

**RECORD VERSION**

CNGB FRAMING PAPER

**THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD:  
A SOLUTION FOR THE TOTAL FORCE IN A  
FISCALLY CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT**

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## Introduction

Increased reliance on the Army National Guard (ARNG) will be essential for the Army to address anticipated budgetary shortfalls. In its former role as a strategic reserve, the ARNG provided the expansibility that enabled the rapid growth of the Army during national emergencies. As an operational reserve since 2001, the role of the ARNG has been expanded to allow the Army to cover capacity and capability gaps while recovering readiness. The net result is a cost-effective means to mitigate strategic risk while allowing the Army to meet its expansibility, recovery, regeneration, and modernization goals.

As General Ray Odierno stated in testimony earlier this year, “the amount and velocity of instability continues to increase around the world.”<sup>1</sup> The Army will continue to meet these challenges as well as future commitments with a professional, all-volunteer force. The 2015 Army Vision highlights the nature of these challenges and the need for the Army to adapt:

The complexity and unpredictability of the security environment will pose significant challenges to how the U.S. military operates, requiring an Army that can respond more rapidly to crises and more skillfully transition between types of military operations.<sup>2</sup>

Modernizing the Total Army and determining an affordable mix of forces among its three components are the two most compelling issues facing our Army today. To address these issues, we should re-examine our assumptions to identify efficiencies and maximize the effectiveness of the Total Army. I believe that a re-evaluation of certain assumptions concerning the accessibility, rotational capacity, and ability of ARNG forces to perform complex combined arms operations would uncover new efficiencies and opportunities for increased effectiveness of the Total Army in a fiscally constrained environment.

## Fiscal Context

The current fiscal situation of the nation is sobering, and Congressional Budget Office projections offer little prospect for long term improvement:

- Publicly held debt will increase to 77% of gross domestic product by the end of 2025.

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<sup>1</sup> Leipold, J.D., “Odierno warns 2016 sequestration could result in 'hollow' Army.” *ARNEWS* 28 Jan. 2015. The United States Army.

<sup>2</sup> United States. Headquarters, Department of the Army. *The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World*. Washington: Army Publishing Directorate, 2015.

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- Non-discretionary spending on entitlement programs and servicing the debt will increase from \$2.3T in 2015 to \$3.9T in 2025 – nearly two-thirds of the total federal budget.
- Corresponding discretionary outlays for national defense will increase from \$586B in 2015 to \$730B in 2025, but this represents a decrease from 16 percent to 12 percent of the total budget.<sup>3</sup>

Given these reduced defense outlays, the Army must consider ways to balance capability, capacity, and costs across its three components. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Congress have identified the need for personnel reductions and the corresponding cost savings.<sup>4</sup> For the ARNG, this has led to increased attention on full-time support (FTS). From FY 2001 through FY 2016, FTS authorizations as a percentage of ES increased from 14% to 17%. This increase, which has been framed as a response to meet rotational demand, was actually planned well before the Army's increased reliance on the Guard following 9/11.<sup>5</sup> ARNG FTS increases actually date back to pre-2001, when Congress identified the ARNG FTS levels as inadequate to meet the growing reliance on the ARNG and its shift from a strategic to an operational reserve.

It has also been said that the active Army has taken disproportionate cuts to its end strength. However, the fact remains that the AC has not yet returned to its pre-war size. The ARNG and USAR experienced little growth during the wars, and have already returned to their pre-war force structure levels with additional reductions looming. Furthermore, because of generous increases to pay and benefits enacted over the past decade, the cost of a full-time service member is significantly greater now than it was 14 years ago.

### Modernization

In 2001, the Army went to war with the equipment it had. The modular conversion of the Total Force that began in 2003 increased levels of modernization across all three components of the Army. The dramatic improvement of both the quality and quantity of ARNG equipment since September 11, 2001, has been a key factor in the transformation of the ARNG from a strategic reserve into an operational force.<sup>6</sup> ARNG modernization highlights include:

- Improvements in equipment-on-hand (EOH) quantities from 77% in 2011 to 93% at the end of FY 2014.

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<sup>3</sup> U.S. Congressional Budget Office. *Updated Budget Projections: 2015 to 2025*. Washington, D.C: CBO, 2015.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. 114th Congress. *Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016*. 5-6, 14 May 2015.

<sup>5</sup> See Enclosure 5, *Full-Time Support*, for CNGB position.

<sup>6</sup> See Enclosure 9, *Equipment and Modernization*, for CNGB position.

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- Increases in Critical Dual Use EOH percentages from 65% in 2006 to 94% in FY 2014. “Critical Dual Use” are those items which are deemed most vital in supporting domestic missions as well as the ARNG’s go-to-war mission.

Modernization and authorization document standardization along with interoperability efforts must remain key priorities in the ARNG’s equipping strategy. The risk that the ARNG will be unable to meet mission requirements will rise if modernization is allowed to wane. Interoperability of equipment between the ARNG, the joint force, and civilian emergency responders remains critical for continued National Guard support to both combatant commanders and civil authorities.

### **Force Structure Mix, Distribution, and Allocation**

In the current fiscal environment, the ARNG must maintain a viable force structure level as a component to the Total Force and to meet the National Defense Strategy.<sup>7</sup> Maintaining a FSA of 335,000, at a minimum, with an ES of at least 345,000, will allow the ARNG to sustain increased personnel readiness levels.

With regards to AC/RC force mix, the AC should be balanced to contain sufficient early deploying enablers to set the theater and support early entry maneuver capabilities, thus minimizing reliance upon RC capabilities during the earliest phases of operations. Any required follow-on forces, both maneuver and enablers, should come from the RC in order to leverage the cost savings to be found in the RC. Force sizing and rebalance initiatives should stabilize RC formations to preserve the Army’s strategic depth and avoid expenditure of scarce resources to reclassify and retrain RC members and units.<sup>8</sup>

These force sizing and rebalance initiatives require coordination and collaboration from each of the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia to ensure the distribution and allocation of forces strikes a proper balance of available capabilities. The ARNG distributes and allocates its portion of the force structure across the 54 using analytical tools and processes that give consideration to demographics, supportability, suitability, and the balancing of capabilities for domestic response. The process of stationing ARNG force structure also includes input from the Adjutants General through submitted stationing analysis documents that are reviewed by a validation board. Recommendations on stationing force structure by the validation board are brought to the Director of the ARNG for decision.

### **Expansibility**

The nation has relied on the All-Volunteer Army for the last four decades, with increasing reliance on the RC. As recent experience with “Grow the Army” demonstrated, it takes significant time to recruit, organize, train, and equip new combat formations. The mobilization of RC structure is much faster and less costly than “growing” new formations.

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<sup>7</sup> See Enclosure 1, *Force Size and Mix*, for CNGB position.

<sup>8</sup> See Enclosure 3, *Force Structure Distribution and Allocation*, for CNGB position.

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Mobilizing the force remains a core Army responsibility under federal law.<sup>9</sup> Historically, the mobilization capability of the Army has atrophied between wars. Given continued reductions in Total Army end strength, the Army must not neglect this essential first step to expanding the Army during the next conflict.

Rapid expansion of the Army is only possible by mobilizing a modernized, well-resourced, and available RC. Ideally, all Army components are composed of interoperable force structure with the RC delivering additional capacity to meet surge demand during decisive and post-conflict stability operations. Additionally, when not employed by the Army, the ARNG is available to the Governors to provide dual-use capabilities in support of civil authorities.<sup>10</sup> This represents enduring support to the distinct needs of the federal and state governments as well as an enduring cost-efficiency to the Department of Defense's role in national security and homeland defense.<sup>11</sup>

### Assumptions on Accessibility

The National Guard is all in. For unplanned contingency operations, the ARNG provides capability and depth required to meet surge requirements and post-surge stability operations that will invariably accompany any major contingency. For steady state, rotational operations, a four-year (1:3) or five-year (1:4) cycle best enables maintaining the operational Guard the nation needs. An effective use of the ARNG should enable the AC to achieve a deploy-to-dwell ratio necessary to maintain a healthy force.<sup>12</sup>

There have been many advocates for a larger AC because of the belief that RC accessibility is insufficient to meet operational demands. However, federal law places few restrictions on RC access and employment during national emergencies, and the Army can also leverage several mobilization authorities to meet enduring operational requirements with RC forces.

One reference for this belief can be traced to a RAND study on RC accessibility. In an attempt to inform AC/RC mix decisions, the study assumed force utilization rates that were initiated in 2007 to sustain two large-scale, prolonged stability operations. RAND acknowledged the limitations imposed by this assumption in the preface of their report, but subsequent readers of the study have missed this important caveat.<sup>13</sup> The misunderstanding with the RAND analysis has led to BOG-dwell ratios that were consequently aligned with two simultaneous stability operations, rather than a more balanced model for cyclical readiness. This limits the RC to 9-month tours, when the Army actually has the full 24-months of access provided by law. The analysis that underlies this

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<sup>9</sup> 10 U.S. Code § 3013 - Secretary of the Army [charges the Secretary of the Army with responsibility for mobilizing and demobilizing the Army].

<sup>10</sup> See Enclosure 10, *HLD, DSCA and National Guard Civil Support*, for CNGB position.

<sup>11</sup> See Enclosure 11, *Cyber*, for CNGB position.

<sup>12</sup> Grass, Frank J. "Authorities and Assumptions to Rotational Use of the National Guard." 1. Memorandum from CNGB for CSA. 31 May 2013.

<sup>13</sup> Klimas, J., Darilek, R., Lippiat, T., Polich, M., Sollinger, J., Dryden, J., Baxter, C., and Watts, S. *Methodology for Analyzing Relative Active-Reserve Costs to Produce Equivalent "Boots On the Ground" Output*. RAND Report #PR-463-A/OSD. ii: RAND, Mar. 2013.

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accessibility assumption continues to be cited as evidence of the costliness of ARNG combat formations in comparison to their AC counterparts and drives the justification for a large AC force.

A specific example of how this BOG-dwell methodology has influenced other matters can be illustrated in the attack aviation element of the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative.<sup>14</sup> Unless the nation is constantly at war, the Army does not need to turn every one of its AH-64 battalions on a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio. Sustaining this level of output is not feasible without supplemental appropriations that Congress only makes available during wartime. A cyclical readiness model is more appropriate for an Army that trains more than it fights.<sup>15</sup> Relying on the RC to save money during dwell would enable the Army to fund modernization and other priorities within the budget.

The ARNG and USAR were mobilized or ordered to active duty under several different laws since 2001, but principally under an authority which provides up to 24 months of active service for one million Ready Reserve members.<sup>16</sup> In 2007, after five years of continuous deployments,<sup>17</sup> Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appropriately decided to change reserve mobilization policy to sustain the health of the force for all military services. The policy implemented at that time limited RC mobilizations to 365 days, with a nine-month BOG.<sup>18</sup> It is the law, not the 2007 BOG-dwell policy, which should guide current and future AC/RC mix decisions. Similar policies may be needed again in the future for all three components should the nation become engaged in another prolonged conflict. Such policies should be imposed after the transition from decisive operations to post-conflict stability operations when necessary to preserve the health of the force. They should not be assumed as the basis for AC/RC mix decisions.

### Conclusion

As the Commission considers the optimal mix of forces among the Army's components, the Army's force generation enterprise, the distribution and allocation of ARNG force structure, and the implications of ARI on Army attack aviation, it must also consider how to best employ limited resources in a wider national security context. The fiscal realities of the current defense budget have forced the consideration of the aforementioned matters.

Adjusting the AC/RC force mix is crucial in achieving cost-efficiencies in the Army. In making those adjustments, we should not set artificial constraints upon the accessibility of the RC for wartime employment and should instead leverage the full authority under the law. Doing so provides better force mix solutions that avoid the maintenance of unneeded

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<sup>14</sup> See Enclosure 2, *Aviation Restructure Initiative*, for CNGB position.

<sup>15</sup> See Enclosure 7, *Training Strategy*, Enclosure 6, *Readiness*, and Enclosure 4, *Force Generation*, for CNGB position.

<sup>16</sup> 10 U.S. Code § 12302 - Ready Reserve.

<sup>17</sup> See Enclosure 8, *Operational Force Utilization*, for CNGB position.

<sup>18</sup> Hall, Thomas F. "Reserve Component Alert/Mobilization Decision Process Implementation." Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (M&RA), Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA). 20 Aug. 2008.

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surge capacity in the active Army and mitigates risk that can be assumed by a properly resourced RC. The establishment of a balanced force mix will allow for the reallocation of resources to aid the Army Total Force to continue its modernization efforts – to include Army aviation. This balanced force mix will concurrently allow for expansibility to serve as a strategic hedge in an uncertain and dangerous world. In the final analysis, the ARNG provides a fiscally sound solution for the Total Force.

Enclosed are eleven individual papers that detail the National Guard Bureau position on a variety of topics broadly addressed within this framing paper. They provide a Guard perspective related to the Commission's tasks. The position papers are:

1. Force Size and Mix
2. Aviation Restructure Initiative
3. Force Structure Distribution and Allocation
4. Force Generation
5. Full-Time Support
6. Readiness
7. Training Strategy
8. Operational Force Utilization
9. Equipment Modernization
10. HLD, DSCA, HS, and National Guard Civil Support
11. Cyberspace Operations

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### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 1. Force Size and Mix

a. Establish a balanced active component (AC) force structure that includes sufficient early deploying enablers to support early entry maneuver forces and to minimize reliance on (reserve component) RC capabilities during initial phases of operations.

b. Follow-on forces should also come from the RC to minimize the expenditure of resources on forces that take time to build readiness prior to employment.

c. Force size and rebalance initiatives should stabilize RC structure and formations to preserve the Army's strategic depth, minimize turbulence on RC Soldiers, and avoid extensive reinvestment of resources.

#### 2. Aviation Restructure Initiative

a. The NCFA should consider recommending to Congress, the Adjutant General and Army National Guard (ARNG) option to ARI that provides a 20 percent increase in operational Army attack aviation capacity for just two to eight percent more in annual aviation costs.

b. Distribute Army capabilities across the Total Army to balance short term operational demands and to provide depth through capacity, leveraging a less costly capability management paradigm.

c. Alternative approaches could include building fewer and smaller Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) that are organized with smaller Attack Reconnaissance Battalions (ARBs) to achieve a greater balance between the AC and the ARNG and to optimize deployments.

e. Establish cadre companies to maintain critical Army aviation skills; and equipping ARBs with fewer AH-64s.

#### 3. Force Structure Distribution and Allocation

Continue to participate in the TAA process to ensure a balanced force size and mix across the Total Army.

#### 4. Force Generation

The ARNG needs updated policies and regulations that provide predictability, unit-level deployments, funding, concurrent equipment fielding, and a mobilization-to-dwell ratios of 1:3 or 1:4 for steady-state operations, and an "all-in" ratio for deployments when our nation requires it. This will also ensure that the force continues to develop its leaders while providing predictability to Soldiers, families and employers.

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### 5. Full-Time Support

Maintain foundational readiness by sustaining fiscal year (FY) 2015 levels of Full-Time Support (FTS) in the ARNG.

### 6. Readiness

a. Resource (man, equip, and train) the ARNG to maximize unit readiness within a five-year progressive readiness cycle.

b. Establish a Trainees, Transients, Holders, and Students (TTHS) like capability for the ARNG that is above the force structure allowance to provide for some flexibility in managing the non-available population and would increase readiness levels for units.

### 7. Training Strategy

a. Maintain the ARNG as an operational reserve.

b. Annually resource four ARNG brigade combat team (BCT) rotations for the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC), allocated proportionally to the appropriate force structure.

c. Establish a Maneuver Area Training Equipment Site (MATES) at JMRC, Germany, to be used by rotational forces.

d. Provide cross component leadership opportunities (short/long tours) for Soldiers, at all levels, by reinstating the Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP). The KPUP sent key personnel to train with active component (AC) units in the field and provided ARNG commanders with non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers who had enhanced tactical and technical experience.

e. Leverage ARNG regional training institutions for increased throughput of active component (AC) and Army Reserve (USAR) Soldiers.

### 8. Operational Force Utilization

a. Codify in policy and regulation the role of the ARNG as the first line combat reserve of the Army.

b. Commit to a future funding model that resources the operational employment of the ARNG in the base budget.

c. Employ ARNG forces within a rotational construct to permit the Army to achieve readiness recovery, force regeneration, and modernization goals.

### 9. Equipment Modernization

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a. Maintain interoperability of equipment between the ARNG, the Joint Force, and civilian authorities as a critical element for the National Guard (NG) to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and for combat readiness.

b. Sustain the ARNG as an operational reserve in order to support its equipping strategy.

### **10. HLD, DSCA, HS, and National Guard Civil Support**

a. Conduct an analysis of the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) enterprise to determine if the current CBRNE construct is appropriately organized trained and equipped for future threats. Consider the units of the CBRNE enterprise to be used for foreign consequence management and training our international partners, with the understanding that they are to be used for the homeland first.

b. Leverage the NG experience gained in the Counter Drug Program to countering transnational organized crime (CTOC) and illicit organizations that threaten the homeland.

### **11. Cyberspace Operations**

a. Include the National Guard Bureau (NGB) as part of the national cybersecurity capability.

b. Continue to use the ARNG as an integral part of the nation's cyber force.

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### CNGB POSITION PAPER FORCE SIZE AND MIX

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** The Total Army must maintain a force structure level that has the appropriate depth and scalability to meet the National Defense Strategy (NDS) within acceptable risk.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

a. Establish a balanced active component (AC) force structure that includes sufficient early deploying enablers to support early entry maneuver forces and to minimize reliance on (reserve component) RC capabilities during initial phases of operations.

b. Follow-on forces should also come from the RC to minimize the expenditure of resources on forces that take time to build readiness prior to employment.

c. Force size and rebalance initiatives should stabilize RC structure and formations to preserve the Army's strategic depth, minimize turbulence on RC Soldiers, and avoid extensive reinvestment of resources.

#### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION:**

a. Force Size. The Army bases its size on the smallest acceptable force to implement the NDS. This force must have the capacity to conduct simultaneous combat operations, defend the nation at home, and sustain a minimal presence in critical regions while retaining a Global Response Force. In addition to strategic guidance, budgetary considerations play a major role in determining the overall size of the Army and the AC/RC force mix. Historically, during times of conflict or national emergency, resources are made available to expand the Army. After conflicts or during periods of protracted peace, reductions in resources have always resulted in a drawdown and subsequent rebalancing of forces. Because active component forces are the most expensive to maintain, the historical trend in peacetime has always been to cut the AC most deeply in order to maximize savings, relying on the RC to mitigate risk.

(1) The Army states the minimum force level to accomplish defense strategic guidance at acceptable risk is a force at 980,000 of Force Structure Allowance (FSA) with a force mix of 450,000 for the AC, 335,000 for the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 195,000 for the Army Reserve (USAR).

(2) Based on strategic guidance and projected funding, the size of the ARNG will reduce from 350,200 of FSA to 335,000 by Fiscal Year (FY) 17 and then reduce to 315,000 by FY19 if sequestration holds. The AC will reduce from 490,000 of FSA to 450,000 by FY17 and to 420,000 should sequestration be fully enacted.

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b. Force Mix. The Army determines Force Mix from a series of national security strategic guidance documents that broadly articulate the Army's role in the national security architecture. Specific missions, responsibilities, and parameters are used by the Army to help determine what kind of force it needs to build. To assure uniformity of force structure, the operational Army transitioned to modular based designs in the 2000s. As a result, the force authorization documents that dictate the structure of Army units are now largely identical across all three Army components and are more closely aligned to the operational environment.

c. End of Program FY15 Total Army composition:

(1) AC (490K): Operating Force (OF) = 334.4K / Generating Force (GF) = 92.1K / Trainees, Transients, Holders, and Students (TTHS) = 63.7K. The AC provides responsiveness and flexibility to deal with unexpected contingencies while sustaining Service day-to-day forward presence, training, readiness, and generating force requirements.

(2) ARNG (350.2K): OF = 313.3K / GF = 36.9K. The ARNG provides forces for: homeland defense; homeland security; defense support to civil authorities; depth, and staying power in support of regional combatant commanders.

(3) USAR (205K): OF = 149.2K / GF = 47.7K. The USAR contributes support capabilities providing depth, and staying power in support of regional combatant commanders. The USAR can provide defense support to civil authorities if required and authorized as requested by Governors.

### KEY POINTS:

a. The AC force mix is currently weighted heavily with combat force structure resulting in an imbalance that causes a reliance on support and sustainment capabilities predominantly resident in the RC. The AC provides nearly all early entry maneuver capabilities whose readiness cannot be quickly replicated by RC units, to include large, complex, training- and resource-intensive formations. However, the AC also contains a large amount of maneuver capability that is not required for early entry into theater, and could be traded for enabler capability that would be employed earlier in a contingency.

b. The Army relies on access to RC forces for specific capabilities, depth for enduring requirements, and to alleviate pressure on the AC. The RC forces are sized to supplement early deploying AC forces across the spectrum of contingency operations.

c. The ARNG retains a balanced mix of maneuver with maneuver support and maneuver sustainment units in sufficient quantity for employment without support from other components, and still provide additional units to relieve AC shortfalls.

d. Changes to force structure create turbulence, affecting readiness and resources. This turbulence has a greater impact over a longer period in the RC than in the AC.

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Because of their civilian careers, RC Soldiers cannot devote themselves full-time to training and attending Army schools to acquire new military skills. Because they must be recruited in the locations where new structure is established, changes to RC force structure require much longer to build readiness than AC formations. An example is the accelerated modular conversion of ARNG BCTs and Division HQs. The AC can surge training and relocate Soldiers quickly to build structure and meet demand as demonstrated by the 'Grow the Army' (GTA) initiative. The GTA plan provided the AC an additional 65,000 Soldiers to meet surge requirements, while the RC received modest increases to authorizations of 8,200 (ARNG) and 1,000 (USAR).

e. The ability to expand and reconstitute capabilities is key to the Army's plan to mitigate risk during times of resource constraints. The AC can reconstitute units rapidly by moving Soldiers and resources to units. Conversely, the RC moves units to Soldiers and reconstitution is a lengthy, resource-intensive process. In cases of large, complex organizations such as BCTs, these capabilities are hard to replace without a baseline of experience to draw from. To put it another way, while it is a challenging and time-consuming process to build a new Division, CAB or BCT in the AC, it is extremely difficult to build an organization of that size and complexity in the RC without having a like-type unit nearby from which to draw senior leaders who have been developed over the course of decades of military training and experience. In effect, once that type of structure is eliminated from the RC, it cannot be replaced.

**CONCLUSION:** The Army must retain a force structure mix across all of its components sufficient to meet the NDS while minimizing risk and avoiding extensive reinvestment of resources.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Establish a balanced AC force structure that includes sufficient early deploying enablers to support early entry maneuver forces and to minimize reliance on RC capabilities during initial phases of operations.

b. Follow-on forces should also come from the RC to minimize the expenditure of resources on forces that take time to build readiness prior to employment.

c. Force size and rebalance initiatives should stabilize RC structure and formations to preserve the Army's strategic depth, minimize turbulence on RC Soldiers, and avoid extensive reinvestment of resources.

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### CNGB POSITION PAPER ON AVIATION RESTRUCTURE INITIATIVE (ARI)

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** There are reasonable arguments on the ARI issue. The Army has to get ARI right, and that includes achieving compromise and balance among all of its components. The intent herein is to provide facts on various aspects of ARI and provide the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) with some recommendations going forward.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- a. The NCFA should consider recommending to Congress, the Adjutant General and Army National Guard (ARNG) option to ARI that provides a 20 percent increase in operational Army attack aviation capacity for just two to eight percent more in annual aviation costs.
- b. Distribute Army capabilities across the Total Army to balance short term operational demands and to provide depth through capacity, leveraging a less costly capability management paradigm.
- c. Alternative approaches could include building fewer and smaller Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) that are organized with smaller Attack Reconnaissance Battalions (ARBs) to achieve a greater balance between the AC and the ARNG and to optimize deployments.
- d. Establish cadre companies to maintain critical Army aviation skills; and equipping ARBs with fewer AH-64s.

#### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION:**

- a. The leadership of the National Guard agrees with the majority of ARI. The fiscal challenges facing the nation necessitate a restructure of the Army's aviation program. Reducing the total Army helicopter fleet to realize the desired \$12 billion in cost avoidance is supportable from the ARNG stand point. This position is taken despite some doubts about the training effectiveness and cost efficiency of the UH-72 as the training aircraft for the Army and a preference for retaining an armed aerial scout platform. While a dedicated armed aerial scout platform would have been preferable, the ARNG supports the divestment of the OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and replacing them with AH-64 Apaches inside the air cavalry squadrons.
- b. The Congressional, governor, and Adjutant General disagreement with ARI includes the portion pertaining to the transfer of the ARNG Apache fleet to the AC.
- c. In December 2013, an ARNG alternative plan was proposed – one that maintains six Apache battalions in the ARNG while still enabling the \$12 billion in larger cost avoidance. The ARNG proposal achieved four additional Attack Reconnaissance

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Battalions (ARBs) by shifting Apaches from the Korea equipment set to operational ARNG ARBs, providing less Apaches in float and test accounts, and upgrading additional “D” model Apaches to “E” models from assets on hand.

d. Two entities, the Department of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), subsequently compared both plans and reached two main conclusions – demand satisfaction was roughly the same, while the ARNG plan costs roughly two to eight percent more for a 100 percent operational reserve capability with Guardsmen on active duty more than one year out of five.

e. Several questions remain: Is it a good investment to maintain an additional 20 percent of Apache capacity (24 battalions vice 20 battalions under the ARI plan) in the ARNG for an additional two to eight percent of the cost? Is it prudent to risk losing the highly trained and combat experienced Apache pilots and maintainers that currently serve in the Guard? At a time of historical security instability, is it necessary or wise to eliminate all strategic reversibility in this platform? Given the fiscal situation, is it prudent to place ALL of one of our most expensive platforms in the most expensive component of the Army?

f. A question that has been heard as part of this debate is: Why do Governors need Apaches? The overarching principle that is missed by this question is that our nation has strategically chosen to retain military capability and capacity of this kind in its reserve components (RCs). This strategic choice is based on both an appreciation for the cost efficiencies realized by maintaining capabilities in the RC and the value of ensuring that any significant commitment of the Army is representative of the Total Force, which includes citizen-Soldiers.

g. A review of ARB readiness clearly shows that Soldiers in ARNG ARBs have retained high readiness levels throughout the Army's force generation process. The historical performance of ARNG combat aviation in Iraq and Afghanistan fully measures up to the level achieved by their active component (AC) counterparts.

h. Removing CABs with lethal Apache capability from the ARNG severely limits the ability to train and develop ARNG divisions with their full complement of organic and doctrinal assets, and the ability of ARNG brigade combat teams (BCTs) to conduct Air-Ground Integration training, handicapping leader development in the ARNG.

i. ARI is inconsistent with enduring and statutory-based force structure management principles of maintaining uniform structure across the Army. This lack of uniformity generates second and third-order effects on the Army aviation force. The plan creates different aviation brigade types by component, and prevents attack aviation interchangeability and interoperability between the AC and the ARNG.

j. Under full ARI, the state of Arizona (AZ) will lose its ARB affecting the ARNG's support to Peace Vanguard (PV). PV is a 20-year Foreign Military Sales (FMS) sponsorship of the Republic of Singapore Apache force through 2022. An Army Flight Training Detachment manned by 14 full-time AZ Guardsmen and 12 contractors provide training, logistics, and administrative support to eight Singapore Apaches co-located with the AZARNG ARB in a \$12M permanent hangar in Marana, AZ funded by the

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Republic of Singapore. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports & Cooperation (DASA DE&C) is coordinating with HQDA, AZARNG, and Singapore to find an acceptable future relationship. The impact of severing this long-term relationship with a key strategic Pacific area security partner is not known.

k. The Army's only depot-level maintenance capability in the battlefield for all combat helicopters resides in the four ARNG Theater Aviation Support Maintenance Groups (TASMGs). The removal of all Apaches from the ARNG force structure through ARI will make it more difficult to recruit, train, and retain ARNG Apache mechanics; will negatively impact the mechanics' proficiency; and will limit the ARNG's ability to resource the full combat mission of the TASMG. Going forward, the established requirement for depot-level Apache maintenance on the battlefield can be resourced three ways. The ARNG can continue to do the mission with ARNG Apache mechanics, or the Army can fill the TASMG Apache positions with Active Component (AC) mechanics, or the Army can pay for maintenance contractors when the TASMG deploys. The fact that for 10 years, TASMGs have maintained wartime maintenance capabilities for the Kiowa Warrior indicates a similar program for Apache maintenance is viable through an annual training program. The best value (and least costly) solution for the Army is to satisfy the Apache battlefield maintenance requirement with ARNG mechanics.

**CONCLUSION:** We should re-consider the assumptions underlying ARI in light of an ever-changing operational and fiscal environment. In the interest of rapidly developing a solution for an affordability problem, the AH-64 lifecycle costs may not have been fully examined. The NCFAs should study the benefits and impacts of forward stationing, lower frequency and duration of deployments, as well as the Total Force benefits of a continued reliance on the ARNG as a combat aviation reserve of the Army. Alternative approaches to achieve the Army's goal of increasing the affordability of the Army's aviation portfolio need further consideration.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. The NCFAs should consider recommending to Congress, the Adjutant General and Army National Guard (ARNG) option to ARI that provides a 20 percent increase in operational Army attack aviation capacity for just two to eight percent more in annual aviation costs.
- b. Distribute Army capabilities across the Total Army to balance short term operational demands and to provide depth through capacity, leveraging a less costly capability management paradigm.
- c. Alternative approaches could include building fewer and smaller Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) that are organized with smaller Attack Reconnaissance Battalions (ARBs) to achieve a greater balance between the AC and the ARNG and to optimize deployments.
- d. Establish cadre companies to maintain critical Army aviation skills; and equipping ARBs with fewer AH-64s.

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# CNGB POSITION PAPER FORCE STRUCTURE DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOCATION

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** The Total Army Analysis (TAA) process led by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G3/7 Force Management Directorate (FM), with oversight provided by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, creates and resources the forces necessary for the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) to execute their National Military Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance tasks. It balances the Army's force structure demands (manpower and equipment) against available and planned resources while balancing risk. The Army National Guard (ARNG) allocates its portion of the resourced force structure across the 54 States, Territories, and the District of Columbia (states) using analytical tools and processes that give consideration to demographics, supportability, suitability, and the balancing of capabilities.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Continue to participate in the TAA process to ensure a balanced force size and mix across the Total Army.

### BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

a. Regulations and guidance: TAA is guided by Army Regulation 71-11 (Total Army Analysis). Each year, the HQDA G-3/7 FM publishes TAA guidance for a corresponding five-year TAA cycle that coincides with the Program Objective Memorandum's fiscal timeline.

b. TAA is conducted in two phases: 1) The TAA Capability Demand Analysis Phase (a.k.a., the Requirements Phase); and 2) The TAA Resourcing Phase. The Requirements Phase is a quantitative analytic process that includes simulations to establish required Army capabilities across a broad range of scenarios that "shape" the Army to meet a wide variety of demands. This process identifies a significantly larger requirement than the Army is able to resource based on its existing Total Obligation Authority. The Resourcing Phase acts as the "art" of the TAA process by adding the "human in the loop" to translate raw requirements into an Army that is sized to meet the wide range of requirements identified in the requirements phase with as little risk as possible given constrained resources. This phase culminates with a resourcing decision codified in a document titled Army Structure Message (ARSTRUC) and endorsed by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army. The output is a listing of the numbers and types of units that will be resourced in each component of the Army.

c. Stationing ARNG force structure allocations: Outputs from each TAA cycle require the ARNG to reassess its force structure mix to ensure that it continues to adequately and effectively support both federal and state missions given changing doctrine and unit designs. A key goal is to minimize turbulence and change that would decrease readiness and increase costs. Tools and processes include:

(1) Force Structure Strategic Plan (FSSP): This document is solicited annually from the states and outlines the Adjutant General's (TAG's) strategic vision for force

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structure within his/her state. The FSSP is used by the ARNG to both resource and distribute force structure allocations generated by the TAA resourcing phase.

(2) The Force Structure Decision Support Tool (FSDST) helps in developing stationing recommendations for new force structure. It uses a set of evaluation criteria fully vetted across the ARNG community to generate an order of merit list (OML) of states that ranks states according to the potential success that new structure will have in a given state, and the need for the new structure.

(3) Stationing of new force structure requires that the ARNG Force Validation Board (ARNG-FVB) review state-populated stationing analysis memoranda and make recommendations on stationing force structure to the Director, ARNG (DARNG). The DARNG makes the final decision and notifies the affected states.

d. Reductions and divestment of ARNG force structure: Force structure reductions may be directed, or rebalance actions required to posture the ARNG to meet strategic guidance. Tools and processes include:

(1) The Unit Analysis Tool (UAT) is a metric-based tool designed to assess and compare the readiness of “like-type” capabilities across multiple states. It provides an OML-ranking of capabilities that are based on personnel and Unit Status Report metrics that assist in both divesting and modernizing capabilities across the states.

(2) Force structure reductions require a formal notification to the Force Structure General Officer Advisory Committee and to all 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia. Reductions follow two paths: standard or complex. A standard reduction uses the UAT with input from the Adjutants General through the Force Management Unit Review Board (FMURB). The FMURB consolidates the “science” and “art” portions of the process and reports recommendations to the TAGs with courses of action and recommendations for submission to the DARNG for decision. A complex reduction is used to implement large scale systemic force structure changes in the ARNG (e.g., reduction from 350K to 335K ARNG force structure allowance). Because of the complexity of these large scale changes, the Complex Force Management Working Group is made up of designated representatives from the states and select representatives from the ARNG Directorate. The Working Group reports to the TAGs on courses of action and recommendations prior to submitting them to the DARNG for decision.

**CONCLUSION:** The ARNG actively participates in the TAA process that creates and resources the forces needed by the GCCs while assuming a certain amount of risk. The resulting portion of the force that the ARNG resources is allocated across the 54 States, Territories, and the District of Columbia using analytical tools and processes that give consideration to demographics, supportability, suitability, and the balancing of capabilities.

**RECCOMENDATION:** Continue to participate in the TAA process to ensure a balanced force size and mix across the Total Army.

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### CNGB POSITION PAPER FORCE GENERATION

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** The Total Force approach is the only way for the Army to meet its operational demands in our current fiscal environment. The Army National Guard (ARNG) has consistently provided trained and ready operational forces to the Total Force over the past 14 years. To achieve the readiness levels required to meet operational demands, the ARNG has been at the forefront in implementing the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN). However, fiscal realities require the development of new ways to generate ready forces to meet operational demands. The ARNG is committed to the continued and expanded use of the ARNG as an operational force.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The ARNG needs updated policies and regulations that provide predictability, unit-level deployments, funding, concurrent equipment fielding, and a mobilization-to-dwell ratios of 1:3 or 1:4 for steady-state operations, and an “all-in” ratio for deployments when our nation requires it. This will also ensure that the force continues to develop its leaders while providing predictability to Soldiers, families and employers.

#### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION:**

a. ARFORGEN is the current progressive readiness model used for generating ready units that are accessible, sustainable, affordable, and deployable. The force generation process builds readiness in a progressive, predictable manner, allowing the Army to meet its readiness goals while optimizing the application of limited resources.

b. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s sequestration guidance called for the development of a new force generation model to maximize readiness with limited resources: the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM). The intent is to maximize readiness to achieve a balance between operational demands and potential contingency requirements within the limits of available resources. SRM builds units up from a baseline level of readiness, sustains readiness for as long as affordable, and rapidly recovers readiness back to baseline after employment.

c. SRM can only achieve overall Army readiness goals through the Total Force approach. An expeditionary Army is reliant on enabling capabilities that predominantly reside in the Reserve Component (RC). An accurate portrayal of the readiness build of RC forces is required to understand the true availability of forces for a contingency response. Additionally, ARNG readiness creates the trade space that allows the Army to regenerate full spectrum readiness lost over the last 14 years. The Army cannot achieve readiness goals and sustain operational requirements for brigade combat teams and enablers without the inclusion of RC forces.

d. The current planning assumption is that most ARNG units will remain on a sustainable, proven, and predictable 60-month progressive cycle, with a 48-month

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progressive cycle for ARNG Divisions. Maintaining a rotational readiness model that provides ARNG Soldiers with predictable utilization has worked well for the ARNG over the past 14 years, and should be continued in the future under SRM.

**CONCLUSION:** Current budget constraints require the development of new ways to provide ready forces to meet future operational demands. The ARNG is committed to the continued and expanded use of the ARNG as an operational force, but mobilization-to-dwell policies and regulations must be brought up to date to meet that commitment.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The ARNG needs updated policies and regulations that provide predictability, unit-level deployments, funding, concurrent equipment fielding, and a mobilization-to-dwell ratios of 1:3 or 1:4 for steady-state operations, and an “all-in” ratio for deployments when our nation requires it. This will also ensure that the force continues to develop its leaders while providing predictability to Soldiers, families and employers.

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**CNGB POSITION PAPER**  
**FULL-TIME SUPPORT**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** Maintaining the current level of Army National Guard (ARNG) full-time support (FTS) resourcing is essential to ensure the continued foundational readiness of the ARNG. Foundational readiness for the ARNG is the baseline level of readiness required to meet Title 10 and 32 functions and to account for personnel and equipment. If foundational readiness is not maintained, the ARNG will find increased difficulty with managing the training, administration, logistics, family assistance, and maintenance resources necessary to develop and maintain the ARNG as an operational reserve of the Army and the militia of the several States.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Maintain foundational readiness by sustaining fiscal year (FY) 2015 levels of FTS in the ARNG.

**BACKGROUND INFORMATION:**

a. The Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) is responsible for and has approval authority for all manpower policies in the Army, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). ASA (M&RA) carries out this responsibility by providing guidance and direction on the Army FTS and military technician (MilTechs) program. The Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) is responsible for establishing policies for the employment and management of National Guard (NG) technicians and managing the ARNG manpower program in accordance with Army regulations and policies. The CNGB plans, programs, budgets, allocates, and controls the ARNG FTS program (which includes MilTechs) in the states, territories, and the District of Columbia and subordinate staff agencies.

b. The ARNG is supported by a small full-time force (17% of the ARNG total authorized end strength) who keep the entire ARNG operational on a day-to-day basis.<sup>1</sup> The authorized Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and MilTech strength is set annually in the National Defense Authorization Act. The FY15 AGR and Non-Dual Status MilTech (a civilian employee not required to maintain unit membership) authorizations of 31,385 and 1,600 respectively are a ceiling that cannot be exceeded. The Dual-Status MilTech (a civilian employee required to serve in an ARNG unit) authorization of 27,210 on the other hand is a floor that must be maintained in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 10216.<sup>2</sup>

c. The total full-time workforce consists of 60,195 AGRs and MilTechs. Both categories of employees are statutorily responsible for assisting in the organizing,

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<sup>1</sup> See SecArmy Statement to HASC, 17 Sept 2012, pg. 2: "Since 2002, the Army has added 15,736 FTS authorizations to support its RC, but FTS authorizations still fall well short of requirements due to increased demands on the RC for operational readiness."

<sup>2</sup> Military technicians authorizations and personnel can be reduced as part of military force structure reductions.

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administering, training, and instructing of National Guardsmen. Additionally, AGR personnel are authorized to recruit.

d. The AGR and MilTech programs are career programs intended to provide institutional memory and continuity to the ARNG. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1205.18 requires that the AGR program be “administered as career programs” and MilTechs be “[m]anaged as a separate category of dual-status civilian personnel.”

e. Although ARNG manpower requirements have increased over the past decade as a result of our transition from a strategic reserve to an operational force, the increase in ARNG full-time authorizations was principally a result of decisions made prior to 9/11.<sup>3</sup> ARNG FTS increases date back to pre-9/11, when Congress identified the ARNG FTS levels as inadequate to meet the growing reliance on the ARNG and its shift from a strategic to an operational reserve. In January 2001, the ASA (M&RA) and G3/5/7 stated, “The Army’s transformation strategy and efforts to fully integrate the RC have placed increased demands on RC [reserve component] FTS manpower requirements... [and] cause the Army to rely a greater extent on the ARNG to meet global commitments.” RC FTS authorizations were gradually increased in subsequent years to address these shortfalls.

f. A 2008 House Armed Services Committee (HASC) report recognized the need to increase FTS levels to support the RC transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. This recognition was reflected in the HASC mark-up that became the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law 110-417, 14 October 2014. As highlighted in DoDD 1200.17, managing the RCs as an Operational Reserve, DoD recognized that the RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.

g. Certain units are entirely manned by NG personnel serving on full-time NG duty (32 U.S.C. §502(f)) (in particular Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams). Such personnel count against the ARNG’s FTS authorizations. Generally-speaking most ARNG units are manned at approximately 68% of their FTS requirements.

h. As stated earlier, foundational readiness for the ARNG is the baseline level of readiness required to meet Title 10 and 32 functions and to account for ARNG personnel and equipment. In practical terms, foundational readiness is:

- (1) Personnel Readiness (“P” rating).
- (2) Equipment Readiness/Serviceability (“R” rating).
- (3) Equipment-on-Hand (“S” rating).

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<sup>3</sup> See SecArmy Statement to HASC, 17 Sept 2012, pg. 3: “[Referencing ARNG/AR FTS requirements chart] Barring significant changes in RC organizational structure, workload or readiness expectations, ASA (M&RA) expects these FTS requirements to remain constant for 3-5 years.”

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i. In contrast, Training Readiness (“T” rating) is generated through the implementation of resources to conduct collective training events. Units must have a foundational level of P, S, and R readiness prior to being able to conduct unit-level training.

### KEY POINTS:

a. ARNG FTS personnel generate and maintain the ARNG’s foundational readiness in over 2,300 armories, 110 training centers, and numerous maintenance facilities across nearly 2,600 communities. Additionally, ARNG FTS personnel are the mechanism through which the ARNG delivers programs to units, Soldiers, and Families, much like at AC installations.

b. To accomplish these functions, FTS personnel operate complex Army systems and programs to manage unit readiness that require extensive experience and credentialing. The technical expertise and continuity the FTS personnel provide is a key enabler to sustain readiness and effectively manage DoD and Army data systems. This type of expertise is difficult to develop outside of the career status program, and cannot be consistently found in Soldiers serving short-term active duty for operational support (ADOS) tours.

c. A critical lesson learned during the last 14 years of war is while FTS is essential to sustaining foundational readiness, it is also critical to optimizing mobilization throughput in support of combatant commanders and homeland defense.

d. Reductions in FTS programs will impact the readiness of critical homeland defense capabilities and dual status equipment readiness.

e. The ARNG has not experienced wartime-related FTS growth. HQDA and Congress initiated the FTS ramp as part of an overall effort to address pre-9/11 readiness requirements associated with transforming the NG from a strategic to an operational reserve.

**CONCLUSION:** For the ARNG to achieve a baseline level of readiness to meet Title 10 and 32 functions requires a certain level of foundational readiness that FTS personnel provide. Maintaining, FTS personnel levels in the ARNG will go a long way in sustaining the ability of the ARNG of being the operational reserve of the Army, especially in a fiscally constrained environment. Otherwise, the ARNG will find it difficult in meeting training, administration, logistics, family assistance, and maintenance readiness goals.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Maintain foundational readiness by sustaining FY15 levels of FTS in the ARNG.

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### **CNGB POSITION PAPER READINESS**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** As part of the Total Force, the Army National Guard (ARNG) must remain globally responsive, regionally engaged, and protective of the Homeland in an unpredictable global security environment. Maximizing readiness for ARNG units is the lynchpin in ensuring that we have the ability to provide trained and operationally ready forces necessary to achieve these ends. If the ARNG is to remain an effective and efficient part of the Total Force, then ensuring the resources are available is critical to the readiness and sustainment of the ARNG and ultimately ensures the successful delivery of our complete capabilities and support.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

a. Resource (man, equip, and train) the ARNG to maximize unit readiness within a five-year progressive readiness cycle.

b. Establish a Trainees, Transients, Holders, and Students (TTHS) like capability for the ARNG that is above the force structure allowance to provide for some flexibility in managing the non-available population and would increase readiness levels for units.

#### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION:**

a. ARNG readiness has improved over the past 14 years as the Army realized that it requires trained and ready operational forces from all components to execute the full-range of missions. The primary mechanism for ensuring the readiness of ARNG Soldiers is by managing the manning, equipping, and training of ARNG units.

b. The ARNG developed, implemented, and continues to use a five-year progressive readiness cycle. The duration and predictability of this cyclic model is instrumental to the dual federal and state roles of the ARNG. Each year, approximately 20 percent of the ARNG force structure is in the "most ready" status and available to conduct missions. The remainder of the force is at various levels of readiness while employed at home or abroad. ARNG manning, equipping, and training levels are now at historic highs. We must sustain these levels to ensure that the ARNG retains the agility and versatility required of an operational reserve.

c. Although manning and equipping levels of readiness take the most time to achieve, they are the easiest to sustain. The key to sustaining the manning of ARNG units is an Army schools program that ensures professional military education and specialty training for Soldiers, resulting in units with at least 85 percent of Soldiers individually trained and prepared for collective training. While the initial cost of equipping ARNG units is the same as for the active component, the cost of sustaining equipment readiness is somewhat lower due to the reduced operational demands on a

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part-time force. However, both the initial equipping and sustainment are critical to ensuring interoperability between the Army's three components.

d. As in all components of the Army, the high levels of training proficiency and overall readiness achieved in the ARNG build upon the high levels of manning and equipping. To sustain these training and readiness levels, we must secure a baseline level of training proficiency across the force. The baseline is secured by maintaining the five-year progressive readiness cycle<sup>1</sup>, and culminates with units being "most ready" following a Combat Training Center. For units that receive eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) training, which supplements CTC rotations, can reduce post-mobilization training and provide participating units the opportunity to reach T-3 status.<sup>2</sup> Through this model, tested and proven over the past 14 years of war, the ARNG can retain the capabilities and depth required to serve as an operational force and crucial component of the Army Total Force.

e. Unless units are undergoing a major reorganization, those completing the available year in the progressive readiness cycle do not experience the turnover of personnel that AC units do; therefore units generally maintain a higher level of collective readiness as they move back through the progressive readiness cycle. The Army should, therefore, continue to resource ARNG units exiting the Available phase at a higher level than what is currently stipulated for the Reset phase to maintain the existing readiness and reduce the resources required to bring them back from Reset.

f. A key driver for readiness levels in the ARNG is the lack of a TTHS account similar to that in the Active Component (AC). Regardless of the component, there will always be a percentage of the population that is considered non-available because of schooling, transitioning to a new unit, medical or other reasons. The AC has a TTHS account of ~13 percent of the AC force structure to offset the loss of readiness these Soldiers create. The creation of a TTHS like capability for the ARNG that is above the force structure allowance would provide some flexibility for the ARNG in managing the non-available population and would increase readiness levels for units.

g. The key component in all of these readiness enablers is ensuring that the resources are available to implement. Regardless of the component, readiness levels have a direct correlation with resourcing. The more resourcing that is applied, the greater the level of readiness that is achieved. Increased resourcing for readiness allows the ARNG to participate in more CTC and XCTC training and allows Soldiers to attend both Annual Training (AT) and Professional Military Education (PME) schools in the same year. The benefit to the Army and ARNG results in maintaining a higher

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<sup>1</sup> With 1:3 deployment cycles for unplanned contingency operations.

<sup>2</sup> T-3 is a Training Readiness rating. The Training Readiness rating reflects the commander's assessment of unit proficiency in the Mission Essential Tasks (METs) associated with its core functions/designed capabilities. T-3 corresponds to 55 to 69 percent under AR 220-1, Table 9-4.

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readiness level throughout the year. This improves the response time and the quality of the ARNG force thus reducing the burden on the more costly AC force.

**CONCLUSION:** The key to sustaining the readiness of the ARNG is ensuring adequate resources are available for schools, training, combat center rotations, a TTHS like account, and adequate support of readiness levels achieved in the available year. ARNG units are capable of achieving and maintaining higher readiness levels at a fraction of the cost of the AC with commensurate resources to support. The application of these resources allows the ARNG to maintain existing readiness, reduce the population of non-available Soldiers in units, participate in more major exercises and attend both AT and PME in the same year. The additional investment in the ARNG is an offset of savings providing additional capability and responsiveness.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- a. Resource (man, equip, and train) the ARNG to maximize unit readiness within a five-year progressive readiness cycle.
- b. Establish a TTHS like capability for the ARNG that is above the force structure allowance to provide for some flexibility in managing the non-available population and would increase readiness levels for units.

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### CNGB POSITION PAPER TRAINING STRATEGY

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** The new Army National Guard (ARNG) Training Strategy supports the National Guard's top four priorities: *Provide Trained and Ready Operational Forces; Be Good Stewards of Our Resources; Sustain the National Guard Community; and Forge and Maintain Partnerships.* Additionally, the ARNG Training Strategy leverages the Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) by providing a progressive method of developing leaders and training units which supports the requirements of both combatant commanders (CCDRs) and civil authorities.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Maintain the ARNG as an operational reserve.
- b. Annually resource four ARNG brigade combat team (BCT) rotations for the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC), allocated proportionally to the appropriate force structure.
- c. Establish a Maneuver Area Training Equipment Site (MATES) at the JMRC, Germany, to be used by rotational forces.
- d. Provide cross component leadership opportunities (short/long tours) for Soldiers, at all levels, by reinstating the Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP). The KPUP sent key personnel to train with active component (AC) units in the field and provided ARNG commanders with non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers who had enhanced tactical and technical experience.
- e. Leverage ARNG regional training institutions for increased throughput of AC and Army Reserve (USAR) Soldiers.

**BACKGROUND INFORMATION:** The ARNG's Training Strategy is intended to develop decisive action capability (the concept of continuous, simultaneous offense, defense, stability or defense support of civilian authorities) in ARNG forces.

- a. The ARNG continually modifies its training strategy to maintain the force as an operational reserve by focusing on decisive operations. The ARNG will aggressively schedule collective training events to meet established training proficiency levels for units as they progress through the force generation cycle.
- b. The role of leaders in training is emphasized as they develop and execute progressive, challenging, and realistic training guided by mission command.
- c. The intent is for the ARNG to send two to four BCTs to a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation each year, building decisive action capability at company level maneuver

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proficiency and battalion/brigade mission command for employment by CCDRs. In addition, the ARNG will provide all CTC rotations with enabler support which provides a platform to build decisive action proficiency in Functional/Multi-functional units. Supporting a rotational plan to employ these brigades with follow-on missions supports an efficient use of resources, relieves stress on the AC, and builds total force readiness.

d. In addition to CTC rotations, the training strategy includes additional culminating training events including the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC), Warfighter Exercises (WFX) and Multi-echelon Integrated Brigade Training (MIBT) to progressively build and sustain decisive action capability and training readiness. This increased readiness reduces ARNG post-mobilization training time, thus, making our units more accessible for employment.

e. Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development codifies the One Army School System comprising AC and Reserve Component schools as the most efficient and effective manner to support individual training without regard to component.

f. The ARNG training strategy develops leaders by leveraging other opportunities. The ARNG currently employs Overseas Deployment Training (ODT); ARNG and Active Component Brigade Partnerships; State Partnership Program (SPP) engagements; the Mission Command Training Support Program (MCTSP); functional and professional development training at the Warrior Training Center (WTC), Fort Benning, Georgia; and the Professional Education Center (PEC), Camp Robinson, Arkansas.

**CONCLUSION:** The ARNG will leverage the ATRP to integrate with the AC and the Army Reserve in all major training exercises to expand our leader development opportunities. The ARNG supports a fluid and progressive movement of Soldiers across components and statuses to encourage volunteerism under ATRP. All units, whether BCTs or Functional/Multi-functional units, will benefit from these opportunities, thus, producing flexible, adaptable leaders well into the future.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Maintain the ARNG as an operational reserve.
- b. Annually resource four ARNG BCT rotations for the NTC, the JRTC, and the JMTC allocated proportionally to the appropriate force structure.
- c. Establish a MATES at JMRC, Germany, to be used by rotational forces.
- d. Provide cross component leadership opportunities (short/long tours) for Soldiers, at all levels, by reinstating the KPUP. The KPUP sent key personnel to train with AC units in the field and provided ARNG commanders with NCOs and officers who had enhanced tactical and technical experience.
- e. Leverage ARNG regional training institutions for increased throughput of AC and USAR Soldiers.

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### CNGB POSITION PAPER OPERATIONAL FORCE

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** The investment in the Army National Guard (ARNG) has proven its value to the Army and the nation over the last 14 years. Continued use of the ARNG as an operational force allows the Army to cover capacity and capability gaps while recovering readiness. The net result is a cost-effective means to mitigating strategic risk.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- a. Codify in policy and regulation the role of the ARNG as the first line combat reserve of the Army.
- b. Commit to a future funding model that resources the operational employment of the ARNG in the base budget.
- c. Employ ARNG forces within a rotational construct to permit the Army to achieve readiness recovery, force regeneration, and modernization goals.

#### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION:**

a. For the past 14 years, the ARNG has provided trained and ready operational forces to the combatant commanders in support of sustained contingency operations. Maintaining the ARNG as an operational force, and sustaining the ability to project these forces through consistent employment has proven invaluable to the Army, providing critical strategic depth and flexibility. Despite increasing fiscal austerity, the demand for ARNG capabilities has remained high even as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have drawn down. ARNG Soldiers have consistently expressed a desire to be deployed for real-world missions. However, lack of funding has often been a roadblock to employing ARNG capabilities to their fullest.

b. Planned end strength reductions across the Total Force increase the challenge of meeting global demands. Applying a rotational construct simultaneously permits the Army to achieve readiness recovery, force regeneration, and modernization goals. The active Army will have to choose between maintaining forward presence to support recovery goals or sacrificing readiness goals to provide rotational forces. Employment of the ARNG as an operational force provides two crucial benefits to the Total Force. First, it increases the pool of units that can be drawn on for a mission, specifically Brigade Combat Teams, Combat Aviation Brigades and Division headquarters. Second, it is critical to sustaining ARNG leader development and giving the ARNG greater agility and capacity to respond to emergent requirements.

**CONCLUSION:** The increasing demand for ARNG formations to support the nation's strategic priorities and commitments requires the requisite resourcing for the employment of the ARNG as a cost efficient operational force. In this vital role, the

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ARNG provides for the continued development leaders and unit capabilities. The appeal of the ARNG as a cost efficient operational force is supported by the latest data that shows the low number of post-mobilization days required to deploy for a variety of mission sets of varying complexity.<sup>1</sup>

### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- a. Codify in policy and regulation the role of the ARNG as the first line combat reserve of the Army.
- b. Commit to a future funding model that resources the operational employment of the ARNG in the base budget.
- c. Employ ARNG forces within a rotational construct to permit the Army to achieve readiness recovery, force regeneration, and modernization goals.

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<sup>1</sup> 2014 Army Reserve Component Submission to Congress required by NDAA 1994, shows that the fourteen RC units mobilized in FY 2013 only needed a range of 22 post-mobilization training days, for elements of a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (156 Soldiers) deploying for a security mission to 86 post-mobilization training days, for elements of an IBC (373 Soldiers) deploying for a security force assistance mission.

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### CNGB POSITION PAPER EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** The dramatic improvement of Army National Guard (ARNG) equipment readiness since 9/11 has been a key factor in its transformation from a strategic reserve into an operational force. Modernization and interoperability efforts remain key priorities in the ARNG's equipping strategy. If these efforts are allowed to wane, there is a risk that the ARNG will not meet mission requirements at home and abroad.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Maintain interoperability of equipment between the ARNG, the Joint Force, and civilian authorities as a critical element for the National Guard (NG) to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and for combat readiness.
- b. Sustain the ARNG as an operational reserve in order to support its equipping strategy.

#### BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

- a. The ARNG is actively engaged in the acquisition and management of resources to provide trained and equipped personnel to execute federal and domestic missions. The ARNG directly coordinates future year equipment acquisition by participating in the Equipping Program Evaluation Group (EE PEG) in development of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

- b. In concert with Headquarters, Department of the Army G8, the ARNG acquisition efforts have paid off. ARNG modernization highlights include:

- (1) Improvements on equipment-on-hand (EOH) quantities from 77% in 2011 to 93% at the end of FY 2014; a 21% increase in three years.

- (2) Increases on Critical Dual Use equipment (Army items determined critical to the support of homeland defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities) EOH percentages from 65% in 2006 to 94% in FY 2014; a 45% increase in the last nine years.

- c. The ARNG will receive a projected 38,451 pieces of equipment valued at approximately \$7.9B from March 2015 through August 2016. In addition, the Army continues to fund the modernization of existing ARNG equipment, including \$135.5M for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. The FY 2016 President's Budget request provides an Army investment of approximately \$1.9B in base funding for ARNG equipment which does not include National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding.

**CONCLUSION:** The ARNG has experienced great improvements in its equipment readiness, and it continues to highlight modernization and interoperability as key

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priorities, the ARNG's equipping strategy depends upon a sustained investment in the ARNG as an operational reserve.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- a. Maintain interoperability of equipment between the ARNG, the Joint Force, and civilian authorities as a critical element for the NG to provide DSCA and for combat readiness.
- b. Sustain the ARNG as an operational reserve in order to support its equipping strategy.

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### CNGB POSITION PAPER HOMELAND DEFENSE, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES, HOMELAND SECURITY, AND NATIONAL GUARD CIVIL SUPPORT

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** Homeland defense (HLD), defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), homeland security (HLS), and National Guard (NG) civil support (NGCS) are all part of one of the core missions of the NG: *Protecting the Homeland*. To accomplish this core mission requires ready, community-based forces postured to respond rapidly (in hours, not days) to a wide variety of emergencies with a wide variety of capabilities. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is receptive to providing additional capabilities to Combatant Commanders (CCDR) based on the NG's long history as a dual purpose force.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Conduct an analysis of the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) enterprise to determine if the current CBRNE construct is appropriately organized trained and equipped for future threats. Consider the units of the CBRNE enterprise to be used for foreign consequence management and training our international partners, with the understanding that they are to be used for the homeland first.

b. Leverage the NG experience gained in the Counter Drug Program to countering transnational organized crime (CTOC) and illicit organizations that threaten the homeland.

#### BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

a. The Army National Guard (ARNG) plays a unique role as both the primary combat reserve of the Army and the land-component response force for domestic operations. Given these dual roles, the ARNG has incorporated a wide variety of plans, policies, and strategies to best meet the nation's security needs.

b. U.S. law provides the states with the authority to use their respective ARNG for response to local incidents and events. This response is undertaken in either a state active duty status or Title 32 status, which are generally unhindered by the limitations imposed on federal forces by the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385). With facilities in nearly 2,600 communities across America, the ARNG is forward-positioned to facilitate rapid response to a crisis.

c. When the scope of an incident is beyond the capacity of local and state responders, the NG is generally the first military responders in support of civilian authorities. In many instances, however, federal forces are also employed in a Defense Support to Civil Authorities mission under the control of the commander, U.S. Northern Command (or in the case of Hawaii and America's Pacific territories, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command). This created the potential for an uncoordinated effort during a

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major disaster due to some military forces being under state command and some under Federal command. Congress addressed this issue by authorizing the appointment of a dual status commander for occasions when the federal armed forces and the NG are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United States (Title 32 U.S. Code, Sections 315 and 325). With the consent of both the President and the affected Governor, a NG officer can be placed on active duty without losing his Title 32 status or an active duty officer can be authorized to accept a commission in the NG of a state without losing his/her active status.

d. The ARNG can employ capabilities both for its federal missions as well as in direct support of state governors. Such capabilities include CBRNE response, support to federal and state officials in counter drug efforts, and cyber defense.

(1) More than 60 percent of the Department of Defense's (DoD) CBRNE response enterprise resides within the NG through the following entities distributed across all 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regions: 17 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs); 10 Homeland Response Forces (HRFs); one Command and Control CBRN Consequence Response Element-Bravo (C2CRE-B); and 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). Total NG contribution to the DoD CBRNE response enterprise is 11,602 Soldiers and Airmen, the majority of whom are ARNG Soldiers.

(2) Recent DoD studies have indicated there are no CCDR overseas mission requirements for these specific NG capabilities; however, the NGB remains open to supporting CCDR CWMD overseas missions. The NGB is pursuing a number of initiatives to develop the NG CRE future concepts and capabilities. These initiatives include participation wargames led by the Joint Staff (J8, Joint Requirements Office) assessing NG CRE current and future biological and radiological response capabilities; and participation in Advance Technology Demonstrations sponsored by the Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) for Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD). As a part of the future concept and capabilities assessment, NGB is re-assessing the force design to optimize the NG CRE sourcing model.

e. In coordination with the DoD and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the NG Counter Drug Program supports the detection, interdiction, disruption and curtailment of transnational criminal organizations and other national security threats to the homeland.

f. A full-time ARNG Cyber Protection Team (CPT) has been organized to defend and secure DoD infrastructure and protect DoD networks. Ten additional part-time (Title 32) CPTs are in the process of being allocated to the states for organization in the ARNG.

g. The ARNG supports the Department of Homeland Security in the execution of federal missions, such as OPERATION PHALANX, which provides assistance to border security operations in CA, AZ, NM, and TX.

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h. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) units in CA, AK, and CO provide ballistic missile defense using a unique manning model where ARNG Soldiers in a Title 32 Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) status transition to Title 10 active duty status while performing the GMD federal operational mission under the authority of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command.

i. The ARNG provides mission support to the Joint Air Defense Operations Center (JADOC) along with radar and ground based air defense systems to protect critical assets in Washington, DC as part of the National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System (NCR-IADS) in support of OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE in a Title 10 duty status. Units from the South Carolina, Florida, Ohio, Mississippi and North Dakota ARNG rotate through the NCR in support of the NCR-IADS mission.

**CONCLUSION:** Protecting the Homeland is one of the three core missions of the NG. Protecting the Homeland requires a ready, community-based force capable and postured to respond at a moment's notice with a wide range of capabilities to meet various types of emergencies. However, these capabilities, though provided in the homeland, could be used to respond to requests by a CCDR. The NG is well-postured to provide these capabilities through its long history as a dual purpose force.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Conduct an analysis of the CBRNE enterprise to determine if the current CBRNE construct is appropriately organized trained and equipped for future threats. Consider the units of the CBRNE enterprise to be used for foreign consequence management and training our international partners, with the understanding that they are to be used for the homeland first.

b. Leverage the NG experience gained in the Counter Drug Program to CTOC and illicit organizations that threaten the homeland.

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### CNGB POSITION PAPER CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:** Cyberspace Operations are a new and growing mission within the National Guard. In 2014, the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) approved two concept plans to increase Army National Guard (ARNG) defensive cyber capacity by 429 Soldiers from its 166 Soldier baseline. This new force structure will posture the 54 States, Territories, and District of Columbia with a trained and responsive cyber capability for Defense Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Defense activities. The ARNG is uniquely qualified to support this emerging mission as it contains Soldiers with the requisite skills or competencies to operate within this field. As this new structure matures, we are working collaboratively to ensure full synchronization of our efforts with the Army and Department of Defense (DoD) cyber community as a component of the Total Force. To this end, the ARNG's Professional Education Center (PEC) at Camp Robinson, Arkansas developed training which meets the equivalency of current National Security Agency (NSA), Intermediate Cyber Core (ICC) training and is available to all Services and components.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- a. Include the National Guard Bureau (NGB) as part of the national cybersecurity capability.
- b. Continue to use the ARNG as an integral part of the nation's cyber force.

#### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION:**

- a. Similar to other aspects of decisive actions supporting unified land operations, cyber units in the ARNG are uniquely postured to support the cyber-incident response in either a Title 10 US Code (T10) federal status, Title 32 US Code (T32) state status, or State Active Duty status when called upon by either a combatant commander, governor, and/or adjutant general.
- b. When used as part of a state response to an incident, the ARNG's dual-status as a state militia and a federal reserve of the Army helps ensure seamless integration of federal personnel and resources in support of civilian incident commanders. With the stand-up of eleven new Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs), the ARNG will be postured to provide a rapid response in the event of a crisis.
- c. The ARNG can employ federally recognized joint cyber skillsets. Examples that illustrate this dual role include:
  - (1) As part of phase I of CPT training, members provide incidental operational support to Army Cyber Command, which includes defending and securing DoD

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infrastructure and protecting DoD networks. Members of the unit are on T10 Active Duty Operational Support orders serving at Army Cyber Command.

(2) Three “traditional” (part-time) T32 CPTs will be stationed in Georgia, California, and shared between Indiana, Ohio and Michigan. The ARNG is in the approval and stationing process for an additional seven traditional CPTs, for a total of ten T32 teams, plus the one T10 team.

(3) Computer Network Defense Teams (CND-Ts): Each of the 54 States, Territories, and District of Columbia have the option to use CND-T force structure within the Joint Forces Headquarters in defense of GuardNet or in support of state response actions as directed.

(4) Virginia ARNG Data Processing Unit (DPU): The Virginia National Guard retains a cyber-cable unit of 166 Soldiers that is able to conduct a range of cyberspace operations in support of state or federal authorities.

d. The Virginia DPU has Soldiers currently mobilized in support of two recurring United States Cyber Command operational requirements.

e. The ARNG is in the process of establishing DoD joint cyber training in support of a requirement to transition certain coursework to the military services by FY17. Until a long-term solution is identified, the joint course will be hosted by the National Guard Professional Education Center (PEC) at Camp Robinson, AR, and will train cyber warriors from each of the services.

(1) In coordination with the Cyber Center of Excellence (CCoE) at Fort Gordon, Georgia, PEC is developing a new block of instruction referred to as Cyber Common Technical Core (CCTC). Designed to meet equivalency of current National Security Agency (NSA), Intermediate Cyber Core (ICC) training, CCTC will enhance individual skills giving them the background they need to properly defend our nation’s military communications networks.

(2) The training is designed for enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers and commissioned officers. When trained, service members will be ready to serve in various Cyber work roles within the cyber protection teams and other formations the same way current Guard units do when needed. The long range goal for PEC is to open the CCTC to other DoD agencies, allowing all services to speak a common language and have similar skill sets.

(3) The CCTC course is scheduled to be an 8-week course with four phases. The first phase covers the Windows operating system with phase two covering the Linux operating system and the differences between the two. Phase three covers networking, and the fourth phase provides training on security concepts. The course culminates with several scenario based, real-world situations.

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f. Exercise CYBER SHIELD is an annual ARNG-sponsored event that has quickly become one of the largest exercises of its kind. CYBER SHIELD is a defensively-focused cyber exercise that is designed to develop, train, and exercise National Guard cyber forces, CND-Ts, threat analysis teams, reporting mechanisms, and leaders.

**CONCLUSION:** The distributed nature and ability of the National Guard to support a cyber-incident response in either a T10 federal status, T32 state status, or State Active Duty status when called upon by either a combatant commander, governor, and/or adjutant general, provides the nation with capabilities and flexibilities unavailable from other formations. The ARNG continues to innovate in the cyber realm by developing a course of instruction at its PEC, which meets the NSA standard for Intermediate Cyber Core (ICC) training. This course, which is open to all DoD agencies, is a cost-effective means to train the nation's cyber force.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Include the NGB as part of the national cybersecurity capability.
- b. Continue to use the ARNG as an integral part of the nation's cyber force.

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