

BLUF

The Adjutants General believe there are viable Total Force Solutions that provide more depth and less risk than ARI that should be considered

ARI is not a Total Force solution

There have been several Army Aviation transformations (i.e., 1993, 2000, 2004) that were fully transparent, collaborative and all components had a voice

Unlike 1993, 2000 and 2004, ARI was a single solution discussion from the Active Army. When NGB was invited to participate decisions had essentially already been made and viable alternatives were not considered

Not a single Adjutant General was involved in the development of ARI

The ARI process included numerous flawed assumptions

- **ARNG ARB's were not available.**

False – ARNG ARBs responded to every deployment request.

- **UH-72 is a cost-effective trainer, over the life of the aircraft.**

This is yet to be proven and top-level analysis shows otherwise. ARI did not include evidence of a Cost-Benefit Analysis.

- **The Army/Nation will be in a period of persistent conflict (ISC-B scenario, RAND).**

This is yet to be proven and current politics appear to favor smaller limited deployments.

- **ARNG is fixed to a 1:4 ARFORGEN model.**

False – As per CNGB and TAG agreement, “we’re all in” for contingency operations. Also, OIF/OEF deployment history shows routine deployments of some AHBs and most Medevac and Cargo Helicopter units with less than 1:4. Army modernization schedules (A to D) prevented greater use of ARNG AH-64s.

- **ARBs have no DOMOPS use.**

False – AH-64s have a role in DOMOPs and the unit C2, personnel, and other MTOE equipment are incredibly valuable.

- **ARNG has insufficient UH-60s for DOMOPS.**

False – There has never been an instance of insufficient lift - EMACs work when requirements exceed a State’s capacity.

- **ARNG ARBs take too long to spin up for mobilization.**

False – The Guard spin-up time is proportional to pre-mob funding levels and is controlled by 1st Army. Using the USAF as an example, ANG units are funded to and meet the same spin-up timeline as the active Air Force.

- **The ARNG can’t sustain proficiency in the complex Attack-Recon mission.**

False – ARNG ARBs performed superbly in OEF/OIF and prior to 9/11 trained to standard for full spectrum operations to include deep attack.

- **We cannot underequip the AC.**

False – We’ve done it before (equipped AC ARBs at 21 of 24 AH-64s), with no adverse consequences. HQDA is prepared to under equip Grey Eagle companies and Shadow Platoons. Additionally, the 24 aircraft configuration was based on engaging former Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiments.

ARIs impact on the Warfighter

ARI redefines the role of the ARNG

- The Constitutional, statutory and historical role of the ARNG is the Army's Combat Reserve
- ARI relegates ARNG Aviation to Domestic Operations or Combat Support
- ARI establishes a "slippery slope" – ARI logic could be used on tanks, Strykers, artillery, etc during next budget crisis

ARI relies on an unsustainable Deploy to Dwell Ratio for ARBs/ARSs

- Active Army Soldiers will have limited time for professional development, their families, etc.
- In the 1990s there was a similar issue and HQDA was unable to retain Apache pilots without a sizeable bonus
- Dwell rates were established for OIF/OEF and may not be relevant for the next conflict(s)

ARI disincentivises the Army from developing/acquiring a true aero-scout

- The Army still has the requirement for a scout helicopter and the AH-64 was not designed to be a scout

ARI assumes unacceptable strategic risk to the Warfighter

- Reduces 37 Apache Bns and Kiowa Warrior Sqdns to 20 Apache Bns (46% loss in Attack/Recon capability)
- No Attack/Recon Bns to cover unknown requirements – modeling shows all ARBs are committed to known requirements
- Potential decrease of over 50% of dedicated USAF and USA ground-attack aircraft

Aircraft	FY 12	FY 19
OH-58D	368*	0
AH-64	810*	726
A-10	348	0
Total	1516	726

ARI reduces direct ground attack aircraft by **38%**

ARI and proposed USAF A-10 cuts reduce direct ground attack aircraft by **52%**

* Army Acquisition Objective

ARI Impacts to the Total Force

ARI moves the most expensive Aviation units to the most expensive component

- ARB annual operating costs: AC: ~\$70M; ARNG: ~\$30M

ARI provides no means for the ARNG to evolve to a manned-unmanned culture

- AC Aviation has organic UAS; ARNG Aviation does not

ARI moves the top level of Aviation modularity from the Brigade to the Battalion


- ARNG Brigades and Brigade HQs no longer have similar capabilities and lose relevance

ARI may violate existing laws and directives

- Secretary of the Army Memorandum establishing Total Force Policy
- DoD Directive 1200.17, Title 32 U.S.C., 2015 National Defense Authorization Act
‘manage RC as operational force, providing strategic depth through RC, and integrating RC across the full spectrum of missions’

ARI further unbalances Army Aviation

- The attack/recon fleet balance no longer mirrors that of the remainder of Army Aviation



ARI – viable options exist

COA 1 (ARNG alternative proposal)

- Provides 24 ARBs/ARSs for 12 CABs: 8 AC CABs, 2 Multi-Component CABs, and 2 ARNG CABs
- Equips 18 AC ARBs/ARSs and 6 ARNG ARBs/ARSs with 24 AH-64s for a total of 576 operational AH-64s
- May require the purchase of a small number of AH-64s
- Increases costing by 2-3% (ARI force), or 6-8% (ARB/ARS force), provides 96 more operational AH-64s over ARI

COA 2 (Reduce the number of AH-64s in ARSs from 24 to 18)

- Provides 26 ARBs/ARSs for 13 CABs: 10 AC CABs and 3 ARNG CABs
- Equips 20 AC ARBs/ARSs and 6 ARNG ARBs/ARSs for a total of 546 operational AH-64s
- ARSs equipped with 18 aircraft (3 platoons of 6) and 3 TUAS platoons. ARBs retain 24 AH-64s
- Meets ARI requirements for AC CABs, Korea, flight school, and test; provides 37 spares (ARI asks for 107 spares)
- Likely to have limited costing impact compared to ARI, provides 66 more operational AH-64s over ARI

COA 3 (Equip ARSs a COTS available Army scout aircraft)

- Provides 26 ARBs/ARSs for 13 CABs; 10 AC CABs and 3 ARNG CABs
- Equips 20 AC ARBs/ARSs and 6 ARNG ARBs/ARSs for a total of 312 AH-64s and 234 AH-6s (546 Aircraft)
- Equips ARSs with 18 AH-6 aircraft – would require the purchase of 234 AH/MH-6s plus training aircraft
- Cost for 234 AH-6 approximately \$1.5B. Provides all new aircraft at a greatly reduced operating cost
- Provides the Army a lower-cost, C-130 deployable, proven quick reaction recon/close combat aircraft
- Maintains the scout mission at a low cost until next generation scout helicopter is developed and fielded
- Likely to increase costs initially, but should be less costly due to lower operational costs, provides 66 more operational attack/recon aircraft over ARI

This is not a decision between ARI or the National Guard Alternative

Its about what is best for the Total Force and the Nation

The COAs highlighted represent some of the numerous compromise proposals available to the Total Force to increase depth, reduce risk and support strategic objectives

BACK UP SLIDES

ARI – viable options exist

ARNG Alternative

- ARNG alternative provides 72 more crewed AH-64s than ARI
- 18 AC ARBs, 6 ARNG ARBs; 2 Multi-Component (MC) Brigades
- MC Brigades were routinely and successfully used in OIF/OEF and similar arrangements are resident and successful in the ANG/USAF
- May require the purchase of an additional AH-64s, but increases total ARB capacity 20%

The California Plan

- Equip ARSs at 18 aircraft (3 platoons of 6) and 3 TUAS platoons. ARBs retain 24 AH-64s.
- Previous Air Cavalry MTOEs had a similar configuration and fewer aircraft than attack battalions
- TUAS platoons provide overmatch capabilities allowing the reduction of AH-64s
- Better balances attack and recon roles/capacities within the Squadron
- Generates sufficient AH-64s to fill 10 AC CABs and 4 ARNG CABs (one ARB and one ARS each)

Procure a new, true Aeroscout helicopter

- If the AH/MH-6 is good enough for Special Ops, it should be good enough for conventional formations
- The AH/MH-6 already exists in the Army inventory so there should be minor development costs, support already resides at AMCOM, and approximately 6 full mission package AH-6s cost the same as a new AH-64
- Provides a C-130 deployable, quick reaction Recon/Close Combat Army conventional force aircraft



How many manned MTOE aircraft are in the ARI and CNGB plans?

CNGB Alternative provides 72 more crewed aircraft than ARI plan

	HQDA ARI	NGB Option	
Active CAB	10	8	
Multi-Compo CAB	0	2	
ARNG CAB	0	2	
Active ARB/ARS	20 (10/10)	18 (8/10)	
ARNG ARB/ARS	0	6 (4/2)	
★ Active AH-64 - MTOE	480 (20 Bns x 24)	432 (18 Bns x 24)	} 552
ARNG AH-64 - MTOE	—	120 (2 x 24 + 4 x 18)	
Korea Equipment Set	48	48	
Flight School	80	80	
Test	15	15	
Spares	107	35	
Mesa Remanufacture	—	—	
AH-64 Spares Costs	\$0	\$0 in ARNG Plan \$2.3B according to HQDA	Annual Costs are Near Neutral One-time Costs favor NGB Plan \$2.3B would buy 74 Spares Costs are HQDA figures
Aviation Annual Costs	\$5.56B	\$5.59B (\$32M Δ)	
One-time Re-Qualification Costs	\$172M	\$98M (- \$73M Δ)	

How much do the CNGB Alternative (18+6) and a 20+6 Alternative help AC dwell?

The following 13 slides are just “how” we came to the answer to the question you asked: “How do 18+6 and 20+6 improve AC dwell?”

The answer itself is:

18+6: can improve AC dwell from 24 to 26.4 months

20+6: can improve AC dwell from 24 to 31.2 months

(assuming a 2-year dwell starting point)

The math is shown on the slide with a 

What are the numbers behind “2-6% more expensive”?

- Initial HQDA cost modeling (Mar 14) found annual cost for the CNGB plan was about \$100M and possibly as high as \$150M more than the ARI plan.

This is **2%-3%** of the total annual cost of **\$5B** for the ARI force (20 Bdes).

- OSD-CAPE assessment (Jul-Nov 14) focused on only Attack Recon Bn (ARB) costs and concluded that CNGB plan was \$89M-\$176M more than the ARI plan.

This is **6%-8%** of the total annual cost of **\$1.7B** for the Army ARB force.

- Annual cost calculations are dependent on cost assumptions for ARNG FTM, AFTPs, and prep for deployment.

Bottom Line Last: Multi-Compo Works

**OEF '13: 1st CAB (AC)
1-135 ARB (MO ARNG)**

**OEF '12: 101st CAB (AC)
1-211 ARB (UT ARNG)**

**OIF '10: 25th CAB (AC)
1-230 ARS (TN ARNG)**

**OIF '10: 12th CAB (AC)
1-130 ARB (NC ARNG)**

**OEF '06: 82nd CAB (AC)
1-285 ARB (AZ ARNG)**

**OEF '05: 10th CAB (AC)
1-183 ARB (ID ARNG)**

AH-64s are fundamental to the ARNG

- Removing AH-64s makes ARNG CABs and Divisions no longer like their AC counterparts
- Removing AH-64s reduces the ARNGs ability to train Divisions, BCTs and CABs the same as the AC does
- Placing all AH-64s in the AC eliminates strategic depth and increases risk to the all volunteer active duty AH forces due to optempo
- Under ARI, 48 aircraft would be in storage, and no aircrews would be assigned or trained to fly them (units would uncover their aircraft to fly these)
- Under ARI, 8 battalions of pilots, maintainers and support personnel would go away, and with them decades of experience that will take decades to replicate

ARI – Processes

- This was a course of action directed by the Chief of Staff Army.
 - Divest all OH-58Ds, OH-58A/Cs, and TH-67s (decision to retire OH-58A/C fleet was made 3 years ago, ARI attempts to take credit for this pre-ARI decision)
 - Transfer all AH-64Ds from ARNG to Active Compo
 - Eliminate 3 AC CABs - but form equipment/aircraft set for OCONUS location
 - Transition Flight School to UH-72 trainer

ARI was a fleet-management decision that backed its way into (suboptimally?) solving operational requirements

- The Apache and Lakota fleets were “available” for re-missioning, to solve the Army’s inability to develop/procure new Aeroscout and Training aircraft fleets.

The ARI decision was unnecessarily hasty

- HQDA does not have to decide now to transfer all the ARNG AH-64s
 - Can establish incremental Decision Points (in and after the POM) for ARNG Apache Bns
 - Decide on 2 Bns now, maybe 2 Bns at a future date. Let the threat and budget environments mature

ARI was a single solution discussion from HQDA – when the ARNG was invited to participate decisions had essentially already been made

Current ARI plan resulted from processes and assumptions unique to the Apache force - precluded consideration of multiple alternatives

The National Commission on the Future of the Army should consider Courses of Action developed by the States and The Adjutants General that ARI precluded considering. We believe our options are Total Force Solutions that provide more depth and less risk to our fighting forces than ARI