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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

19 August 2015

(U) APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF DWELL FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG). (U) Since 2001, the ARNG dwell ratios have fluctuated according to the operational demand, both sustained and surge. In the pre-ARFORGEN era (2001-2006), ARNG units continued to generate readiness according to demand while maintaining a prescribed dwell ratio of 1:5. ARNG dwell ratios have averaged 1:4 during the surge period (2007-2008), but certain unit types and skills sets (e.g., military intelligence and aviation) averaged a lower rate of 1:3. In today's fiscally constrained environment, a dwell ratio of 1:4 within a progressive sustainable readiness model supports a deliberate, cost-effective readiness build that capitalizes on statutory funds to support the ARNG's man, train, and equip functions in producing trained and ready operational forces. Any changes to dwell ratios within a sustainable readiness model would require the commensurate level of resourcing to avoid potential pitfalls related to the resiliency of the force. A dwell ratio of 1:4 for ARNG units is supported by the CNGB in his 31 May 13 memorandum for the CSA.

Consideration:

- Should we consider different dwell rates for different types of units/capabilities (e.g. military intelligence, aviation, Special Forces, Air Defense Artillery)?
- The likely level of support, resources, funding, ability to execute, and sustainability for each dwell ratio.
- Recommended modifications to existing or new policies/directives that should be made regarding dwell rates/ratios.
- Recommend a focused study on the risks and benefits of increase utilization of the RC, and the current dwell ratios as suggested in the CNGB memorandum for the CSA.

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INFORMATION PAPER

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SUBJECT: Suitable Model for Dwell for the Army National Guard (ARNG)

1. Purpose: To identify the appropriate dwell ratios for ARNG units to meet operational requirements with consideration given to the sustainability and ability to execute proposed dwell ratios.

2. Summary: A dwell ratio of 1:4 for ARNG units is supported by the CNGB in his 31 May 13 memorandum for the CSA where he commits the National Guard to supporting “boots-on-the-ground deployments for one-year within a three year period for unplanned contingency operations and one year within a five-year period for longer steady state operations (current ARFORGEN model).”¹ Since 2001, the ARNG dwell ratios have fluctuated according to the operational demand, both sustained and surge. In the pre-ARFORGEN era (2001-2006), ARNG units continued to generate readiness according to demand while maintaining a prescribed dwell ratio of 1:5. ARNG dwell ratios have averaged 1:4 during the surge period (2007-2008), but certain unit types and skills sets (e.g., military intelligence and aviation) averaged a lower rate of 1:3. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, a dwell ratio of 1:4 within a progressive sustainable readiness model supports a deliberate, cost-effective readiness build that capitalizes on statutory funds to support the ARNG’s man, train, and equip functions in producing trained and ready operational forces. A focused study is recommended on the risks and benefits of increase utilization of the RC, and the current dwell ratios as suggested in the CNGB memorandum for the CSA.

3. Background: While many studies have been conducted on the risks and benefits of increase utilization of the Reserve Component (RC), none of these studies addresses the holistic impacts of the current dwell policy as set forth in the Chief, National Guard Bureau’s (CNGB) memorandum for the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The most important factors to consider in changing the current policy are demand and funding the readiness build. This paper addresses these factors and outlines the risks of increased demand, reduced funding and the correlating effect on force (e.g. units) resiliency if current dwell ratios are changed. A focused study is recommended on the suitable model of dwell for the ARNG to identify and analyze potential benefits and/or risks to the long-term health of the force.

4. Analysis:

a. The Combatant Commands (CCMDs) drive the demand factor with requirements to meet an operational need. This demand signal further drives the Army’s analysis to

¹ Chief, National Guard Bureau, “CNGB Authorities and Assumptions Related to Rotational Use of the National Guard,” Memorandum for Chief of Staff of the Army May 31, 2013.

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meet this capability demand. To better understand this analysis, “dwell time” must be defined. Dwell time is the time a member of the armed forces or a unit spends at their permanent duty station or home station after returning from a deployment². A dwell ratio of 1:4 is one year deployed and four years dwell time in a five year period. This dwell ratio of 1:4 is supported by the CNGB in his 31 May 13 memorandum for the CSA where he commits the National Guard to supporting “boots-on-the-ground deployments for one-year within a three year period for unplanned contingency operations and one year within a five-year period for longer steady state operations (current ARFORGEN model).”³

b. Since 2001, the ARNG dwell ratios have fluctuated according to the operational demand, both sustained and surge. Implementation of a series of policy changes over the last 14 years affected ARNG dwell ratios. In the pre-ARFORGEN era (2001-2006), ARNG units continued to generate readiness according to demand while maintaining a prescribed dwell ratio of 1:5. At that time, the Army had not yet realized the levels or length of efforts required to sustain overseas contingency operations. This was a contributing factor during the surge era (2007-2008) in which the ratios for many units dropped to a low of 1:3 (2008). The ARNG average unit dwell rate was 1:4 during the surge period. The 1:4 dwell ratio was adequate for the majority of the ARNG force, however, certain unit types remained at about 1:3 ratio for an ever increasing demand for specific skill sets such as military intelligence and aviation.⁴

c. The Under Secretary of Defense, David S. C. Chu voiced concern that the demand for RC capabilities was changing and the appropriate level of dwell goes far in setting the conditions for a viable long-term RC. He iterated his concerns during testimony to the 2008 Commission of the National Guard and Reserves, “how extensively can we use the Guard and Reserve and still maintain a viable long-term Reserve force?”⁵ Army senior leader’s observations of developing trends was consistent with the Under Secretary’s concern, that the dwell ratio fluctuation was unsustainable and detrimental to the long-term health of the force. At this point, Army senior leaders re-engaged representatives of the ARNG, the Army Reserve, employers, family members, and the governors who reached a consensus that 1:5 dwell time would minimize the risk to the force by optimizing predictability and sustainability of the RC operating tempo.⁶ This set the stage for the ARFORGEN era (2009-Current). However, the current operational environment (COE) is increasing CCMD demand for RC capabilities.

² United State Code, Title 10 Sec 991, *Management of deployments of members and measurement and data collection of unit operating and personnel tempo.*

³ Chief, National Guard Bureau, “CNGB Authorities and Assumptions Related to Rotational Use of the National Guard,” Memorandum for Chief of Staff of the Army May 31, 2013.

⁴ Mobilization & Deployment Information System, System report of ARNG mobilizations from 2001-2015.

⁵ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, Arlington, Va. Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, 2008.

⁶ “Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), September 2007

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d. In 2013, in response to increasing demand on all components of the Army, the CNGB in consultation with the Council of Governors and the Adjutants General, committed to continue generating forces based on a 1:4 dwell ratio, one year mobilized within a five-year period to sustain steady state operations and to enable the Active Component (AC) to achieve healthy deployment to dwell rates.⁷ With the COE and global demand for forces exceeding the AC's capacity, the Total Force (AC/RC) ensures the Army is postured to sustain operational demand and achieve readiness recovery goals. The Total Force allows the Army to avoid short falls in meeting and sustaining operational demands while maintaining predictability for the RC, reducing pressure on AC, and preserving strategic depth and flexibility.

e. Funding is critical to the success of delivering capability once the appropriate dwell ratio is established. With the ARNG's range of dwell ratios, funding is even more important in sustaining the long-term health of the force. Ratios lower than 1:4 are only sustainable over short periods (2-3 years). Additionally, generating forces at this ratio requires more resources. Any acceleration of this model without additional resourcing will reduce the Army's flexibility in generating ARNG ready forces over a longer period.

5. Conclusion: In summary, this paper addressed demand and funding factors associated with current dwell ratios and other proposed changes to dwell policy. Any changes to dwell ratios within a sustainable readiness model would require the commensurate level of resourcing to avoid potential pitfalls related to the resiliency of the force. Certain levels of risk can be assumed, but not at the expense of the long-term health of the force. Additionally, a focused study is recommended on the risks and benefits of increase utilization of the RC, and the current dwell ratios as suggested in the CNGB memorandum for the CSA. Such detailed study is recommended to determine the suitable model of dwell for the ARNG, and to identify and analyze potential benefits and/or risks to the long-term health of the force from a holistic perspective. The factors that should shape this study are demand, funding, and resilience.

⁷ Chief, National Guard Bureau, "CNGB Authorities and Assumptions Related to Rotational Use of the National Guard," Memorandum for Chief of Staff of the Army May 31, 2013.

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Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335