Army and Air Force, the National Guard force structure should mirror that of the Active Component, and modernization of equipment and weapons systems should occur concurrently with the Active Component.
- Remaining Engaged; Always Accessible - Challenging, realistic training, real-world employment, and predictability are keys to National Guard leader development, member retention, and ensuring family and civilian employer support. The National Guard is ideal for predictable rotational missions to leverage the benefits of real-world operations, while concurrently providing stability in its deployment cycle. Accessibility is not an issue -- a full suite of statutory authorities exists for both contingencies and steady state operations.
- Connected with America - Guardsmen live in nearly every ZIP code with armories and airfields in over 3000 communities. The National Guard is often the face of the military across much of our nation; communicating the strategic value of the Total Force to the citizens we serve, and in return, gaining the trust and confidence of the American people. With less than 0.73% of the population serving in the Armed Forces, the National Guard further connects the U.S. military to America.

The National Guard stands ready to address the challenges facing our nation as an invaluable combat reserve of the Army and Air Force. The National Guard will succeed due to the commitment, extraordinary talent and excellence of the next generation of Minutemen who, like those who served before them for almost 400 years, will rise to the challenge of defending our nation and responding in the community during times of crises. We will continue to strive to be more innovative, responsive, accessible, capable, and affordable as we embark on a journey filled with many challenges, but one filled with hope and promise. I am certain that future generations of Guardsmen will continue our commitment to be Always Ready, Always There!

## Adjutants' General Vision for the Army National Guard

*"To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States..."*

Article 1. Section 8 U.S. Constitution

*"In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times."*

32 U.S. Code § 102 - General policy

The determined and dedicated Militia that fired the *"shot heard round the world"* and forged our Nation's freedom is now codified in law and lives today as the National Guard, recognized by our nation as constitutionally unique with three core missions:

1. Fighting America's Wars
2. Responding in the Homeland
3. Building Partnerships

The necessity of balancing our strategic national security interests and objectives with fiscal responsibility is vital to enabling Congress' ability to raise and provide our Nation's Army. The most capable Army for our nation is the "One Army" as defined in the accepted Abrams Doctrine. A combat-effective, affordable Army is possible only through provision of a relevant and resourced Army National Guard.

**Our vision for the Army National Guard ensures we remain well-postured to confront and deter current and emerging threats. Tomorrow's Army National Guard will be organized around the following key principles:**

- **Integral to the Total Force**—Total Force Policy will be fully implemented to organize, man, train, equip, modernize and utilize the Army National Guard as an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring, and sustainable capabilities to meet Combatant Command requirements.
- **A Truly Operational Reserve**—The Army National Guard will be resourced to remain an operational reserve. ARNG units will be resourced at a baseline of C3 within a progressive readiness model. Units that have been assigned, apportioned, or allocated for federal missions will be resourced to achieve the required level of readiness for deployment.
- **Tremendous Value for America**—Army National Guard forces provide our Nation with an on-demand, cost effective, combat reserve, providing full spectrum capability in the warfight, and is the force of choice for domestic emergencies.

- **Building Partnerships**—The Army National Guard provides Combatant Commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available forces for building partner capacity around the world.
- **Our Nation’s Combat Reserve**—As the combat reserve of the Army, the ARNG Maneuver, Maneuver Support, and Maneuver Sustainment formations should mirror that of the Active Army.
- **Cutting Edge**—Army National Guard organizations must be organized, fielded, and modernized with equipment and weapons systems concurrently with the Active Army.
- **Remaining Engaged, Always Accessible**—The Army National Guard is accessible through a full suite of statutory authorities available for both contingencies and steady state operations. It is ideal for predictable, rotational missions that leverage the benefits of real-world operations, while concurrently providing stability in the deployment cycle.
- **Connected with America**—The Army National Guard connects the Army to America and secures the will of the American people to support National Defense. With Soldiers living in nearly every ZIP code, and armories in over 2,600 communities, the ARNG is the face of the Army across our country and helps to communicate the strategic value of the Army to the citizens we serve. They also bring specific skills and perspectives to fully support the “Army Operating Concept.”

The Army National Guard is invaluable as the Army’s combat reserve and stands ready to address the challenges facing our nation. We will succeed due to the commitment, extraordinary talent and excellence of the next generation of Minutemen, who, like those who served before them for almost 400 years, will rise to the challenge of fighting our nation’s wars, responding in the homeland, and building global and domestic partnerships.

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#### ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ASK

**In accordance with our stated vision and principles, the ARNG must be a balanced maneuver, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment force of 350,200. This assures that the Essential 10 are represented in every state and the ARNG can fulfill its role as the combat reserve of the Army.**

**Programming and resourcing the ARNG as an operational force should be done through a progressive and rotating readiness model and the continued prioritization of the acquisition of dual use equipment.**



John Hickenlooper  
Governor of Colorado  
Chair

Gary Herbert  
Governor of Utah  
Vice Chair

Dan Crippen  
Executive Director

February 26, 2015

The President  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The nation's governors strongly oppose the U.S. Army's fiscal year 2016 budget proposal to reduce the size of the Army National Guard and remove its Apache helicopters. As we wrote to you last year, we recognize the need to reduce costs and restructure military forces, but firmly believe the Army's proposals are ill-advised.

The Army has proposed to eliminate more than 8,000 Army National Guard positions, including 1,700 full-time positions necessary to maintain the Guard's readiness, and transfer its Apache helicopters to the active component. As commanders-in-chief, we must express our concerns that these plans suggest a return to a pre-9/11 strategic reserve construct that would squander more than a decade of investments and discredit the Guard's accomplishments.

For more than a decade, the men and women of the National Guard have served alongside their active duty counterparts in overseas combat. They are the nation's most cost-effective fighting force and also help save lives and protect property during emergencies here at home. To reduce the Guard's ranks and remove capabilities during a time of continued global insecurity simply does not make sense.

Congress responded to these concerns last year by limiting the transfer of Apaches and establishing an independent commission to review these proposals. We encourage you to maintain the Army National Guard's personnel and combat aviation capability until the commission has had time to complete its review.

We respectfully request you work with us to fashion solutions that provide for a scalable, cost-effective force that best serves the interests of our nation.


Sincerely,

Governor Terry E. Branstad  
Co-Chair  
Council of Governors

Governor Dannel Malloy  
Co-Chair  
Council of Governors



Governor Rick Snyder  
Chair  
Homeland Security & Public  
Safety Committee



Governor Terry McAuliffe  
Vice Chair  
Homeland Security & Public  
Safety Committee



## National Lieutenant Governors Association

April 14, 2015

President Barack Obama  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The undersigned seconds-in-command (Lieutenant Governors, Senate Presidents, and Secretaries of States) of the nation's states and territories oppose potential cuts to the Army National Guard as found in the fiscal 2016 U.S. Army budget proposal. As a unique state-based military force, the National Guard is the only military force that is shared by the states and the federal government. It is a ready, reliable, and essential force that responds to national disasters and emergencies, and is critical to peace and security at home and abroad.

As the executive branch seconds-in-command of the states and territories, we appreciate the need to examine military structure and readiness to meet both ongoing and new threats amidst current budget considerations. However, the Army has proposed to eliminate more than 8,000 Army National Guard positions, including 1,700 full-time positions necessary to maintain the Guard's readiness and transfer its Apache helicopters to the active component.

These National Guard budgets would cut Army National Guard forces to a pre-2001 level. A return to these levels is contrary to the interest of the states and nation and we encourage transparent discussion of active duty and National Guard force structure pre- and post-9/11.

Congress responded to these concerns last year by limiting the transfer of Apaches and establishing an independent commission to review these proposals. We encourage you to maintain the Army National Guard's personnel and combat aviation capability until the commission has had time to complete its review.

Across the many and diverse states we represent, the accomplishments of the National Guard are unparalleled in response to flood, wildfire, storm, and serving our nation overseas. We stand together in support to maintain Army Guard operational capabilities.


Sincerely,

Lt. Governor Nancy Wyman  
Connecticut  
NLGA Chair

Lt. Governor Kim Reynolds  
Iowa  
NLGA Chair-elect




Lt. Governor Matt Michels  
South Dakota  
NLGA Treasurer



Lt. Governor John A. Sanchez  
New Mexico



Lt. Governor Kim Guadagno  
New Jersey




Lt. Governor Tim Griffin  
Arkansas



Lt. Governor Phil Scott  
Vermont



Lt. Governor Kay Ivey  
Alabama



Lt. Governor Rebecca Kleefisch  
Wisconsin



Lt. Governor Peter Kinder  
Missouri




Lt. Governor Sue Ellspermann  
Indiana



Lt. Governor Angela McLean  
Montana



Secretary of State David E. Bernier  
Puerto Rico



Lt. Governor Jay Dardenne  
Louisiana



Lt. Governor Kathy Hochul  
New York




Lt. Governor Jeff Coyer  
Kansas



Lt. Governor Ron Ramsey  
Tennessee



Secretary of State Michele Reagan  
Arizona



Lt. Governor Shan S. Tsutsui  
Hawaii



Lt. Governor Tate Reeves  
Mississippi



Lt. Governor Spencer Cox  
Utah



Secretary of State Edward F. Murray III  
Wyoming



Lt. Governor Mike Stack  
Pennsylvania



Lt. Governor Brad Owen  
Washington



Lt. Governor Osbert Potter  
U.S. Virgin Islands





John Hickenlooper  
Governor of Colorado  
Chair

Gary Herbert  
Governor of Utah  
Vice Chair

Dan Crippen  
Executive Director

April 20, 2015

The Honorable John McCain  
Chairman  
Armed Services Committee  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Jack Reed  
Ranking Member  
Armed Services Committee  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed:

Governors appreciated Congressional action last year to limit the transfer of Army National Guard (ARNG) Apaches to the active component to no more than 48 during fiscal year (FY) 2015. As you draft the FY 2016 defense authorization bill, governors request that you include language to prohibit any additional transfers beyond the 48 until FY 2017.

Earlier this year, governors wrote to the President and Department of Defense leadership to express concerns that the Army's FY 2016 budget proposal would waste more than a decade of investments and squander the combat experience resident in the ARNG. Governors firmly believe that the Guard's cost-effectiveness could be better leveraged to maintain overall capability while reducing costs for the nation.

Governors raised similar concerns last year and supported Congressional action to create the National Commission on the Future of the Army (Commission) to provide an independent assessment of the Army's proposals. As the Commission begins its work this month, we ask that Congress prevent any further reductions of ARNG personnel, force structure and aircraft until at least the enactment of the FY 2017 defense authorization bill. This would allow sufficient time for Congressional consideration of the Commission's report and ensure flexibility to implement its recommendations. Governors also ask that you clarify that the 12 ARNG Apaches previously sent to the active component for modernization be counted toward the 48 authorized for transfer.

Thank you for your leadership and consideration.

Sincerely,

Dan Crippen  
Executive Director



## INFORMATION PAPER

### SUBJECT: Army Force Structure Plan for Proportional Cuts

1. **Purpose.** To discuss the complexities and flawed baseline underpinning the Army's plan for proportional force structure cuts between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard.

2. **Facts.**

a. The Army Leadership has developed a plan to reduce Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) proportionally between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. Using proportionality is a potential technique for managing the force. However, there are two key factors that should be considered. First, what baseline is used for those proportional cuts is a critical issue. The Army's plan uses the current force as the baseline, which ignores the significant growth in manpower and structure and manpower during the surge over the last 13 years of war. Second, to achieve this maximum capability for the least cost and most cost effective capability, the National Guard should not be reduced more than the more costly Active Component.

b. The argument that the post-war Total Army can be reduced proportionally across AC/RC components in order to achieve budget goals is not rational in that the current plan does not leverage the high cost force but disproportionately reduces the lower cost force. The basis for proportional cuts should reflect conditions present when the objective proportions of AC/RC were in effect. Moreover, if Total Army AC/RC proportions are used to reset from war, the pre-conflict proportions should be used when trying to restructure for post-conflict.

c. As the Nation and the Army move beyond its two post-9/11 wars, it is logical to use the AC/RC mix present during the pre-9/11 Total Army as a baseline. In response to the wars resulting from the 9/11 attacks, the Army successfully mobilized its forces and executed the Nation's security strategy. The Nation's success in responding to the attacks of 9/11 demonstrates the ability of both the Regular Army to respond and the Army National Guard (ARNG) to mobilize as the Operational Reserve. This has been proven time and again over the last 14 years. In addition, the ARNG achieved this operational capability and at points over this period provided a significant portion of the deployed forces while being reduced in formation by 14 BCTs.

d. The table below illustrates the complexities surrounding Regular Army and Army National Guard BCT statistics. In 2000, the Regular Army had 33 BCTs, compared to 42 in the ARNG, for a total of 75. By 2010, the Total Army lost 2 BCTs for a new total of 73 BCTs. However, the Regular Army *increased* by 12 during that time while the National Guard *lost* 14. These initial changes are not addressed in the current proportional change plan.

**Brigade Combat Team Statistics**

Number and Percent of Brigade Combat Teams 2000-2015									Proportional Cut Plan for 2019				
	2000 Number	2000 Percent	2010 Number	2010 Percent	2015 Number	2015 Percent	2000 to 2015 BCT Change	Percent Change	BCT Plan for 2019	Change 2015 to 2019	Change Percentage	Change 2000 to 2019	Change 2000 to 2019
Regular Army	33	44%	45	62%	45	62%	+12	<b>+36%</b>	28	-17	-38%	-5	<b>-15%</b>
Army National Guard	42	56%	28	38%	28	38%	-14	<b>-33%</b>	24	-4	-19%	-18	<b>-43%</b>
TOTALS	75	100%	73	100%	73	100%	-2		52	-21		-23	

e. The proposed change of reducing the Regular Army to 28 BCTs and the ARNG to 24 BCTs appears to favor the ARNG by percentage if the baseline of the wartime BCT numbers of 45 Regular and 28 ARNG are used. However, determining proportional cuts and the starting baseline is more complicated. For example, calculating the change using the pre-conflict baseline, the current programmed plan reduces the ARNG by **43%** and the Regular Army by **15%** (BCT changes from 2000 to current programmed goals). That method *maximizes reductions of the least expensive forces*, instead of maximizing Total Army combat capability in peacetime by putting proportionally larger numbers of forces in less costly Operational Reserve status.

### 3. Summary

a. If, instead, the 2000 proportions were used and the assumption of a Total Army BCT need is 52 BCTs, then the Regular Army would reduce to 23 BCTs and the ARNG would increase by one to 29. This would yield 44% of the BCTs in the Regular Army and 56% in the ARNG, proportions as they were in 2000.

b. The Reserve Forces Policy Board published a study of the per-capita cost differences between Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) in 2013. The study revealed the direct DoD costs for AC members are \$218,839 each, versus \$60,749 for RC members. US Government total costs (adding in all indirect costs), were \$384,622 for AC versus \$123,351 for RC members. In light of what's been described earlier in this paper, and these cost differences, if 40,000 Regular Army positions were moved to the RC, DoD would save \$8.8 Billion annually, and an additional \$1.7 Billion for the rest of the US Government. These savings would preserve the "hard won" capabilities of combat trained individuals for the Total Army while freeing between \$8 and \$10 Billion annually for investments in Readiness and Modernization.

c. This discussion reveals the complicated nature of the AC/RC balance. Nevertheless the Nation faces a complex and urgent decision to determine the most effective structure of the Total Army. A desirable outcome is one that preserves capability achieved in the long period of combat by the Total Army, applies lessons learned from the move from the pre-9/11 force structure to wartime, addresses new risks not present in 2001, and is achieved within new budget realities.

d. Congress's requirement for a commission to make these determinations is exactly the right approach to this complex problem. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the Commission's study and ultimate conclusions, it makes sense to cease any significant shifts in AC/RC mix until completion of the Commission's work.