

ARI is a Bad Idea

Overall: Sacrifices Capabilities, Readiness, Least Cost Effective Solution

- No Notice/Non Prolonged
 - No Historical Bases
 - Least Likely
 - Highest Cost
 - RC Can Deploy in 60 Days
- Questionable Lift Assumption
 - Untested in past 75 Years of Conflict
 - Relies on assumption of availability of significant Non-USG Assets
- Total Army / RC-AC Model / Similar Capability
 - Mandated
 - Cost Effective
- Dual-Use Important
 - But Not with Fewer Airframes
 - Depth of Formation
- Apache has Greater Capability
 - Range, Loiter Time, ETC
- RC as Capable / Not Second Rate
 - Did All Mission EEQ?
 - Did HA @ Mission
- Cost Savings Negligible vs. Capability
 - Less Capability vs. Guard Plan
 - Assumes No Replacement Scout A/C
 - Ultimately Compo 2 much more cost effective
- Assumes Significant Risk in Transition
 - 2-3 Years, More risk in time of significant turmoil
 - Too much Risk if you foresee a No-Notice Event
- Did Not Consult States
 - Required to Consult

Plan Comparison Slide

HAH-64 Assignment	AC Army	States Solution**	NGB
AC MTOE (AH-64)	480	420	432
ARNG MTOE (AH-64)	0	168	120
Korea Equipment Set (AH-64)	48	0	48
Training Set (AH-64)	80	70	80
Research and Test Set (AH-64)	15	10	15
Floats* (AH-64)	67	22	37
Total	690	690	732

* 54 Boeing remanufacturing line, 6 Depot maintenance, 3 pending attrition, 4 theater spares.

** Thirty-two AH-64s of the ARNG MTOE would be committed to the Boeing remanufacturing line but remain in the ARNG authorization.

Hence, the number of AH-64s in the float is actually 54.

Sell States Plan

- **States Solution Provides:**
 - **40% Operational/Strategic Reserve** by keeping 4 of 8 NG CABs.
 - Cost increase of \$38m/yr by increasing the current AC operational fleet from 408 AH to 420, the equivalent of 1/2 Attack/Recon BN (ARB) (1 ARB costs \$77m*/yr).
 - -Current NG AH operational fleet decreases by 24 AH or equivalent of 1 ARB for a savings of \$32m/yr.
 - Essentially **cost neutral**
- * **AC BN of AH cost \$77M/Yr. ARNG AG BN costs \$32M/Yr.**