

Testimony presented to the National Commission on the Future of the Army

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*Illinois
Army
National
Guard*



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I am Major General Richard J. Hayes Jr., the Adjutant General for the State of Illinois and I serve as the Senior Military Commander for the Illinois National Guard which is comprised of approximately 10,100 soldiers and 3,000 airmen.

My presence here today, on behalf of the Illinois Army National Guard, is to affirm our support for a Total Force that is in the best interest of the United States and in which the Army National Guard functions as the primary combat reserve and as the nation's military first responder in the homeland.

We are charged to protect and defend the constitution of our State and Nation. When I reflect on protect and defend, I know it is for our citizens, families, friends, and loved ones and this is our very first priority.

I believe that it is critical to recognize the relative importance of homeland security and DSCA, which my Governor is an essential stakeholder, with that of balancing our responsibilities for homeland defense; the Illinois National Guard serves as the glue that bands Illinoisans together to protect our state, defend our homeland, and fight our nation's wars.

Similarities between the stories I will share today are also found throughout the other 53 states and territories. I will attempt to illustrate key aspects of the Army National Guard, through the lens of Illinois, of what the Army National Guard is and why our connection to our hometowns binds the nation with their military.

As I present this testimony today, I want to acknowledge that I was part of, and provided input to, the questions posed by the NCFR to the AGAUS at the June meeting. Those responses are contained in a statement entitled "Consensus of the 54 Adjutants General on issues pertinent to the National Commission on the Future of the Army" dated 13 July 2015 as delivered to the

commission by MG Glenn Curtis, the President of AGAUS. This testimony I present today is intended to add knowledge to the body of information already received by the Commission.

I want to tell the Illinois Army National Guard story and how that story interrelates to the tasks given to the Commission. My testimony will focus on the topics of history, accessibility, affordability, readiness, competence/effectiveness, homeland defense, security, and defense support to civil authorities.

Underlying these stories is the undisputable evidence of that the ILARNG, much like the other 53 states and territories, are interoperable and interchangeable with the Reserves, Active Army, Joint Force, and our international partner nations. Illinois' experience, since 1723, clearly illustrates this fact.

History

History best informs of the missteps of the past and provides insight in how to frame thought around difficult issues. Only through a deep review of history coupled with reliance of that intelligent insight looking forward can we arrive at sound conclusions for our future.

As I reflected and reviewed the turmoil of the topic of force size and structure looking back to the early 20th century on forward, I found many correlations between the challenges then and today. The Total Force was vastly different pre-WWI, the interwar years through to WWII, and through all conflicts since. The sine wave of change in our total force was driven by the complexities (diplomatic and economic) across the different varying decades. All along this way there has been much discourse on this topic and the lessons of the past informed me as I prepared this testimony today.

Reoccurring key challenges discussed over all these periods, is the continued need for a coordinated military industrial complex and a deep base of capability. Between the interwar

years of WWI and WWII, the availability of supplies and equipment determined the rate at which troops could be absorbed into the Army. Mobilization strategy drove the discussion but the assumptions used to make the decisions regarding force structure and readiness were reasonably driven by our ability to generate supplies and equipment. With the current complexity of our weapon systems and dispersion of our military industrial complex around the world, can we afford to shrink our Total Force below where we are today and can we mobilize effectively to meet our future challenges?

The logic applied during the interwar years between WWI and WWII assumed men would simply be equipped supplied and trained as they entered service. The key difference between then and today was the Army saw its role as protecting the United States and the Western Hemisphere from hostile European forces rather than participating in global Coalition warfare.¹ So to that end, what assumptions should be relied on as we reflect forward?

Another factor when looking at preparations just prior to WWII, appropriations came faster than the Army could absorb them. This suggests to me, that this discussion on the topic of readiness levels within the Total Force at the expense of force structure, requires significant reflection.

I am of the opinion based on history and my own experience that to trade force structure for readiness is a strategic risk that has far more long term consequences than buying back readiness when you need it. Readiness can be bought back rapidly in comparison to the cost of generating new equipment and new soldiers. History is repeat with examples of this.

¹ US Army Center of Military History. "The US Army in WWII – The 50th Anniversary"; <http://www.history.army.mil/documents/mobpam.htm>

To reduce readiness imparts risk on time to deploy, but to fund readiness at the detriment of having available soldiers and equipment we will struggle as history has illustrated. We need a deep base even at the expense of select readiness.

So what are the strategic implications trading readiness for time while affording a depth of force structure? This is a difficult question but reflection on the past provides that insight and I believe having a depth of force structure, utilizing adaptive readiness models, coupled with better mobilization triggers is a large part of the answer to our current dilemma.

Should we assume, as history has shown, that in a time of need, generating equipment and soldiers will take care of itself in the absence of standing force structure? I don't suggest I have a holistic answer, but the question of mobilizing the industrial base, the Army, and training a force in the absence of a solid base has repeatedly proven to be one of our biggest challenges. This question is at the heart determining the right force structure and mix between the components.

The history of the Illinois National Guard and Illinois Militia dating back to 1723 also informs me on the various challenges and transitions in the world environment of the past and how the Illinois Army National Guard adapted to these challenges. As part of this testimony, I have provided a video presentation highlighting our history; Illinois has always been there in support of our nation and has been interoperable and interchangeable all along the way.² The Illinois National Guard has fought in most all of our nation's wars and it is the lessons we learn from this history that helps inform me and the Illinois National Guard today.

Accessibility

The Illinois Army National Guard has met every request for forces in support of our nation when called on and certainly since 9/11. We have conducted 204 operational deployments

² Enclosure 1 - Pritzker Military Museum and Library. "History of the Illinois National Guard.mp4"; June 2014.

to 13 countries, in support of 10 different named operations from 1995 to present with 93% of these occurring from 9/11 to present.

This deployment history includes 13,501 ARNG Soldiers, their families, as well as hundreds of Employers, who have sacrificed in support of national strategic interests. We have soldiers mobilized around the world today working side by side with our Active, Reserve, Joint Force, and Coalition partners. We have been there in the past and we will always be there in the future. We have consistently been accessible, cost effective, interoperable, and interchangeable since our very founding.

Affordability

There has been numerous studies on the topic but to evaluate this in light of the force structure mix between the components, requires establishing a credible foundation supported by common metrics between the components to determine the costs of our Total Force. On a per capita basis, there is no doubt that the reserves are the most cost effective tool in our Total Force.

Over the years, many studies have made contradicting claims often using select sets of data to support the arguments made. We will continue to struggle to determine what real costs are and what timelines are required to train and mobilize our forces until we work together to create a credible foundation of common metrics. The data exists and must be captured so adequate comparisons can be made. There is no doubt the National Guard and Reserves cost significantly less to maintain and are able to meet necessary mobilization timelines to competently execute the missions required of us at locations around the world when and where we are needed.

Readiness

The current ARFORGEN model and proposed Sustainable Readiness Model provide a trained and ready Total Army predicated on the current force structure. It is clear to me as the force structure continues to be reduced across all Army components, the force generation cycles will increase with a corresponding reduction in dwell time in order to field the same size force under the current environment and construct. Regardless of future readiness models, the Illinois Army National Guard will always be there.

What I have learned over the last 30 years is the importance of working with your teammates early and often. Absent in the 1980's and 1990's was substantive collective training by and between the Total Force. The last 10+ years through these recent conflicts, finally this has started to come together. When you train together, you learn together, you assimilate disparate cultures, and you build trust.

Recent initiatives led by FORSCOM to integrate Illinois National Guard brigade size formations with Active component units is a first step in furthering a total force. We need to codify how we can and will train together going forward and we must recognize this is critical to our effectiveness in the future as a Total Force. We didn't have this right two decades ago, and I would suggest we need to figure this out in a more robust and formal way.

Perceptions drive reality; perceptions grounded in team training and operations become one's reality versus abstract ideas of what things are or are not. I fully support furthering integration through training and continued deployments alongside of all of our other components comprising the Total Force. This starts with leaders having a desire and willingness to do so and as such I would like to see more engagement with the Active Army and Army Reserves starting with their senior leaders, in conjunction with all my fellow TAGs, in furthering building relationships down to our brigade formations.

Capability/Effectiveness

There has not been a deployment since 9/11 conducted by the Illinois Army National Guard in which our efforts were judged anything other than meeting or exceeding the mission requirements. In every case, the ILARNG clearly demonstrated that we are interoperable and interchangeable with all the other components within the Army, the Joint Force, and with our Coalition partners.

To illustrate this point and contained within this testimony³, I have provided a snapshot of many deployment and training examples illustrating the team work by the Illinois Army National Guard with the Total Force and our Coalition partners. Working side by side, assuming and handing missions over to each other, and through training we built trust and lifelong relationships. Trust is at the very core of a sound relationship, and acknowledging the views each other is a foundational requirement.

Our 33rd IBCT was missioned with TF Phoenix between December 2008 and November 2009. This was the largest deployment of the Illinois National Guard since WWII. The 33rd IBCT took a total of 81 days to mobilize to TOA in country. Quite an accomplishment for a non-standard mission assigned to an Army National Guard Infantry Brigade Combat Team. This same story is embodied in examples all throughout the Army National Guard.

Our State Partnership with Poland is another fine example of the strength and capability of all around the Army National Guard. Since 1993 the Illinois National Guard has trained with and fought alongside of our Polish Partners. We have conducted combined operational deployments with Poland on every rotation to Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 to present and in addition have conducted over 320 training events. Poland's contribution to the wars is and has been significant and we shouldered their burden and sacrifice alongside of them proudly.

³ Enclosure 2 – Examples of Illinois National Guard Training and Exercise History post 9/11.

Homeland Defense, Security, and Defense Support for Civil Authorities

The Illinois National Guard is the Governor of Illinois' primary tool for disaster and emergency response. Illinois is has many key population centers and critical infrastructure nodes.

Illinois is home to the 3rd most populous city in the nation, the largest city in FEMA Region V, the 2nd largest stock exchange in the US, the 2nd busiest airport in the world, the largest transcontinental transportation hub, the 3rd largest intermodal port in the world, the 3rd largest communications network in the nation, and is the home of POTUS.

In addition to this, Illinois has the most flood plains of any state, highest annual tornado average, is situated along the New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones, has one of the nation's largest agricultural production output subject to animal borne diseases, and has a history at times of significant civil unrest. Considering the foregoing, Illinois is home to the 48th smallest National Guard based on the population served.

We have been aggressive in partnering with our neighboring states, National Guard Bureau, the Title 10 forces in our state, and with US NORTHCOM. We have built solid relationships with our partners over the last decade and recognize the continued need for

"ILNG Domestic Operations averaged 38,294 man days a year from 2005–2014. Operations included support for NATO Summit, Mississippi/Ohio and North Dakota Flooding, Gulf oil spill, Hurricane Katrina, the counterdrug and CST missions, as well as hundreds of inter-agency exercises and training events."

improvement interrelating and preparing for disasters at home with each other. One risk I can't afford is to see a reduction in our force structure.

Hurricane Katrina revealed our nation's lack of preparedness in response to a complex catastrophe⁴ in a rapid, efficient, and effective manner. This catastrophe forced a reevaluation of how we plan for and respond to natural disasters and/or emergencies. Over the last ten years, efforts have focused on new response frameworks and building capacity to respond to such events, however capitalizing on the Title 10 capabilities, especially the reserves components, requires significant additional discussion.

The National Guard (NG), constitutionally under the Command and Control of the Governors of the several States and territories, has a primary role to support civilian authorities in the aftermath of emergencies, disasters, and complex catastrophes. The NG has always been the most responsive military asset aligned to perform this role due to the close proximity of the units situated in 2600+ communities throughout the nation.

In 2012 Congress smartly expanded community sourced capabilities with a change to 10 USC § 12304(a) contained in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.⁵ Today Governors finally have the means to access the reserves of the military services to support a response under the Stafford Act.

The States have the primary responsibility for Homeland Security and for response to emergencies, disasters, and complex catastrophes. The constitution affirms common (homeland) defense as a primary federal responsibility.⁶ The 2nd Amendment recognizes the rights of the

⁴ Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, "Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments," July 20, 2012. The term complex catastrophe is solely a DOD Term.

⁵ PL 112-81, Sect. 515(a); 10 USC 12304(a), "National Defense Authorization Act of 2012," <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/html/PLAW-112publ81.htm>.

⁶ The Constitution of the United States and Amendments, http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm

several States to form and have “a well-regulated Militia (National Guard), being necessary to the security of a free State,”⁷ and the 10th Amendment provides that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”⁸

These key provisions place primary responsibility for homeland security and the general welfare of the people with the several States and territories, and defense of the homeland with the federal government; specifically assigned to the Department of Defense (DoD).

Governors inherently are heads of State and therefore are ultimately responsible for the security and general welfare of the people in their geographic jurisdictions. The importance of the constitution in this discussion is that all disasters are state matters and therefore state/local governments, when able to act in this capacity, are always in charge of their response; the federal government solely supports these efforts.⁹

I ask the Commission to consider balancing the needs of the Governor’s with the needs of the nation recognizing that “defending U.S. territory and the people of the United States is the highest priority of the Department of Defense (DOD), and providing appropriate defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is one of the Department’s primary missions.”¹⁰ I request the Commission consider recommendations that give all Governor’s rapid unimpeded access to the Title 10 Total Force in a seamless manner. The Title 10 Force should be readily available to

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Hayes Jr., Richard J. “DoD Response Under the Stafford Act: A Call to Action”. Joint Forces Quarterly, April 2015. This paper provides an in depth discussion on the need to better integrate Title 10 Forces with the several states and territories in support of Governor’s Constitutional responsibilities as it relates to DSCA. The subject of this paper is currently a topic of discussion being taught to the 2nd year DDE students at the US Army War College – See Enclosure 3 and Enclosure 4 of this testimony.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistance Secretary of Defense, February 2013), 1.

support our Governor's and our citizens across this great country at a moment notice with the same responsiveness as the National Guards of the several states and territories.

Conclusion

The Illinois Army National Guard has proven its ability to be interoperable, interchangeable, and always there when called on by our Governor and President. I want to thank the commission for allowing me to embellish our story on behalf of the Illinois Army National Guard. Thank you for contemplating the information presented in this testimony and I look forward to continuing the dialog with the Commission moving forward.