

**National Guard Review of  
the Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI)**  
Better Choices for the Total Army

**Bottom Line Up Front:** In order to maintain the most combat capability in the total Army, and ensure the affordability of that capability, the Department of Defense (DoD) should not adopt the current Army Restructuring Initiative (ARI) and instead look at alternative plans, such as the alternative plan provided by the National Guard Bureau.

With stagnant defense budgets likely to continue for the next ten years, utilizing the National Guard will be key for the DoD to ensure it is able to carryout U.S. defense and Army Total Force Policy requirements at an affordable cost. Most importantly, as it is part of ARI, retaining Army National Guard attack aviation capability provides accessible, expansible and cost-effective forces with the ability to regenerate and afford the strategic depth necessary for future conflicts.<sup>1</sup>

This document reviews the Army's ARI and describes why alternative policies provide a better business case for the future of the total Army and the country.

**Background Information:** The 2015 NDAA directs the GAO to provide a report by March 1, 2015 to the defense committees of congress assessing the the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) . ARI suggests combat aviation assets should be consolidated in the Active Component to provide the nation with the most modernized fleet in Aviation history and the most available combat power given fiscal constraints. ARI effects Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs), the placement of AH-64D Apaches, and several related personnel and force generation requirements. The National Guard provides a alternative proposal to maintain Apache Attack Helicopter force structure in National Guard formations at reduced numbers.

As the cornerstone of Army Aviation, the CAB is the ground maneuver commander's forward attack element used to shape the battlefield. During the past two decades this fighting force has been some of the first elements to engage the enemy in all conflicts.

ARI seeks to change Aviation doctrine by removing combat aircraft from the National Guard's CABs, changing these CABs to Combat Support Aviation Brigades. ARI suggests doctrine must be developed and/or updated to reflect consolidation of attack reconnaissance capabilities in AC CABs and optimization of lift, assault and aeromedical evacuation in RC Aviation brigades. This proposal would fundamentally change the construct of the RC CAB making it less than lethal and reducing it to a support roll. This AC response to the Budget Control Act (BCA) degrades the strategic capability of U.S. Army Aviation.

Identical Combat Aviation Brigade structure in the AC and Reserve Component (RC) creates interoperability among components and allows the ARNG to meet all federal and domestic operations missions and provides the best value for the nation and not a single component stakeholder.

**As an example, A medium CAB includes 120 helicopters of which 24 are AH-64 Apache Helicopters**

**ARI Impacts on the Active Component:**

- Loss in Attack Helicopter Force Structure. Cuts three Combat Aviation Brigades
- Eliminates reach-back capability to the National Guard – the combat reserve for the Nation. No place to maintain experienced pilots and support personnel after leaving active duty.
- Placing all Attack Helicopters in the Active Component costs more, not less.
- Divests 600 aircraft

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<sup>1</sup> DOD Directive 1200.17

- 300 of the 600 are OH-58D models already scheduled for retirement
- 200 of the 600 are OH-58 scout fleet which came from ARNG
- Gain of 192 AH-64D Apaches (transferred from ARNG) with an operational float of 107
- Maintains a CAB's worth of aircraft in Korea for AC CAB rotations.
- Reorganizes remaining Aviation Brigades so that Attack-Recon Battalions and Air Reconnaissance Squadrons reside solely in the AC
- Does not allow retention of qualified aviators and support personnel in the national guard upon completion of active tour

**ARI Impacts on the Army National Guard:**

- Converts all ARNG CABs into Combat Support Aviation Brigades<sup>2</sup>
- Adds 111 UH60s, but leaves ARNG short on modernized UH60s
- Cuts 111 aircraft, about 3600 personnel and 3 Command/Brigade HQs, 9 Battalion HQs and 38 Companies
- Removes ARNG's role as Army's combat aviation reserve and ability to regenerate forces
- Forces re-training for aviators and maintenance personnel
- Removes organic attack/gun ship support for ARNG Infantry Divisions

**Criteria:** Evaluating major areas of Aviation will help inform the response to Section 1057 of the NDAA which requires a briefing on ARI and the National Guard Bureau's counter proposal. These areas are:

- Lifecycle costs and maintenance
- Operational Readiness Rates
- Accessibility and performance

Data for comparing annual costs to own/operate ARNG and AC Attack-Recon Battalions is listed in Table A below. ARNG cost is \$31.8M/year vs. AC cost at \$76.8M/year.

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<sup>2</sup> Current ARNG Attack/Recon units reside in ID, UT, AZ, TX, MO, MS, NC, SC, PA

Operations & Sustainment		\$31,799,548	Operations & Sustainment		\$76,777,682
<b>Direct Equipment Parts &amp; Fuel Cost</b>		\$20,030,362	<b>Direct Equipment Parts &amp; Fuel Cost</b>		\$31,728,436
Training Operations		\$18,096,896	Training Operations		\$26,357,575
Aircraft Operations		\$17,637,046	Aircraft Operations		\$25,130,168
Reparables		\$11,954,754 OMNG	Reparables		\$17,024,064 OMA
Consumables		\$4,196,207 OMNG	Consumables		\$5,966,276 OMA
POL		\$1,486,086 OMNG	POL		\$2,139,827 OMA
Ground/Afloat Operations		\$446,495	Ground/Afloat Operations		\$1,191,944
Reparables		\$73,936 OMNG	Reparables		\$264,637 OMA
Consumables		\$312,305 OMNG	Consumables		\$795,548 OMA
POL		\$60,254 OMNG	POL		\$131,759 OMA
Non-OSMIS Equipment Operating Cost		\$13,356 OMNG	Non-OSMIS Equipment Operating Cost		\$35,464 OMA
Training Ammunition & Missiles		\$1,933,465 AMMO	Training Ammunition & Missiles		\$5,370,861 AMMO
<b>Post Production Software Support</b>		\$101,298	<b>Post Production Software Support</b>		\$101,298
Annual Maintenance Cost		\$10,488 OMNG	Annual Maintenance Cost		\$10,488 OMA
Modernization Amortized Cost		\$90,809 OPA2	Modernization Amortized Cost		\$90,809 OPA2
<b>Indirect Support Cost</b>		\$1,110,818	<b>Indirect Support Cost</b>		\$1,462,027
Transportation of Things		\$27,114 OMNG	Transportation of Things		\$72,868 OMA
Supplies and Equipment		\$478,728 OMNG	Supplies and Equipment		\$416,451 OMA
Contractual Services - Field		\$15,675 OMNG	Contractual Services - Field		\$76,681 OMA
Mission Travel		\$63,972 OMNG	Mission Travel		\$187,255 OMA
Equipment Leases		\$16,522 OMNG	Equipment Leases		\$43,213 OMA
Contractual Services	ARNG	\$233,856	Contractual Services	Active	\$383,406
ADP		\$8,049 OMNG	ADP		\$47,873 OMA
Other		\$225,807 OMNG	Other		\$335,533 OMA
Purchased Equipment		\$108,455 OMNG	Purchased Equipment		\$184,289 OMA
Admin Travel		\$13,981 OMNG	Admin Travel		\$31,774 OMA
Civilian Labor		\$139,805 OMNG	Civilian Labor		\$52,957 OMA
Other		\$12,710 OMNG	Other		\$13,133 OMA
<b>Personnel</b>		\$8,889,029	<b>Personnel</b>		\$35,246,718
Replacement Personnel Training		\$231,768	Replacement Personnel Training		\$589,256
Training Through Initial MOS		\$214,816	Training Through Initial MOS		\$544,201
Military Pay Funded		\$82,894 NGPA	Military Pay Funded		\$209,997 MPA
O&M Funded		\$122,560 OMNG	O&M Funded		\$310,485 OMA
Other Funded		\$9,363 AMMO	Other Funded		\$23,719 AMMO
Clothing Initial Issue		\$16,952 NGPA	Clothing Initial Issue		\$45,055 MPA
PCS Travel: Military & Dependents		\$0 N/A	PCS Travel: Military & Dependents		\$2,027,019 MPA
Military Personnel		\$8,657,261	Military Personnel		\$32,630,444
Basic Pay and Allowances		\$7,779,376 NGPA	Basic Pay and Allowances		\$25,929,334 MPA
BAH/OHA		\$271,374 NGPA	BAH/OHA		\$6,135,388 MPA
COLA		\$0 NGPA	COLA		\$0 MPA
Special/Incentive/Hazardous Duty Pay		\$606,511 NGPA	Special/Incentive/Hazardous Duty Pay		\$565,722 MPA
<b>Other Unit Support</b>		\$1,668,042	<b>Other Unit Support</b>		\$8,239,204
Installation Services		\$1,493,800	Installation Services		\$4,035,718
Housing		\$424 N/A	Housing		\$64,395 AFH
Command Support		\$61,006 OMNG	Command Support		\$140,229 OMA
Human Resources Management		\$424 OMNG	Human Resources Management		\$67,784 OMA
Infrastructure Support		\$722,752 OMNG	Infrastructure Support		\$1,403,986 OMA
Information Technology		\$204,624 OMNG	Information Technology		\$149,126 OMA
Logistics		\$61,853 OMNG	Logistics		\$474,915 OMA
Mission Support		\$70,750 OMNG	Mission Support		\$671,066 OMA
Natural Infrastructure Supt		\$216,063 OMNG	Natural Infrastructure Supt		\$526,177 OMA
Soldier & Family Support		\$59,735 OMNG	Soldier & Family Support		\$294,439 OMA
Security		\$96,169 OMNG	Security		\$95,746 OMA
Tng Aids Devices Simulations		\$0 OMNG	Tng Aids Devices Simulations		\$147,855 OMA
Defense Health Program		\$174,241 OMD	Defense Health Program		\$4,203,485 OMD

Table A

Operations and Sustainment Comparison between ARNG and Active Component

Additionally, the ARNG plan reduces the cost of re-training aircrews and maintainers into new aircraft. ARNG maintainers provide a greater continuity of experience over the life-cycle of the airframe while reducing the need for contractors to conduct scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activities.

<sup>3</sup> DASA – CE Forces Cost Estimate Model (FCM) for AH64D Battalion; Base Year 2014, Version: 2012.050913

ARNG AH-64 Operational Readiness Rates have been historically below that of the AC, but have improved over the last few years. Table B tracks Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rates from FY04 through 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter of FY14.




Table B  
ARNG AH-64 Operational Readiness Rates<sup>4</sup>

Deployment requests for Aviation to the ARNG should be taken into account when examining the above data. In short, the ARNG Attack-Recon Bn and Air Cavalry Squadrons fulfilled every deployment which included Kosovo, Bosnia, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation New Dawn. In these theaters, ARNG Attack and Air Cavalry Aviation formations excelled at the same mission sets as their AC counterparts. In comparing ARNG and AC FORSCOM ARMS results, 75% of ARNG ARBs (6 of 8) scored overall satisfactory from 2011-2013, while 36% of AC report ARBs (4 of 11) scored satisfactory, and 54% of AC reporting ARBs (6 of 11) scored unsatisfactory or lower for the same period.<sup>5</sup>

**Conclusion:** The most cost effective and strategically sound method of maintaining the attack helicopter capability during these fiscally constrained times is to maintain the Apaches and the eight Aerial Reconnaissance Battalions in the National Guard while providing 48 Apaches to the Active Component. Maintaining Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) force structure, including AH-64 Apache Helicopters, within the Army National Guard is the best way to provide the nation with the most modernized fleet in Aviation history and the most available combat power given fiscal constraints.

<sup>4</sup> There were no ARNG AH-64s deployed in FY09 or FY11. OIF Surge and Draw-down between July 2007 and January 2011 largely excluded ARNG ARBs due to revised theater requirements and slow pace of ARNG modernization.

<sup>5</sup> FORSCOM ARMS is a comprehensive study of aviation operational systems, with emphasis on safe and efficient management of aviation resources. FORMSCOM ARMS teams inspect thirteen functional areas to assess whether units and facilities are in compliance with Army standards.