Why an Army

"It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense [and] overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States."
U.S. Code Tile 10, § 3062

One of the first things the Second Continental Congress did in 1775 was establish the Continental Army. Other colonies had sent volunteers to help Massachusetts' militia fight the British Army in Boston, but the assembled American forces lacked unity of command and organization. The Second Continental Congress gathered in Philadelphia to coordinate a united response to the crisis, and on June 14 voted to establish the Continental Army and appoint George Washington as commander.

Our Nation had an Army before we were a nation.

In times of war, the Army provides our Nation with ready, trained, and well-equipped land forces that combine with the forces from the other Services to form the Joint Force to fight and win. In times of national crises, the Army provides our states and communities a first line of aid and recovery. In times of peace, the Army provides our Nation with talent and infrastructure expertise to bolster prosperity and ensure security.

Our Nation is not officially at war—but it certainly is not at peace, either. Meantime, the government has been perched on the ledge of a budget crisis for more than half a decade, one that could evolve into a security threat in and of itself. In this climate, the Congress established the National Commission on the Future of the Army. The Commission's foundational purpose is

to assist the nation's political and military leaders grappling with difficult issues surrounding the size and structure of the Army in a period of budget constraint and in a global environment of multiple, pressing threats to our Nation.

Though the Commission, in its very title, is charged with looking into the future, we don't have a mandate to predict where and when the Nation will call upon its Army to respond to an imminent threat or unexpected crisis, or to secure a strategic objective. The Commission is certain, however, that such a demand will come; and though many political leaders and military strategists believe we should and can fight wars at arms' length, the Commission is certain that the land power the Army provides our Nation will be required to fight and win wars. Even in our current not-quite-war-but-not-yet-peace footing, all signs point to growing demands for American land power, not less. The Army, responding to requirements from the Combatant Commands, has deployed Regular Army and reserve component forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Pacific, the Baltics, and Latin America.

One of the Army's foremost responsibilities is to build forces ready and able to confront threats that, judging by history, will not be obvious until after they have been realized, by which time it could be too late to prepare. Instead, if the past is a guide, understrength, ill-equipped forces will pay the price to buy time while the Army goes through the laborious, time-intensive process of mobilizing reserve units and expanding the force. The Commission concluded that one of its most important services to the Nation is to help the President, the Congress, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Army appreciate these challenges and anticipate what must be done to mitigate these risks going forward.

Civil-Military Way America Goes to War

One of the Nation's greatest strengths is not merely the might of its armed forces but the principles behind the structure of its armed forces. Aware of the danger posed by a standing army under the sole control of the executive, the framers of the U.S. Constitution placed military authority wholly under the joint authority of Congress and the President. While the President serves as commander-in-chief of the military, Congress appropriates funds and legislates governance of the military. Civilian oversight of the military is further established in the chain of command, descending from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the individual services, who are responsible for directing the non-operational functions of their military department: recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping forces that can be provided to combatant commanders for military operations. The highest ranking military members, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serve as advisors to their service secretaries, the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Civilian control of the military is a defining principle of our Nation. It ensures that the U.S. military remains responsive to the will of the people through their duly elected representatives, who not only determine when to use military force but also sets the parameters for the size and component mix of the Services. Frankly, it is not the most efficient way to finance and manage a military, but the Commission set about its tasks firmly rooted to the fundamental principle that, in addition to a Commander in Chief, the Army has a 535-member board of directors in the U.S. Congress and serves the 54 governors of the states and territories.

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives the Congress the power to raise and support armies and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. Additionally, the Constitution gives congress the authority to call forth the militia for specific purposes, to organize, arm and discipline the militia when they are in the service of the United States, and to prescribe how the militias are to be trained by the states. When not in federal service, the militias were intended to fall under the authority of their state governors. Congress exercised its constitutional authorities through legislation that has ultimately been codified in Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code.

The history of the Army and its relationship with the militia, parallels the history of the nation. As the country grew throughout the 19th centuries, its need for a military able to defend its growing borders and secure its vital interests also grew while the militia suffered misuse and neglect. Congress began to reform a poorly organized and equipped militia in 1903. Through a series of legislative actions between 1903 and 1933, Congress transformed state militias into the Army National Guard, standardized unit organizations, provided funding for equipment and training, and authorized situations in which the National Guard could be called into federal service by the President.

At the same time that it reformed the militia system and created the National Guard, Congress created an Organized Reserve Corps of officers for the U.S. Army. This reserve corps provided more than 170,000 officers and enlisted soldiers during World War I and more than 57,000 officers during World War II. During the Cold War, Congress transformed the Organized

Reserve Corps into the U.S. Army Reserve which was divided into a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve.

Together, the three components of the Army—the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve—form One Army dedicated to defending the United States and implementing our National Military Strategy. Each component is distinct. Each is essential. Yet, all are interdependent. The individual components are connected through a purposeful reliance on the other components to maximize reinforcing effects while minimizing component vulnerabilities in order to achieve mission requirements. This requires a broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each component's capabilities, clear agreement about how those capabilities will be committed in any given operational setting, and absolute mutual trust that, once committed, each component will be employed as agreed.

The All-Volunteer Force

The Army is a profession dedicated to the security and defense of the Nation and the U.S. Constitution. Soldiers and Army civilians, bound by the Army's professional ethic, develop and use their expertise in the service of the country. This ethic guides professional conduct and permits self-regulation, which forms the basis of the trust that the American people place in the Army.

The Profession of Arms consists of uniformed soldiers, regardless of component. It is made up of volunteers who have trained to become experts in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, and entrusted with the defense of the Constitution and the rights

and interests of the American people. The Army Civilian Corps is part of the Army Profession, albeit not a part of the Profession of Arms. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan made clear that, with the current force structure, soldiers must have the support of a highly professional Civilian Corps. Army civilians led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan focused on rebuilding infrastructure. Civilians from Army Depots were deployed in order to expedite the repair of vehicles damaged in combat. Some 30,000 Army civilians were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to serve with Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams and many other civilian specialists in medical logistics, transportation, and information technology likewise deployed to support Army operations. The Army Civilian Corps complements the Profession of Arms by providing expertise in support of critical operations and management processes.

The Army is an All-Volunteer Force. Conscription was used during the Civil War and World War I, and the first peacetime draft was adopted in 1940 with the specter of World War II raising concerns about the strength of the U.S. Army. The draft continued throughout the war and ended in March, 1947. Less than a year and a half later, in July 1948, with the Army failing to meet recruitment goals and the beginning of the Cold War raising fears of communist aggression, Congress established the Selective Service System to provide the Army with manpower. The draft remained the primary source of personnel for the Army through the Vietnam War. The Gates Commission, established in 1969 to develop a plan to end the draft and return to an All-Volunteer Force, stated that “We unanimously believe that the nation’s interest will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts.” In 1972, at the request of President Richard Nixon, Congress

passed Public Law 92-129, which extended the draft for only two years and committed the country to transition to an All-Volunteer Force.

The All-Volunteer Force had an immediate and dramatic impact on the Army. The quality of the force, as measured by test scores and high school graduation rates, has improved. The number of career personnel increased as has their proficiency and professionalism: prior to the All-Volunteer Force, only 18 percent of the Army had more than four years of service, but by 2006, that number stood at more than 51 percent. The increase in education and length of service has allowed the Army to develop into a true profession of arms.

But the clear benefits of the All-Volunteer Force come at a price. It increases costs over a draft army due to the personnel costs to recruit and retain qualified and talented personnel and their families. The Army also must provide support for the families of the All-Volunteer Force who, more than any other group, share the burden of service with their soldier family member and are vital in ensuring soldiers continue to serve. Maintaining an All-Volunteer Force is also subjected to the pressures of economic cycles and social conditions, such as the increasing prevalence of obesity.

So fundamental is an All-Volunteer Force to the governing principles of our Nation, and so essential is an All-Volunteer Force in achieving the highest possible level of capabilities and readiness, the Commission considers sustaining an All-Volunteer Force vital to the future of the Army, and all budget and force management decisions should begin with that template.

Recommendation 1: Congress should adhere to the principle of sustaining an All-Volunteer Army.

Critical Tasks and Range of Missions

The Army fulfills a broad range of missions outlined in Title 10: 1) preserve the peace and defend U.S. territory and possessions, 2) support national policies, 3) implement national objectives, and 4) overcome adversaries threatening U.S. peace and security. Over the past three decades the Army has fulfilled these missions by engaging in interstate war; conducting counterterrorism operations, nation building, and humanitarian relief missions; deterring potential adversaries; assuring our partners and allies; and providing diplomatic leverage for elected leaders.

During this time period, the Army has provided capabilities irrespective of political changes, downsizing, or changing needs. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered the Army into Iraq while downsizing the Army to gain a "peace dividend" from the Cold War. Similarly, President Bill Clinton sent the Army to Bosnia and other places while downsizing the force. Nation-building and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq began under a President George W. Bush who had explicitly denounced U.S. participation in nation-building. Furthermore, employing Army forces for nation-building and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq came more than 50 years after the Army closed its School of Military Government and more than 60 years after publication of the last counterinsurgency manual (*Marine Corps Small Wars Manual*).

For the foreseeable future, the Commission concludes that only land forces, working in as part of the Joint Force, have the ability to compel adversaries, consolidate gains made during combat, and provide the connective tissue to local populations during non-combat missions.

America's Army has served as the Nation's multipurpose utility tool since the first Continental Congress, a reality unlikely to change. Army support across the Joint Force extends past headquarter functions and combat units to the support functions necessary for military operations in any environment. In accordance with Joint Doctrine and DoD instructions, the Army provides intra-theater overland and inland waterway distribution for food, water, fuel, and ammunition during joint operations, which includes jet fuel for all air operations. Army logistical and security functions also support the operations of other U.S. entities operating around the world, including the State Department and Drug Enforcement Agency. Based on discussions with many foreign partners, the Commission found that most U.S. partners could not participate with the U.S. on missions without Army logistical support above the brigade level; most partners simply lack the capability to execute expeditionary logistics.

In addition to operational support, America's Army provides unique institutional support to other services, U.S. government organizations, and international partners. In fiscal year 2014, the Army provided training for more than 26,500 service members from the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. These numbers include training for all Marine tank crewmen as well as Marine field artillery and fire support personnel. Additionally the Army trained over 5,300 international students in support of combatant commander and State Department security cooperation objectives. The Army also benefits greatly from schooling provided by other services, further illustrating the need for and value of a fully resourced Joint Force. The Army

fulfills executive agent responsibilities for 42 functions, more than the Air Force (21), Navy (7), and Marine Corps (1) combined.

The Strategic Environment

The Army and other defense organizations conduct their missions in a continuously changing strategic environment, which both affects and is affected by U.S. policy decisions. U.S. military forces must constantly adapt to maximize their effectiveness. The Commission based its recommendations on a shared understanding of the likely future strategic environment, but acknowledges the impossibility of precisely predicting the future. Commission perceptions rely on evaluating current trends and extending or adjusting those trends as appropriate.

U.S. leaders should expect to face a variety of simultaneous, diverse threats to its national interests from both state and non-state actors as well as natural and man-made disasters. These threats will likely test America's security commitments to allies and partners around the world as well as American expectations of their Army's ability to assist with homeland challenges. Weak or failed states around the globe may become more vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated criminal and terrorist networks posing serious threats to domestic and international security and stability. Furthermore, many traditional American allies and partners have been reducing defense expenditures to address competing social, demographic, and economic challenges.

Russia poses significant and complex challenges to American security interests due to its nuclear capabilities, sales of advanced weapon systems, willingness to violate international convention, and support for actors working against U.S. interests, as it is doing in Syria. Russia is facing

severe challenges in demography, corruption, capital flight, and opportunities for economic growth over the next 10 to 20 years, and so may seek international adversaries to solidify domestic support. Insufficient revenues—especially if oil prices remain low—have the potential to undermine Russian military modernization, increase Russia's willingness to sell weapons to malign actors, decrease stability within Russia's borders, and narrow the influence Russia can project internationally. Over the next two decades, the Commission expects the Russian government to prioritize military modernization with available resources and coerce or subvert its neighbors to preserve and extend Russian influence. Russia's ability to achieve its objectives in Georgia and Ukraine by combining a variety of military and non-military activities with a propaganda campaign blurring the distinction between war and peace promises a future of "hybrid war" and "gray zone" tactics with which the United States will have to contend.

In Asia, an area dominated by land armies, China's trajectory impacts regional security more than any other single factor. China's insistence on creating spheres of exclusive influence in the East and South China Seas will keep regional tensions high and perpetuate the risk of escalation to direct conflict between the United States and China. The rapid pace of China's military modernization and its actions in the air, maritime, space, and cyber domains increase the risks to U.S. forces if tensions escalate. However, China's military and economic growth trajectory may falter as demographic and citizen demands challenge the ruling Communist party, though that could inspire China's leaders to escalate foreign issues in an effort to unite their population. War with China remains an important consideration due to its high impact, even if the probability of a U.S.-China war remains low. The Commission sees North Korea's volatile nature and North Korean military provocations as a possible catalyst for Sino-American confrontation and the

most likely military threat to Asian stability. The moderate potential for the collapse of North Korea presents a potential threat to regional stability with conceivably greater consequences outside the region due to the possibility of loose nuclear material. Failed deterrence or rapid North Korea epitomizes the need to be ready to fight tonight and win.

Trends suggest India should grow in global importance and acquire the ability to positively influence Asia through economic and political leadership. However, India's volatile relationship with Pakistan risks destabilizing the region and creates potential for escalation to nuclear conflict. Globally, nuclear proliferation increases the opportunities for malign actors to acquire a nuclear weapon, especially in a country with violent extremism problems and growing tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles. Violent extremist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to support and direct attacks against American interests around the globe.

Islamic extremist organizations and Iran are the current and most likely future threats to Middle East stability and U.S. interests. The organization currently attaining the most attention on the threat spectrum is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), operating in Iraq and Syria but with devoted followers and affiliates willing to engage in acts of terrorism in nations around the globe, including the United States. The emergence of ISIL is an example of how nonstate actors seize upon opportunities created by communal conflict and weak governance. ISIL's willingness to use murder and other forms of brutality against innocents; and ability to mobilize people, money, and weapons have enabled it to seize territory and establish control of populations and resources. ISIL uses social media and cyberspace to prosecute a propaganda campaign while using terrorist tactics to control populations and territory. ISIL demonstrates the need for land

forces to defeat determined enemies that operate among and control civilian populations. ISIL also highlights the need to extend efforts beyond physical battlegrounds to other contested spaces such as public perception and political subversion. In addition to the threat of direct attacks, the activities of ISIL and other organizations in the region have created a massive movement of refugees, a humanitarian crisis that raises concerns for future instability in Europe and other regions.

Iran expects to benefit tremendously from the nuclear agreement endorsed by the United Nations Security Council and could use the windfall from relaxed sanctions to substantially invest in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Quds force, and terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah to subvert and destabilize Arab, Israeli, and Western interests. If Tehran fails to abide by its commitments not to pursue nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon proliferation in Iran and beyond— potentially including Saudi Arabia—would significantly complicate U.S. goals in the region.

In Africa, unstable and corrupt governments have fomented civil strife and humanitarian crises, while weak states provide fertile ground for terrorist cells seeking members, financing, and safe havens. The continent faces several humanitarian challenges, both man-made and natural, ranging from civil strife and poverty to drought and disease.

Although the Western Hemisphere poses few direct threats to the United States, many countries in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean will probably struggle with economic growth while corruption and inadequate governance could cause civil unrest. The Commission expects transnational criminal organizations to remain entrenched and maintain sophisticated

smuggling networks into the United States, which terrorists or other U.S. adversaries could leverage to attack the homeland.

Globally, climate change has numerous implications for national security. Warming trends are lessening agricultural productivity in many areas and increasing the frequency of extreme weather events. The resulting food and water insecurities may increase resource competition between and within states. Changes in the Arctic have the potential to create benefits for the global economy but may also become a flashpoint for confrontation. Russia has ambitious designs on the resource-rich Arctic region and has substantially expanded its arctic forces. In addition to overlapping claims by Arctic nations, many non-Arctic nations, including China, have strong interests in facilitating access to low-cost shipping routes and Arctic resources.

Population growth across the globe is giving rise to megacities, which are frequently located in littoral regions increasing the likelihood and scale of future natural disasters. Megacities offer the potential to foster economic growth and stability but also provide safe-haven and recruitment opportunities for criminal networks, warlords, and terrorists, especially in weakly governed but highly connected slums. These megacities have the potential to create unique governmental entities transcending traditional or existing state governments and could complicate U.S. involvement on multiple levels.

Despite all the threats abroad, the Commission never took its eyes off the homeland, and neither should the Army. Aside from girding against potential attacks from both state and non- or near-state actors, the Nation must prepare to respond to terrorist attacks on a scale that ranges from small, localized incidents to regional events with numerous casualties and severe detrimental

impact on infrastructure. Responding to natural and man-made disasters are part of the Army's purview, too, and the governors will continue to rely on their National Guard assets in the event of severe weather events, earthquakes, wildfires, and civil unrest.

In this current and future strategic environment, the Commission undertook its comprehensive study of the structure of the Army and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Army.

-30-

The Laws that Shaped the Army

Act of Second Continental Congress, June 14, 1775 — approved the creation of the Continental Army.

Uniform Militia Act of 1792 — required states to establish militia units and required all men 18 to 45 to enroll as part of the militia, but provided no federal funding or guidance on organization.

Dick Act of 1903 — reformed the state militia system, providing federal funding and equipping while requiring states to organize and train militias according to specific standards. Subsequent amendments created the Army National Guard and strengthened the ties between the Regular Army and National Guard Units.

National Defense Act of 1920 — created the Organized Reserve, consisting of the Officer Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. The Organized Reserve later became the U.S. Army Reserve.

National Security Act of 1947 — established the National Military Establishment (later renamed the Department of Defense), the Department of the Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and renamed the Department of War as the Department of the Army.

Women's Armed Services Integration Act (1948) — enabled women to serve as permanent, regular members of the armed forces.

Military Selective Service Act of 1967 and amendments — the last of a series of four peacetime selective service acts, dating back to 1940, that authorized conscription for military service. The final draft lottery authorized under the act was held in 1972. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced the creation of the All-Volunteer Armed Forces in January 1973, negating the need for the military draft.

DOPMA and ROPMA (1980 and 1994) — DOPMA standardized officer personnel management across the U.S. armed forces, and ROPMA provided similar standardized officer personnel management for the reserve components.

Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) — dramatically reformed the Department of Defense by strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combatant Commanders and streamlining the chain of command.

Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (1993) — increased Regular Army authority and responsibility for advising and training of National Guard combat units.

A History of Readiness Crises

Though it eventually mobilized almost 8 million soldiers to fight the Second World War, the U.S. Army was woefully unprepared when the war began. In three wars since, the Nation has also had to play catch-up with its armed forces upon the onset of conflict.

With two oceans serving as a buffer for the homeland, and with lingering regret over the casualties of 1917-1918, the United States saw no need to build a large Army. Consequently, when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, the U.S. Army had less than 190,000 personnel on active duty. Germany's conquest of France in June 1940 convinced President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress that Army readiness needed improving, so Congress activated the National Guard in August 1940 and established the Nation's first peacetime draft in September. However, both measures were to expire after one year.

Mobilization did not go smoothly. Through the winter and spring of 1941, the Army struggled to build temporary bases and gather uniforms, equipment, and supplies, and General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, had trouble filling leadership ranks as almost half of the National Guardsmen who reported for duty were discharged because they were unfit, needed for war industries, or claimed family hardship.

In August 1941, despite the growing threats around the globe, the House of Representatives extended the call-up of the National Guard and the draft by a margin of just one vote, 203 to 202. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt diverted most of the arms and equipment the Army needed to Britain and Russia to help those countries stave off defeat. The president even directed the Army

in September 1941 to reduce its ranks and discharge Guardsmen and soldiers, believing they would not be needed in the near future.

That future came three months later with the attack on Pearl Harbor. In 1942, the Army rushed to build large, combat-ready forces but had too few company and field grade officers or sergeants to train and lead the new recruits. The Army drew leaders from hastily assembled units to provide cadre for other new units. The North Africa campaign kicked off in November 1942 with landings in French Morocco and French Algeria, and American forces suffered defeat in their first major engagement with German troops at the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943.

The next readiness crisis for the Army came less than five years after the end of World War II—five years of reduced spending on the Army—when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950. The Army rushed poorly equipped and ill-trained units from Japan to South Korea, and, repeating the results of 1942, the Americans were quickly overwhelmed by North Korean armor. Unprepared active duty units deployed from the United States as rapidly as possible, and President Harry S. Truman mobilized the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps. Though the Army's authorized end strength was increased, it took months to draft and train tens of thousands more soldiers and bring National Guard divisions up to full strength. By the time the Army had more ready forces to commit to Korea, the war had devolved into a stalemate leading to a ceasefire two years later.

After the Korean War, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's New Look strategy counted on "massive nuclear retaliation by the U.S. Air Force, rather than ground forces, to counter any

communist aggression." This strategy led to the marginalization of the Army in defense strategy and significant Army reductions. The Army invested in the reserve components as a hedge against wartime operational demands, but the Berlin Crisis of 1961 demonstrated that reserve units needed more post-mobilization training than Army planners had realized. President John F. Kennedy, meanwhile, embraced Special Operations Forces as a solution for small wars, such as the growing advisory effort in Vietnam.

However, as Viet Cong attacks intensified, General William Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, determined he needed American ground combat forces to launch offensive operations to prevent the South Vietnamese government from falling. President Lyndon B. Johnson approved GEN Westmoreland's requests for hundreds of thousands of troops, but the president rejected repeated requests to mobilize reserve component forces. Instead, President Johnson filled the Army's ranks with conscripts by doubling monthly draft calls. Because conscripts only had to serve a year in Vietnam before being discharged, the Army had to rely increasingly on career soldiers to provide experienced leadership, which put excess stress on the force as the war continued. The end of the draft and the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force became an opportunity to rebuild a professional Army, but for the remainder of the 1970s, resources were spare and defeat in Vietnam reverberated in institutional memory.

The Army in the 1980s turned the resources provided by President Ronald Reagan's buildup into ready combat power, and a generation of officers used the lessons of the past to build a force that could prevail on the battlefield. The Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) was a resounding success for the Army. It was also an anomaly, a rare moment when, due to the sudden end of the Cold War

and what turned out to be months of advanced preparation before the onset of combat, the Army's Regular Army readiness far exceeded requirements. The only exception arose from expectations and perceptions surrounding readiness in the reserve components. Although many Reserve and National Guard units deployed for the war, three Army National Guard combat brigades, designated as round-out formations, did not deploy with their associated active-duty divisions. Arguments over why—that they were not ready, that they required too much post-mobilization training, that readiness standards were imposed to preclude deploying the National Guard combat brigades, or that readiness requirements and reporting standards were too vague—helped foster a new commitment to increasing reserve component readiness.

Yet, the Army faced another readiness crisis in 2006—well after the onset of war in Iraq. Budget cuts forced the Army to shrink by a third in the early 1990s while, paradoxically, renewed confidence in military solutions led to more deployments. Demands on all the services soon outstripped the supply of active forces and required greater use of the reserve components. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq saw dramatic successes initially but did not lead not to decisive victory, and in late 2004, both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard warned that growing demands were having a detrimental effect on their ranks. Two years later General Peter Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army, warned that "without recurrent access to the reserve components through remobilization, we will break the active component." When President George W. Bush decided to surge forces to Iraq, he simultaneously expanded the Army. However, growing the Army's end strength by tens of thousands in a couple of years brought its own difficulties with significant increases in enlistment bonues and lower enlistment standards.

A readiness crisis is easier to regret in hindsight than to predict or prevent ahead of time. There are no easy paths for building a ready force before the demand for ground combat power is immediate and significant. Within the span of living memory, the United States has used multiple solutions for the problem of building readiness:

- full reserve mobilization, conscription and expansion (World War II);
- partial mobilization, conscription and expansion (Korea);
- no mobilization, conscription and expansion (Vietnam);
- partial mobilization (Gulf War);
- partial mobilization and limited expansion (2001-2011).

When wars come, policy makers and commanders struggle to build forces for the fight, and they often regret not having made the Army ready sooner. Peacetime savings seem pennywise and pound foolish when war breaks out and the Nation sends soldiers into combat without the numbers, equipment, supplies, or training they need to accomplish the mission.

To Serve and Protect

Physically and sexually abused as a child, Linda L. Singh was homeless—tossed out by her mother—at age 15. She dropped out of high school in 1981 and was working in a pretzel stand at a mall when she saw a National Guard recruiter. Realizing the Guard offered her a chance to better her life, Singh joined up, and her aspiration has resulted in a lifetime of service and led to her achieving the rank of major general and the position of Adjutant General for Maryland.

After serving for 11 years as an enlisted soldier, MG Singh was commissioned in 1991 through Officer Candidate School and has served in command and staff assignments at every level. She is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College and has deployed to Kosovo and Afghanistan. In January, 2015, MG Singh became the 29th Adjutant General of the Maryland National Guard, where she is responsible for the state's Military Department, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Emergency Management Agency, and its Defense Force. In a *Fortune* magazine profile published after she took command, MG Singh recounted a key leadership lesson: "The back story of many successful leaders is heartbreak, sleepless nights, and overcoming adversity."

Just a few months after she became the Adjutant General, riots broke out in Baltimore over the April 12, 2015, death of Freddie Carlos Gray Jr., a 25-year-old African-American man, while in the custody of the Baltimore Police Department. Widespread violence erupted following Mr. Gray's funeral on April 27. While peaceful protestors and community activists called for justice, some rioters began assaulting police and destroying vehicles. Looters attacked dozens of businesses, and arson burned at least one business.

In response to the violence, the Maryland National Guard deployed thousands of Guard members to protect critical infrastructure and support law enforcement as the police made hundreds of arrests and city authorities gradually restored order. The city lifted the curfew on May 3, and the National Guard withdrew from Baltimore the following day. The immediate crisis had passed, but the circumstances of Mr. Gray's death and the riots reinforced the importance of three points MG Singh emphasizes about leadership: value diversity, be authentic, and mentor others. When asked how the Guard has changed since she enlisted, MG Singh replied "I would not want to deploy to the streets of Baltimore with the National Guard from the 1980s or early '90s." Building a capable and ready National Guard is critical to restoring order in a crisis, and developing leaders like MG Singh ensures the Army has the vision it needs for its mission to protect the nation.

-30-

The Commission's Mission

"The Commission shall undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Army, and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Army…"

2015 NDAA, Section 1703(a)(1)

The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) was established by the Congress in the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Public Law 113-291). The Congress was prompted, in large part, by concerns over how the Army should best organize and employ the reserve components in a time of declining resources and whether to implement the transfer of AH-64 Apache aircraft from the reserve components to the Regular Army as directed by the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI).

The issue of how best to organize and employ the reserve components is not new; the Army, indeed the Nation, has wrestled with this question for decades. In 1993, the Regular Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and the associations representing these elements met to consider how best to restructure the reserve components. The decision to include the National Guard and Army Reserve leadership in the discussion, along with providing a seat at the table for the relevant associations, was important because bringing all of the stakeholders and their advocates together to settle the issue prevented any second guessing of the agreed-upon changes. It also gave the resulting "Offsite Agreement" (MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD, SUBJECT: AC-RC LEADERS' OFFSITE Agreement as of 29 October 1993, DACS-ZB dated 10 November 1993) a desired aura of credibility and legitimacy, especially with Congress. Today's challenges to

simultaneously resource readiness, force structure, and modernization in the face of fiscal constraints are, in many ways, echoes from the past.

Understanding the history involved and appreciating both the historical and the current relationships between the components, the Commission approached its mandate with a clear understanding that in order to address the apparent rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard, the Commission's final report would have to provide policymakers with credible recommendations that could stand up to intense scrutiny. In that regard, the Commission has made every effort to be unbiased, comprehensive, conclusive, balanced, and transparent. Commissioners and staff considered every proposal submitted by advocates of each of the components and those submitted from outside the Army. This holistic approach maintained an eye toward what is best for the Nation. No component was given short shrift or shown favoritism. The result is a final product that is thoroughly researched, based on realistic assumptions, and backed by solid data.

The Commission's Tasks

Specifically, Congress directed the Commission to undertake a "comprehensive study of the structure of the Army" in order to assess the size and force mix of the active and reserve components and make recommendations in those areas as the Commission thought appropriate. In considering recommendations, the Commission was instructed to take into account "anticipated mission requirements for the Army at acceptable levels of national risk and in a manner consistent with available resources and anticipated future resources." Furthermore, the

Commission was assigned the specific task of studying the transfer of all the Army National Guard's AH-64 Apache helicopters to the Regular Army using the same considerations cited above for the Army size and force mix question. A date of no later than February 1, 2016 was set for submitting the final report to the Congressional defense committees and the President.

To help commissioners organize the study efforts and allocate resources, the Commission enlisted three separate elements to conduct parallel assessments of assigned tasks. The assistance provided by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Army War College, and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command was greatly appreciated.

Given the scope and complexity of the task and the limited time frame, the Commission decided to focus on several overarching principles to guide its work. Primary among those was the adoption of a Total Army approach in which each component is considered distinct, essential, and interdependent. The Commission focused on the differing strengths and limitations of each component's capabilities, particularly regarding cost efficiencies, while taking into account how the components rely on each other to achieve mission requirements.

The commissioners also agreed that all recommendations must take into account acceptable levels of risk, potential impacts on the All-Volunteer Force, and fiscal implications. Furthermore, the commissioners sought to ensure that the combatant commanders' and the governors' needs were paramount. To that end, the capacity of Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve to support current and anticipated homeland defense and disaster assistance missions in the United States was an essential requirement.

Lastly, a major concern was determining a reasonable estimate of "anticipated future resources," illustrated by the fact that during the short lifespan of the Commission, the defense budget took a wildly unpredictable course until passage of the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2015 (BBA15) apparently settled the matter for fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017. In the end, the Commission looked to the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP), the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), and the BBA15 for guidance on future resources.

The Commission would also add its voice to those in the Department of Defense calling for stable and predictable funding going forward. Fiscal unpredictability and uncertainty have sadly become the norm, playing havoc with Army budgeting and planning. The Commission hopes that, with enactment of the BBA15, Congress and the Administration have ended their budgetary brinkmanship and are now committed to enacting defense policy and spending bills on time.

Federal Advisory Committee Act

The Congress created the NCFA as a federal advisory committee subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972 (Public Law 92-463). FACA, while outdated in many ways by advances in technology, guided the Commission in striking a balance between being inclusive and transparent with the public, yet protective of information in the interests of national security.

FACA committees must be sponsored by a federal agency that is responsibile for ensuring compliance with all legal requirements, from the creation of a committee through its expiration. The Department of Defense (DoD) sponsored the NCFA, and by working in close coordination with the Department of the Army, did much to ensure the Commission's success. With the

benefit of having learned from the experience of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF), Secretary of the Army John McHugh nominated Mr. Don Tison, a senior leader from the Army Staff, to serve as NCFA's Designated Federal Officer (DFO); the DoD appointed the Secretary's selection prior to the NCFA standing up. The DFO is the sponsoring agency's representative and is responsibile for ensuring compliance with FACA and all other legal requirements. In this capacity, the DFO serves as a liason between the sponsoring agency and the Commission to ensure efficient operations and success.

The DFO, with the support of the Secretary McHugh, selected a core, versatile staff, as well as a few alternate DFOs to assist him in executing his responsibilites. The DFO staff worked hand-in-hand with the NCFA staff and DoD in facilitating the commissioners' efforts. The assembled DFO team had the flexibility to expand and contract as needed to support the Commission in executing its mission.



The proactive efforts to prepare for the NCFA ensured it was able to get off to a quick start and immediately demonstrate inclusiveness and transparency with the public. Nevertheless, compliance with FACA comes at a cost in terms of personnel and resources. Several of the goals of FACA could be accomplished in a much more efficient manner without compromising the desired goals of the law. For example, the NCFA maintained a thorough and comprehensive website (www.ncfa.ncr.gov) allowing the public to track the Commission's progress and interact with it through public comment and news announcements. Yet, the NCFA, via its supporting DFO team, also had to enter information into the General Services Administration website, which is an antiquated site at best. This type of redundancy is unnecessary. Additionally, FACA requires a physical reading room when a virtual reading room is not only easier to maintain but is also easier for the public to access. From how meetings are conducted to how records are kept,

FACA needs to be updated to reflect the advances in technology since the law's inception in 1972.

Furthermore, a sound understanding and application of the relevant law, specifically the government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-409), and its interplay with FACA and the law establishing the Commission, as amended, provided the deliberative safe haven necessary to allow the commissioners to freely and throughly discuss and analyze the voluminous amount of information provided to them in DoD-approved closed meetings and in a classified setting.

Thankfully, the Commission did not have to navigate the full challenge of drafting its report under the complete constraints of FACA due to a provision in the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA (Public Law 114-92) allowing the NCFA to expedite its meetings.

Recommendation 2-1: Congress should incorporate into a law creating any similar commission a provision similar to the one in Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA to facilitate the committee's activities without the complete constraints of Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Recommendation 2-2: Congress should update FACA's requirements in a way that reflects changes in information technology (e.g. using web-based reading room, using committee website vice GSA database, etc.).

The Commission's Organization

The commissioners decided early on to have a multidisciplinary operating staff with all components well represented; indeed, both Army Reserve and Army National Guard staff

outnumbered Regular Army staff. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and Congressional Research Service contributed staff as well. Overall, the staff included a mix of direct hires, employees detailed to NCFA from other government entities, and contract employees. They came to NCFA with a wide range of operational and institutional experience and were encouraged to speak with candor and rely on evidence in their reasoning.

The experience of the NCSAF informed many of the NCFA's organizational decisions, allowing this Commission to get up and running in short order. The Commission is appreciative of the advice and information provided by NCSFA alumni.

Congress mandated a broad set of tasks for the Commission. To better manage that workload, the Commission established five subcommittees: Operational, Institutional, Force Generation, Aviation, and Drafting. Each subcommittee had a membership of three to four commissioners, its own dedicated staff, and a designated DFO. The DoD, as the Commission's sponsor, approved all subcommittees and their terms of reference, including a mission statement, objectives, scope, and methodology. A DFO attended all subcommittee meetings, as required by FACA. Commissioners outside a given subcommittee did not participate in that subcommittee's activities. The subcommittees gathered information, conducted research, and analyzed relevant issues and facts for consideration and deliberation by the full Commission.

June 2015

Subcommittee Assignments / Tasks

NDAA Task	Section	Operational	Institutional	Force Generation	Aviation	Drafting
		Commissioners Dr. Kathleen Hicks (C) SMA(R) R Chandler GEN(R) Carter Ham LTG(R) Jack Stultz	**Commissioners** LTG(R) Jack Stultz (C) SMA(R) R Chandler GEN(R) Carter Ham	**Commissioners** GEN(R) Larry Ellis (C) GEN(R) JD Thurman Sec Robert Hale Sec Thomas Lamont	**Commissioners** Sec R Hale (C) GEN(R) JD Thurman Sec T Lamont GEN(R) Larry Ellis	**Commissioners** GEN(R) C Ham (C) Sec T Lamont LTG(R) Jack Stultz Dr. K Hicks
		Staff Lead Mr. Kerry Schindler	**Staff Lead** Mr. Johnny Thomas	**Staff Lead** Ms. Cherie Emerson	**Staff Lead** LTC Pierce LTC Hartvigsen	**Staff Lead** Mr. Eric Minton
	DFO sub-committee oversight Mr. Donald Tison	**DFO** MAJ Vince Morris	**DFO** LTC Michael Lockwood	**DFO** Mrs. Deborah Gantt	**DFO** Mr. Mark Pizzuto	**DFO** Mr. Mark Von Heeringen
Future Demand	1703(a)(1) (A) 1703(a)(1)(B) 1703(a)(2)(A)(i)	**Primary Responsibility (PR)**	**Secondary Responsibility (SR)**	**SR**		
Force Generation	1703(a)(2)(A)(iii-vi) 1703(a)(2)(B)	**SR**	**SR**	**PR**		
Cost Efficiency	1703(a)(1)(B) 1703(a)(2)(A)(ii)	**SR**	**PR**	**SR**	**SR**	
Apache Transfer	1703(b)	**SR**			**PR**	
ARNG Allocation	1703 (a)(2)(C) 1703 (a)(2)(D)	**SR**	**PR**			
Report	1703(c)	**SR**	**SR**	**SR**	**SR**	**PR**

The Fact-Finding Phase

Comprehensiveness and transparency drove the Commission's work. Commissioners and staff made every effort to consider all alternatives and ensure stakeholders had an opportunity to make their case before the Commission.

The overall Commission strategy during the fact-finding phase was to cover as much of the Army as feasible in the shortest time and at the least cost to taxpayers. To that end, on several occasions, the Commission took advantage of commissioner travel with other organizations to schedule visits to parts of the Army that might otherwise have been omitted. For example, Vice Chairman Thomas R. Lamont's travel to the Pacific with another national commission provided

the opportunity to arrange a visit to Hawaii on his way back to the continental United States. This allowed the Commission to hear directly from some more distant stakeholders, including the Governor of Hawaii and the Adjutants General of Guam and Hawaii. The NCFA's trip to Germany was also planned around Chairman Carter F. Ham's presence in Europe on other matters. Lastly, the Commission arranged meetings with leaders from the 2nd Infantry Division, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) when they were in the D.C. area on other business to gather information from them at less cost to the taxpayers.

The Commission conducted site visits to gather firsthand information from soldiers and leaders in person and hear the tones of their concerns. For site visits, the Commission established some basic criteria to help guide site selection. First, the Commission asked the Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau, and Office of the Chief of Army Reserve for their recommendations on where to visit. From this start point, the commissioners expanded the list to include as geographically diffuse locations as possible. A quick glance at the map of site visits on page XX illustrates that few, if any, locales with heavy Army concentrations were not visited.

Second, commissioners wanted to go to locations that featured a good mix of Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units. A good example is North Carolina. Fort Bragg provided a wide variety of unit types from all components. Commissioners first met with FORSCOM, which provides trained and ready land power to combatant commanders. At the time of the Commission visit, soldiers from Fort Bragg were deployed to dozens of countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Liberia. Other major units engaged during the North Carolina site visits were U.S. Army Reserve Command, XVII Airborne Corps, and U.S. Army Special

Operations Command, as well as elements of the North Carolina Army National Guard. In short, North Carolina was an essential first stop.

Third, we sought formations with differing functions. Especially important for this site visit planning parameter was the focused effort to meet with a wide variety of aviation units. Over the course of its fact-finding phase, the Commission visited 18 states and had over 330 individual engagements with Army units in the United States and Europe covering the following functions: mission command; institutional; maneuver; signal; sustainment; intelligence; protection; fires; medical; and cyber. Of these, just over 100 were Regular Army while 130 were National Guard. Army Reserve units numbered about 30, as did multicomponent or joint units.

The Commission had interactions, either in person or in writing, with all 54 Adjutants General. Commissioners also attended the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS) conference in Georgia and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) general conference in Tennessee. The Commission engaged in person or through written correspondence with 33 governors and also attended the National Governors Association's summer meeting in West Virginia. In addition, during site visits, the Commission engaged with fifteen General Officer Commands from the U.S. Army Reserve. Two of these units were undergoing post-mobilization training and validation during the Commission visit.

In the Washington, D.C., area, commissioners met with senior leaders from the Department of the Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Association of the United States Army (AUSA), NGAUS, AGAUS, Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States (EANGUS), the Reserve Officers Association, and the National Governor's Association. NCFA

staff met with members of the House National Guard and Reserve Components Caucus. The Commission also held monthly closed and open meetings in Arlington, Virginia. The closed meetings involved classified material while the open sessions allowed commissioners to hear from a wide range of witnesses and members of the public.

Commissioners met with the every geographic combatant command (Pacific Command, Northern Command, Southern Command, Central Command, Africa Command, and European Command), several functional commands (Transportation Command and Space Command), and two sub-unified commands (U.S. Forces Korea and Cyber Command). Commissioners also met with the military defense attaches from Australia, Colombia, Estonia, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, Poland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.

In short, the Commission endeavored to be as comprehensive in its approach as possible.

Commission Transparency

The Commission also believed it was important to be available to the general public while traveling around the country. To that end, the Commission held open meetings in Fayetteville, North Carolina; Killeen, Texas; Long Beach, California; and Tacoma, Washington—all areas with a large Total Army footprint. At each of these stops, local officials had the opportunity to tell the Commission their views on the Army, and commissioners heard many heartfelt expressions of support for the Army, its soldiers and families, and its mission.

> **"Only in America would the government sit down with its citizens and say, 'Hey, how ought we structure our defense forces?'"**
>
> **Ted Vorhees**

The Commission also received significant input from Congress, including written comments from over 75 members. There were staff-to-staff meetings with professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, as well as a meeting with staff and members of the House National Guard and Reserve Components Caucus.

The public affairs posture of the Commission was to actively use a variety of communication strategies to stimulate public interest, including Twitter. NCFA issued media advisories on upcoming events, distributed press releases about each meeting, and responded to queries from reporters. All of this activity is documented on the NCFA website. NCFA communications staff actively worked with media covering the open meetings (both in the D.C. area and around the country), attend the follow-on question-and-answer sessions with commissioners, and conduct

one-on-one interviews. During site visits, NCFA staff was able to get on-post media to assist in encouraging external media to publicize the Commission's visit and support public participation in the open meetings. NCFA accommodated every media request, helping to fulfill a primary Commission goal of transparency.

Comprehensive Analytical Review

The Commission's comprehensive approach extended beyond its site visits and face-to-face engagements into its analytical phase of research and modeling. During six months of fact finding and information gathering, the Commission collected a mountain of data, thousands of pages of written submissions, and many hours of testimony from across the Army and around the country. The effort to make sense of so much information was daunting, and the Commission recognized early on that it would need a culminating event to present analytical results, integrate sometime conflicting information, and weigh the results. Various proposals produced by the subcommittees were another key element the Commission needed to discuss in a classified setting. The Commission settled on a two-day Comprehensive Analytical Review (CAR) hosted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).

The analysis leading up to the CAR took months. The Commission used the Department of Defense integrated security scenarios, war plans, and intelligence estimates to assess Army capacity and capabilities. Staff planning products—such as estimates, intelligence on the operational environment, defense studies, reports, and histories—were used to describe and better understand the future environment. Geopolitical relationships, political actors, tactical

functions, cultural tensions, economic efficiencies, and strategic importance were also added to the equation. The NCFA staff produced a “gap analysis,” a list of questions for the commissioners to consider during and after the CAR.

The Commission and multiple agencies performed redundant analysis in parallel to complementary and ensure that findings were consistent or rationalize any inconsistencies. Participating agencies included the Center for Army Analysis, Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, IDA, and RAND Corporation. The goal was to identify the levers of Army force management, understand the interrelationships, and examine the implications for the size and mix of the force. Some of these activities included cost estimates, modeling of joint force campaigns, reviewing significant activities from combat operations, and interviews or seminars. These analytical efforts incorporated the assessment of risk and identified potential trade space.

The CAR itself allowed commissioners to evaluate plausible relationships and make comparisons against simple and complex models using reasonably known data expected to exist (or continue in the absence of known conditions to the contrary). Particular conditions that can cause variations in these relationships (world security environment, policy generation, political administration) are critical when identifying and integrating areas of potential risk and areas of potential material misstatement. Discussion included presentations by NCFA staff analysts, including an overview discussion on the Army today, rules of allocation, and modeling outputs (both baseline POM budget forecasts and constrained BCA). NCFA staff provided findings and indicators regarding force mix, stationing, rotational goals, strategic lift, expansion, generating force, training, mobilization, recruiting, and equipping. RAND provided a review of its study on

"Regrets and Other Potential Contingencies." NCFA staff led a discussion on generating force size and sufficiency. At the end of the two days, the commissioners had a better collective understanding of the proposals under consideration as well as their feasibility and second- and third-order effects. Additional modeling and research questions were also identified to help commissioners transition from proposals to recommendations.

Preparing the Report

Following the CAR, each subcommittee proposed recommendations for the full Commission to consider. During the November closed meeting, commissioners came to agreement in principle for most recommendations. These agreements were crucial to allow the Drafting Subcommittee to move from an outline to explanatory text for the agreements.

The task of turning the Commission's analysis, findings, and recommendations into a useful report for policymakers was the primary task of the Drafting Subcommittee. The NCFA apparently is the first commission sponsored by DoD to use a drafting subcommittee, and the Commission suggests that future commissions consider adopting one as well.

During the July 16, 2015, open meeting, the Commission unanimously approved a draft outline presented by the Drafting Subcommittee for the final report. The starting outline was generated by reviewing other commission reports for best practices. This outline provided subcommittees a framework for their findings and allowed the staff to begin filling in administrative information in annexes, such as the list of site visits and public comment. While some changes occurred, the original outline held up well.

The Drafting Subcommittee assigned each chapter to one of its four members for which they would serve as the lead writer. Two different NCFA staff members were also assigned to assist the chapter Commissioner leading each chapter by developing outlines and serving as resource channels. The editor managed the individual chapter writing process under the supervision of the Executive Director. This approach facilitated development of graphics, vignettes, and sidebar information as the outline transitioned into report text.

Prior to enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA, which significantly freed up the writing process by limiting FACA's application only to meetings with five or more commissioners, the Commission adopted a hub-and-spoke method for getting inputs and edits from all eight commissioners while remaining FACA compliant. The editor, under the supervision of the Executive Director, provided each of the eight commissioners with a draft report and then received and processed comments, questions, and edits from them individually. After consolidating this input, the editor provided the new version of the report back to commissioners for further review and edits.

Once the editing process was complete, the report was approved for security review by the Commission. Following the DoD security review, the Commission gathered to address security review comments and proof read the final report before delivery to the printer for production and an on-time public release of Commission's report.

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY



SUBCOMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS / TASKS

		SUBCOMMITTEES				
		OPERATIONAL	INSTITUTIONAL	FORCE GENERATION	AVIATION	DRAFTING
		COMMISSIONERS				*Chairperson
		HON (Dr.) Kathleen H. Hicks* GEN Carter F. Ham SMA Raymond F. Chandler LTG Jack C. Stultz	**LTG Jack C. Stultz*** GEN Carter F. Ham SMA Raymond F. Chandler	**GEN Larry R. Ellis*** HON Thomas R. Lamont HON Robert F. Hale GEN James D. Thurman	**HON Robert F. Hale*** HON Thomas R. Lamont GEN Larry R. Ellis GEN James D. Thurman	**GEN Carter F. Ham*** HON Thomas R. Lamont HON (Dr.) Kathleen H. Hicks LTG Jack C. Stultz
		STAFF LEAD				
		Mr. Kerry Schindler	Mr. Johnny Thomas	Ms. Cherie Emerson	LTC Steven Pierce LTC Gregory Hartvigsen	Mr. Eric Minton
		DFO (Commission DFO oversight: Mr. Donald Tison)				
NDAA TASK	SECTION	MAJ Vince Morris	LTC Michael Lockwood	Mrs. Deborah Gantt	Mr. Mark Pizzuto	Mr. Mark Von Heeringen
FUTURE DEMAND	1703(a)(1) (A) 1703(a)(1)(B) 1703(a)(2)(A)(i)	**Primary Responsibility (PR)**	Secondary Responsibility (SR)	SR		
FORCE GENERATION	1703(a)(2)(A)(iii-vi) 1703(a)(2)(B)	SR	SR	**PR**		
COST EFFICIENCY	1703(a)(1)(B) 1703(a)(2)(A)(ii)	SR	**PR**	SR	SR	
APACHE TRANSFER	1703(b)	SR			**PR**	
ARNG ALLOCATION	1703 (a)(2)(C) 1703 (a)(2)(D)	SR	**PR**			
SUBMIT REPORT	1703(c)	SR	SR	SR	SR	**PR**

COMMISSION MILITARY TOUCH POINTS




EUROPE
ESTONIA
UNITED KINGDOM
GERMANY
POLAND
FRANCE
ITALY
ASIA
KOREA
JAPAN
GUAM
AUSTRALIA
ISRAEL
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
MIDDLE EAST
KEY
REGULAR ARMY
NATIONAL GUARD
ARMY RESERVE
MULTICOMPONENT
JOINT
INTERNATIONAL

NCFA Analytical Tools

System for Periodically Apportioning Demands (SPADES): The TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) developed SPADES to model force sufficiency problems over time. Force sufficiency modeling done with SPADES accounts for a high amount of variability under different scenarios. This allows TRAC to examine, on a month-by-month basis, how a proposed force structure could be expected to deliver capacity during periods of both peace and war, given Army policy.

MARATHON: The U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA) developed MARATHON for analyzing inventory, demand, and force generation of ready forces over time. The discrete events simulation engine mimics, on a day-by-day basis, how the Army matches a changing supply to demands that vary over extended time periods under varying force generation policies. The Army uses MARATHON to model the entire operating force structure (over 200 unit types) for the Total Army Analysis process, as well as for ad hoc studies on force structure, demand over time, and alternative force generation policies. This model reflects a wide variety of plausible demand futures, any proposed inventories or end strengths, and virtually any force generation policy.

Joint Integrated Campaign Model (JICM): JICM is a computer simulation used by elements of the Department of Defense to analyze major combat at the strategic and operational (theater) levels. JICM was originally developed by the RAND Corporation under contract to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While JICM reflects the entire Joint warfight, the model predominantly focuses on ground combat operations at the brigade-and-above level. JICM is used by the Army to, among other things, validate the feasibility of the force lists and concepts of operation in the

jointly developed planning scenarios. In the process, JICM also provides important data on the speed of advance, casualties, equipment losses, fuel consumption, and other factors critical for analysis of support force requirements.

Analysis of Mobility Platform (AMP): AMP is a federation of computer models sponsored by the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command used as part of the budgetary decision process looking specifically at strategic and operational transportation requirements and capacity. AMP models the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies from home station to ports and airports in the United States, transit from U.S. ports and airports to overseas ports and airports, and onward to their final destinations using all available methods of transport. AMP is used by the Army to, among other things, validate the transportation feasibility of force deployments in the jointly developed planning scenarios. In the process, AMP provides important data on estimated arrival dates of units into a theater of war, strategic lift asset requirements, and the feasibility of maintaining the required levels of supply to meet warfighting requirements.

Force Requirements Generation (FORGE): CAA created the FORGE model to inform decisions about support force requirements at the strategic and operational (theater) levels. FORGE applies Army doctrine, the concept for providing support and sustainment element from the jointly developed planning scenarios, JICM output, and other analytic processes to determine the doctrinal requirements for a balanced force capable of conducting and sustaining major combat operations. FORGE uses doctrine, combat forces employed, and other high-level data from the warfight plan in order to develop the required enabler capabilities such as trucks,

military police, engineers, and all of the other Army capabilities required for the Joint warfight to succeed. FORGE is used by the Army to broaden the scope of the jointly developed planning scenarios beyond the brigade level to encompass all of the capabilities the Army must provide to the specified combat forces so they can conduct the operation as described in the planning scenario. In combination with the brigade-and-above force requirements listed in the jointly developed planning scenario, the FORGE output allows the Army to conduct analysis of the total force requirements for major combat operations.

Iso-Cost Model: CAA adapted the Iso-cost model from the model developed for the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. The adapted version combines plausible future demands for forces and availability policies to determine what inventory mixes could meet the demands. Units are further sorted by comparing equal-cost (i.e. iso-cost) mixes of Regular Army and reserve component units of same type to determine the lowest average annual cost mix that can meet the demands. Summary data from the analysis of individual unit types was then used to consider potential trades between different types of units and different components.

Integrated Risk Assessment and Management Model (IRAMM): IRAMM is a tool to create informed estimates of the probabilities and risks associated with significant future threat scenarios. IRAMM allows knowledgeable experts to express their views on strategic risk during one-on-one, not-for-attribution interviews. Each respondent uses a common risk definition and scales for estimating consequences, and these responses are tabulated for use in group discussion among respondents following the interviews. This two-step process provides a coherent

framework to help evaluators identify areas of consensus as well as differences in judgments regarding the adverse consequences to the Nation that would result under each scenario.

The Stochastic Active-Reserve Assessment (SARA) Model: The SARA model is a tool for assessing force structures and force readiness policies in diverse and uncertain scenarios with a variety of future threats. Modeled force generation policies include the force structure size and mix, rotation rate, readiness posture, and deployment lengths. The SARA model permits analysis of policy alternatives in a predetermined scenario (e.g., Integrated Security Construct-B). It also allows consideration of a range of possible scenarios, generating 10,000 twenty-year scenarios based on user-specified expectations about the future. Users can either use default historical averages or specify the types of operations they expect to occur and, on average, how often. This allows users to evaluate how alternative views of the future impact the expected effectiveness of different force structures and related policies. Finally, the SARA model estimates the cost of each force structure, including both peacetime costs and deployment costs, allowing an examination of the tradeoffs between risk (in terms of demand shortfalls) and costs for various policy choices.

Significant Activities (SIGACTs): The SIGACTS database is the most comprehensive, official military record of daily activity for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, containing some three-quarters of a million entries. Nearly one-third of those entries have been identified as having been generated by U.S. Army units; the bulk of the remainder coms from the other U.S. Services,

non-U.S. coalition partners, and host nation forces. SIGACTs reporting was mandatory and a matter of command emphasis in both theaters. Commanders and staffs at all levels used the data to track enemy actions and their impacts, formulate effective counter-measures, and provide general situational awareness. SIGACTs entries typically answered questions related to who, what, where, when and how for enemy-initiated attacks as well as friendly-generated actions. Because of SIGACTs and a variety of supporting operational information, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan arguably provide the most complete, near-real time, empirical documentation of warfighting in U.S. history. For the operational analyses conducted for the Commission, measures were established for Regular Army and reserve component units to show how direct and indirect fire attacks and improvised explosive device (IED) incidents were distributed, what friendly casualty and IED neutralization rates were achieved, and what missions or activities were being performed as encounters took place.

-30-

Assessing Risk

"The Commission shall undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Army, and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Army, in order … to make recommendations on the modifications, if any, of the structure of the Army related to current and anticipated mission requirements for the Army at acceptable levels of national risk…"

2015 NDAA, Section 1703(a)(1)(B)

At the heart of the Commission's mandate is a requirement to recommend how best the Army can meet mission requirements at its planned structure and funding with "acceptable levels of national risk." In the course of its work, the Commission encountered divergent levels of risk tolerance inside the U.S. Government and among outside experts. Circumstances believed by some to be unacceptable were perfectly palatable to others. The Commission relied on evidence presented to it and its collective professional judgement and experience to assess "acceptable" risk.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 charged the Commission to consider four types of risk: national, military, operational, and strategic. These four risks can best be assessed in the context of the Army's ability to fulfill two basic responsibilities: (1) to provide options to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Combatant Commanders when called upon (risk to mission), and (2) to ensure the health of the force (risk to force).

Risk to mission addresses the Army's ability to provide well trained, appropriately equipped forces when employed. Missions are at risk when Army forces do not have appropriate or sufficient capability and capacity, or cannot bring capability and capacity to bear when needed to

defeat an adversary or achieve other assigned missions. Risk to mission can be measured in the near term as comprising the manning, training, and equipping for possible "fight tonight" contingencies. Risk to mission should also be measured in the long term as an expression of the preparedness of the force to meet over-the-horizon challenges.

Risk to force addresses the Army's ability to maintain the health of its All-Volunteer Force. The force is at risk when units suffer undue casualties, when units deploy without being fully prepared for their assigned missions, when soldiers experience prolonged periods of repeated, extended deployments, or when the Army cannot recruit and retain enough qualified men and women with the needed skill sets. As with risk to mission, risk to force should be measured in both the near and long term.

Other elements of the Joint Force rely on Army support, just as Army forces rely on capabilities from other services. Because of this interdependency, Army risk to mission will affect the capability of the entire joint force.

Assessing the magnitude of a potential military challenge, its probability, and whether the force has attained an acceptable level of readiness to meet it are all highly subjective. Magnitude might be best understood in terms of the cost to U.S. interests, which can range from relatively concrete measures, such as lives, property, and resources, to intangible metrics, such as U.S. credibility and deterrence. The probability of challenges that might require the use of U.S. Army assets is always difficult to measure, but our nation repeatedly finds itself in need of the kind of land forces only the Army delivers. The nature of the conflict and sometimes the location are not always predictable several years out. However, by tracking geopolitical, technological, and other

important trends, such as laid out in Chapter 1, and bearing in mind historical patterns, the Commission drew some conclusions about the general range and pace of likely threats and their potential costs to U.S. interests.

The Army and Risk Mitigation

The Army uses three primary tools to mitigate risk—readiness, force structure, and investment. The Army can spend funds to ensure its existing forces are trained and ready to respond to the needs of the moment. The Army can also modify existing unit designs, invest in additional force structure, and adjust force mix within the force structure to improve its capabilities over the near- to midterm. And, the Army can spend funds on force modernization, often with a focus on maintaining or gaining operational and technological advantage in the mid- to long term. Leader development is also a key element of investment that improves the Army's ability to adapt available force structure and capabilities to unforeseen future demands. However, investing in leaders, technology, structure, or readiness in isolation is not sufficient. The Army's advantage over adversaries is not due just to quantity; it depends in large measure on qualitative advantages in all areas, particularly in technology and the skill of our soldiers and the adaptive characteristics of their leaders.

Conducting the Risk Assessment

To conduct the risk assessment, the Commission first established its view of the future strategic environment. The Commission identified missions that might require Army forces. By looking at these missions in isolation, we sought to identify capability gaps. We then looked at potential

combinations of missions over time to determine the appropriate overall size of the Army and the capability and component mix of forces within the Army.

The Commission's findings and recommendations are grounded in its assessment of the Army's ability to satisfy global requirements, notably those present or emerging in Europe, the Pacific, the Middle East, and at home. The most stressing combination of missions assessed by the Commission included three significant near-simultaneous events: a large-scale homeland defense response; a large-scale conventional force operation; and a limited duration deterrence mission elsewhere. This combination reflects the Department of Defense's current strategic guidance for force sizing and shaping. Although the world is unlikely to present exactly this set of challenges in the place, time, and order assessed, the Commission considered the scale of these combined challenges as reasonable to comprehensively assess risk to mission and risk to force.

Findings and Recommendations

America's method for preparing for and executing war has evolved to one of Total Force with the reserve components providing operational capabilities and strategic depth. From a strict efficiency approach, decisions on size, types, and mix of forces could lower overall monetary costs. However, the nation has decided to field an Army of and for the people, and the distinct, interdependent, and essential components of the Army (Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) combine to provide the United States with the most effective force. The nature of the strategic and fiscal environments is such that the nation cannot afford the luxury of relying primarily on the Regular Army to execute missions. The burden of the nation's defense must be borne by the whole Army, and the Army must manage its forces in a manner that

leverages the unique strengths, offsets the weaknesses, and gains the most utility from all three components.

Recommendation 3-1: The Army must manage and employ forces under the Total Force approach.

In general terms, the Army is appropriately sized, shaped, and ready to meet the strategic guidance it has been given, first promulgated in 2012 and reiterated in Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Assuming current readiness and investment levels, a force of 980,000 uniformed personnel (450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve) provides the Army sufficient capability and capacity across a range of potential challenges—but only just so. Further, this distribution of forces by component is about right. However, the Commission identified concerns with the timely delivery of certain key enablers for long-duration campaigns requiring ongoing rotations of Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve forces. For some potential challenges ahead, the Army might have to deploy units not fully ready while some units might have deployments extended beyond 12 months. Depending on the nature of the challenge, these operational conditions might persist for several years.

Current strategic guidance directs the Army and other Defense components to no longer size themselves for large-scale, long-duration stability operations. The Commission concluded that the Army has complied with this guidance. Using directed planning assumptions and with its

planned fiscal year 2017 force, it is in fact neither sized nor shaped for conducting such missions at acceptable risk.

Moreover, the Army's limited investment in modernization is a source of significant long-term concern to the Commission, even under existing guidance. Decreases to the Army budget over the past several years (due to the Budget Control Act) have forced the Army to limit modernizing the force. The Army has already made difficult choices in dropping the Ground Combat Vehicle, Armed Aerial Scout, and Unmanned Ground Vehicle upgrades. The investment planning for modernization reflects Mounted Soldier System programs, aviation, communications, and ground combat vehicles as vulnerable to further reductions. The Army's current strategy to protect science and technology investments, incrementally improve existing fleets, and delay the procurement of the next generation of platforms strains the Army' ability to build the foundation of a force that can meet future challenges and puts major acquisition programs at risk.

However, decreasing budgets and continued operational demands means the Army is assuming greater risk in both near-term readiness and modernization. Nevertheless, investing in near-term readiness equates to "non-negotiable" for Army leaders as they must complete current missions. By default, assuming greater risk falls onto the modernization accounts.

Furthermore, the risk extends to the industrial base. The Army's equipment strategy requires an industrial base that can ramp up to meet increased demand during emergencies while still providing smaller quantities between major conflicts. With modernization budgets rapidly declining, companies are likely to sour on the defense sector and direct their R&D efforts and production capacity to non-defense products. Continued fiscal uncertainty will also dissuade

potential companies from entering the market. A shrinking defense industrial base erodes the Army's ability to respond to significant national emergencies.

Perhaps of greater concern to the Commission is the inadequacy of current guidance in light of the evolving security environment. In areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq, missions are persisting or re-emerging, respectively, in ways not anticipated by the Department's plans. The rise of ISIL as a global challenge is likewise not well accounted for in current force guidance. Moreover, Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine, its regular use of large-scale, snap exercises near the border of NATO countries, and its actions in Syria all create challenges for assurance and deterrence—and unthinkable though it may be to some, may require forceful response options in the future.

As such, the Commission has determined that the 980,000 force with the current component distribution is the *minimum* sufficient force necessary to meet the challenges of the future strategic environment. In response to emerging and evolving threats, the Army, in fact, may need to develop new capabilities or invest in increased capacity of existing capabilities. The Commission cannot see either of these possibilities realized with the Army's current size, structure, and investment plan. The exact implications of this environment-to-strategy mismatch are unclear. The first step in addressing these capability and capacity questions is for DoD and the President to revise the defense strategic guidance based on the changes in the security environment. A thorough strategic review is required to provide a frank assessment of the resources and investments necessary to ensure the Army is capable of its contributions to the joint force both today and in the future.

Recommendation 3-2: The president should budget and the Congress should authorize and fund an Army that maintains an end strength of at least 980,000 (450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve) at current readiness levels.

Recommendation 3-3: The President should revise strategic and budget guidance to the Department of Defense based on changes in the security environment. The Department of Defense should then use this revised guidance as the basis for revising its planning guidance, and the Army should adjust its force—structure, readiness, and modernization plan--accordingly.

ARMY IN EUROPE



Source: U.S. European Command.

U.S. Forces in Europe have seen a significant drawdown since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. At that time, the Army had more than 216,700 soldiers stationed in Europe. The reduction in forces continued even as NATO expanded and its borders pushed further east. Now, with Army forces numbering about 28,450, Europe is facing security threats from Russia, from the refugee crises, and from ISIL. Force decisions are made according to the risk environment of the time, and environment that can change substantially in a matter of months.

The Budget Environment

"The Commission shall undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Army … to make recommendations … in a manner consistent with available resources and anticipated future resources."

2015 NDAA, Section 1703(a)(1)(B)

"The Commission shall give particular consideration to … an evaluation and identification of a structure for the Army that … achieves cost-efficiency between the regular and reserve components of the Army, manages military risk, takes advantage of the strengths and capabilities of each, and considers fully burdened lifecycle costs."

2015 NDAA, Section 1703 (2)(A)(ii)

Top-line budget projections have changed substantially in almost every year since 2011. Congress enacted the Budget Control Act (BCA) in August 2011. That law was amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, enacted in January 2013, and again by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, enacted in December 2014. Another Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA15) passed in October 2015. Such budget uncertainty has created a challenging environment for the Department of Defense and the Army to program confidently for the future.

This state of budget uncertainty compounds a trend of declining defense spending for the nation. From fiscal year 2010 to 2015, total DoD funding has declined by 7 percent while Army funding has declined by 14 percent. Investment (procurement plus research, development, test and evaluation, or RDT&E) reduced by 15 percent across DoD during that time, but by 35 percent in the Army.

Though the Congress has funded DoD's base budget more than 3 percent below Presidential Budget requests since fiscal year 2012, it has provided more money in defense spending than the levels initially set by the BCA (which would have resulted in an almost 15 percent cut). The

Army has received substantial levels of wartime funding from the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account and has used some of this funding to meet readiness and other key needs. In the fiscal year 2016 budget, for example, the Administration and the Congress permitted the Army to use OCO funding to pay for some activities that had at least some relation to contingency operations but would normally have been in the non-wartime or base budget. However, OCO funding has been declining in recent years with the reduction of U.S. combat efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army portion of OCO funding has declined from $99 billion in fiscal year 2010 to $28 billion in fiscal year 2015.

Despite the BBA15 and OCO funding, no satisfactory long-term funding approach provides DoD and the Army the funds needed to build and maintain military readiness, invest in modernization, and ensure the health of the force. In this constrained budget environment, the Army appears to have prioritized manpower numbers and force readiness to hedge against near-term demands, accepting substantial risk in modernization. The Commission finds this solution highly regrettable but understandable, given the persistence of challenges to the United States and the ongoing strain those challenges are putting on ground forces, especially Regular Army combat formations and reserve component enablers. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter Three, these risks to modernization cannot be sustained if the Army is to protect the mission readiness of the force in the long term.

The current budget resource environment also complicates the Commission's task to examine Army trends well into the future. In order to carry out this mandate, the Commission first considered a range of potential future levels of budgetary resources that could be available to the

Army. The Commission also considered the effects these alternative resource levels would have on the Army's ability to meet current and anticipated mission requirements at acceptable levels of risk.

With this information in mind, the Commission made assumptions about future resource levels that guided its assessment of changes in Army programs. The Commission did not attempt to create or recommend specific alternative Army budgets; rather it developed general assumptions about available resources to use in assessing alternatives.

Alternative Resource Levels and Their Effects

Sequester-level funding. The Army might only receive the funding permitted by the Budget Control Act of 2011, as amended. That act and its amendments specify the total funding available for national security activities; the Administration and eventually the Congress then allocate funding to the Army. Under the act and its amendments, Army budget authority has fallen during each of the past five years, declining from $140 billion in fiscal year 2010 to $121 billion in fiscal year 2015. Under the BBA15, the Army will receive about $125 billion in fiscal year 2016 and probably remain at that level in fiscal year 2017. This funding profile, often called "sequester-level" funding, leaves the Army budget for fiscal year 2017 about 10 percent below its fiscal year 2010 level. A 2014 DoD report on sequester-level funding, *Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-Level Funding,* suggests that funding growth in the years immediately beyond fiscal year 2017 would likely be insufficient to keep pace with anticipated inflation.

If it is faced with sequester-level funding and limited OCO funding, the Army has stated that it would reduce its total force to 920,000 soldiers: 420,000 in the Regular Army with the remainder in the National Guard and Army Reserve. This compares to a total size of 980,000 soldiers in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 (PB16).

During testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2015, the Army Secretary and Chief of Staff stated that sequester-level budgets had already had a detrimental impact on Army readiness and modernization. They concluded that continuation of sequester-level funding creates significant risk to the Army fulfilling its national security requirements as specified in the current Defense Strategic Guidance. Based on its own experiences and discussions with leaders and troops, the Commission concurs with these concerns: the size of the force would not meet national security requirements, readiness would suffer, and funding for modernization, already low, would reach levels that would leave the nation too exposed to risk.

Funding planned in fiscal year 2016 request. Rather than sequester-level funding, the Army might receive the dollars proposed in the B16, which would have provided $127 billion to the Army in fiscal year 2016, rising to $129 billion in fiscal year 2017. Growth in the years beyond fiscal year 2017 would amount to a few percent a year, probably enough to offset the effects of inflation. BBA15 chipped away at the President's plan for Army funding in fiscal year 2016 and 2017, down to $125 billion in fiscal year 2016 and, probably, 2017. A portion of these funding reductions would be offset by greater reliance on wartime or OCO funding.

Under the PB16, the Army would be able to remain at a total size of 980,000 soldiers. Senior Army leaders have stated that, with this funding, the Army could pursue initiatives aimed at achieving a reasonable balance of readiness and modernization and the service would meet the primary missions of the Defense Strategic Guidance, though its ability to do so would become tenuous. Current Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley concurred with this assessment in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 2015.

Higher funding levels. Historically, Army and overall defense funding has been cyclical. Funding has tended to rise as threats to national security increase, followed by decline as threats ease. The Commission has concluded that threats to national security are currently increasing due to escalating threats from ISIL, Russia, and ongoing threats from North Korea and Iran, among others. Despite today's limits on funding, these increasing threats make plausible the possibility that Army and overall defense funding may increase in the long term.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Army base budget (that is, the budget excluding wartime funding) increased by almost $70 billion from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2010. Absent some future catastrophic events, an increase of this magnitude seems unlikely. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that, as it assesses the long-term future of the Army, it should take into account the possibility of funding increases above the levels in the fiscal year 2016 budget plan.

National Strategy/Resourcing Mismatch

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released March 4, 2014, describes the strategic environment informing the resourcing decisions in the PB16. The QDR, published less than two years ago, assumed the drawdown of combat forces in Afghanistan would continue and referred to the influence of al-Qaeda "to recruit or inspire Westerners to carry out attacks against our homeland with little or no warning," but made no mention of the Islamic State or Boko Haram. The QDR discussed "the instability in the Balkans and on the European periphery [that] will continue to pose a security challenge" but did not forecast the extent of the Russian involvement in Ukraine.

Using the 2014 QDR as its basis, the PB16 request represents the minimum needed for the Army to carry out its missions and meet the Defense Strategic Guidance at the expense of modernization and long-term readiness. PB16 does not address the escalation of threats to global stability and national security, especially by ISIS, and BBA15 further widens this gap.

Resource Conclusions

After assessing future resource levels and their effects, the Commission finds that sequester-level funding will not provide the Army with adequate finances to meet national security requirements at acceptable levels of risk. An Army that declines to 920,000 soldiers and faces limits on funding for readiness and modernization is not enough to do the job. Therefore, for purposes of assessing the long-term future of the Army, the Commission rejects the use of sequester-level funding as a guide to anticipated future resources, understanding that providing the Army with funding in excess of sequester levels will require Congress to change current law.

Recommendation 4.1: Congress should maintain future Army budgets at funding levels at least equal to the fiscal year 2016 Presidential Budget due to significant and emerging threats to national security.

The funding in PB16 provides the Army with the minimum resources necessary to meet national security needs. The Commission therefore uses this plan as a rough benchmark for anticipated future resources necessary to meet requirements. Given that the BBA15 reduces funding for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 to levels below the fiscal year 2016 plan, the Commission does not view the BBA15 as an adequate solution for national security and urges the Administration and Congress to restore fiscal year 2017 funding to the PB16 levels, whether by altering the budget caps or by providing increased OCO funding for activities that have relationship to wartime needs.

Consistent with its charter, the Commission focused on Army funding and programs. However, the Army can only function effectively if the other military services and DoD as a whole have adequate funding and capacity. The Army depends on the Navy for sealift assets to move equipment. It depends on the Air Force for strategic lift, close air support, and more. A strong Marine Corps complements the Army's ground capability. The Commission finds that sequester-level funding would not provide adequate resources for DoD to protect our nation and win our wars.

Recommendation 4.2: Because the Army relies on the other services for strategic lift, Congress should also maintain future DoD budgets at least equal to the fiscal year 16 Presidential Budget.

Stretching Army Resources

Even with funding at PB16 levels, the Commission agrees with senior Army leaders who stated that the service's ability to meet national security needs at reasonable levels of risk is tenuous. The Commission has identified a number of initiatives that could reduce this risk. These initiatives may become financially feasible if, for reasons noted above, long-term Army funding may rise above the levels in the fiscal year 2016 plan.

Regardless of future budget levels, additional funds may be made available for the Army's direct warfighting needs through efficiency initiatives and the elimination of lower-priority programs. Moreover, the service can make better use of its resources if the Administration and the Congress reduce the budgetary turmoil that has plagued the Army and DoD in recent years.

Various groups have proposed a number of initiatives to free up funding for direct warfighting needs. Following are some examples:

- The Administration's proposal to slow growth in the cost of military compensation, as long as recruiting and retention needs are met

- Proposals by DoD and by the Commission on Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization to reform of the military health care system

- DoD's proposal to streamline military medical treatment facilities

- DoD's proposed legislation that would permit the department to close unneeded facilities.

DoD is currently updating its capacity analysis to determine the level of facilities, including Army facilities, that are unneeded

- Proposals by the Army to pursue energy consumption efficiency initiatives

- A proposal by this Commission for a pilot program to test the feasibility of integrating recruiting across the Regular Army, Guard, and Reserve. While designed primarily to better integrate the Total Force, integrated recruiting might free up resources.

The Commission has not undertaken a detailed review of these and other efficiency proposals. However, it urges the Administration and the Congress to carefully review these initiatives and enact or permit them wherever they make sense. In some cases, the proposed efficiencies are already included in the PB16 and so would not free up additional resources to meet direct warfighting needs. In other cases, such efficiencies could help finance some of the high-priority initiatives identified in this report.

Recommendation 4.3: The Congress should look for cost-savings opportunities in acquisitions, the military health system, and the inventory of military facilities.

Budgetary Turmoil

The Army, and DoD as a whole, could also make better use of available resources if the Congress acts to reduce budgetary turmoil. In recent years the Army and DoD have furloughed

civilian employees twice. They have planned to shut down the government more than half a dozen times and, regrettably, were required to execute one of those plans, resulting in a shutdown of many Army and government operations for 16 days in 2013. The Army and DoD have operated under continuing resolutions in every year of the current Administration, including two resolutions that extended for about six months. During the short duration of this Commission, two separate government shutdowns came within days of execution.

A Brookings report, *Budgetary Turmoil at the Department of Defense from 2010 to 2014*, by Robert F. Hale (a member of this Commission) published in August 2015, highlighted the effects of this turmoil, especially the adverse effects on the morale of Army and DoD civilian employees. Congressional testimony by Army senior leaders in March 2015 emphasized the effects of the lack of predictable funding, focusing especially on continuing resolutions. That testimony concluded that the lack of predictable funding "wreaks havoc with Army readiness, modernization, and end strength."

The Commission agrees that budgetary turmoil is having serious adverse effects on the Army. The Commission concludes that to have an effective Army, Congress must find ways to provide the Army and all of DoD with more predictable funding and avoid the budgetary turmoil that has plagued government in recent years.

Recommendation 4.4: The Congress and the Administration should return to predictable and responsible budgeting.

BUDGET UNCERTAINTY OVER TIME

DOD BASE BUDGET IN THEN-YEAR DOLLARS IN BILLIONS



Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff

In recent years, policies enacted to restrain spending, along with a stronger economy, have led to reductions in the budget deficit. On August 2, 2011, the President signed into law the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). The BCA contained a variety of measures intended to reduce the deficit by at least $2.1 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period, along with a mechanism to increase the debt limit. Two subsequent pieces of legislation have modified the BCA since it was enacted—the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA; P.L. 113-67). Both pieces of legislation allow for more discretionary spending than was provided under the BCA for FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015. Various deficit reduction measures were included to offset the costs of the changes to spending levels in both ATRA and the BBA. The BCA and the BBA will continue to affect spending levels in FY2015 and beyond as Congress may debate whether or not to enact further changes.

ARMY OVER TIME, 1946-2019



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ARMY OVER TIME, 2000-2019



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END STRENGTH RAMPS UNDER DIFFERENT FUNDING LEVELS, FY01-22

REGULAR ARMY, FULL TIME SUPPORT, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD & U.S. ARMY RESERVES, AND CIVILIANS



Source: Army President's Budget Submission 2016

Measuring Costs and Benefits

The fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act that chartered the National Commission on the Future of the Army directed the Commission to consider "fully burdened lifecycle costs" in evaluating cost efficiency between the regular and reserve components of the Army. The Commission examined fully burdened lifecycle costs and found that, in principle, that costing model is useful in discussions comparing the costs of personnel in the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve. However, Commission research suggests that equipment used or unit structure, not reserve or active status, had the greatest impact on the per capita cost of a soldier. Additionally, the resourcing of numerous major functions, such as recruiting, marketing, equipment procurement, training, installations, and research and development, cannot be segregated by component. Therefore, the Commission determined a methodology like Activity Based Costing would be more appropriate for comparing per capita costs.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) introduced the term *fully burdened lifecycle costs* for comparative costing analysis in its reporting. However, the term does not appear in the Government Accountability Office publication of standard terms, definitions, and classifications for government fiscal, budget, and program information. Additionally, the Financial Management Regulation, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and DoDI 7042.04 do not mention the term in their methodologies for calculating burdened labor rates. Commission research into industry and academia also did not yield a methodology for fully burdened lifecycle costs.

The RFPB report *Eliminating Major Gaps in DoD data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should be Mandated by Policy* calculates the per capita cost for a soldier as $123,351 in fiscal year 2013. Using the Joint Inflation Calculator, that value would be $127,670 in fiscal year 2016. Multiplying this value by the number of personnel in a unit should arrive at the comparative costs for particular units. A Stryker Brigade Combat Team with 4,345 soldiers would cost a total of $554,726,150. Meanwhile, the cost of the equipment the soldiers would need in order to train is almost $2 billion, a cost not driven by whether a soldier is a member of the Regular Army or a reserve component but by the structure of the unit specified.

In evaluating the costs related to force structure, Activity Based Costing is more reliable for projecting and estimating future costs. Activity Based Costing estimates cost by determining a current per capita cost (such as per person or per mile) and applying that cost to a future population or level of activity. Annual costs for a service, such as water, for instance, for various installations over a range of years are plotted against the number of personnel on that installation in each year to determine if a linear relationship exists. If so, linear regression will yield a fixed cost and a per capita cost for that service across the installations. Using the Army Stationing and Installation Plan, future populations can be approximated, and this can be multiplied by the per capita cost estimated from the regression. Similarly, the Army will determine parts needed for operating equipment based on the number of miles or hours of usage that equipment is expected to have multiplied by the cost per mile or per hour of using that piece of equipment. In these examples, cost is driven by the amount of activity.

In planning, programming, and execution of its budget, the Army does use a "burdened labor rate" as part of analyzing alternative courses of action during budget formulation. While the Army routinely utilizes burdened labor rates in order to facilitate workforce mix decisions, cost-benefit analyses, and course-of-action analysis, the Army and all other Department of Defense elements do not calculate a universal or "fully burdened" cost factor in all decision making.

Activity based costing would produce lifecycle costs that are fully burdened in a manner that is appropriate to the issues this Commission was charged with considering.

-30-

Continuum of Service

When she was 17 years old, Holly Donica joined the Army to become an aircraft mechanic. That was 2005, and a year later she was serving with the 4th Infantry Division in Camp Taji, Iraq. In 2008, she became a single mother and active service no longer fit her family's needs, so she transitioned from the Regular Army to the Army Reserve as a civilian maintenance technician at the Conroe Aviation Support Facility in Conroe, Texas.

After becoming a warrant officer and inspired by her daughter to take on still bigger challenges, CW2 Donica applied for flight school at Fort Rucker, Alabama. However, she needed help with child care. Her mother gave up a job to move to Fort Rucker and care for her granddaughter for the two years CW2 Donica needed to complete basic flight training and qualification courses for two aircraft, the UH-60 A/L Blackhawk and the AH-64D Apache. Thanks to her mother's commitment that allowed time for study, CW2 Donica became the Distinguished Honor Graduate of the UH-60 A/L course.

CW2 Donica said she is planning to complete a bachelor's of science degree in aeronautics later this year [ED: 2016], and plans to continue her studies for a degree in aeronautics. This 27-year-old soldier also aspires to become a maintenance test pilot in the UH-60 A/L, and in the long term study medicine to become a flight surgeon. CW2 Donica, her daughter, and her mother are a family that are part of the Army family. They bring strength, talent, and depth to the Army thanks to CW2 Donica's continuum of service.

Managing the Army

"…manages strategic and operational risk by making tradeoffs among readiness, efficiency, effectiveness, capability, and affordability…"

The defining attributes of the U.S. Army are size and capability diversity; its size and capabilities delineate it from other land forces. It provides the capabilities and capacity to fulfill its statutory mission prescribed in section 3062 of the U.S. Code,

> "It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war...."

The Congress has vested the responsibility to conduct all affairs of the Department of Army in the Secretary through twelve enumerated functions. These twelve functions provide the framework for managing the Soldiers and Civilians in preparing the Army for both prompt and sustained combat. Title 10 U.S. Code identifies the functions of the Department of the Army, in order, as: recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping; training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering; maintaining; the construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment; and, the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities. The Secretary of the Army balances the Combatant Commander's requirements for forces and the necessity to ensure the health of the All-Volunteer Force with the resources provided by the Congress across these twelve functions.

Role of the Components of the Army

The Army is composed of three distinct, essential, and interdependent components, each with unique attributes informing the distribution of capabilities. The first component is the Regular Army, located on large installations and ready to rapidly project capabilities to support the Joint Force, as needed, by maintaining the highest readiness to provide the greatest flexibility. The second component is the Army National Guard, located in 2,600 communities across the 54 U.S. states, territories, and the District of Columbia. The third component is the 2,000 units of the Army Reserve, also a community based organization providing lifesaving and sustaining capabilities. The Reserve Components, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to the Regular Army, as needed. Distribution of these Army forces is determined through the Total Army Analysis process.

The Regular Army should be structured to provide forward stationed forces and any capabilities needed twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. The Regular Army's high readiness provides the foundation to provide all Army capabilities for the first 90 days of Combatant Commander operational plans (OPLANs). The Army National Guard should be structured to provide forces to serve as the organized militia, when not under the authority of the Secretary of the Army, and provide additional Army capacity after the first 70 - 90 days of conflict. Similarly, the Army Reserve should be structured to provide additional institutional elements after 60 days of conflict and operational support and sustainment capacity after the 70 -90 days. The unique capabilities found in the part time force leverages civilian expertise that has proven

essential when answering the call to our Nation's defense or in time of regional disaster relief. Selected capabilities found only in one of Reserve Components may be called upon earlier in a conflict.

The Army uses all three components in a synergistic manner and thus it is imperative for all three using their distinct roles and functions. The Army's Reserve Components play both an operational and strategic role, i.e., "the RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense strategy requirements across the full spectrum of conflict."

Recruiting

Recruiting is the primary function required to raise and sustain an Army. The Army accessed 114,800 Soldiers in fiscal year 2014, more than the other Services combined and, in fact, more soldiers than constitute the total end strength of some allies. The Army achieved the 2014 recruiting mission by employing 11,114 total Army recruiters across the nation. The 2015 Army recruiting force is has reduced to 10,955 (5,833 Regular Army, 3,210 Army National Guard, and 1,912 Army Reserve Recruiters). To tell the Army story and generate more than 118,000 potential recruits, the total Army spends more than $280M on a marketing campaign in the national market place.

Local Reserve Component commanders have additional recruiting responsibilities. The local unit commander in an Army National Guard and Army Reserve unit is also accountable for the manning of his or her unit. Additionally, Army National Guard commanders and leaders usually have end strength performance objectives included in their evaluations. This responsibility

manifests at a local level with recruiters assigned to specific units for which they are to recruit. Army National Guard recruiters succeed by having a solid working knowledge of the unit, its members, leadership, activities and mission, and likewise the unit members know the recruiter.

The Commission has observed a lack of recruiting unity of effort at the Army Headquarters level. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command is responsible for Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiting. Consistent with law and tradition, each state is responsible for Army National Guard recruiting. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&RA)) has strategic oversight of the recruiting function, but each component and state establishes their own recruiting goals. Similarly Regular Army and the Army Reserve marketing is controlled by the Army Marketing and Research Group (AMRG) while Army National Guard marketing is managed by the National Guard Bureau on behalf of the States. This results in inconsistent branding and different marketing campaigns for the Army and the National Guard.

To the maximum extent feasible, the Army should be managed as One Army. Achieving this unity of effort requires changing certain practices, policies, and statutes that prevent the Army from managing the three components as One Army. These legal and policy structures prevent efficiency, encourage competition between the components, and contribute to the continued tension between them. These difficulties are readily apparent in the area of recruiting and marketing and, therefore, any effort to truly manage the Army as One Army must address the management of recruiting efforts in all three components. The Commission observed an absence of recruiting unity of effort at the local level. Recruiters from each component compete against

each other for the dwindling population of potential recruits, even to the extent of influencing an individual to join a component that may not be the best fit for them individually.

The overall goal of the recruiting function of the Army is to "man" all components of the Army at their established end strength goals. Garnering efficiencies and effectiveness through unity of effort must ensure recruiting consistently produces the requisite quality and quantity of Soldiers for all three Components. Additionally, the Reserve Components must achieve local unit goals.

Recommendation 5-1: The Secretary of the Army should reauthorize the Active First Program.

Recommendation 5-2: Congress should authorize and direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a significant pilot program in which recruiters from all three components are authorized to recruit individuals into any of the components and receive credit for an enlistee regardless of the component. The Secretary of the Army should conduct a multi-year pilot program with a requirement to periodically, throughout the pilot and at the pilot's conclusion, present reports to Congress with the results of the pilot and recommendations as to whether to make the temporary authorities permanent.

Recommendation 5-3: Congress should specifically authorize this "notwithstanding any other laws" in order to avoid potential fiscal law concerns.

Recommendation 5-4: Congress should authorize, and Secretary of the Army direct, the consolidation of marketing functions under the authority of the Army Marketing Research Group (AMRG).

Organizing

Generating a force that is ready to defend the nation against emerging threats is intrinsically necessary. The past decade and a half of war proved to require a ready force comprised of all

three components was effective. This involves both manning and equipping the entire organized force.

Developing and designing units

Soldiers are the Army's essential resource; they must be combined with leadership, doctrine, equipment, and training to become a capability when organized into formations. These formations or units scale from squads and sections (5 to 9 soldiers), to platoons (roughly 30 soldiers), to companies (approximately 100 soldiers), to battalions (two or more companies) or brigades (Two or more battalions). Army Regulation 10-87 prescribes the mission, functions and command and staff relationships of the commands within the Army Structure. There are three Army Commands, nine Army Service Component Commands, and eleven direct reporting units to the Department of the Army commanded by general officers. The Army has three corps, eighteen divisions (ten Active and eight National Guard), and 58 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) (30 Regular and 28 Army National Guard). The Army Reserve's capabilities are embedded in fifteen operational or functional, seven support, and four training commands. When combined with enabling organizations, Army BCTs are the essential combat capability the Army provides the Combatant Commander.



Army Support to Other Services

The Army provides foundational support such as communications, intelligence, rotary wing aviation, theater missile defense, logistics and engineering to the entire Joint Force. This includes providing Blue Force Tracking capabilities for all Services in theater to improve the situational awareness, operations, and force protection for all U.S. Service members. Army radar systems provide advanced missile warning information to all U.S. forces.

The Army also serves as the DOD Executive Agent for 42 functions, more than the other Services combined. For example, the Army is DOD's single manager for conventional ammunition and disposal of chemical weapons. The Army provides intra-theater overland and inland waterway distribution for food, water, fuel, and ammunition during joint operations. The Army provides communications for all Services in theater through the theater signal architecture

and Army procured satellite equipment.

The Army provides foundational capabilities to other Services including, but not limited to:

- Missile defense
- Fire support
- Base defense
- Transportation
- Fuel distribution
- General engineering
- Intratheater medical evacuation
- Port Opening
- Veterinary services
- Logistics management
- Communications
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense
- Consequence management capability
- Explosive ordnance disposal

Multi-Component Units

The Army is, and will continue to be, a force in demand. Resources to address the demands are under continual scrutiny for priority which, historically, pushes the components into discussions that go awry. Past resource pressures have led to multi-component units (MCUs) that achieved mixed success.

The Army has established multi-component units (MCU) several times for a variety of reasons. The key tenant of the perceived success or failure for a given MCU was the motivation behind the decision to create the MCU: saving Regular Army spaces, increasing readiness, educating the components, or changing culture. Based on the rationale, the design for each MCU is different and has different challenges. When senior leadership has sought to use MCUs to increase readiness and collaboration between the components, they have been successful.

MCUs can generate an environment that mitigates obstacles - cultural and structural - for true integration across and within the Total Force. One MCU example is First Army, the Army's principle MCU established for evaluating the readiness for Reserve Component forces. First

Army serves as the FORSCOM agent for the training and readiness of the RC forces. Having all three components together provides an organization that improves readiness for Reserve Component units and helps break down cultural barriers between Army components.

Equipping

Meeting the Army's equipping requirements in a cost-effective manner will be challenging in the future. It is necessary to examine how the Army distributes equipment throughout the force. The Army's intent to develop a single equipment database is a step in the right direction. However, there is still a lack of a single equipment manager. The Army must determine its minimum essential requirement to meet forecasted demand for training sets, equipment for unplanned contingencies, and prepositioned stocks, including critical dual use equipment in the homeland, and retain enough equipment above and beyond this requirement to effectively train its units. This includes capitalizing on the use of the Army's investment in prepositioned stocks to meet unplanned contingencies.

The Army continuously manages equipment shortages across almost every unit, regardless of component. The Army explains the management of shortages in direct terms and must move beyond promoting the paradigm of providing 100 percent of equipment requirements for each fielded organization.

Equipment fielding is not universally managed from a One Army perspective, resulting in significantly different levels of modernization. Rapid modernization and the integration of equipment fielding with deployment preparations have led to a wide range of modernization

levels, especially within the mission command war fighting function. Army units not programmed to deploy (generally reserve component units) are slowly losing Mission Command interoperability with supported and supporting units that deploy more often (generally Regular Army).

Recommendation 5-5: The Army should prioritize mission command interoperability across the Total Force to narrow modernization gaps. All committed Army forces must be able to leverage the full suite of network capabilities to rapidly support the Joint Force rather than a small portion of highly modernized units unable to communicate with the rest of the force.

Leader Development, Training, and Education

Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, and progressive process that grows soldiers and Army civilians into competent, committed professional leaders. Leader development is attained through the combination of training, education, and experiences acquired through opportunities in the operational, institutional, and self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships.

U.S. Army training and education are highly regarded globally for producing excellent leaders with proven adaptability, showcased over the past 14 years of combat. However, new technology, advances in management science, and cultural changes suggest careful adjustments to the Army's accession, training, education, assignment, and personnel evaluations/assessments can improve the Army's agility, adaptability, and effectiveness. Improving the Army's ability to acquire, develop (training, education, and experience), retain, and employ talent potentially offers the most important method to prepare for a complex, unknowable future. As Secretary

Carter indicated in March, winning the next war has more to do with human talent and out-thinking the enemy than advanced technology. The Army's human capital is its most important asset requiring sustained investments.

The Army has made substantial strides towards improving leadership development and talent management. However, sustaining these investments in Army human capital could wane as budgets tighten without continued senior leader emphasis.

Total Army School System

In the 1990s, the Army started a series of initiatives to improve, streamline, and consolidate its school system due to budgetary constraints. The primary goal was to develop The Army School System (TASS) that improved the performance and efficiency of the Army's existing school system by raising standards and consolidating facilities. TASS consists of initial military training (IMT); reclassification training; officer, warrant officer (WO), noncommissioned officer (NCO) and Department of the Army (DA) civilian professional development training; functional training; and education. The long term goal of TASS was to be more efficient and integrated across the components of the Army. The resulting program centered on a regional system of Reserve Component schools, established the first pilot program in the southeastern United States (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida), and intended to be extended nationwide after a period of testing.

In 2007, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted a feasibility study to nest all Army training under one command. As a result of this study, in 2009, the Army implemented the

One Army School System (OASS) as a set of processes synchronizing all three components to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of TASS. Army Regulation 350-1 states "the One Army School System is comprised of RC and AC institutions that utilize training resources to train soldiers in the most efficient and effective manner possible without regard to component." OASS leverages existing infrastructure in all components to efficiently project training requirements and program training capacity.

TRADOC commands 29 schools and provides quality control across all Army schools inside and outside of TRADOC (e.g. Army Medical). The highest density of schools outside TRADOC's command are found in the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard has 85 training institutions located at 66 locations across the 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia. Regional Training Institutes (RTI) make up the majority, accounting for 54 of the training institutions across 6 training regions. As of September 2015, TRADOC has fully accredited 83 of the 85 ARNG training institutions.

TRADOC made notable progress by reorganizing its existing structure and capacity to meet training requirements and improve the quality of its programs. Recently, TRADOC gathered a forum of key stakeholders across the Army to further OASS implementation. The resulting areas of effort are :

- OASS Capacity
- OASS Legal Review and Policy Recommendations
- RC Training Resource Arbitration Panel methodology

- Army Training Requirements and Resources System expansion
- Standardizing all Programs of Instruction

Recommendation 5-6: The Army should conduct an end-to-end review of The Army School System and report to Congress on the efficiencies gained by consolidating unused capacity that is not cost effective for the ability to regenerate and expand the Army if needed. The review should take a holistic look at successes and shortfalls from current strategy, reduce publications, and ensure consistent naming conventions to minimize confusion.

Recommendation 5-7: The Army should establish true regionalization of the Army's school system. Continue to consolidate the infrastructure where efficiencies can be gained. Acknowledge and explain any unused capacity and develop a plan to retain or eliminate it. Plan for the ability to regenerate and expand the Army. Ensure the correct balance of infrastructure and capacity to meet the Nation's needs.

Recommendation 5-8: The Army should accelerate the One Army School System concept to realize savings sooner. While this may increase initial costs, recent savings generated indicate more money can be saved in the long run.

The Generating Force

The Army's primary mission is to provide capabilities for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. The Army most effectively executes a particular mission when it draws on the collective capability of the entire force. The Army provides its capabilities from functionally discrete, but organizationally integrated, operational and institutional elements. Most of the Army's operational capability resides in the units and headquarters of the operational Army, which the generating force produces and sustains. The generating force is that part of the

Army whose primary purpose is to produce and sustain operational Army units by performing functions specified and implied in law.

The generating force's primary mission—generating and sustaining the operational Army — determines its overall capabilities and capacity. This mission involves designing, organizing, recruiting, training, equipping, modernizing, deploying and sustaining, and ensuring readiness and availability of all Army forces. The generating force also provides some operational depth to the fighting forces by providing real-time reach back support and by deploying individuals, teams, or entire units to provide specific capabilities and functions for employment by, or in direct support of, Joint Force Commanders and operating forces.

Counterintuitively, the size of the operational Army is not the only driver of the size of the generating force. Many of the generating force functions are required regardless of the size of the Army. The twelve Title 10 specified functions of the Department of the Army are required irrespective of the size of the operational Army. Whether there are five or fifty divisions in the Army, they must be recruited, equipped, supplied, administered, maintained and based on an installation. In fact, reducing the size of the operating Army will have a limited impact on the size of the generating force.

Primary generating force size drivers include, but are not limited to,

- Number of installations.
- Equipment Density.
- Research, Development and Testing.

- Demand for medical care for Active Army personnel, other Services' personnel, dependents, and retirees.
- Individual and Collective Training

Using the metric that a lower generating force percentage of the total force is better is not useful. The risk of relating the size of the generating force to only the size of the operational Army, and not the other critical drivers, puts the ability to expand the Army at risk. Reducing the size of the generating force to a rate equal or greater than the operational Army further increases the risk to expanding the Army. The opposite should occur: the generating force as a percentage of the total force should increase as the total force decreases. In raw terms, this means the size of the generating force will remain relatively constant or lag behind the operational Army in size as the size of the total force decreases.

The Army approach to reducing resources by distributing the reductions equally across functions or targeting the generating force for reduction without addressing the enduring necessity performing the functions in the generating force increase risk as the Army decreases in size. The Center of Army Analysis (CAA) and the United States Army Manpower Analysis Agency (USAMAA) have a promising Generating Force Model to project requirements in development. The methodology identifies factors that influence manpower requirements based on the twelve Title 10 specified functions of the Department of the Army. This methodology focuses on the drivers for sizing the generating force and not just the size of the operational Army.

Recommendation 5-9: The Army should complete development and fully implement the Generating Force Model to improve requirements determination. The model will have the ability to project

Generating Force manpower requirements into the out-years and provide the leadership options to redistribute manpower externally, realign manpower internally, or divest the function.

Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army

Fundamental to managing as One Army are integrated data systems to support decision making and minimize gaps in visibility of the force. The three components of the Army currently operate separate personnel and pay systems, creating barriers to the continuum of service and visibility on the elements of personnel readiness. The Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) is a web-based human resources (HR) system that, for the first time, will provide integrated, multi-component, personnel and pay capabilities across the components of the Army. IPPS-A will create an integrated personnel and pay record for each soldier that covers their entire career, allows personnel actions to drive associated pay events, and features self-service capabilities allowing soldiers to access their personal information 24 hours a day. IPPS-A will provide commanders a single source for personnel asset visibility and accountability across all components. IPPS-A will also facilitate the movement of soldiers between Army components by maintaining benefits, personnel information, and training in accordance with the Army Total Force Policy. IPPS-A will replace the Army National Guard (ARNG) personnel system in 2QFY18; the Regular Army and United States Army Reserve (USAR) personnel systems in 1QFY19; establish one pay system for Regular Army, ARNG, and USAR in 4QFY19; and establish a unified evaluation and retention management system in 3QFY20.

IPPS-A is critical underpinning and the key to achieving the Total Force in reality. IPSS-A will facilitate the “Continuum of Service” and Army Total Force Policy through multi-component

capabilities by enabling and streamlining Soldiers' movement between statuses (transfers between the Active and Reserve Components). The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) proposed a FY16 decrement of $50 million and the Senate Appropriations Committee - Defense (SAC-D) also proposed a FY16 decrement of $37 million. Both proposed decrement reflect concerns over the program under executing funding. The IPPS-A program has adjusted following under execution and remains on schedule at this point.

Recommendation 5-10: The Congress, the Department of Defense and the Army should continue to support and adequately fund the Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPSS-A) as the cornerstone to the effective management and enhanced integration of the components of the Army. The Army must maintain the program's current schedule as a critical underpinning capability for the Army to support the Total Force.

Full-Time Support

A well administered and ready reserve component make the Army credible for sustained land combat. Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel execute the Secretary of the Army's statutory functions and ensure adherence to statue and policy in the conduct day to day operations. Army programs are delivered to the distributed reserve components by FTS to set the conditions for commanders to achieve collective readiness.

FTS personnel execute the statutory functions of recruiting, organizing, administering, maintaining, instructing, or training the reserve components. FTS personnel accomplish management and administrative tasks that would otherwise have to be performed by reserve

Soldiers during limited weekend drills. The majority of Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers (~85%) are traditional drilling reservists with 48 drill periods and 15 annual training days a year.

The Secretary of the Army is responsible for determining FTS levels managed by the RC Chiefs. FTS requirements are determined using the Army's universal workload based process that determines manpower requirements to accomplish the directed tasks for Tables of Distribution and Allowance organizations. The same process is used to determine manpower requirements across Army Posts, Camps, and Stations. In 2005, the FTS requirement methodology was revalidated and in 2012, the Secretary of the Army reported to the Congress a total FTS requirement of 123,000 in response to a NDAA 2008 directive. The November 2014 Department of the Army, Army Management Action Group FTS Review, reflected FTS requirements filled at 67% for FY16.

The Army predominately uses RC manpower to satisfy FTS requirements. FTS comprises 17% of ARNG and 14% of USAR end strength. The majority of FTS (~90%) are deployable, unlike the preponderance of Army civilians. During the peak of RC contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006 to 2009, the FTS shortage was mitigated through temporary FTS, primarily Active Duty for Operational Support and selective early mobilization.

Achieving Total Force Policy ideals has been challenging. The challenges to developing a "One Army," culture are both cultural and legal. A key aspect to achieving integration of the components is providing officers and enlisted Soldiers opportunities to serve in other components. There currently are statutory limits to such integration. Statute does not permit the

assignment of Regular Army officers and enlisted soldiers into Army National Guard positions to execute Full-Time Support functions. Currently, Regular Army personnel are limited to detailing to serve with Army National Guard units with limits on authorities and permitted actions.

Recommendation 5-11: Congress should enact legislation to allow assignment of Regular Army officers and enlisted Soldiers to Army National Guard positions to execute all functions without prejudice to their Federal standing. The legislation should also permit the similar assignment of National Guard officers and enlisted Soldiers to Regular Army units. Assignment to another component should be considered a key developmental experience and could be considered criteria for promotion.

Authorities / Duty Status Reform

The Congress continues to provide a wide variety of authorities to bring reserve members to duty. The multitudes of authorities, at times vexing senior leaders, are not a recent phenomenon; most established prior to 1980. The Congress has recently enacted legislation providing easier access to the RC. New duty statuses were created to codify new roles and missions for the National Guard and Reserves or a new purpose of the duty. Each individual modification was made to address a specific issue but resulted in a patchwork of laws and administrative fixes that complicate personnel management and employment of the reserves.

'Duty status reform' is frequently, but incorrectly, used as a synonym for a reduction in the number of authorities. The authority to order a reserve member to perform duty is one of four parts of the reserve duty system. The second part is the "purpose" of the duty; the third is

restrictions or limitations that may be associated with the duty; the fourth is funding source. Collectively, the four parts comprise a duty status. Modifying one of the four parts does not constitute full 'duty status reform;' however, it can begin to simplify the complex system. A parallel effort, which will materially simplify the reserve duty system, is the implementation of the Integrated Personnel and Pay System – Army (IPPS-A).

Active component members have a single duty status—active duty. Reserve component members have three duty statuses (Inactive duty, Active duty, Full-time National Guard duty) and over 30 legal authorities further delineate these three duty statuses. The 30 authorities simultaneously provide flexibility and accountability. Each authority is a distinct delegation of authority to order a reserve member to duty and provides an accountability mechanism when used.

Currently section 515 of the 2016 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to assess the impact of the consolidating of the current statues into six within 180 days of enactment and desired alternate approaches are due to the Congress October 1, 2016. The Commission applauds and supports the Congress' efforts to simplify the authorities and reduce the friction to using the Total Force.

Total Force Policy

Since 1973, the Army has explored myriad alternatives to integrate Active and Reserve forces. These efforts achieved an unparalleled level of success during Operation Iraqi Freedom, when the Army honed its ability to seamlessly employ the Reserve Components formations in theater

as members of the Total Army. Extensive use of the Reserve Components caused DoD leadership to review and adjust policies. In 2007, Secretary Gates issued his "Utilization of the Total Force" memo in which stated "...the Department has been assessing a number of options on how best to support global military operational needs. A significant question addressed by the review has been whether we have the right policies to govern how we utilize members for the Reserve, National Guard, and our Active Component units." Later, in his 2008 Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force," Secretary Gates codified the new paradigm that "the RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict…Ensure total force policies encourage optimum integration of AC and RC personnel to provide the most efficient training opportunities to all personnel, allow for shared use of resources, and provide the most operational benefits and mission capability." The directive further promulgated optimum integration of AC and RC training, cross-component assignments, and assignment policies that encourage RC members to serve in key leadership positions throughout the Department of Defense.

To codify the maturation of Army policy and internalize the lessons learned, the Secretary of the Army issued Army Directive 2012-08, "Army Total Force Policy" establishing Army policy for integration of the Army's Active and Reserve Components as a "Total Force." In support of this policy, the Army has integrated RC soldiers with their Regular Army counterparts in numerous ways.

FORSCOM has implemented the Total Force Partnership Program (TFPP) which provides a framework for the alignment and partnership of selected regular and reserve units. FORSCOM's Integrated Training Guidance initiated deliberate steps to purposefully incorporate training between the components at major collective training events such as the Combat Training Centers. First Army retains over 3,200 Title 11 active positions providing continuous engagement and habitual relationships with RC units for critical pre- and post-mobilization training support.

FORSCOM, in cooperation with the RC, is conducting Multi-Component Unit (MCU) pilots at the Corps and Division levels in which the USAR will provide 56 USAR soldiers to XVIII Corps Headquarters at Ft. Bragg and the ARNG will provide 123 soldiers and the USAR five soldiers to the101st Airborne Division at Ft. Campbell, KY. As stated in the Secretary of the Army's October 2014 "Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) Implementation Guidance," "successful implementation will result in the Army organizing, manning, training and equipping the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) as an integrated Total Force." The Army's existing initiatives are partially meeting Total Force integration intent, but additional resources are required to fully implement the comprehensive partnership and integrated training programs.

Title 10 and Title 32

U.S. Code Title 10 § 3062

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces—(1) of preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; (2) supporting the national policies; (3) implementing the national objectives; and (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

The Army consists of—(1) the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Army Reserve; and (2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Army without component.

U.S. Code Title 10 § 10102

The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such

other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.

U.S. Code Title 32 U.S.C. §102

In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed.

-30-

ARMY FRAMEWORK RESOURCES, 2016–2020



Source: Army President's Budget Submission 2016

MAN THE FORCE

- AC Manpower 32.2%
- RC Full Time Support (FCS){AGR/MILTECH} 6.3%
- RC Manpower 4.7%
- Recruiting and Retention 2.1%

OPERATE THE FORCE

- Operations & Activities (Army) 1.2%
- Joint and International Programs 0.8%
- Military and Civilian Personnel Support 0.8%
- Cyber-Network Operations 0.6%
- Forward Presence Missions 0.6%
- Homeland Defense 0.4%

TRAIN THE FORCE

- Operational Training Indirect OPTEMPO 5.1%
- Institutional Training 3.0%
- Training Support Systems 1.9%
- Operational Training Air (FHP) Direct OPTEMPO 1.3%
- Training Ammunition 0.6%

SUSTAIN THE FORCE

- Depot Maintenance 1.4%
- Core Logistic Sustainment 1.1%
- Strategic Wartime Equipment (APS, WRSI) 0.6%
- Second Destination Transportation (SDT) 0.4%
- Sustainment Systems Technical Support (SSTS) 0.4%
- Ammunition Readiness 0.2%

INSTALLATION / ENTERPRISE SERVICES AND FACILITY SUSTAINMENT



- Facility Operations 2.8%
- Facility Sustainment 2.3%
- Information Technology Services Management 2.1%
- Family, Community, and Soldier Programs 1.1%
- Garrison 1.0%
- Security 1.0%
- Logistics Operations 0.9%
- Housing (AFHO & Unaccompanied) 0.4%

CAPITAL INVESTMENTS

- Major Investments 7.9%
- Major Investment Enablers 4.3%
- Minor Investment Enablers 2.3%
- Science & Technology (S&T) 1.9%
- Modernization, Test, and Studies 1.1%
- Disposal and Demilitarization 0.9%
- Military Construction (MCA, MCAR, MCNG) 0.8%
- Restoration and Modernization (RM) 0.7%
- Environmental Management 0.6%
- Army Family Housing Construction (AFHC) 0.1%
- Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 0.002%

SERVICE HQS & OBLIGATIONS

- Non-Discretionary Obligations 0.9%
- Directed Discretionary Obligations 0.5%
- Army HQS (HQDA, USAR, FOA) 0.5%
- ARNG HQS 0.1%

A Word about the "Abrams Doctrine"

The backdrop of the NCFA's assessment of the Army's structure is similar in many respects to the circumstances facing Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams between 1972 and 1974. That was an era in which budget cuts combined with both the increased cost of fielding an All-Volunteer Force and the usual post-war impulse to reduce the military led to plans for deep cuts to active force structure. General Abrams, however, believed the threat from the Soviet Union to Europe was severe enough that the Army should increase divisions. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger agreed, but insisted the Army could not exceed the 785,000 manpower cap authorized by Congress. The two also agreed that a greater use of the reserve component forces was needed. To maximize combat forces within the Regular Army, GEN Abrams directed reserve component units to "Round Out" regular divisions and moved most combat support and combat service support units into the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

The "Abrams Doctrine" is often used to justify recommendations for Army Total Force policy, such as the proper mix between regular and reserve force structure. The "Abrams Doctrine" asserts that a significant amount of force structure must be placed in the Army reserve components so that a President sending the Army to war must mobilize the National Guard and Reserve and thereby ensure the support of the American people for that war. However, there is no primary evidence supporting the assertion that GEN Abrams consciously set out to structure the force to ensure domestic support for future wars. GEN Abrams' actions were designed to address the strategic challenge of the Soviet threat within manpower and budgetary constraints, nothing more.

That is not to say that support from the American people is not mandatory goal. Testifying to the Commission, Congressman Trent Kelly of Mississippi said, "When the Guard and Reserve go to war, their communities go to war." Rep. Trent's observation is surely correct. However, how those communities react is unlikely to be monolithic. The Commission can certainly envision scenarios in which that phenomenon could actually lead to *less* support for military action, particularly in the event of large loss of life or if employers begin experiencing hardships due to overuse of the reserve components.

-30-

Total Force Training

During force-on-force training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, in August 2015, tank platoons from the 155th Armored Brigade Combat Team, Mississippi Army National Guard, maneuvered against the 3d Brigade's 1-12 Cavalry, home based at Fort Hood, Texas. The training was in preparation for a platoon-level, live fire exercise in which the 155th ABCT was joined by the 142d Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Alabama Army National Guard, which identified targets in the engagement area and called for indirect fire, delivered by the 2-114th Field Artillery Battalion, Mississippi Army National Guard, using unmanned aerial vehicles to support intelligence collection and monitor round impacts. After an attack weapons team of Apache helicopters from A/1-149 Attack Reconnaissance Battalion, Texas Army National Guard, engaged targets using diving rocket fire, the 155th tank platoon maneuvered and engaged stationary and moving targets. The 143d Expeditionary Sustainment Command, U.S. Army Reserve, provided sustainment support and joint tactical air controllers from the Mississippi Air National Guard's 238th Air Support Operations Squadron controlled the airspace.

While the active and reserve components must overcome real or perceived legislative and administrative hurdles to function effectively together—hindering the implementation of the Army's Total Force Policy—mission-mindedness within the Profession of Arms eclipses component affiliation during operations. This was clear during the total force live fire exercise at Camp Shelby's eXportable Combat Training Center in August 2015.

The foundation for such training is the Total Force Partnership Program the U.S. Forces Command established in 2014. The program pairs active and reserve component formations to

best use limited resources and develop leaders . Multicomponent training events enhance understanding across all the components and will pay off when the components conduct missions together during deployments.

Coordination for the August exercise began in 2014 when Colonel Jeffrey Van (ARNG), commander of the 155th ABCT, called Colonel Matthew Van Wagenen (USA), commander of the 3d Brigade, to coordinate their partnership training plans. Key enabler units were eager to join the training exercise. Each unit performed their mission-essential tasks using common graphics and a common scenario for day and night operations.

“The lessons learned here about successful partnerships—how BCT commanders who are ‘all in’ backed up by two-star leaders who value partnership enough to provide funding to ensure proper coordination occurs—must be codified fully into policy,” said COL Van.

-30-

Evaluating Structure

Army forces operate as part of a Joint or multinational force to accomplish assigned objectives and to protect US national interestsAt any given time, the active Army consists of the Regular Army and any activated reservists. For example, in November of 2015 the active Army included approximately 491,000 Regular Army soldiers, about 46,000 full-time active Guard and Reservists, and an additional 16,000 RC soldiers mobilized (activated) for active duty, for a total active force of about 553,000. This example of total active Army illustrates how Reserve Components provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to the Regular Army as needed to expand its' collective capacity.

DoD and Army Total Force Policy

The most recent guidance on employing all three Army components is the September 2012 Army Total Force Policy (Army Directive 2012-08). The Army Total Force Policy directs the Army to organize, man, train and equip the Regular Army, Army National Guard and US Army Reserve as an integrated, operational Total Force. Subsequent Army Total Force implementation guidance has emphasized the importance of improved and continued integration across Army components.

Operational employment and Strategic depth are reflected in the spectrum of collective readiness where units, regardless of components, exist based on a specific assigned mission requirement ranging from the most complex to a limited, simple mission coupled with how quickly (time) the unit may be required for employment. Operational and strategic labels do not infer only direct

combat (infantry, aviation, armor, etc.) as operational or support and sustainment (transportation, quartermaster, medical, etc.) as strategic.

The Army applies manning, training, and equipping to a unit to ensure readiness to accomplish a specific mission within the timeline required. Always rotating units between mission requirements across the readiness spectrum avoids a given unit suffering from a chronic lack of readiness by ensuring all units have a pathway to readiness over time.



Characteristics of Army Components

The Army relies heavily on the contributions of all three Components and on its Reserve Components for over half of its total capacity. The three Army components are distinct, interdependent and essential.

Graphic: Pie charts showing Compo % makeup of each Service

All Army units share the same training standards, doctrine and equipment. Regular Army units are full time with more training time, higher readiness and proficiency levels., Army National Guard units have a unique dual-status role – responsible in peacetime to their state Governor for emergencies and disasters, but to the President when federalized for missions both at home and abroad. ARNG forces are a robust mix of combat and sustainment or enabler units; Guard combat units are generally funded for platoon readiness or proficiency and sustainment units for company-level proficiency. Army Reserve units are composed mostly of sustainment or enabler capabilities, including some early deployers that require higher readiness levels. Once activated, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units generally require some post-mobilization training before deployment. The extent of post-mobilization training depends a unit's collective readiness level and the complexity of collective tasks for the mission.

Multi-component units are units that have assigned personnel from more than one component and therefore often have a mixture of the characteristics described above. The Army uses multi-component units for several reasons including to improve or enhance specific capabilities and integration across the Total Force.

Upon activation, other Services generally integrate their RC forces and capabilities into active units at lower levels, e.g., at the individual/crew/platform level. The Army integrates RC units up to battalion, brigade and even division level with active forces. This fact places a premium on collective training (training as a team or unit) and unit readiness in the Army. Units must train

together at higher levels, e.g., brigade or division, for some high priority or combat missions. This fundamental difference between the Army and the Air Force was highlighted in the January 2014 report of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, Appendix D . Many of the enabler capabilities resident in RC forces reflect civilian-type skills, e.g., medical or engineering, that can be brought onto active duty with a minimal amount of collective and/or post mobilization training.

Similar units in all Army components (e.g., infantry battalions, truck companies) are organized the same and follow the same operational and training doctrines. Regular Army units are more heavily consolidated and collocated with necessary training facilities, such as weapons ranges, maneuver areas, and urban training sites. Reserve and National Guard forces are distributed throughout our Nation's communities, and typically must travel to regional training centers to conduct collective training. Since the 1993 *AC-RC Leaders Offsite Agreement*, National Guard forces have focused primarily on wartime direct combat mission and peacetime domestic emergencies while the Army Reserve has focused on providing wartime sustainment or combat support.

Regular Army forces are routinely provided significant additional training opportunities to master more complex individual and collective skills. Reserve and National Guard forces conduct a minimum of about 40 days annually, although some individuals (e.g., helicopter pilots) and units (e.g., early deployers or those alerted or designated for possible deployment) are allocated additional training days to achieve higher readiness levels. The principal differences in

training and readiness across the Army's full-time and part-time units are available training time, facilities, and resources

Recent Operational Experience

During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2003 to 2013, soldiers and units from all three Army components seamlessly integrated to accomplish missions. ARAND Corporation's report titled *Army Deployments to OIF and OEF* identified a substantial portion of operational deployments involved Reserve Component units (almost 30%), especially support or enabler capabilities. Most operational support and sustainment units were employed for missions very similar to their unit designs, e.g., medical units operated hospitals and transportation units moved personnel and supplies across theaters. Some units were innovatively employed to fill critical demands in other capabilities, e.g., employing artillery battalions as transportation units to alleviate shortfalls in transportation capacity.

In the Central Command area of responsibility, Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) were employed in one of four mission sets or as a theater reserve force:

1) Combined Arms Maneuver – close combat against organized enemy forces, requiring integration of combined arms team and close air support from other Services.

2) Counter Insurgency (COIN) – working with host nation forces to separate insurgent forces from the population and create opportunities for conflict resolution.

3) Security Force – protecting installations, facilities and lines of supply.

4) Train & Assist – training host nation forces to build and enhance their capabilities and capacity.

5) Theater Reserve Force

Army BCT Usage, 2003-2013

	Combined Arms Maneuver	COIN	Security Force	Train & Assist	Theater Reserve	Total
RA	8	121	2	32	3	166
ARNG	0	10	29	11	0	50

The types of missions performed by the Regular Army and Army National Guard BCTs were a combination of unit selection for mission with associated training and certification by Forces Command and the Combatant Command's decision of how to employ the BCT. As outlined in the table from RAND Report titled *Army Active and Reserve Component Forces in Global Operations, 2003-2011*, Regular Army BCTs provided the majority of combined arms maneuver and COIN capability and ARNG BCTs provided COIN, security force and train & assist capabilities. ARNG BCTs provided nearly one quarter of all BCTs that deployed during this time period.

During this same time period, the Army extensively used Expeditionary Sustainment Commands (1-star General Officer command) and Sustainment Brigades from all three components to command and control operational support and sustainment units in theater. (note: add FORSCOM data on usage)

More recently, the Army continues to commit both Regular Army and Army National Guard divisions to important global missions (Figure xx). A division is considered committed when it is assigned duties, missions and/or functions that preclude its immediate employment elsewhere. Today, Army divisions are a stressed capability and committing both Regular Army and Army

Guard divisions to meet operational demands in the future is essential.

	Regular Army	Army National Guard
FY 12 – FY 15	❑ **11 Afghanistan** ❑ **1 EUCOM** ❑ **4 Global Response Force (GRF)** ❑ **2 PACOM**	❑ **1 Afghanistan** ❑ **2 NORTHCOM** ❑ **4 GTMO Rotations** ❑ **2 KFOR/SFOR (Kosovo/Sinai)**
FY 16 – FY 17 (planned)	❑ **2 Afghanistan** ❑ **2 CENTCOM** ❑ **1 GRF** ❑ **1 EUCOM** ❑ **2 PACOM**	❑ **1 AFRICOM** ❑ **2 NORTHCOM** ❑ **2 GTMO Rotations** ❑ **2 KFOR/SKOR**
Total	**26**	**16**

Figure xx

Army Force Structure Today

In its' March 2015 *Report to Congress on Army Force Structure*, the Army emphasized that it uses the well-established Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to regularly and incrementally adjust force structure. TAA is a phased planning process conducted by headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) and all Army components to determine future operational requirements. Through this process, the Army examines the Total Force from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective using anticipated threats, scenarios, assumptions, and priorities. TAA also considers complex Army coordination and agreements, such as allocation rules, resource assumptions, warfighting capabilities, and infrastructure priorities.

TAA serves as the bridge between Office of the Secretary of Defense /Joint Staff guidance and the Army's planning and program building processes, balancing the Army's force structure requirements against available and planned resources. It is important to understand that when units are inactivated or reduced, the Army rapidly loses readiness and capability, but when units are activated, especially in the Reserve Components, it takes time to recruit and build unit readiness. TAA is also the process by which the Regular Army and Army Reserve allocate personnel and force structure to units and installations that make up the operational Army. Within the TAA process, the ARNG allocates its portion of the resourced force structure across the 54 States and Territories using the Force Program Review as described and assessed in Chapter 8.

The 2015 Army Force Structure report lists Army force planning assumptions, describes the importance of force structure decisions such as Brigade Combat Team reorganization and the Aviation Restructure Initiative in preserving combat power, and expresses specific concerns with

the "optimistic" assumptions of the defense strategy. The overall result is a significantly increased level of risk associated with a reduced total force of 980k. With a force of 980k at current readiness and investment levels, the Army has minimum sufficient capability and capacity across a range of potential challenges. The Army's programmed force accepts risk in depth and balance including some enabler shortfalls in the Regular Army. If the Army is called upon to conduct a lengthy campaign (1-2 years), the force will be under great stress until the Army can regenerate additional combat power – a process that will take several years.

Homeland Defense

Defense of the homeland is is best explained as the Army's top priority. The United States is not a sanctuary protected by two oceans. The threats to the homeland are significant and increasing. Extensive discussions with and feedback from Governors, state Adjutants General, and both the NORTHCOM and Army North commanders indicate that the Army's disaster response and homeland defense capabilities and capacity have improved and are adequate to support anticipated homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities requirements. The Army provides NORTHCOM the only full-time 3-Star Service Component Command . Army forces are also allocated to NORTHCOM under DOD Global Force Management. Essential homeland defense capabilities are provided to states through the Army National Guard and regional Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, which are agreements between states, that facilitate sharing key capabilities and resources across state borders in an emergency or disaster. In the event of a large, complex catastrophe in the homeland, the Army would provide the

majority of defense capabilities and support and must be prepared to provide a large, immediate Total Army response including Regular Army forces.

Multi-component Units

The Army has a long history of mixed success using multi-component units. Multi-component designs can be used to effectively provide specific operational and institutional capabilities and to improve integration and interoperability across the Total Force. Currently, there are 37 multi-component units documented in the Army including many successful examples like the Army Space and Missile Defense Command's 100th Missile Defense Brigade (Ground-based Midcourse Defense). Reduced budgets and the desire to generate manpower savings have also led to multi-compo initiatives such as the ongoing redesign of both division and corps to add RC personnel in place of Regular Army.

Insert 100th Missile Defense vignette

Multi-component units, as part of implementing the Army's Total Force Policy, require an understanding of the associated specific goals, benefits and challenges associated with them. In addition to multi-component units, the Army should continue command emphasis on ongoing Regular Army-Reserve Component training partnerships/associations and re-examine past efforts

including the use of round-out units and cross component personnel assignments including command as part of the Army's Total Force Policy.

Finding: Multi-component units can improve integration and interoperability across the Total Force. Implementing a multi-component unit solely to generate Regular Army manpower savings has had less historical success in operational units.

Recommendation 6-1: The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.

Recommendation 6-2: The Army should add specific guidance on goals for future use of multicomponent units and related initiatives to the Army's Total Force Policy Implementation Guidance for fiscal year 2017.

Recommendation 6-3: The Army should develop a substantial pilot program to test the viability of a multicomponent aviation unit in order to improve readiness and improve integration of Regular Army and reserve component forces.

The Generating Force

The generating force is that part of the Army whose primary purpose is building (or generating) and sustaining the operational units – battalion, brigade, division, etc. – that defend that nation. It includes recruiters, the Army's training base, and Army installations and installation support. From time to time, the generating force has also provided additional depth to the operating force by providing real-time reach back support. The generating force has also provided individuals,

teams, or entire units with specific capabilities and functions for employment by or in direct support of Joint Force Commanders. While the Army has a formal Total Army Analysis process for operational units, it lacks a similar process for the generating force.

Building upon initial work by RAND Corporation, the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) and the United States Army Manpower Analysis Agency (USAMAA) recently developed a methodology to assist senior leaders in the requirements determination process for the generating force. Since there is no simple correlation between the generating force and the size of the operating force, the methodology focuses on several drivers that impact the size of the generating force. Based on this methodology, CAA is developing a Generating Force Model using a function to organization approach for each major Army institutional element. The model will have the ability to project generating force manpower requirements into the out-years and provide the leadership options to redistribute manpower externally, realign manpower internally, or divest functions or tasks. (see Recommendation 5-9).

The Operational Force

The Army's primary mission is to provide capabilities for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to land operations. The Army most effectively executes a particular mission when it draws on the collective capability of the Total Force including functionally discrete, but organizationally integrated, operational and institutional elements. The operating force of the Army is composed of those units and other elements of all Army components that are employed

to accomplish operational missions assigned to the Army – approximately 77% of the Total Force today.

In terms of finding a proper investment balance between structure, modernization, and readiness, America's Army with the implementation of the Budget Control Act (BCA) has risen to the challenge of meeting current demands largely at the expense of modernization. The Army has appropriately placed readiness as the priority above modernization to meet current demands. In the future threat environment, modernization shortfalls in short range Air Defense Artillery (ADA), Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN), and Field Artillery are major concerns. The Army must reassess the risk assumed in these areas as highlighted below.

Previous resourcing and threat assumptions that made reducing below an Army of 980k acceptable have changed. Army resourcing has declined and threats have become greater than previously assumed. Even with full access to all components, this size only provides limited ability to react to unforeseen circumstances. Given the emerging world environment, the planned 980k Total Army force lacks some key capabilities, capacity, as well as the flexibility to meet or deter some of the potential threats. To that end, any recommendations or identification of potential end strength off-sets (bill payers) are an attempt to identify the least risky off-set within that 980k Total Army end strength. Any growth in capacity without an equivalent off-set would require an increase in Army end strength.

Due primarily to the large number of Army force structure changes driven by force design updates (changes in organization by type unit), the Army has struggled to efficiently integrate the

changes into doctrine and COCOM war plans. As a result, fully assessing where operational shortfalls in capability, responsiveness, or capacity exist in current plans is difficult.

Combatant Command and Army Service Component Command plans do not adequately reflect the Army's current and programmed force structure and doctrine.

Recommendation 6-5: The Army should assist Combatant Commands and Army Service Component Commands with timely integration of force structure changes into their strategic planning process.

Recommendation 6-6: Combatant Commands and Army Service Component Commands should update all war plans with current and programed force structure and doctrine and establish a process to ensure routine war plan and Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) updates at a minimum of once every two years.

The Commission's assessment, based on current and projected threats, found the Army's capability and capacity in Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) has less risk than several other important shortfalls in Army structure and posture (see classified annex and Chapter 9 discussions).

Recommendation 6-7: If the Army cannot grow beyond an end strength of 980,000, the Army should consider reducing up to two Regular Army Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) as end-strength off-sets for growing selected units listed below to meet Regular Army shortfalls due to short-notice war plan requirements and capacity demands. These IBCTs could also be used to provide equipment for additional pre-positioned equipment sets or equipment for expanding the Army if needed.

1. Priority for additional resources should go to fully man an eleventh Combat Aviation Brigade

2. Retain a forward-stationed Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) in Korea.

3. Forward station an operational aviation mission command element in Europe.

4. Forward station an ABCT in Europe.

5. Ensure the ability to provide operational mission command in proportion to mission requirements for each Combatant Command (COCOM) or Army Service Component Command (ASCC), likely unique for each COCOM. Force reductions to headquarters should be done in close coordination with COCOM/ASCC commanders.

Recommendation 6-8: Congress should require the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army to provide an assessment of ways and associated costs to reduce or eliminate shortfalls in responsiveness and capacity of the following capabilities (see classified annex of report):

1. Attack Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB) capabilities

2. Air defense capability to meet existing and emerging threats, including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Cruise Missiles, and manned aircraft. Include in the assessment the status of solutions to shortfalls, potential commercial-off-the-shelf solutions, and planning with timelines to mitigate shortfalls. Include how growth in Regular Army Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) capacity to meet responsiveness shortfalls can assist with meeting the ongoing National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) mission.

3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and modernization related to homeland missions and war plans.

4. Field Artillery capabilities and the changes in doctrine and war plans resulting from U.S. participation in the cluster munitions ban as well as required modernization or inventory shortfalls.

5. Quartermaster fuel distribution and water purification.

6. Army watercraft, other port opening capabilities and modernization (with particular attention to the ability to flex between oceans)

7. Transportation (fuel, water, and cargo).

8. Military Police.

Recommendation 6-9: Congress should require the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army to provide an assessment of the effect of the current Reserve Component sourcing solution for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) mission on mission effectiveness and cost. The assessment should consider implications for recruiting, training, career progression, doctrine development, and GMD modernization strategy. It should explicitly include consideration of a Regular Army solution as an alternative for the GMD mission.

Army BCT Usage, 2003-2013

	Combined Arms Maneuver	COIN	Security Force	Train & Assist	Theater Reserve	Total
RA	8	121	2	32	3	166
ARNG	0	10	29	11	0	50

Deployment of Divisions

	Regular Army	**Army National Guard**
FY 12 – FY 15	❑ **11 Afghanistan** ❑ **1 EUCOM** ❑ **4 Global Response Force (GRF)** ❑ **2 PACOM**	❑ **1 Afghanistan** ❑ **2 NORTHCOM** ❑ **4 GTMO Rotations** ❑ **2 KFOR/SFOR (Kosovo/Sinai)**
FY 16 – FY 17 (planned)	❑ **2 Afghanistan** ❑ **2 CENTCOM** ❑ **1 GRF** ❑ **1 EUCOM** ❑ **2 PACOM**	❑ **1 AFRICOM** ❑ **2 NORTHCOM** ❑ **2 GTMO Rotations** ❑ **2 KFOR/SKOR**
Total	**26**	**16**

ESC

RA - 4
ARNG - 3
USAR - 11

Multicomponent Challenges

The 100th Missile Defense Brigade (Ground-based Midcourse Defense), a multicomponent unit that defends the continental United States against ballistic missile attack, demonstrates the strengths and challenges of Total Force integration.

Based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the brigade commands a battalion in Alaska, detachments in California and New York, and early warning radar batteries in the Pacific Command, European Command, and Central Command areas of operations. Authorized over 560 soldiers—Regular Army, and Army National Guard—the 100th Missile Defense Brigade falls under U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), which supports U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

Operationally, the brigade is part of a joint, global network of space, sea, and ground-based sensors and missile systems designed to defeat intercontinental missile threats. Legally, the brigade's chain of command reflects the complexities of state and federal authorities embodied in Title 32 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

The 100th Brigade benefits from being a multicomponent unit because Regular Army soldiers facilitate planning, training, and integration with the rest of the Army while the Army National Guard soldiers provide an enduring presence for daily missions. In 2014, for example, the Army began to transition the brigade's detachments to batteries and convert the operations and maintenance personnel from contractors to soldiers. During this on-going transition, a brigade Regular Army officers coordinates new equipment training at Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Sill,

Oklahoma for the brigade's Guard members. This requires extensive coordination with the active duty installations to take care of the National Guard soldiers, including their housing, vehicle support, and leave. Meanwhile, Guard soldiers provide long-term stability to the brigade's small, highly technical force.

At the same time, the 100th Brigade demonstrates challenges for multicomponent units implementing Total Force integration. Because the brigade falls under SMDC and, therefore, component Regular Army chain of command, all deployments and exercises are credited to the Regular Army without National Guard credit. This skews service-level reporting on the components' respective operational tempo in favor of the Regular Army. The 100th Brigade also demonstrates the shortfalls in computer network integration because the active and reserve components use separate human resources networks and data systems. The Army is working to integrate these systems in the Integrated Personnel and Pay System–Army (IPPS-A), but the Service will not complete system fielding until 2020. In the meantime, the chain of command must rely on multiple and separate personnel and pay systems to manage Regular Army and National Guard soldiers.

Multicomponent units can help improve Total Force integration, but the 100th Missile Defense Brigade's experience demonstrates that the process is not easy and much work remains to be done.

Reserve Components: Strategic *and* Operational

Published in October 2008, DoD Directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force," directs the Services to manage their reserve components as an operational force including integrating all components as a total force. It is DoD policy that the reserve components play both an operational and strategic role, e.g., "the RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense strategy requirements across the full spectrum of conflict." This directive does not use or define the terms operational reserve and strategic reserve. Further, Joint Pub 1-02 does not define strategic reserve and only defines operational reserve at a tactical level: "An emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established for the support of a specific operation." Following the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, a Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component co-led by Joint Staff and OSD Reserve Affairs included a specific recommendation not to use the terms *operational reserve* and *strategic reserve* because they are non-doctrinal, inconsistently used across DoD, and confusing.

This Commission likewise decided that delineating between operational and strategic for the reserve components would be an inaccurate portrayal of Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces that reside on a spectrum of readiness.

Force Generation

The Army has always generated forces and has evolved the processes and readiness models as demand, operational conditions, and military strategies have changed. During the Cold War, the Army developed a static, tiered readiness methodology designed to prepare forces according to war plan timelines to counter a peer capability. This readiness model enabled the Army to sustain a large, standing force (augmented by the draft) even in periods of active peace to deter possible acts of large scale aggression and respond quickly to small scale, short-duration aggression.

From the Vietnam War to initiating Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army deployed soldiers for short duration missions that did not require a rotational or replacement force. In the 2004, the Army needed to replace the units deployed for the invasion of Iraq with follow on forces. The response was the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model which generated cyclical readiness rather than tiered readiness. ARFORGEN also enabled the Army to effectively integrate the Reserve Component, reset returning units, and incorporate lessons from prior rotations.

In 2015, the Army moved towards a force generation method known as the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM). SRM was created to optimize available readiness resources to enable more units, across all components, to generate and maintain higher levels of readiness over time. The planning addresses improvement for assessing and maximizing unit readiness necessary to meet global Army requirements while maximizing available capabilities for unforeseen requirements. SRM provides improved readiness visibility on a quarterly basis, and forecasts

readiness out 3 to 4 years. This improved visibility is expected to better inform budgeting and programming of funds.

Finding: The Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) is a work in progress that will adopt elements from both cyclic and tiered readiness methods. The Army's force generation regulation does not yet reflect SRM.

Army Total Force Policy

The global security environment has driven a steady or increased, demand from Combatant Commanders over the past several years. The Army has been stressed to meet those increasing demands. A contributing factor has been the practice of minimizing Reserve Components forces use. The primary reasons for turning first to the Regular Army are funding and the unpredictability of emergent missions and political decisions.

The Army must be adequately resourced to fully employ the Total Force and fulfill the vision of One Army. By employing forces from all components as a Total Force, the Army will be able to meet priority and emergent missions requirements and reduce stress on the Regular Army which has down-sized the most of any Army component. One of the tenets for the Total Force approach is increased collaboration between the Army components.

Chapter 5, Managing the Force, highlighted Secretary Gates' 2007 "Utilization of the Total Force" memo, and his 2008 Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force." The Secretary of the Army 2012 directive, "Army Total Force Policy" further specified policy for integrating all Army components.

In line with these policies, the Army has integrated Reserve Component soldiers with their Regular Army counterparts in numerous ways. FORSCOM implemented the Total Force Partnership Program (TFPP) which provides a framework for the alignment and partnership of selected units from different components. FORSCOM's Integrated Training Guidance initiated deliberate steps to purposefully incorporate training between active and reserve units at major collective training events such as those conducted at the Combat Training Centers (CTC). First Army shifted focus from post-mobilization training to pre-mobilization training support with more engagement and habitual relationships with National Guard and Army Reserve units. Army National Guard BCTs undergoing exportable CTC events are supported by their partnered Regualr Army BCT which provides the exercise opposing force. The Army Reserve has forward-stationed Army Reserve Engagement Cells at Army Service Comonent Commands to provide subject matter expertise, planning, and reach back capability for the ASCC commanders.

Findings:

(1) The Army's initiatives for implementing the Total Force Policy are moving in a positive direction, but additional resources and senior leader continued focus are required to fully implement the comprehensive partnership and integrated training programs.

(2) The obstacles to implementing a Total Force approach identified in Chapter 5 are constraining progress towards One Army.

Recommendation 7-1: The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions, which would allow individuals from all components to fill positions and help foster a Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components. The Secretary of the Army's goal should be to increase billets designated for any component fill. The review should be completed within nine months after publication of this report, and any new designations should be completed within eighteen months.

Recommendation 7-2: The Secretary of the Army should develop selection and promotion policies that incentivize Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve assignments across components and within multicomponent units. The Secretary of the Army's goal should be to substantially increase incentives for service in multicomponent units. The Secretary of the Army should make changes within one year after publication of this report.

Current Mission Requirements

Although the United States is no longer engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army is not experiencing a respite and there are no indications that Army global commitments will decrease in the foreseeable future. Most recently, troop strength in Afghanistan did not reduce as planned, Russia invaded Ukraine; ISIL established a stronghold in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram instigated aggressive actions against non-Muslims in Africa, and Ebola spread in West Africa. For each of these "emergent" requirements, the Army responded by deploying additional forces, above those already assigned or allocated for steady state or "enduring" requirements such as the Global Response Force (GRF), rotational requirements in

Central Command (CENTCOM), and forward stationed units in the Pacific and European theaters.

During interviews with Combatant Commanders, each Combatant Commander expressed that at current force levels there are unmet demands for Army capabilities. The following table delineates Army forces assigned or allocated to Combatant Commands since 2001. The percentage of the force assigned or allocated in 2015 remains closer to levels when the Army was fully engaged in both the Iraq and Afghanistan than in 2001.

Assigned & Allocated Army Forces as a Percent of Total Army Strength/*As of 15 Sep 15

Source: HQDA

	Sep'00	Sep '01	Sep'07	Sep '08	Sep'14	Sep '15*
Total Army end strength (all COMPOS) at end of the FY	1,042,107	1,038,258	1,064,606	1,101,020	1,057,720	1,038,030
Total # of Soldiers assigned or allocated to Combatant Commands (all COMPOS) at end of the FY	124,532	132,414	228,471	232,307	149,937	180,140
Assigned/Allocated forces as a percent of Total Army end strength	11.95%	12.75%	21.46%	21.10%	14.18%	17.35%

Demand for Army forces is sufficiently high in 2015 that one third of the Regular Army is either deployed, forward stationed, or a CONUS-based assigned or allocated force.

FINDING: The Army has not benefitted significantly from a reduction in Iraq and Afghanistan requirements because these decreases have been supplanted by growth in emergent demands for a smaller force.

On 7 July 2015, the Army announced continued end strength reductions from 1,045M to 980K to meet reduced funding levels by Fiscal Year 2017. In this era of continued global threats, declining military force structure, and budget constraints, the Army must make some tough decisions about how to address the consistently high global demand for Army capabilities. These decisions are sometimes outside the Army direct authorities: (1) leave the demand unmnet with attendant risk, (2) increase the length of time a unit is deployed going beyond Defense and Army deployment rotation goals, (3) decrease the amount of time a unit is at home station for dwell before deploying again, or (4) the Army could increase in size.

Training Policies

The Army generates and sustains operational Army formations ensuring readiness to meet Joint Force Commander requirements. Training is an essential element of that readiness. Commanders create an environment that balances training readiness with other Army requirements (regulatory guidance, support tasking's and other directed activities.) Inherent in training policies are the mandatory training requirements.

Mandatory Training. Commanders and staff from all components noted there was not enough time to do everything the Army expects units to accomplish. In one year, active units spend up to 241 days generating readiness with 201 days spent in collective training, training support, and functional training. The additional 40 days are dedicated to leader development and individual common mandatory training specified in AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development.

The ARNG and USAR leaders generally agreed that 31 of their 39 minimum authorized training days are needed to complete all AR 350-1 requirements. The Army Reserve Force Policy Committee (ARFPC) uses the figure of 48 Unit Training Assembly periods (UTAs) required to meet these requirements, which equates to 24 days. Whether 24 days or up to 31 days, RC units spend significant time on training below the unit collective level to meet AR 350-1 requirements. RC leaders were unanimous in their assessment that AR 350-1 training requirements leave very little time to conduct collective training or to focus the training where commanders assess their units needs the most training.

The Army identified the problem of excessive "Mandatory Training" requirements contained in AR 350-1 several years back. Their desired end state is reducing mandatory training requirements and allowing commanders to appropriately balance training readiness with other Army requirements. Key take aways from the the 2015 Army Training Leader Development Conference: (1) there are too many training requirements for RC forces, (2) there are over 1000 Army directives, regulation, pamphlets and messages concerning this issue, (3) 3 and 2 star

commanders must have the ability to prioritize these training requirements and underwrite risk when giving lower level commanders flexibility, and (4) the Army will always have mandatory training requirements.

FINDING: Delegating mandatory training exception approval means commanders will assume some risk in a risk-averse culture, especially if something negative occurs later in that particular subject area. However, there are risks by lessening mandatory training requirements, and risk by having too many mandatory training requirements that cut into valuable collective training time.

Recommendation 7-3: The Army should reduce mandatory training prescribed in AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, using the following means:

- **Implementing the 2015 Army Training and Leader Development Conference recommendations by the end of fiscal year 2016**
- **Reducing the number of mandatory training requirements by half and moving the reduced tasks to local command policy per AR 600-20**
- **Developing a formal process for approving the addition of any mandatory training tasks and reviewing existing mandatory training requirements annually for retention or deletion**
- **Chartering the Training General Officer Steering Committee (TGOSC) to provide a viable governance entity to approve all Army and Combatant Commander mandatory training requirements and the addition of any item to the list**
- **Changing the reserve component's mandatory training requirements from annual to a two-year cycle**
- **Codifying every mandatory training requirement with a task, condition and standard, Training and Evaluation Outline, and lesson plan, and making this information accessible to all components through the Army Training Network**
- **Delegating mandatory training exception approval authority to the two-star Commanders**

- **Abandoning the administrative task for 100 percent individual training record accountability for mandatory training**
- **Compensating reserve component soldiers for using the Electronics Based Distance Learning system to complete mandatory training requirements on line on their own time**
- **Rewriting AR 350-1 and establishing a consolidated repository for training requirements.**

Training Assessment. The Army has sought ways to improve objectivity of describing task proficiency in the form of ratings. The U.S. Army Inspector General Agency found significant issues with how units assessed their readiness. For example, attending training does not mean that the unit personnel are "trained". Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs) are used to evaluate training events. Unit commanders will depict the level at which the unit is assessed from highest trained to lowest: T1-T4. Commanders are expected to prioritize collective mission essential tasks and approve unit training plans to improve or sustain essential task proficiency to provide unit capabilities and accomplish assigned missions. An external evaluation provides commanders standardization in the overall readiness assessment.

The Army has initiatied the Objective T-Level Assessment for a unit's ability to provide the capabilities per unit design using a composite assessment of three foundational aspects of training to determine the training days required to achieve the highest rating of T1. The Collective Task proficiency determined by Mission Essential Task (MET) as demonstrated through a Command Post Exercise / Field Training Exercise of Staff Exercise. The Individual and Crew qualification required in accordance with appropriate doctrinal references. And finally, a Collective Live Fire Proficiency demonstrated through both Fire Coordination Exercise

and Maneuver Live Fire Exercise in accordance to Army Unit Live Fire Gates. Nested together with a force generation model for planning and resourcing training, Objective-T enables training assessments that builds and sustains measured readiness allowing the Army to meet its operational demands.

FINDING: The Objective T-Level Assessment provides a much more quantifiable and objective assessment of unit collective training readiness.

Recommendation 7-4: The Army should implement the Objective-T methodology for assessing the progression of training readiness and revise readiness reporting using the quantifiable criteria.

Mobilizing

As part of an effort to garner efficiencies and shorten post-mobilization training time, First Army and Reserve Component units are conducting Joint Assessments (JA) as directed by HQDA EXORD 150-08. The JA is the primary forum to assess manning, confirm training requirements, plan for resourcing equipment, coordinate with support elements, and confirm the unit training plan for executing pre-deployment training and unit mobilization.

FINDING: Reserve Component units that complete the Joint Assessment with First Army reduce redundant post-mobilization training and improve the mobilization process by identifying pre- and post-mobilization support requirements.

First Army's principle mission is to implement the Army Total Force Policy: advising, assisting and training RC formations in preparation for worldwide requirements. Additionally, FORSCOM employs First Army to assess training and ensure units are ready before they deploy for their respective missions around the globe. As a multicomponent unit, First Army is comprised of soldiers from each component. First Army partners with RC units throughout their readiness cycle to support the unit's pre mobilization training and provide an estimate of post mobilization training time needed for the unit to complete its Culminating Training Exercise or Capstone event. This detailed planning helps ensure validation of the unit for deployment, and ensures qualifications remain current for the duration of the mobilization and deployment period. The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (1993) increased Regular Army authority and responsibility for advising and training of National Guard combat units. After 1996, Training Support XXI (TS XXI) consolidated pre- and post-mobilization training support under First and Fifth Continental Armies. TS XXI merged RC training support organizations under regional training brigades which largely supported combat arms units and under USAR training divisions which supported Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. In 2005, Congress authorized the Army to reduce the manning for these missions from 5,000 to 3,500.

To support the intent of Amy Total Force Policy, and to improve training support, First Army has undertaken a major reorganization and adjusted its primary mission focus from RC post-mobilization to RC pre-mobilization training support. Known as Bold Shift II, this effort seeks to account for the planned reduction of operational deployments and the need to maintain the

cross-component integration achieved during OEF and OIF. Title XI positions are predominantly in First Army. First Army retains 3,299 of the 3,500 authorized Title XI positions to provide the engagement and habitual relationships with RC units throughout the force generation cycle to enhance readiness while minimizing redundant training costs. In addition to the Regular Army Title XI personnel, First Army force structure includes ARNG and USAR manning. Current manning is comprised of Active Guard and Reserve personnel as well as traditional drilling RC soldiers from ARNG and USAR). Currently, the National Guard fill rate is around 16 percent and the Army Reserve around 80 percent of their authorizations within First Army.

FINDING: All three components have an obligation to provide adequate full time manning within First Army to foster Total Force integration.

Recommendation 7-5: The Army should resource First Army's AGR positions from the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve at the aggregate manning level provided for each Component not later than fiscal year 2017.

Combat Training Center (CTC) programs generate ready units and agile leaders who are confident in their ability to operate in complex environments, according AR 350-50 *Combat Training Center Program,* April 2013. The Army CTC program includes the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP, formerly known as the Battle Command Training Program); the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), in Hohenfels, Germany; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), at Ft. Polk, Louisiana; and the National Training Center (NTC), at Ft. Irwin,

California. JMRC, JRTC, and NTC are collectively referred to as the maneuver CTCs (MCTC) or fixed CTC sites.

The Maneuver CTCs conduct scenario driven, instrumented force-on-force and live-fire training using a professional opposing force (OPFOR) and controlled by an expert, dedicated operations group. Training occurs under tough, realistic, combat-like conditions across a wide range of likely tactical operations focusing on collective level tasks from a Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) Mission Essential Task List (METL). According to current policy, CTCs serve as a capstone training events determining if units are ready to progress to the available force pool within the force generation model or as a mobilization rehearsal exercises (MRE) to prepare brigade and below formations for operational deployments or combat. Entering the available force pool does not equate to a T1 training level for collective training as a RC formation may only be resourced to enter the available pool at T2.

MCTP provides staff focused training events for BCT's, Functional/Multifunctional (F/MF) brigades, sustainment brigades, division, corps, and Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) headquarters, and Joint Task Forces (JTF)s.

Army base-budget funding for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 and FY 17 supports 9 total CTC rotations each for NTC and JRTC, one at each location for ARNG BCTs, and one decisive action BCT rotation at JMRC. JMRC is also scheduled to host ASCC exercises for the regionally aligned force (RAF) BCT each year. The RAF exercise will focus on theater specific shaping operations and not decisive action training. An Army decision is currently pending on increasing ARNG

MCTC rotations from two to four annually. The proposed increase of four ARNG MCTCs will affect the training and manning funding levels for the two additional ARNG BCTs and supporting units.

The Army is considering shifting the emphasis for the MCTC from executing culminating training events for transition into the available force pool to synchronizing MCTC rotations with brigade command tours to optimize leader development. Additionally, the CTC program will align with the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) for projecting readiness requirements and assessments.

During engagements at NTC and JMRC, resourcing for observer, coach, trainers (OC/T) and enabler unit support, particularly from the USAR, were major concerns expressed. JMRC also articulated concerns with availability of OC/Ts as well as funding for extended 21-30 day Annual Training periods for USAR units that must come from the United States. NTC leadership pointed out that all NTC rotations are in effect multi-component. The main NTC issue is the planning for USAR support (sustainment/support units) and better programming/funding to support the additional man days required.

Regardless of Component, the BCT training proficiency level upon completing a NTC rotation improves for all units completing a CTC rotation. However, the force generation process produces a different training level for Regular Army BCT (available for deployment) than for an

ARNG BCT (enters the available year but still requires post mobilization training for deployment).

FINDING: Maneuver CTC throughput capabilities are sufficient to execute the Decisive Action training strategy and the emerging Sustainable Readiness Model, including an increase from 2 to 4 rotations annually for ARNG BCTs.

Continued priority support for CTC activities and proper alignment of resourcing will enable the Army to quickly recover and maintain required levels of readiness to support current and projected operational demands. Greater participation of the RC as rotational units and as supporting capabilities to the CTCs will enhance Total Army readiness, provide greater leader development opportunities and build interoperability between the components.

The eXportable Combat Training Capability (xCTC) is the Army National Guard's contracted, portable training enhancement assets that provide multi-echelon instrumented training for BCTs and some enabling units. The xCTC transportability allows support the geographically dispersed ARNG units by integrating multiple training capabilities into a single event at a local maneuver training center. The event may be in lieu of a "dirt CTC," or in preparation for a rotation at JRTC or NTC. All training is integrated into a common operating picture which includes a 4-week event with 2 weeks of maneuver for each company by staggering the dates for maneuver battalions to maximize training effects and space.

Recommendation 7-6: The Army should increase the number of annual rotations for Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams at combat training centers beginning fiscal year 2017 without decreasing the number of Regular Army Brigade Combat Team rotations.

Mobilization Force Generation Installation (MFGI)

During the 2003 peak, the ARNG mobilized over 102,000 Soldiers and the USAR over 77,000 Soldiers. At the height of OIF/OEF, more than 20 installations were conducting mobilization and demobilization operations. These 25 different mobilization locations known as Mobilization Force Generation Installations (MFGI) operated at various levels of preparation. There were seven (7) primary MFGIs, five (5) secondary MFGIs, and thirteen (13) contingency MFGIs. In addition to unit deployment processing at MFGIs, mobilized individual augmentees were processed at CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) located at Fort Benning, GA, Camp Atterbury, IN and Winchester, VA.

Today, the Army has only two active MFGIs at Ft. Hood and Ft. Bliss including all CRC functions. Only Ft. Hood has a Pre-Deployment Training Equipment set, or PDTE, set on site. Before the Army determined which MFGIs would remain active, a decision was made to to co-locate PDTE sets at the three Army Corps locations, Fort Lewis, Ft Bragg, and Ft. Hood. Because there is no PDTE set at Ft. Bliss, the Army currently transports equipment to and from Ft. Bliss and other locations to support RC post-mobilization training.

The 23 other "inactive" MFGIs have reduced manning and can be utilized only after providing significant funding. During a contingency or major mobilization effort the inactive MFGIs would probably take between 180 and 220 days to activate without specific additional authorities and policy exceptions (e.g. contracting, hirings, etc.). The two active MFGIs can process 8,000 Soldiers per month and have been working well below capacity for current operations.

FINDING: The lack of a Pre-Deployment Training Equipment set at Fort Bliss, TX, increases transportation costs and causes some loss of training time while units await equipment delivery.

Recommendation 7-7: The Army should provide a Pre-deployment Training Equipment set to Fort Bliss for the Mobilization Force Generation Installation role no later than fiscal year 2017.

Demobilizing

After a deployment, Regular Army forces re-assimilate with their families and transition back to their CONUS-based routine more rapidly than RC counterparts. Usually, these Regular Army soldiers return directly to their home installations or they return to their home installation after a couple of days at an MFGI completing mandatory briefings and equipment turn-in. By virtue of their assignment to an active military installation, these soldiers can readily access medical, financial, and administrative support services after a deployment. On the other hand, for RC soldiers, post-deployment and demobilization activities involve more time and more out-processing actions. RC soldiers usually do not reside near active installation. Additonally, following the demobilization process the RC soldier is no longer on mobilization orders. This

change in status limits access to medical, administrative, and employment services and may mean these services are not be available once they revert back to full-time civilian status.

The extensive mobilization and demobilization experience gained from OEF and OIF translated into improvements in both processes. Prior to 2014, the Army's demobilization process for RCsoldiers was "time-focused" whereby each soldier experienced five (5) days of out-processing. Beginning with HQDA EXORD 034-014 in March 2014, the Army changed the demobilization processes to "requirements-based" operations that are more tailored to a soldier's needs. The "requirements-based" model is focused on the individual soldier's needs and "better connects processes to reintegrating soldiers with their families, communities, and employers."

The new "requirements-based" demobilization model is a deliberate process that adopts a holistic approach to planning and aligning resources for demobilization processes beginning at the Joint Assessment Conference (JAC). The most salient improvement to the demobilization process includes the addition of a Demobilization Validation Board (DVB) that reviews each soldier's out-processing paperwork to ensure the soldier has met the requirements for release from Active Duty and return to Home Station. If a soldier requires additional administrative support or medical care after 14 days into the demobilization process, the DVB will transition the soldier to another order type, to the Warrior Transition Unit, or into an administrative hold under First Army's command to complete final actions.

Future (Anticipated) Mission Requirements

In 2011, the Secretary of the Army issued an "Army Deployment Period Policy" memo which stated that Army General Purpose Forces (GPF) supporting Secretary of Defence approved named operations outside the continental United States, would transition from a one year deployment period to a nine month deployment period beginning 2012. This policy also stated that the Department of the Army "….will refine and adjust future deployment period policies based on global security conditions and Combatant Commanders' requirements." This memo established what is known in the Army as "Boots on the Ground" or BOG policy.

Soldiers from all components have expressed support for shorter nine-month deployments as more palatable to them, and their families, than 12-month deployments. These shorter 9-month deployments also save money because the Army does not incur the transportation costs associated with sending deployed soldiers home on mid-tour leave. Additionally, RC soldiers are able return to their civilian employment sooner.

The BOG policy fits within the Deployment to Dwell (D2D) and Mobilization to Dwell (M2D) rotation rates goals (Regular Army at one interval deployed to two intervals at home station and Reserve Component units at one interval mobilized to five intervals at home) established by the SECDEF Memorandum dated January 2007 "Utilization of the Total Force." However, Combatant Command requirements have necessitated employment of some Regular Army and Reserve Component unit types more frequently than the rotation rate goals. Each unit that exceeded the rotation rate frequency gained Secretary of Defense approval. For example, during the period 2010-2014, 25 different types of Regular Army units and 16 different types of Reserve Component units exceeded SECDEF planning guidance.

The Defense Science Board concluded in their September 2007 report, "Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism" that "there is a consensus that 1:5 M2D time would satisfy their needs for predictability and sustainability." However, Commission site visit discussions, testimony, interviews with USAR and ARNG leaders, and RC soldiers statements highlight a resounding willingness across the Reserve Components to be employed more frequently for predictable requirements at a rotation rate of M2D 1:4 with requisite resourcing. FINDING: ARNG and USAR units can sustain a Mobilization to Dwell rotation rate with requisite resourcing and predictable mission requirements.

Increasing RC unit employment can help the Army meet Combatant Command requirements, but available funding for such an increase is an issue. In the current environment, RC forces have been involuntarily mobilized for named and unnamed operations/missions utilizing two primary authorities:

a) Title 10 USC 12302 (Partial Mobilization) with OCO funding

b) Title 10 USC 12304b (CCMD planned missions) with base budget funding

During the past 14 years, Title 10 USC 12302(a) (Partial Mobilization) has been used extensively in OCO-funded operations for employing RC soldiers.

Title 10 USC 12304b (Active Duty for Preplanned Missions in Support of the Combatant Commands) is a relatively new authority created by the 2012 National Defense Authorization

Act (NDAA). This authority allows the Services involuntary partial mobilization of up to 60,000 personnel at any one time for a maximum of 365 days. To use this authority, the Services are required, in advance, to detail manpower and costs in budget materials, including intended missions and mobilization periods, so that the funding can be approved in the programming cycle at least 2 years in advance of intended mobilization.

The intent of this authority is to provide access to the Reserve Components for predictable global demands on an enduring basis. For FY's '14, '15, and '16, the highest priority non-OCO funded 12304b missions required 3,000 Man Years of base funding, but only one-third the funds for these 12304b missions were programmed. Consequently, some Regular Army formations have been used more frequently than a D2D ratio of 1:2 even when like formations existed in the Reserve Component. During the 11 September 2015 National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) meeting, GEN Milley, CSA, explained,

"We will be providing the Joint Force commanders with Army capabilities to win decisively on land because that is where wars are ultimately won. To meet that demand, we in the Army leadership have decided to propose to Congress to request additional funding for 12304."

Some examples of enduring, pre-programmed missions that could be performed by the Reserve Component utilizing the 12304b authority include Kosovo peacekeeping, Multi-National Forward Observer (Sinai), Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Response Force

(DCRF), and selected Theater Security Cooperation events. The National Capitol Region Integrated Air Defense System (NCR-IADS) mission is currently being funded by 12304b. Army programming and budget decisions implemented due to the Budget Control Act (BCA) led the Army to un-source many Reserve Component units in favor of Regular Army units for steady state Combatant Command requirements as a way to save funds. The impact of sequestration and budgetary limitation has effectively limited the Army's utilization of the Reserve Component.

When the 12302 authority ends, the 12304b authority will be the only assured involuntary access to the RC, providing there is sufficient funding. The Total Force Policy must be resourced if it is going to be effective. In the absence of adequate 12304b funding, the Reserve Component is unable to support missions for which they are ideally suited thereby increasing operational tempo for many Regular Army units.

FINDING: With the ecline in Army end strength to 980K, the Army will need to rely upon the Reserve Components more to meet Combatant Command requirements while reducing stress on the Regular Army.

Recommendation 7-8: The Secretary of Defense January 19, 2007, memo "Utilization of the Total Force" should be revised to change the planning goal for involuntary mobilization of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units to one interval mobilized to four intervals demobilized (Mobilize-to-Dwell 1:4).

Recommendation 7-9: The Secretary of Defense January 19, 2007, memo "Utilization of the Total Force" should be revised to adjust involuntary mobilization time to more than or less than twelve months as needed to achieve the same operational deployment period (BOG) for all Army components. The total mobilization timeframe for Army National Guard and Army Reserves could vary in length based on type of unit.

Recommendation 7-10: During budget review, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget, working with the Services, should expand use of Overseas Contingency Operations to selected "unnamed operations," such as Atlantic Resolve, and for emergent missions, such as the Ebola response, to facilitate greater reserve component employment across all geographic Combatant Commands. Operations included in OCO must be contingency operations that qualify for this type of funding.

Recommendation 7-11: The Army should fund approximately 3,000 man years annually for 12304(b) utilization of the reserve components.

Recommendation 7-12: Expand 12304b authority to include operational requirements that emerge within the programmed budget timeline. This modification must also include adjustment for use of "year of execution" funding to support reserve component employment.

Strategic Lift

The Army relies on the strategic mobility triad (prepositioning, airlift, and sealift) to project land power into theaters of operation around the globe at the speed and tempo required by the

Combatant Command. This triad will be increasingly stressed by 2023 to meet war plans and/or scenario timelines.

DOD strategic mobility assessments from US Transportation Command and Army G-4 information identified strategic lift shortfalls after the year 2020. While current capacity and timeline requirements are adequate to meet the most demanding contingency, several factors will contribute to increased force projection challenges and risk over time.

a. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) – The June 2014 APS Revised Strategy provides critical war-fighting stocks strategically positioned afloat and land based that contribute to an agile stance by optimizing expeditionary power projection. The forward-positioned APS equipment and sustainment stocks are designed to equip early-entry BCT and support formations in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders.

b. Airlift - Strategic airlift is not a limiting factor for Army forces power projection since a majority of Army capabilities are transported and close faster by sealift. The airlift risk is based on the dependency on the commercial industrial base in the form of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Airline carriers in the CRAF program provide assured access to airlift services during contingencies, and in return DOD provides airlift business to CRAF participants in peacetime. Airlift capacity to move Army forces could fluctuate as the economy changes, aircraft fleet ages, and the airline industry with its supporting logistics network shifts.

c. Sealift - Sealift was assessed in the DOD mobility capabilities studies as adequate today. Several DOD Roll-On Roll-Off ships in surge fleet will age out by 2023 and over half of the surge fleet capacity will retire by 2030 necessitating a recapitalization effort to sustain current capability.

Deploying a sizeable Army force (BCT or larger) is generally faster by sealift than airlift because of capacity. One Large Medium Speed Roll-On Roll-Off ship (LMSR) has a capacity equivalent of 450 C-17 sorties, and it takes roughly two LMSRs to deploy one Armored BCT. However, OPLAN BCT lift comprises only 25% of the Army's total sealift requirement. The remaining 75% is the enabling force and initial sustainment. Given the Army's heavy reliance on sealift, the Army will have a significant risk between 2021 and 2030. To prevent the projected sealift capacity losses, DOD must plan and execute a recapitalization program and program funding for the U.S. flagged (Organic and Commercial) RORO fleet.

d. Fort-to-Port. The Army must ensure the movement from military installation (origin) to the Port of Embarkation (POE). That means units must convoy or self-deploy their equipment to and from the installations. The installations must be able to outload the equipment, which depends on the availability of trucks and railcars and reception capability at the POE. Rail is the primary method for moving Army vehicles and equipment for major contingency deployments, with 70% of rolling stock moving by rail. In 2014, railcar inventory is likely to face a significant decline because almost half of the commercial chain tie-down railcar fleet will reach age-mandated retirement by 2022. The Army recognizes this capability gap and has recommended

exploring a commercial solution to include public private partnerships with the rail industry and use of heavy lift trucks.

e. Other challenges: Difficulties are expected to arise in the future in moving Army equipment by air, highway, rail, and across bridges. One example is vehicle size. The new M1A2 SEP V3 tank exceeds capabilities of our current mobility platforms. Increasing the dimensions of equipment potentially increases risk by exceeding lift capability of military or commercial assets.

Recommendation 7-13: DoD should take corrective action by the end of fiscal year 2017 to mitigate the strategic mobility shortfall for ground forces forecasted for 2023 (sea, rail, and heavy-lift trucks).

Expansion Of the US Army

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) states "…DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force." The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated, "We will protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands." Since we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, the Army needs to manage the force in ways that protect the ability to regenerate capabilities, should they be needed to meet future. The guidance of these two documents is further amplified in Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 17-21 for the Army.

The Army established an Investment and Regeneration (I&R) Task Force in 2012; issued an Army Posture Statement on Investment and Regeneration in 2013: and the Under Secretary of the Army published an Information paper titled: How fast can the Army grow? Implications of Regeneration Decisions" in 2014." The Army's most recent response on planning for expansion noted that end strength reductions and furthering funding decrements resulting from the Budget Control Act made resourcing expansion infeasible, With the shortfalls in funding and manning, the Army appears to have halted planning for expanding the force.

From a personnel perspective, one of the key findings of the October 2013 RAND study on Estimating Institutional Army Manpower Requirements is that "If the Army indeed mans to support expansion, the size of the institutional Army should paradoxically grow as the Army shrinks." Rapid expansion of the Army is not feasible and without personnel management to retain mid-grade leaders, the Army risks diluting leaders' average levels of professional experience, as occurred during the WW II and the Vietnam War. Many of the billets and personnel eliminated from the Regular Army to achieve mandated budget cuts are the same mid/senior-level NCOs and mid-grade officers that would have been available to support future regeneration efforts. In addition, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) could support future regeneration efforts, but the IRR program has significant challenges.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is made up mainly of individuals who have had training, have previously served in the Active Army or Selected Reserves, and are not assigned to a unit, but still have a Military Service Obligation (MSO) remaining. The IRR currently comprises approximately 93K Soldiers managed by the Human Resources Command (HRC). Subject

matter experts from various Army agencies described the multiple challenges associated with meeting the IRR and readiness management requirements outlined in Title 10 of the USC and the 22 February 2006 Secretary of the Army memo, "Individual Ready Reserve Transformation." HRC is not resourced to manage a population of this magnitude. The Army struggles to maintain an accurate database of IRR troops and contact information is outdated. Additionally, the Army does not gain or share information with other government agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, to maintain contact information for IRR members.

Expanding the equipment in the Army is dependent upon key industrial lines. An Army Materiel Command (AMC) observation from March 2013, showed that around 100 different production lines were due to go cold by 2020 and the estimated time to regenerate those lines varied by system between 3 and 48 months. Contract award typically took a minimum of 9 months alone.

Infrastructure (e.g., billets, motor pools, and weapons training ranges) can also affect the rate and magnitude of expansion efforts. Ideally, force expansion would start months or years before the forces are required to be deployed, but at such times much of the Army's infrastructure would be occupied by existing units preparing for deployment. Retaining "excess" infrastructure in peacetime could facilitate future expansion, but at a cost, and such costs do not easily compete for declining resources. Determining the difference between excess and unused capacity retained for expansion is the key.

The paradox is that preserving the capability to quickly grow the Army can be in direct conflict with garnering efficiencies in a smaller force. However, the benefits of over-investment in

certain key areas such as recruiting and accessions, placing facilities in 'caretaker' status, investing in certain industrial lines, and overmanning the institutional force outweigh the risk and time that would confront the Army in a moment of national crisis.

FINDING: A plan that enhances the understanding of the difficulties involved in expanding the force could inform force sizing and shape OSD and Army drawdown decisions.

Recommendation 7-14: As recommended in Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, the Secretary of Defense should plan in fiscal year 2017 and execute no later than the end of fiscal year 2018 a comprehensive review of the Nation's ability to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of national mobilization.

Recommendation 7-15: The Army should develop by end of fiscal year 2017 the plan for expansion, which would include maintaining a running estimate for long-lead equipment production and modification and personnel accession and training for anticipated capability shortfalls that occur after reorganization and mobilization. The plan should address each of the statutory Department of the Army functions as articulated in 10 U.S. Code § 3013 and examine and report annually to the Secretary of Defense on the necessary requirements to expand Army's capacity. The Army should also consider placing increased emphasis on the management of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) population in order to ensure access to trained mid-grade officers and NCOs.

Recommendation 7-16: The Secretary of Defense should incorporate in defense planning and fiscal guidance the analysis of Army expansion requirements for force-sizing and

capability-mix analyses in fiscal year 2017. This guidance would give priority to the retention of expansion-required leaders, infrastructure, and materiel in the defense budget and program.

Recommendation 7-17: The Secretary of the Army should perform a top-to-bottom review in fiscal year 2017 of the IRR program to ensure compliance with existing statutes.

Recommendation 7-18: Congress should amend 10 USC 10205 to authorize the Secretary of Defense to coordinate with other federal agencies to obtain updated contact information on IRR Soldiers.

Recommendation 7-19: Congress should amend Title 10 USC to authorize a virtual muster that does not include a physical examination or review.

Recommendation 7-20: The Secretary of Defense should rescind the February 22, 2006, memo "Individual Ready Reserve Transformation."

Ebola and the Realities of Emergent Requirements

In 2011, the drawdown of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a widely held assumption that the United States would need fewer ground forces. Meanwhile, intense budget pressures led to the Budget Control Act and a sharply reduced budget. As a result, the Army began downsizing, from 570,000 to 490,000 in the Regular Army, from 358,000 to 350,000 in the National Guard, and from 206,000 to 205,000 in the Army Reserve -- all by 2015. Although combat demands for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have decreased, a proliferation of emergent requirements across multiple combat commands is again forcing the Army to deploy soldiers at a high operational tempo. An example of one of these emergent requirements was Operation United Assistance to help stem the Ebola epidemic in Africa.

The 2014 Ebola outbreak killed thousands of people in West Africa and sparked fears that the virus would trigger a global pandemic. In August 2014, the World Health Organization declared the outbreak an international public health emergency. The next month President Barack Obama directed the U.S. military to support the U.S. Agency for International Development in its efforts to fight the epidemic. U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) immediately began coordinating force requests and sourcing solutions with U.S. Africa Command.

As it always does, FORSCOM took a Total Force approach to accomplishing the mission. It developed multiple courses of action using active and reserve component forces and general officer-level headquarters. Although Reserve and Guard units had the structure and capabilities needed for the mission, the Army did not yet have mobilization authority specifically for Operation United Assistance; consequently, notification and training requirements meant reserve

component units could not deploy fast enough to meet immediate mission demands. After FORSCOM determined the 101st Airborne Division was best prepared to begin the mission quickly, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel ordered the division to establish Joint Force Command–United Assistance (JFC-UA) by October 25.

While it required active forces to meet initial mission requirements because availability and readiness were critical, it was also clear the Army could not sustain the mission without mobilizing reserve forces. In mid-November, Secretary Hagel authorized the involuntary mobilization of some 2,100 Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers to support the operation, and FORSCOM identified the 34th Infantry Division, Minnesota Army National Guard, to succeed the 101st Airborne Division.

The sourcing process was full of uncertainties, starting with decision lead time. Reserve component units need at least 90 days advanced notification to execute such missions, and short-notice mission changes make the deployment process much more difficult. Also, if supplemental funding has not already been provided, the Army must move funds from other programs to pay costs and allowances. On the other hand, using Reserve and Guard units for emerging requirements like United Assistance spares the Army having to divert active units from other pressing missions.

Uncertainty about the scope and duration of the mission continued as JFC-UA began operations in Liberia and reassessed mission requirements. By late November, progress in fighting the spread of Ebola meant those requirements were shrinking. Signal units and a civil affairs planning team were removed from initial and subsequent force requests and the division headquarters requirements shrank from 698 to 286 personnel. By late January 2015, new Ebola

cases had declined significantly and civil authorities had regained control of the epidemic. FORSCOM then cancelled the reserve component mobilizations planned to support the operation. In March, the 101st Airborne Division turned the JFC-UA mission over to the 48th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Brigade as a transitional command, and the operation ended in June 2015.

Operation United Assistance demonstrated some important truths about the Army. Although the primary purpose of the Army is to fight and win the nation's wars, the nation also relies upon the Army to provide the land power needed for many other national security purposes. When crises arise, the president often looks to the Army to provide ground forces to ensure stability, restore order, and deliver humanitarian relief. When the Ebola virus threatened to become a global pandemic, the United States needed ground forces to deal with the threat. Regular Army forces deployed first because they were ready and available to take on the mission while reserve component forces prepared to take over the mission in a few months' time. The president needed both an immediate and a sustained response capability, and he had it in the Army.

-30-

Army National Guard Allocation

"An identification and evaluation of the distribution of responsibility and authority for the allocation of Army National Guard personnel and force structure to the States and territories."

2015 NDAA, Section 1703(a)(2)(C)

Force management is described in *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2013-2014* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania, U.S. Army War College) as the overall framework on which the Army is raised, maintained, and sustained and results in the development of a capable operational force within constrained resources. Force management involves execution of activities encompassing concept development, capabilities requirements generation, force development, organizational development, force integration functions, and resourcing. Force development, a sub-process of force management, determines organizational and materiel requirements and translates them into force structure to accomplish Army missions and functions (AR 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation*, 01 July 2013, Section 1-5.a). The force management framework applies to all components of the Army, including the Army National Guard.

Legislative, Regulatory and Policy Framework

The processes that shape and support the allocation of National Guard forces have morphed over time to help better execute the National Guard's dual missions under Title 32 and Title 10 United States Code (USC). Title 32 firmly establishes the dual mission requirements of the National Guard. First, in section 102, the law calls "essential" that the strength and organization of the Guard be "an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States," which should be

"maintained and assured at all times. That section then dictates that "Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components… the Army National Guard of the United States… together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed." Additionally, Title 32 section 104 specifies that "the organization of the Army National Guard and the composition of its units shall be the same as those prescribed for the Army, subject, in time of peace, to such general exceptions as the Secretary of the Army may authorize." Furthermore, section 104 stipulates that "(e)ach State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands may fix the location of the units and headquarters of its National Guard." Meanwhile, Title 10, section 18238, stipulates that no National Guard unit may be relocated or withdrawn without the consent of the governor of the state.

Pursuant to Title 10, section 10503, the Secretary of Defense with consultation from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force will develop a charter for the National Guard Bureau (NGB) that will define its scope and duties. Under this charter, the NGB is responsible for "allocating unit structure, strength authorizations, and other resources to the Army National Guard". The charter defines the role of NGB in support of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force and establishes responsibility for the training discipline, training requirements, and the allocation of Federal funds for training to ensure that National Guard units and members are trained by the states in accordance with approved programs and policies of, and guidance from, the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), the

Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force. NGB thus monitors and assists the states in organizing, maintaining, and operating National Guard units so as to provide well trained and well equipped units capable of augmenting the active forces in time of war or national emergency.

To implement these statutory requirements, the Department of the Army uses a comprehensive Force Management Model that defines military capabilities, designs unit organization, allocates force structure to provide these capabilities, and produces plans and programs that translate these organizational concepts into a trained and ready Army. This force management framework is comprehensive and collaborative, bringing together representatives from all components, the combatant commands, Army Commands, and other key stakeholders to ensure that Army capabilities are developed and resourced to address Title 10 and Title 32 mission requirements. The forces developed by the Army Force Management Process are distributed across the Components to optimize capabilities of the Total Force. Within the allocation of National Guard forces, Title 32 demands are included in assessments and evaluations of force structure requirements and considered in decisions on distribution of forces. Consequently, within the National Guard and the Army writ large, there is an understanding of the collective obligation to provide adequate forces to all states to meet their statutory requirements as the first-line defense and to execute their duties as the organized militias of the several states and territories, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia."

Assessment of Authorities and Responsibilities for Allocation

In addition to directing the Commission to consider "distribution of responsibility and authority for the allocation of Army National Guard personnel and force structure to the states and territories," the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2015 adds "an identification and evaluation of the strategic basis or rationale, analytical methods, and decision-making processes for the allocation of the Army National Guard (ARNG) personnel and force structure to the states and territories."

Numerous laws, policies, and legal precedents articulate how responsibilities and authorities are distributed between the legislative and executive branches of the federal government, within the executive branch, and between federal and state government. Congress has, through numerous additional statutory provisions, given the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army authority and responsibility for allocating ARNG force structure.

The Secretary of the Army is ultimately responsible for the allocation of Army National Guard personnel and force structure to the states and territories and has delegated this authority to the CNGB through a complicated, although still identifiable, chain of authority. Under the current NGB process, the Director, Army National Guard, makes ARNG force structure allocation decisions on behalf of the CNGB.

The ARNG Role in Total Army Analysis

Total Army Analysis (TAA) is the process by which the Army structures the forces necessary to support the Combatant Commands in executing their National Military Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance tasks. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G3/7-Force Management leads the TAA process with oversight provided by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The process balances the Army's force structure demands (manpower and equipment) against available and planned resources while addressing risk to mission and risk to the force. TAA is codified in Army Regulation 71-11 and is shaped by Department of Defense and Army strategies, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-approved war plans, programming and budget guidance, doctrine, and current operational demands. The HQDA G-3/7 Force Management Directorate publishes TAA guidance each year for a corresponding five-year TAA cycle that coincides with the Program Objective Memorandum's fiscal timeline.

TAA is a two-phased process consisting of a Capability Demand Analysis Phase (a.k.a., Requirements Phase) and a Resourcing Phase. The Capability Demand Analysis Phase is a quantitative analytic process which uses models and simulations to establish capability requirements for Army forces across a broad range of scenarios. These scenarios are used to "shape" the Army to meet a wide variety of current operational and possible wartime demands. This phase constitutes the "science" of Total Army Analysis. The second phase in TAA, the Resourcing Phase, addresses the "art" of the TAA process. It adds the human in the loop to translate raw data into an Army that is sized to meet the findings identified in the Requirements Phase with as little risk as possible given current and projected resource constraints. This phase

culminates with a resourcing decision codified in the Army Structure Message endorsed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and approved by the Secretary of the Army.

ARNG Force Structure Allocation Process

Within the TAA process, the Army National Guard allocates its portion of the resourced force structure across the 54 states and territories using the Force Program Review. The process is designed to support the force structure needs of the Army National Guard using objective tools to help make informed decisions for growth or reductions of structure, as well as giving consideration to supportability, suitability, and balance of personnel and capabilities across the 54 states, which is referred to as collective obligation. Outputs from each TAA cycle require the Army National Guard to reassess its force structure and mix to ensure that adequate and effective support for both federal and state missions continues as doctrine and unit designs adapt to meet changes in the strategic environment. The goal is to ensure mission success while minimizing turbulence within formations to limit decreases in readiness and increases in costs.

State Adjutants General (TAGs) provide input annually to the TAA process by submitting a Force Structure Strategic Plan (FSSP). This annual input is solicited from the 54 states and territories which outlines an Adjutant General's strategic vision for force structure within his or her state. This document is used by the Army National Guard to both acquire and distribute force structure generated by the TAA resourcing phase.

Two tools are key to ARNG force structure analysis when divesting or allocating forces identified in the early steps of TAA: the Unit Analysis Tool (UAT) and the Force Structure

Decision Support Tool (FSDST). The UAT is a metric-based model designed to assess and compare the reported readiness criteria of "like-type" capabilities across multiple states. The FSDST uses similar metrics and criteria for all capabilities in a given state for stationing new structure and re-stationing existing units. The generated order of merit list (OML) ranks capabilities based on personnel and Unit Status Report metrics to help identify quantitative priorities for both divesting and stationing capabilities across the Army National Guard. Both the UAT and FSDST use a set of evaluation criteria fully vetted across the ARNG community.

These tools generate an order of merit list (OML) of units for divestment and a given state's potential for success if receiving new structure. These National Guard unique tools are used when the TAA process determines the need for force structure changes in the Army National Guard. When stationing of new force structure is required, qualitative information is also collected through a stationing analysis memo prepared by a state and reviewed by a board or working group. When a requirement to inactivate or move a unit is generated, the Chief, Force Management (CFM), at the NGB, notifies the Force Structure General Officer Advisory Committee and all 54 states and territories of the reductions. Depending on the complexity and magnitude of the force structure reductions, one of two processes is undertaken.

If structure reductions or moves are limited in scope, then the Standard Reduction Process is used to make routine recommendations for the reduction of ARNG Force Structure. This process combines the quantitative metrics of the Unit Analysis Tool with qualitative input from the TAGs. A Force Management Unit Review Board (FMURB), comprised of membership from the ARNG Directorate and the 54 states and territories, convenes to make recommendations. The

FMURB consolidates the "science" and "art" portions of this process and reports recommendations to the TAGs with courses of action and recommendations for submission to the DARNG for decision.

The Complex Reduction Process is used to implement large-scale systemic force structure changes in the Army National Guard, such as reduction from a 350K to a 335K ARNG force-structure allowance). Because of the intricacy of large-scale changes, a Complex Force Management Working Group is convened. This working group is made up of designated representatives from the 54 states and territories as well as limited representation from the Army National Guard Directorate. The working group reports the recommendations to the CFM. The CFM reviews the recommendations with a General Officer Advisory Committee prior to submission to the DARNG for decision.

Representation and state involvement through either the standard and complex process provides the states transparency as a voting member or as an observer. The transparency and quantitative data directly address the concerns of state and territory leaders when past allocation actions were perceived as neither analytical nor transparent. Adopting these qualitative and quantitative allocation processes provides a holistic look when stationing or reducing force structure.

The Force Program Review process allows the Army National Guard to balance the aggregate force among the States. The process also provides the ability for senior leaders to shape the force by looking at the supportability, suitability, and the balance of personnel and capabilities across the 54 states and territories. Applying collective obligation as a shaping tool within the Force

Program Review ensures the 54 states and territories are balanced with no one state's force structure disproportionally reduced or increased. Collective obligation also helps to assess whether a given state has sufficient forces for both Title 32 requirements and Title 10 requirements, especially the capacity needed to support current and anticipated homeland defense and disaster assistance missions in the United States.

In accordance with National Guard procedures, state governments participate in the NGB allocation process by providing input as well as detailing personnel to the boards responsible for allocating new force structure and making decisions on force structure reductions. State governors, are not directly involved in the allocation process; however, by statute, a governor's approval is required for any change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a state while the Secretary of the Army has final approval authority on all force structure changes. National Guard Bureau regulation 10-1 goes further than the statute and requires a governor's approval for all actions requesting organization, reorganization, re-designation, consolidation, conversion, and withdrawal of federal recognition from any structure within a state.

NCFA Perspective

The Commission found that allocation of Army National Guard personnel and force structure to the states and territories is accomplished within the Army's Total Army Analysis process managed by the Army G-3/5/7. Within that process, Army G-3/5/7 informs the Chief, National Guard Bureau of the overall personnel and force structure changes to be applied to the Army

National Guard. The CNGB has processes within the Army National Guard for making recommendations for allocating these changes to states and territories that are consistent with national security objectives and priorities to produce allocation recommendations. The process depends on the complexity of the changes, as well as whether decrements or increases are to be allocated. Employing these processes, the Director, ARNG reviews and approves the proposed changes before the CNGB provides an allocation recommendation that is incorporated into the overall Army personnel and force structure changes generated by TAA. All changes are submitted to the Secretary of the Army for review and approval.

Additionally, the subcommittee found that the allocation processes used by the NGB begins by using objective, quantified metrics, which were vetted with the states and territories. The metrics produce an order of merit list of either specific reductions or increases to be applied. A board or working group then uses the analytical products as well as input from the states and territories that addresses the types of force structure under consideration. An additional consideration is the balance of National Guard forces across the states and territories to provide capacity for both domestic and overseas contingency operations. These boards and working groups are conducted in a transparent manner, either with representatives from the states and territories on the board or having representatives present to observe these boards or working groups.

Additionally, within the policy documents are several minor issues. The regulations concerning the allocation of ARNG personnel and force structure are complicated and should be clarified by the Department of the Army. For example, older Army regulations delegate authority to the Director, ARNG, but the more recent applicable regulations correctly delegate authority to the

CNGB—ideally, the CNGB should provide a written delegation of authority to the Director, ARNG (after extensive research and requests, NCFA Staff has been unable to verify whether such a written delegation exists).

Recommendation 8-1: The Secretary of the Army should codify in Army regulations the delegation of authority from the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to the Director, Army National Guard in Army regulations.

Recommendation 8-2: The Secretary of the Army should codify in Army regulations the existing Army National Guard Force Program Review process as the formal way to manage change in the Army National Guard.

Recommendation 8-3: The Army National Guard Force Program Review process should add representatives from the office of the Secretary of the Army and from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G3, to the Force Program Review working groups and boards as observers.

AUTHORITIES

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	Law	Subject to the Direction of the President…has authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY	Law	Responsible for, and has authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army including…(2) Organizing.
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU	Policy	The principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army and CSA on matters relating to the National Guard.
	Policy	The Chief, NGB is under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary normally exercises authority, direction, and control through the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force for matters pertaining to their responsibilities in law or DoD policy.
	Policy	Implements DoD, Department of the Army, and Department of the Air Force guidance on the structure, strength authorizations, and other resources of the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States.
	Policy	Approval authority for Army National Guard Stationing.
	Policy	Issues the Troop Structure Program to the adjutants general of the states.
	Policy	Reviews, monitors, and provides input to the requirements and authorizations development process.
	Policy	Recommends specific types of units to be activated, inactivated, or converted in the ARNG in accordance with policy from the ASA(M&RA).
ASA (M&RA)	Policy	Secretary of the Army's principal adviser for reserve issues; responsible for ensuring Army policies, plans, and programs regarding force structure are managed properly.
	Policy	Establishes overall Army policy for Army organization and force structure, responsible for oversight and review of all RC policies addressing stationing actions.
DCS, G-3/5/7	Policy	Responsible for developing and implementing policies for managing/accounting for Total Army.
	Policy	Army Staff proponent for Stationing actions and responsible for the force management process.
	Policy	Approval authority for Multi-Component Unit policies.
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD	Policy	Staff proponent for ARNG stationing actions, coordinate with Chief, NGB for all stationing actions.
	Policy	Forward brigade and division stationing actions to DCS, G-3/5/7 for Secretary of the Army and Secretary of Defense approval.

■ Law ■ Policy

STATIONING PROCESS FLOW CHART



DIVESTMENT PROCESS FLOW CHART



A Space-and-Time Readiness Continuum

The members of the Oregon Army National Guard's 3d Combined Arms Battalion , 116th Armored Brigade Combat Team, come from the small towns of northern and eastern Oregon. They drill in armories spread across 400 miles of this rural area. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brian K. Dean, lives 300 miles from his headquarters. Over half of his staff lives more than 150 miles from the battalion headquarters. These distances create a challenge in building a ready, cohesive force.

In their civilian jobs, most members of the 3-116th work in the education, law enforcement, corrections, manufacturing, or service industries. Service in the National Guard provides important opportunities in these rural communities, many of which have not fared well economically in recent years. Service also means Guard members have to work hard to balance their civilian jobs with their families' needs and the demands of building unit readiness.

After returning from Iraq in 2011, the 3-116th CAB a comprehensive training program in the summer of 2014 to increase its overall readiness in preparation for a rotation to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, in August 2015. Support for the battalion was provided by the eXportable Combat Training Center (xCTC), which combines a networked Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System with a Global Positioning System to provide users accurate training feedback at locations other than a Combat Training Center. Not only can combat units use xCTC, but support and specialty platoons also participate. LTC Dean called the xCTC "fantastic training" because this allowed his platoons to conduct multiple repetitions of different

scenarios in day and night conditions against a Regular Army opposing force from Joint Base Lewis-McCord.

From the summer of 2014 through June 2015, LTC Dean used the battalion's training assemblies to focus on platoon- and company-level maneuvers using another significant training aid, the Close Combat Tactical Trainer, a simulator that replicates combat vehicles and command posts. In June 2015, the battalion executed an 11-day gunnery exercise that culminated in an evaluation of platoon-level collective tasks in a live-fire environment. Gunnery was a fast-paced event that included two days of travel and one day of recovery before the soldiers returned to their full-time civilian jobs.

National Guard units rotating to the National Training Center require additional resources and funds to ensure the unit has needed training. For the 3-116th, this included working with the state of Oregon to protect funding for functional training, such as Combat Lifesaver, Field Sanitation, and the Unit Movement Officer courses. LTC Dean also had to manage his budget to pay for transportation and put Guard members on orders early to complete critical preparations. He also gained access to the Rapid Fielding Initiative program to outfit the unit with combat shirts, additional eye protection and gloves, and fire protection suits.

The 3-116th's long months of preparation paid off during its Fort Irwin rotation from August 14–25, 2015 during its Decisive Action Training Environment "force-on-force" exercise against the National Training Center's 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment as the opposing force. The 3-116th conducted three running battles in "an extremely challenging environment" and against "a very difficult standard," LTC Dean said.

For LTC Dean, a few lessons stood out about training at Fort Irwin. First was the challenge of moving the battalion from Oregon to the Mojave Desert. Soldiers can understand such a challenge only after they have done it, as LTC Dean did on a rotation to Fort Irwin when he was a second lieutenant in 1998. This experience sticks with Guard members for the rest of their careers. An even more important lesson concerned stretched logistics. For the 3-116th, this meant units running out of ammunition in a firefight and having to make due with hot water for three days in the desert. Again, mistakes were something soldiers had to experience in training to truly learn the lessons. Training center rotations also highlight the importance of travel time. With only 21 days available to train, and with only enough money to travel by bus rather than fly, the bus trips there and back may take up four or five days. That challenge contributes to the final lesson: for reserve component units, intense, collective training happens only in a compressed timeline.

Guard members have to work hard to manage their civilian jobs, care for their homes and families, and travel for training. They have to execute important training quickly to maximize limited time. If work/rest cycles in the heat, maintenance problems, or poor illumination disrupts training, they will have few opportunities to make it up later. For the soldiers of the 3-116th, their rotation to the National Training Center will pay dividends for years to come in increased readiness thanks to the experience and knowledge they gained over more than a year of ramped-up training.

-30-

Apache Transfers and Related Issues

"The Commission shall also conduct a study of a transfer of Army National Guard AH–64 Apache aircraft from the Army National Guard to the regular Army."

2015 NDAA, Section 1703(b)(1)

Army aviation makes a substantial contribution toward the service's warfighting capability. Apache helicopters (AH-64s) provide attack/reconnaissance capability in support of ground operations. Black Hawk helicopters (UH-60s) provide assault capability by transporting troops and equipment into battle and support logistics activities and medical evacuation. Shadow and Gray Eagle unmanned aerial systems, teamed with Apache helicopters, are being integrated into Army aviation units to provide increased attack and reconnaissance capability. Other aircraft support Army operations with heavy lift and general support.

Army aviation capability resides in all three Army components: the Regular Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. While Army aviation provides substantial capability, it is also expensive: Army leaders stated that aviation accounts for the largest portion of Army funding for both training and modernization.

To respond to declining total budgets while maintaining critical aviation capability, the Army presented the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) as part of its budget plan for fiscal year 2015. The initiative was supported by the Department of Defense (DoD) and became part of the President's plan. The ARI proposed numerous changes, including the transfer of all Apache

helicopters out of the Army National Guard. Under the ARI, all Apaches would be operated in the Regular Army.

During discussions with the National Commission on the Future of the Army, Regular Army leaders strongly endorsed the ARI as a way to accommodate budget limits while maintaining a reasonable level of wartime capacity and sustaining a modernization program for aviation forces. Specifically, the ARI permitted the Army to accommodate aviation budgets that, according to Army estimates, will decline by 40 percent between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2020.

However, leaders of the Army National Guard expressed strong concerns about the ARI. They argued that the initiative eliminates a cost-effective portion of the National Guard force and leaves the Guard without full-spectrum combat capability. As an indication of the strength of their concern, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) formulated an alternative to the ARI that retained a number of Apache helicopters in the National Guard and altered other aspects of the plan. The NGB presented its plan to the Department of the Army and the Congress.

Faced with strongly conflicting views and alternative approaches, the Congress directed that the Commission review the Apache transfer and make specific recommendations regarding the transfer of all Apache helicopters to the Regular Army. That and related aviation issues is the focus of this chapter.

Information Gathered

The Commission, working partly through its Aviation Subcommittee, gathered extensive information about the Apache helicopter transfer and other Army aviation topics, drawing on a wide variety of personnel with differing backgrounds and points of view. The Commission's information came from

- multiple discussions with Regular Army leaders about the ARI and the NGB Alternative;

- multiple discussions with Army National Guard leaders about the NGB Alternative and the ARI;

- multiple discussions with Army Reserve leaders about the ARI;

- a briefing on Army Aviation, including the ARI, from the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Alabama;

- a briefing on the overall Army program from the officer on the Army headquarters staff responsible for formulating Army programs (G8);

- a briefing on the overall aviation modernization program from the aviation expert in the financial branch of the Army headquarters staff (G8);

- a briefing on the ARI from the director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

- discussions with a number of former senior Army leaders, including several with extensive aviation experience;

- letters and communications from members of Congress and discussions with Congressional staff members;

- assistance from expert analysts at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center (TRAC), the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), and the Center for Army Analysis (CAA);

- cost analysts at the RAND Corporation; and

- experts on the Commission staff.

The Commission also heard from senior state leaders. Numerous governors, who serve as commanders in chief of their state National Guard organizations, either discussed or provided written input to the Commission. These communications addressed the ARI and the governors' concerns regarding the transfer of all Apaches out of the National Guard. Commissioners also held discussions with The Adjutants General (TAGs) who expressed serious concerns about the ARI.

During its travels, Commissioners or staff held meetings with personnel in 30 aviation units: 12 Regular Army aviation units, 15 National Guard aviation units, and three aviation units in the

Army Reserve. During its public meetings, the Commission heard from 66 public witnesses, several addressing the ARI and alternatives to it.

Criteria for Assessing Options

Armed with this extensive information, the Commission formulated criteria to be used in assessing alternative aviation approaches. Overall, the Commission assessed alternatives based on their wartime capability, because wartime capability remains the fundamental reason for maintaining a military force. Wartime capability requires forces at a high state of readiness and able to be deployed quickly, as future wars may begin with little or no notice. However, forces must also be scalable, able to expand reasonably rapidly should wartime conditions require.

The military also deploys during periods of relative peace. To maintain readiness during peacetime periods, the military must have enough forces to allow units sufficient time to train and military personnel time to be with their families. The pace of peacetime operations therefore constitutes another criterion for assessing alternatives.

Costs must be considered. The Commission heard testimony that, in large part, the ARI reflects a response to budget limits imposed in recent years. The budgetary effects of alternative approaches thus constitute an important criterion.

Finally, the Commission considered how alternatives affect the integration of the Regular Army and reserve components. The Commission believes that this nation needs one Army, with

Regular Army and reserve component units training together where feasible and fighting together when necessary. How well alternatives support this goal constitutes a key criterion.

As it applied these general criteria to assess options, the Commission considered many qualitative factors and relied on its own judgments. The Commission also made use of some quantitative assessments:

- Wartime capacity. The Commission utilized assessments of the wartime capacity under a relevant DoD wartime scenario. In that scenario, Army aviation units play a substantial role. The capacity assessments take into account numbers of units but also the time required to deploy and the need to rotate forces.

- Surge capacity. No one can be sure where U.S. military forces will be engaged in the future, nor can we know how much time will be available to prepare for war. Therefore, forces must have depth and scalability that permits them to surge in time of war. As one measure relevant to the Apache surge capacity, the Commission considered the number of Apache pilots in the reserve components that have required training and are in units that have necessary equipment and command structure.

- Peacetime deployment rates. For Regular Army units in peacetime, the Army's goal calls for one cycle deployed followed by two equivalent cycles in non-deployed status. Stated another way, if a deployment lasts one year, the unit should spend two years in non-deployed status. For

reserve components, the current goal requires that a one-year deployment should be followed by five years in non-deployed status.

- Cost. The law establishing the Commission directed that its recommendations be "consistent with available resources and anticipated future resources." For reasons noted earlier in this report, the Commission designed aviation options at levels of funding roughly consistent with the President's budget plan submitted with the fiscal year 2016 budget request (PB16). The Commission also identifies high-priority initiatives to be undertaken if added funds become available for the Army.

Options for Apache Transfers

Using these criteria and the information gathered from the sources noted above, the Commission carefully considered both the ARI and the NGB Alternative. The Commission also examined options that would keep varying numbers of Apache battalions in the National Guard along with approaches that would alter the number of aircraft in units and change numbers of aircraft available for maintenance and other activities. In its final analysis, the Commission focused on three options.

Option 1: Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI)

The Army proposed the ARI as part of the budget plan submitted for fiscal year 2015.

Description. Under the ARI, all Apache helicopters would be transferred to the Regular Army. Once ARI is fully implemented, there would be 20 manned Apache battalions in the Regular Army and none in the Army National Guard. Thus, compared with the force structure in place just before the ARI, the new initiative transfers six Apache battalions from the Army National Guard to the Regular Army. There would also be two unmanned Apache battalions in the Regular Army as part of the Korea equipment set. Each of these battalions would have 24 Apaches but, no assigned personnel.

The ARI would also create four additional Black Hawk battalions in the Army National Guard. The aircraft required to create these four new battalions would be made available because of the inactivation of three aviation brigades in the Regular Army.

The ARI has made or will make other changes. Most notably, under the ARI all Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters (OH-58Ds) are retired and Lakota helicopters (UH-72As) become the primary training aircraft for initial rotary wing training. The ARI also will require some changes among facilities used to maintain Apache helicopters. Currently five National Guard facilities—known as Theater Aviation Support Maintenance Groups (TASM-Gs)—provide intermediate-level depot maintenance for Apaches and other aircraft in the National Guard. National Guard personnel provide all of the staff for these facilities and often deploy to provide maintenance capability. Under the ARI, there will be no National Guard Apache helicopters to maintain. The TASM-G facilities may respond to the ARI by revising their business practices in order to provide maintenance for Apaches in the Regular Army. Alternatively, the Army will have to reconsider the size and role of the TASM-G facilities.

When it is fully implemented at the end of fiscal year 2019, the ARI will result in a net reduction of 798 Army rotary wing aircraft. Reductions will occur in all three Army components, including 687 fewer aircraft in the Regular Army, 104 fewer in the National Guard, and seven fewer in the Army Reserve.

Advantages of the ARI. The Commission concluded the ARI is a well-crafted plan that holds down costs while maintaining a reasonable level of wartime capacity. The ARI also retains funds for a modernization program required to support future Army aviation forces.

Analyses performed by TRAC suggest that the ARI fares well in terms of wartime capacity, though there are shortfalls. TRAC concludes that under the ARI, aviation capacity would see modest shortfalls early in the wartime scenario used in the analysis and larger shortfalls later in the scenario. However, TRAC concluded that overall, compared with the National Guard alternative discussed below, the ARI consistently provided the lowest risk in terms of wartime capacity. This TRAC conclusion represents a key advantage for the ARI.

The Commission relied on TRAC analyses of aviation options because the general results were unclassified and were available at a level of detail sufficient to distinguish among the various aviation alternatives considered in this report. The Commission also considered analyses performed by IDA. The detailed results of these analyses are classified, but the results generally corroborate the TRAC findings for the ARI.

The ARI supports modernization of Army aviation assets. According to Army officials who briefed the Commission, the ARI maintains a substantial program of aircraft modernization, not just for major aircraft but also for critical enablers such as aviation rockets and missiles, aircraft survivability equipment, and avionics. The Army argues that the ARI accomplishes these goals while holding down costs. ARI costs are consistent with PB16, the baseline used by the Commission.

Disadvantages of the ARI. The initiative offers little help in reducing the high levels of peacetime operational tempo anticipated for Regular Army Apache units. The Army expects that, given current assumptions about future peacetime demands , Regular Army Apache units that deploy for one year will spend about 22 months (1.85 years) or less in non-deployed status. This projection falls slightly short of the goal of two years in non-deployed status, a shortfall that could grow in size if world events in Europe or elsewhere lead to greater demand for Apache helicopters. No National Guard Apache units would be available to deploy and help reduce this operational stress.

More important, the ARI provides no wartime surge capacity for Apache aircraft. In the period before ARI and other force changes, about 700 pilots serving in reserve components were trained to fly Apaches and had assigned aircraft and other equipment. In past conflicts, reserve component Apache pilots, and the units in which they serve, have provided surge capacity in time of war by deploying to wartime theaters, acting as trainers, or handling other tasks. Under the ARI, there will be no such depth. The Commission is concerned about the lack of wartime surge capacity.

There would also be no reserve component backup in case of peacetime problems. In 1999, for example, transmission problems led to the grounding of many Apache helicopters and transmissions were taken from reserve component aircraft to maintain Regular Army units until needed rework could be accomplished. Under the ARI, this approach to resolving such an issue would not have been possible.

Finally, the Commission notes that the ARI exacerbates a problem highlighted in this report: the lack of unity between Regular Army and National Guard forces. The ARI will further reduce the "connective tissue" that binds the Regular Army and National Guard together. Under the ARI, Apaches will constitute an area where Regular Army and National Guard units cannot or do not work closely together as one Army.

Option 2: National Guard Bureau Alternative

In response to the ARI, the National Guard Bureau formulated an approach to restructuring Army aviation, including a significantly different approach to shaping the Apache force.

Description. The NGB Alternative would provide 24 manned Apache battalions. Of these, 18 are in the Regular Army (compared to 20 under ARI) and six are in the National Guard (compared to zero under ARI). Two of the six National Guard battalions would be in multicomponent aviation brigades that have one Apache battalion from the Regular Army and one from the National Guard.

The 18 Regular Army Apache battalions and the two National Guard battalions in multicomponent brigades would be equipped with 24 helicopters. The other four National Guard battalions would be equipped with 18 Apaches. When called to active duty, these four battalions would acquire Apache helicopters from other National Guard battalions, a procedure called cross-leveling that the National Guard commonly employs today.

In order to equip additional Apache battalions, the NGB Alternative makes use of 48 Apache helicopters involved in Korean rotational operations. If ARI were fully implemented, the personnel associated with a Combat Aviation Brigade (including two Apache battalions) will rotate annually to Korea and operate helicopters already in place there as part of an equipment set. The 48 Apache helicopters at the stateside locations of these two battalions may not be actively used by operational units. The NGB Alternative would transfer these 48 helicopters to units that need them, a procedure that is employed today. This approach eliminates the need to purchase 48 additional new Apaches. When the Regular Army units rotate home, aircraft would be rotated back to their unit. In addition to the transfers, the NGB Alternative calls for procuring 11 new or remanufactured Apache helicopters.

The NGB Alternative also alters the Black Hawk helicopter force. Under the ARI, three Regular Army Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) would be inactivated and the Black Hawks in these brigades would be used to create four additional Black Hawk battalions that would be added to the Army National Guard. Under the NGB Alternative, only two additional battalions would be added; the remaining Black Hawk helicopters would be retired. As a result, the NGB Alternative offers about three percent fewer operational Black Hawk helicopters compared with the ARI.

While the NGB Alternative makes significant changes in portions of the ARI, it leaves many ARI proposals intact. Most notably, the NGB Alternative does not alter the ARI proposal to retire all the Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters. The NGB Alternative also leaves in place the ARI proposal to utilize the Lakota helicopter as the primary training aircraft for initial rotary wing training.

Advantages of the NGB Alternative. The NGB Alternative provides a significant wartime surge capacity for the Apache force. Approximately 420 Apache pilots would remain in the National Guard in a trained status and have equipment, which would enhance the depth and scalability of the force. These pilots, and the units in which they serve, could be made available during a war, whereas no National Guard pilots would be available under the ARI. In the Commission's view, this wartime surge capacity constitutes a significant advantage.

The NGB Alternative might be able to reduce the stress on Regular Army Apache forces during peacetime. Under current plans, a National Guard Apache battalion that deployed for one year would be in non-deployed status for five years. Thus, the six battalions could provide an average of one deployed battalion each year, which would more than offset the loss of deployed capacity associated with two fewer Regular Army battalions. This favorable outcome would require a decision to deploy the National Guard Apache battalions on a regular basis along with the funding needed to implement that decision.

Notably, the NGB Alternative would also permit the Regular Army and National Guard Apache units to continue to work together, training together in peacetime where feasible, and fighting

together in war if necessary. The plan would contribute to maintaining one Army that draws as needed on the capabilities of the Regular Army and the reserve components.

NGB disadvantages. The NGB Alternative provides less wartime capacity than the ARI, based on TRAC analyses of capacity during a wartime scenario. Shortfalls early in the conflict are greater because, even with limited warning, Regular Army units can be available in the first few weeks of a conflict, and the NGB Alternative maintains two fewer Regular Army Apache battalions. The NGB Alternative also provides less wartime capacity later in a conflict. The six National Guard Apache battalions in the NGB Alternative do not offset the loss of the two Regular Army battalions because some of the Guard battalions have fewer aircraft and because Guard units are available in theater for shorter periods. As a result, TRAC concludes that, compared with the ARI, the NGB Alternative increases the risk of not having sufficient aviation capacity.

In addition to adding to wartime risks, the NGB Alternative adds to costs. The Department of Defense established a Tiger Team to examine ARI and NGB costs. The Tiger Team, which included analysts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD-CAPE) as well as Regular Army and National Guard experts, concluded that the NGB Alternative would add about $180 million a year to the aviation operating costs compared to costs budgeted in PB16. This estimate reflects the net effect of adding six National Guard Apache battalions, cutting back two Regular Army Apache battalions, and adding two fewer Black Hawk battalions compared to the ARI. The NGB Alternative would also involve

between $220 and $420 million in one-time costs to provide an additional 11 Apache helicopters. The range depends on whether the additional 11 Apaches are new or remanufactured aircraft.

These added costs are small as a percentage of total Army and DoD funding. However, finding offsets for these added costs in order to comply with limits on defense funding imposed by law would be challenging.

Option Three: ARI Modified to Maintain Four National Guard Apache Battalions

The Commission examined numerous additional options to determine if any offered more advantages or fewer disadvantages compared with the ARI and the NGB Alternative. The Commission determined the option below best meets that test.

Description. Option Three would maintain 24 manned Apache battalions. Of these 24 battalions, 20 would be in the Regular Army (same as under the ARI) and four would be in the National Guard (compared to zero under the ARI). All the Regular Army battalions would be equipped with 24 aircraft. The four National Guard battalions would be equipped with 18 aircraft and thus would have to cross-level helicopters before deploying.

To hold down costs, Option Three assumes that only two Black Hawk battalions are added to the National Guard (compared with four under the ARI). This approach, which is the same one used by the NGB Alternative, would result in a reduction in operational Black Hawk aircraft by about Three percent.

Option Three proposes that the Army commit to use the National Guard battalions regularly—mobilizing them and deploying them in peacetime. National Guard personnel told the Commission that they wanted to be mobilized and deployed on a regular basis. They would be less willing to stay in the National Guard if they cannot periodically participate in meaningful military missions. National Guard leaders agreed with this assessment in testimony before the Commission. To make regular deployments feasible, the costs for Option Three include funds to pay for mobilization and employment of National Guard units. Cost estimates assume the current deployment policy, which requires that a National Guard unit deployed for one year would spend five years in non-deployed status.

To equip the National Guard units retained in Option Three, the option assumes use of the 48 Apache aircraft left at home station when unit personnel rotate to Korea. This approach was described above in the NGB Alternative. Option Three also assumes the remanufacture of an additional 24 Apache helicopters to convert them from D models to E models. The E model provides greater capability to work with unmanned reconnaissance assets and has a new drive train and rotors for improved aircraft performance, significantly enhancing safety and combat performance.

Option Three also proposes changes to aviation forces in Korea. Once the ARI is fully implemented, personnel from aviation units (including Apache units) would rotate from stateside locations and serve roughly nine months in Korea, using equipment that is prepositioned there. The personnel from these units would then return and be replaced with personnel from other stateside units. Based on the experience of commissioners and discussions with senior leaders,

the Commission concludes that these short-term rotations will not permit aviation units the time needed to properly mitigate risks posed by the threat situation in Korea, which features a volatile military environment and the potential for no-notice hostilities. Specifically, rotating units will not have time to master the geographic and environmental conditions well enough to operate effectively and safely in the region. Rotating units also will make building and retaining enduring relationships with our Korean allies more difficult, relationships that are critical to warfighting success.

Rather than rotating a Combat Aviation Brigade, Option Three calls for a CAB to be forward stationed in Korea, the current practice. This would mean that the CAB would remain while individual soldiers rotate, providing a more stable fighting force. Forward stationing has disadvantages. It would increase costs because the expense of stationing personnel in Korea more than offset savings associated with fewer moves. However, costs would increase by only a small amount (about $8 million a year). Additionally, with forward stationing, a stateside Army division would not have an assigned CAB and would have to work with other stateside aviation units to provide needed training capability. Nevertheless, greater stability for the fighting force in Korea argues for accepting these disadvantages.

Finally, Option Three calls for the Army to review its emerging requirements for aviation in Europe, taking into account recent Russian adventurism. The Army may need a more robust aviation force, including an operational headquarters command element, in this increasingly volatile area.

Consistent with its charter and its time constraints, the Commission focused on the issue of Apache transfers and did not make recommendations regarding other aspects of the ARI, including retirement of all Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters and use of Lakota helicopters for initial training. For purposes of costing, Option Three assumes implementation of the ARI proposals regarding retirement of all the Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters and using Lakota helicopters for initial rotary wing training.

Advantages of Option Three. According to TRAC analyses provided to the Commission, Option Three would offer more wartime capacity compared to the ARI. Capacity early in the war would be similar to the ARI because both maintain the same number of Regular Army Apache units. Later in the conflict, the four National Guard battalions would be mobilized and would provide added capacity. Classified analyses by IDA corroborate these findings.

Option Three also provides wartime surge capacity by maintaining approximately 280 Apache pilots and associated helicopters and equipment in the National Guard. These pilots and their units would be available for surge during wartime. This is less than the NGB Alternative's 420 pilots but significantly more than the zero level of surge capacity offered under the ARI.

Option Three would also help with peacetime operational tempo. The forward stationing of an aviation brigade in Korea significantly reduces the number of deployed units because forward-stationed units are not considered to be deployed under Army counting rules. Primarily for this reason, the peacetime operational tempo for Regular Army Apache battalions improves significantly. Nevertheless, forward-stationed units could be away from their families and

experience many of the stresses associated with deployments. Even if forward-stationed units were counted as deployed units, however, regular call up and use of the National Guard Apache battalions provided under this option would permit Regular Army units to meet the goal that calls for units deployed for one year to spend two years in non-deployed status. The added peacetime capacity available under Option Three would be particularly useful if world events in Europe or elsewhere increase the demand for Apache units.

Finally, assessments by the CAA suggest that Option Three would be more cost effective than the ARI. The CAA analysis considers the time to deploy active and reserve units in a wartime scenario and the average annual costs of keeping and using them in both the Regular Army and reserve components. CAA did not attempt detailed budgetary analyses and did not consider all operational impacts. However, based on average annual costs, CAA concludes that options with Apaches in the reserve components would be more cost effective than the ARI.

Disadvantages of Option Three. Option Three would add to costs, a significant disadvantage. However, the Commission offers an illustrative proposal to offset those added costs.

Under Option Three, operating costs would increase by a net of about $90 million a year. This figure reflects the added costs of four National Guard Apache battalions (including costs to deploy them on a regular basis) and costs to maintain a forward-stationed aviation brigade in Korea. These additional operating costs are partially offset by savings from foregoing the operation of two National Guard Black Hawk battalions and savings from personnel cuts designed to leave National Guard and Regular Army personnel at the levels in the PB16.

In addition, Option Three would result in one-time costs of about $400 million to remanufacture 24 Apache helicopters from the D to E models. These remanufactures would likely occur at some time beyond the next five years.

These added operating and procurement costs are small compared to the total defense budget. The Administration or the Congress may therefore be able to offset savings in budgets outside of the Army or in the non-aviation portions of the Army budget. The Commission has identified reductions in the number of Infantry Brigade Combat Teams as one means of financing needed new initiatives.

However, the Commission recognizes that some of the offsets required to pay for its Apache option may have to come from within Army aviation. Therefore, the Commission proposes an illustrative approach to offsetting the added costs of Option Three from within aviation funds. The Commission did not attempt to create a detailed, time-phased budget plan; instead these illustrative savings examine a five-year period when all changes are in place.

A portion of the added costs in Option Three would be offset by maintaining two fewer Black Hawk battalions in the National Guard. The remaining added costs could be offset through a modest slowdown in the procurement of new Black Hawk helicopters. Option Three makes no change in the L-to-V conversion program for Black Hawks, a program that produces a fully digitized Black Hawk and, according to Army aviation leaders, a highly capable aircraft. However, buys of new Black Hawks (UH-60M) could be slowed. To offset the added costs of Option Three, the Army would probably have to buy five to ten fewer Black Hawks a year.

Based on information available to the Commission at the time this report was prepared, in most years the Army should be able to adjust the annual buys so as not to undermine the multiyear contract for Black Hawks. It should be noted that reductions in buys of new Black Hawks would need to continue beyond the next five years in order to offset operating costs and provide funds needed to remanufacture 24 Apache helicopters.

Eliminating two National Guard battalions of Black Hawks and slowing the pace of new buys does have drawbacks. As has been noted, there will be about three percent fewer operational Black Hawk helicopters even though the Black Hawks are heavily used in wartime. Buying fewer new Black Hawks each year would also modestly slow efforts to modernize the Army National Guard's Black Hawk fleet. The Commission recognizes the important role of the Black Hawk fleet and urges the Administration and Congress to examine other possible offsets.

However, if costs must be offset within Army aviation, the Black Hawk changes should be considered. The three percent reduction in operational Black Hawks would match the percentage reduction in operational Apaches under this option, leaving the reductions in the two fleets balanced. (If the Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopter is included in the count of "shooter" helicopters, then the reduction in shooters equals about 37 percent compared with the three percent reduction in Black Hawks.) Also, the modest reduction in Black Hawks does not significantly affect the TRAC, IDA, or CAA assessments of wartime capacity. Finally, the slowdown in buys of new Black Hawks may not delay the date for completion of modernization of the fleet because of the reduction in the overall size of the Black Hawk fleet by 60 helicopters.

The Table below summarizes the descriptions and effects of the three options.

	Option #1 (ARI)	Option #2 (NGB Alt.)	Option #3 (Commission Recommendation)
Descriptions			
Apaches			
Regular Army battalions	20[a]	18	20
National Guard battalions	0	6	4
Total aircraft	690	701	714
Black Hawks			
Regular Army battalions	10[a]	10	10[a]
National Guard/Army Reserve battalions	20	18	18
Total aircraft	2135	2075[b]	2075
Assessments			
Wartime capacity (compared to ARI)	- - -	Less than ARI	More than ARI
Wartime surge (Apache pilots in ARNG)	0	420	280
Peacetime deployment (BOG:Dwell) for Regular Army Apache battalions	1:1.85	1:2	1:3.2 / *1:2*[d]
Cost (compared to ARI)[e]			
Increased annual operating	N/A	+ $180M	0[c] to + $90M
Increased one-time procurement	N/A	+ $220M to +$440M	0[c] to + $400M

[a]Does not include Korea equipment set battalions
[b]Assumes NGB Alternative results in force structure reduction
[c]Assumes offsets in Black Hawk program
[d]Number in italics assumes that forward-stationed units count as deployed
[e]Army has stated that ARI costs are consistent with those in the President's FY 2016 budget plan

Overall, compared with the ARI, Option Three offers advantages in wartime capacity, peacetime surge, and peacetime operational tempo. Option Three provides greater wartime capacity than the ARI or the NGB Alternative, which is a key advantage. Scalability, measured by surge capacity, is higher than under the ARI. It also improves aviation capabilities in Korea. Added costs under Option Three are significant but could be offset by either modest changes in the Black Hawk fleet or other offsets identified by the Administration or Congress. Perhaps most important, Option Three maintains Apaches in the National Guard and assumes a commitment to regular use of those forces, therefore contributing to a key Commission goal of achieving one Army that works and trains together in peacetime and, if necessary, fights together in war.

Recommendation 9-1: The Army should implement the Commission's Option Three plan for distribution of the Apache fleet, maintaining 24 manned Apache battalions, 20 in the Regular Army equipped with 24 aircraft and four in the National Guard equipped with 18 aircraft while adding only two Black Hawk battalions to the National Guard. The Army should commit to using the four National Guard Apache battalions regularly, mobilizing them and deploying them in peacetime.

Recommendation 9-2: The Army should maintain a forward-stationed Combat Aviation Brigade in Korea.

Multicomponent Units

Multicomponent units combining Regular Army and reserve component soldiers, can improve readiness and, importantly, force integration. Multicomponent aviation units could improve readiness by exploiting the differing strengths of Regular Army and reserve component units. Training together would help integrate the Regular Army with the National Guard and Army Reserve and so move toward greater adherence to the Army's desire for total force integration. To achieve this goal, multicomponent units should be co-located so that they can train together in peacetime.

The U.S. Air Force makes substantial use of multicomponent approaches to achieve these goals. For example, the Air Force has associate unit programs that pair Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve units with active-duty units. These associate units share equipment, train together, and conduct missions and maintenance activities together. The Air Force believes that initiatives like the associate program provide better training and leverage the skills and experience of different components. The associate program also helps integrate active and reserve component units.

The specific structure of the Air Force reserve associate program, and especially the sharing of equipment, would not work well for some types of Army aviation units (including Apache units) because pilots in these units need their own aircraft in order to train for missions involving multiple helicopters. However, other multicomponent approaches should be feasible.

The Army has begun limited use of multicomponent approaches with its fixed-wing C-12 aircraft. Some National Guard and Regular Army units operating C-12s will be co-located and will train and potentially deploy together. Other co-located units—such as Black Hawk and

Chinook (heavy lift) helicopters in some states—permit Regular Army and reserve component units to train together.

The Commission concludes the Army could make greater use of multicomponent aviation units in order to improve readiness and better integrate Regular Army and reserve component forces.

Recommendation 9-3: The Army should develop a substantial pilot program to test multicomponent approaches, such as the following options:

- **Appending an existing National Guard or Reserve aviation company to a Regular Army aviation battalion. The units should be co-located so that they can train together. This approach would probably not work well for Apache units because few National Guard units are located near Regular Army units, but it would be feasible for National Guard or Reserve Black Hawk units located near Regular Army units. Other types of aircraft should also be considered during design of the pilot program.**
- **Applying the shared-equipment approach used in Air Force associate units to Army general support aviation. General support aviation units fly fewer multiple-aircraft missions and so might be able to share equipment. Multicomponent units should be co-located so that they can train together.**
- **Assigning Regular Army pilots to National Guard or Reserve units, or vice versa, in order to leverage the unique skills and experience present in different components. This approach could be used for all types of Army aircraft.**
- **Other approaches proposed by Army experts.**

The multicomponent approach does have potential disadvantages that would have to be considered during design of the pilot program. To avoid adding to costs, the pilot program

should use existing units that already have equipment and operating funds. Units would have to be chosen at locations that offer enough space for appended companies to train. Design of the pilot program will have to consider how best to integrate reserve component weekend training with Regular Army training, and how to avoid adverse effects on promotion opportunities for participating personnel. Importantly, multicomponent units should be designed so that the Regular Army units can deploy effectively without their affiliated reserve units if that is required to meet military needs. Some of the proposals noted above (such as appending reserve component units) should help the Army achieve this goal. While these challenges are potentially significant, the Army should strive to overcome them in order to achieve the overarching goal of better integration of Regular Army and reserve component forces.

Recommendation 9-4: The Army should complete a detailed design for a pilot program within one year after publication of this report and fully implement the pilot program within one year after completion of the design work.

Recommendations with Added Funding

Key recommendations in this report, including the recommendation regarding Apache transfers, are designed to be generally consistent with the funding proposed in the President's budget plan submitted along with the fiscal year 2016 budget request. However, the Commission believes that significant threats to national security may eventually lead to defense funding that substantially exceeds the funding recommended in PB16. Efficiencies may also free up funding. Added funding is not certain and, even if it eventually occurs, might not materialize for several years. Nevertheless, because the Commission is charged with a long-term look at the future of

the Army, we determined that it is appropriate to identify high-priority initiatives that would be feasible at higher budget levels.

Recommendation 9-5: In the event added funding becomes available, the Army should retain 11 Combat Aviation Brigades in the Regular Army.

The Commission's highest-priority were additional funds made available for aviation or other Army forces is to retain 11 Combat Aviation Brigades in the Regular Army. Considering all types of Army units, the demand for aviation forces is among the highest, and the addition of an eleventh CAB would help meet this strong demand.

The eleventh CAB would be used in Korea. Under the current ARI plan, the CAB located in Korea will inactivate in fiscal year 2019, and personnel from stateside CABs would rotate to Korea and operate helicopters already in place in the region. If an eleventh CAB is retained, the CAB in Korea would remain fully manned and rotational units would not be needed.

An eleventh CAB offers important advantages. Peacetime operational tempo for Regular Army Apache units would meet the Army's goals because the CAB would be permanently stationed in Korea rather than deploying to the region. Most wartime capacity shortfalls, including some early shortfalls identified by TRAC analyses discussed above, would be eliminated. Perhaps most important, the nation would have a stable force of Army aviation in Korea rather than a rotating force as now planned under the ARI. As noted above, stability would be a major

advantage in a region that is volatile and could become involved in combat with little or no notice.

Retaining an eleventh Regular Army CAB would, however, add substantially to costs. Compared to those under the Commission's recommended Apache transfer option, annual operating costs would increase by about $180 million a year. Procurement costs would grow by much more. For aircraft other than Apaches, the eleventh CAB would draw from the equipment set already planned for Korea. For Apaches, however, Option Three temporarily uses the 48 stateside Apaches belonging to units that would rotate to Korea. If an eleventh CAB is added to Option Three, and units no longer rotate, then 48 additional Apaches would have to be purchased to outfit stateside units. One-time cost to purchase 48 new Apaches—which are the most expensive Army helicopter with a unit cost of about $40 million—would total roughly $1.9 billion. Because of the size of these added costs, the Commission notes this option would require added funding for Army aviation.

Recommendation 9-6: In the event added funding becomes available, the Army should increase flying hours available for peacetime training.

The Commission learned from senior Army leaders that the current level of flying hours for the Regular Army (an average of about 11 hours per pilot per month) permits typical aviation units to maintain platoon- to company-level proficiency, whereas collective proficiency at the battalion level is appropriate and requires an average of 14.5 hours per pilot per month. Aviation units in the reserve components typically maintain individual- to team-level proficiency using

about seven hours per pilot per month for mission aircraft, whereas platoon-level proficiency is appropriate and requires about eight hours per pilot per month. Some of these shortfalls can be offset with wartime funding, but that type of funding is becoming less available.

Without additional flying hours, individual and collective training proficiency will decline, contributing to further declines in readiness and possible increases in accident rates. According to Army data, the rate of serious aviation accidents in 2015 stood about 16 percent above the average level in the years from 2006 to 2010. (These results are based on Army aviation accidents in Classes A, B, and C and so include serious and less serious accidents.) Many factors influence accident rates, such as operational tempo and the introduction of new aircraft models. But the relatively low level of training flight hours could be one cause of the increase in accident rates, a trend that is worrisome to the Commission.

The Army should determine the exact level and composition of the increase in flying hours. However, an increase of about two hours per pilot per month in both the Regular Army and Reserve Components may be appropriate. Such an increase would apply to all types of Army rotary wing aircraft and, compared to the PB16, would add between $250 million and $300 million a year in costs.

Recommendation 9-7: In the event added funding becomes available, the Army should implement a more aggressive modernization program for Army aviation.

The Commission heard from Army aviation officials who believe that modernization is key to maintaining aviation capability given the planned reduction in force size. With additional funds, the Army should ensure that it has a robust science and technology effort designed to offset evolving threats and ensure the survivability of helicopters flying in hostile environments. The Army should also consider a program to develop a future armed reconnaissance helicopter, either by restarting programs that have been cancelled or by placing a higher priority on developing and fielding the armed reconnaissance capability within the Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) initiatives.

In the nearer term, added funds could be used to offset reductions to the Black Hawk modernization program discussed as part of the Commission's Apache transfer recommendation, and perhaps even accelerate the Black Hawk modernization. Added modernization funds could also be used to buy more Apache helicopters, thereby avoiding the need to equip National Guard battalions with only 18 aircraft under the Commission's approach.

-30-

Combat Aviation Brigade

A Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) is designed to be modular and organized to support offensive, defensive, and stability operations in support of ground maneuver forces or in defense support to civil authorities. A CAB comprises the following:

- a headquarters and headquarters company
- an attack reconnaissance squadron of AH-64 Apaches and RQ-7 Shadow unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
- an attack reconnaissance battalion of Apaches and MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS
- an assault helicopter battalion of UH-60 Black Hawks
- a general support aviation battalion with Black Hawks for support missions and medical evacuation, and CH-47 Chinook heavy lift helicopters
- an aviation support battalion (maintenance).