

UNCLASSIFIED

National Commission on the Future of the Army
Minutes from Closed Meeting on 19 May 2015

0800-0805 Chair and Mr. Don Tison, Designated Federal Officer (DFO), opened the meeting. Mr. Tison explained the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and that this was a closed meeting, as determined by the DoD, the sponsoring agency of the Commission, upon Mr. Tison's request. The Chair provided introductory remarks.

0805-0900 National Intelligence Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, and HQDA G2

Each intelligence agency discussed its respective view on the future Operational Environment for land forces between now and the year 2025. This discussion addressed future threats for land forces from small unit level to larger formations. The probability and severity of different threats was discussed ranging from existing threats to emerging ones.

0900-1030 Robert Scher Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Policy, MajGen Gary Thomas Joint Staff J8, BG Chris McPadden Joint Staff J5

Group discussed force requirements based on COCOM war plans and Defense Planning Scenarios. Discussion included details from the Defense Planning Guidance, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Global Force Integration Matrix.

1100-1200 Jim Mitre OUSD Policy, MG William Hix HQDA G-3/5/7 Strategy, Mr Dan Klippstein HQDA G-3/5/7 Strategy, Dr. Tom Carney JS J8, and Dr. Steve Stoddard Center for Army Analysis

OUSD Policy provided detailed discussion on Defense Planning Scenario development and process following. HQDA G-3 Strategy discussed assumptions underpinning the Defense Planning Scenarios and how these assumptions impact force requirements and force analysis. CAA provided visualization of force generation across time against specific war plan.

1300-1445 GEN Frank Grass Chief, National Guard Bureau

GEN Grass provided an unclassified written statement (posted to NCFR website, www.ncfa.ncr.gov) and both classified and unclassified comments. GEN Grass highlighted the need to continue to emphasize Total Force Policy implementation and the Guard's operational role. He discussed the Guard's value as a cost effective and proven combat reserve, the success of the State Partnership Program in supporting COCOM theater security efforts, and cited better integration of the total force as one key to the future of the Army.

1445-1500 LTG Timothy Kadavy Director, Army National Guard

LTG Kadavy provided comments during discussion led by GEN Grass including a description of how the Guard deploys individuals and small teams. During the remaining time, LTG Kadavy discussed allocation and distribution of ARNG personnel and units as being driven by demographics, recruiting and states' past demonstrated ability to man and sustain ready units.

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1500-1600 LTG Jeffrey Talley Chief, Army Reserve

LTG Talley provided an unclassified written statement (posted to NCFR website) and both classified and unclassified comments. In his comments, LTG Talley emphasized the importance of maintaining three distinct Army components and their respective roles and missions. He also described the need to continue Reserve operational contributions to the total force for the foreseeable future especially from highly technical enabler units like logistics and medical. He specifically recommended reinstating or increasing Regular Army Title XI support to the Reserves as a way to increase available full time support and unit readiness in the Army Reserve.

1600-1730 Honorable John McHugh, Secretary of the Army (SA) and GEN Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)

SA and CSA provided a joint unclassified written statement (see NCFR website) as the basis for discussion and added classified comments as needed. SA noted that the Army is the only Armed Service with more than 50% of the force in the Reserve Components. SA also emphasized hard choices had to be made with decreases in funding in the face of increases in threats and instability across the globe. CSA noted the Regular Army had reduced by 80 thousand in end strength in four years while Reserve Components had not reduced until FY 16. CSA explained the smaller the force, the smaller the margin of error in preparing for future. Both SA and CSA emphasized need to retain substantial capability in three separate and distinct Army Components.

The DFO adjourned the meeting at approximately 1730.