

## Current Reserve Component (RC) Issues

Purpose: Describe issues impacting the RCs as of 10 July 2015

Background: Following are the current issues that affect the capabilities, efficiency, and/or effectiveness of the RCs. One or more entities from among OSD Reserve Affairs, the service Mobilization and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) offices, the RC Chiefs, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), the service Reserve Forces Policy Committees, RC Associations and others are addressing these issues through various commissions, studies, and recommendations, with an eye toward potential changes to policy or legislation as appropriate.

### Key Points:

- **Mobilization to Dwell Ratios.** Based on experience of the past 13 years and the assumptions on which current mobilization to dwell ratios are based, the expectation that an RC unit can only mobilize and dwell at a 1:5 ratio is no longer a valid one. Mobilization to dwell ratios should be reexamined to identify the most effective and efficient deployment cycle for the RC.
- **ARNG End Strength.** In the wake of the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) and sequestration, the Army has discussed cuts to ARNG end strength that range from 80K (a 23% reduction) to 15K (a 4% reduction). Under sequestration, the ARNG is programmed to reduce from 350K to 335K in FY17 and to 315K in FY19. The National Guard Bureau, Council of Governors, and Adjutants General have weighed-in in favor of the most robust ARNG force possible in order to maintain a strong operational reserve and sustain appropriate strength to support the U.S. Northern Command and the states during domestic operations and emergencies.
- **AC/RC Mix.** A related issue to end strength and mobilization to dwell ratios. When the Department determines the appropriate end strengths of each of the services and components and how frequently RC organizations will be mobilized, it must then determine how much of each force element each service can place in its RCs. Given the significant cost effectiveness of maintaining the reserve force, it stands to reason that more of the larger, more expensive force elements (e.g. Brigade Combat Teams) that might not be required for immediate employment should be maintained in greater numbers in the RC.
- **Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI).** The Army is pressing forward with its desire to remove all (192) Apache helicopters from the Army National Guard (ARNG) in order to realize cost savings by transferring them to the Active Component (AC). The ARNG has proposed a number of alternatives that will achieve significant cost savings while maintaining various levels of aircraft fill in ARNG Attack Reconnaissance Battalions. 2015 NDAA has delayed 75% of the transfer, but has authorized movement of 48 Apaches from the ARNG to the AC by March 2016. The ARNG contends that Apaches are a critical element of RC combat power that must be sustained as an operational reserve.
- **Sustaining the Operational Reserve.** The preservation of the RC as an operational reserve is a concept that meets with almost universal support. However, neither the Joint Staff nor the services have offered a clear definition for the term “operational reserve.” Likewise, nobody has identified an agreed set of requirements to sustain the operational reserve (i.e. manning, equipping, training, readiness levels) or its impact on deployments. Operational Reserve must be defined and the services must identify all of the metrics and resources that contribute to it.
- **RC Integration into the Cyber Mission Force (CMF).** A significant number of RC service members who serve in a wide array of military occupational specialties hold unmatched skills in the cyber arena through their civilian professions. Following a predecessor who saw no role for RC service members in the CMF, the current Commander of U.S. Cyber Command wants to employ the RC in the CMF. However, force structure is crafted by the services and their perspectives on the RC role in the CMF vary widely. Individual RCs and other interested agencies will continue to advocate to the services for maximum employment of RC cyber warriors in the CMF.

- **RC Headquarters Overhead.** The Department, services, and Combatant Commands have embarked on a path to eliminating, combining, or down-sizing major headquarters in order to reduce redundancies and cut wasteful overhead. However, neither the services nor their individual RCs have undertaken a similar examination of RC headquarters overhead, other than for the AF Reserve (as identified by GAO and the FY15 PB). There undoubtedly is wasteful overhead in our RC senior headquarters structure that is equally ripe for reduction or elimination and the Department should direct the initiation of such an effort.
- **Funding and Authorities for Domestic Operations.** 32 USC 502(f) authorizes the employment of the National Guard for domestic operations in a federal status. The National Guard of select states supports recurring National Special Security Events (NSSE) like the quadrennial national political conventions and the presidential inauguration. 32 USC 502(f) is also used for non-routine domestic operations in which RC formations are employed to conduct disaster response and recovery operations, civil disturbance operations, and other missions in support of federal, state, and local authorities. While timing, location, and scope of these operations are not predictable, their occurrence is inevitable. However, the department does not POM for recurring NSSEs or have a system in place for rapid approval of 502(f) funding or authority. As a result, the National Guard must often find creative ways to use existing training funds and authorities in the early stages of an NSSE or domestic emergency, hoping to be reimbursed later. The Department should address this issue by streamlining and codifying a more efficient 502(f) process.
- **Burdensome General Military Training Requirements.** Every year, the list of mandatory training requirements for individual service members grows. While AC commanders have their members at their disposal full-time to meet these annual requirements, RC commanders have extremely limited time with their members and the requirements consume an increasing share of that time. In recent surveys and panel discussions, RC junior officers and senior NCOs have expressed heightened frustration with the second and third order effects of these requirements. Most significant among their concerns is the reduced time for collective training and its impact on unit readiness. OSD P&R has directed Reserve Affairs to examine this issue.
- **RC Members' Access to DoD Networks.** Much of the general military training conducted by individual service members is offered online. However, DoD requires a Common Access Card to access an increasing number of its sites and networks for both training and routine administrative functions. As a result, RC leaders and service members must find the time and means to get to a reserve or readiness center in order to complete these tasks. The Department should explore ways to allow greater access to the .mil domain for RC service members working from their homes, places of business, local libraries, and other locations that will allow them to complete online training and administrative tasks.
- **Duty Status Reform.** There are currently more than 30 unique statuses in which RC members serve when on full-time duty. Each duty status comes with a different set of authorities and varying compensation packages. As a result, service members serving shoulder to shoulder and performing the same mission might receive different campaign credits and awards, pay and benefits, and, potentially, different levels of medical coverage or family benefits if they are wounded, injured, or killed.

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