



“...An evaluation and identification of force generation policies for the Army with respect to size and force mixture in order to fulfill current and anticipated mission requirements for the Army in a manner consistent with available resources and anticipated future resources...”

2015 NDAA, Section 1703(a)(2)(B)

DEVELOPING ONE ARMY

From the mountains of Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom to the streets of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, Americans saw images of U.S. Army soldiers doing their duty for our nation, fulfilling their oaths of service, demonstrating teamwork and a willingness to sacrifice for us all, and laying down their lives if necessary. Only by listening closely to newscasts or by reading the captions with photographs would the typical American know whether a soldier was in the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, or

the Army Reserve. In times of war and crisis, “the Army” is the only label that matters to the American people.

In legislation, administration, and funding, Army components fall into distinct categories. The Army has assigned broad mission sets to each component according to accessibility of units over time and to stretch force structure within budget constraints. A cultural divide exists between the components, as well: Some of that is good, healthy unit pride and esprit de corps; unfortunately, some of that is the result of

a long-standing—and, the Commission contends, outdated—prejudice regarding the skills and dedication of one component over the others. These differences among the components continue to be manifested in a wide range of administrative policies and traditional practices, from promotion standards and training opportunities to personnel management and human resources stove piping. These work against developing one Army.

In its travels, the Commission constantly heard the same two refrains. One, members of all three components commented about continuing obstacles facing soldiers transitioning among the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. Two, once prepared, a soldier is a soldier and has the confidence of fellow soldiers and commanders to accomplish the mission, regardless of component.

What soldiers accomplish so well in the crucible of combat, the Commission challenges Army and political leaders to accomplish in managing these soldiers all the time: to take specific steps to achieve a truly Total Force with three distinct, interdependent, and essential components.

“You cannot wave a wand, you can’t throw money on it and build personal readiness overnight. Personal readiness takes time. It takes operational experience. It requires institutional experience. It requires us to invest in their professional military education. It requires us to ensure we carve out enough time for them to maintain their personal fitness, both physically and mentally. That’s why I say time is our biggest resource challenge when it comes to building and sustaining readiness.”

GEN Robert “Abe” Abrams, Comanding General, Forces Command, speaking at the Association of the United States Army’s annual meeting, Oct. 14, 2015.

Photo on page 59

Staff Sergeant Christopher Croslin, the 2014 Army Reserve Drill Sergeant of the Year, brings a group of Army Reserve soldiers to present arms during reveille at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

ROLES OF THE ARMY COMPONENTS

The Army’s size and diversity of capabilities distinguish it from other land forces. It provides the capabilities and capacity to fulfill its statutory mission prescribed in section 3062 of the U.S. Code:

“It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war...” (Figure 9)

At any given time, the active Army consists of the Regular Army and any activated Army National Guard members and Army Reservists. For example, in November 2015, the active Army included approximately 491,000 Regular Army soldiers, about 46,000 full-time active Guard and Reservists, and an additional 16,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers who had been placed on active duty, for a total active force of about 553,000. This example of total active Army illustrates how the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to the Regular Army to expand its collective capacity.

Among the nation’s armed services, the Army is unique in its reliance on its reserve components (Figure 10). The Army National Guard and Army Reserve provide over half of the Army’s total capacity. While the three Army components share the same training standards, doctrine, and equipment, each are distinct, interdependent and essential. Similar units in all Army components (such as infantry battalions and truck companies) are organized the same and follow the same operational and training doctrines. Yet, each component has unique attributes informing the distribution of capabilities.

Regular Army units are more heavily consolidated and co-located on large installations with necessary training facilities, such as weapons ranges, maneuver areas, and urban training sites. Regular Army units are intended to rapidly project capabilities to support the Joint Force, as needed, by maintaining the highest readiness to provide the greatest flexibility. Army National Guard forces, located in 2,600 communities across the 54 U.S. states, territories, and the District of Columbia, and the 2,000 units of the Army Reserve, are distributed throughout our nation’s communities and typically must travel to regional training centers to conduct collective training. Since the 1993 *AC-RC Leaders Offsite Agreement* (see Appendix C), Army National Guard forces have focused primarily on wartime direct combat missions and

Figure 9
ARMY FORMATIONS

Army (2-5 Corps)	Task Organized with 100,000-300,000 Soldiers	General 
Corps (2-5 Divisions)	Task Organized with 40,000-100,000 Soldiers	Lieutenant General 
Division (5 or more Brigades)	Task Organized with 10,000-18,000 Soldiers	Major General 
Brigade/Regiment/Group (3 or more Battalions)	3,000-5,000 Soldiers	Colonel 
Battalion/Squadron (3-5 Companies)	400-1,000 Soldiers	Lieutenant Colonel 
Company/Battery/Troop (3-5 Platoons)	60-200 Soldiers	Captain 
Platoon (3-4 Squads)	16-50 Soldiers	Lieutenant 
Squad/Section (2-4 Teams)	4-12 Soldiers	Staff Sergeant 
Fire Team/Crew (4-6)	4-6 Soldiers	Sergeant 


peacetime domestic emergencies while the Army Reserve has focused on providing operational support and sustainment. The Army National Guard also serves as the organized militia for the states and territories when not under federal authority.

The Regular Army provides forward-stationed forces and capabilities needed twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. This high readiness is the foundation of Army capabilities provided to Combatant Commands. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve provide additional Army maneuver

and support capacity, and each also provide selected capabilities found only in that component that may be called upon early in a conflict or crisis response. The unique civilian expertise in these part-time forces also brings capabilities that have proven essential when answering the call to our nation's defense or in times of regional disaster relief.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve play both an operational and strategic role, providing operational capabilities and strategic depth across the full range of military operations.

Figure 10
RATIO OF RESERVE COMPONENTS PER SERVICE, 2016



Source: FY 2016 President's Base Budget Request, Feb 2015

Operational employment and strategic depth are reflected in the spectrum of collective readiness in which units exist, regardless of component, based on specific assigned mission requirements coupled with how quickly the units may be required for employment. Furthermore, an *operational* label does not infer only direct combat (infantry, aviation, armor, etc.), nor does the *strategic* label mean only support and sustainment (transportation, quartermaster, medical, etc.). All units are operational, and all contribute to the force's strategic depth. All units in every component are part of the force mix, and action must be taken to avoid a given unit suffering from a chronic lack of readiness, ensuring all units have a pathway to readiness over time.

ONE ARMY IN TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Department of Defense and Army policy directs the Army to organize, man, train, and equip the Regular Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve as an integrated, operational Total Force. Subsequent Army Total Force implementation guidance has emphasized the importance of improved and continued integration across Army components. The Army has explored a myriad of means to integrate components. Such efforts achieved an unparalleled level of success during Operation Iraqi Freedom when the Army honed its ability to seamlessly employ reserve component formations in theater as part of a

TITLE 10 AND TITLE 32

In the specific sections of Title 10 and Title 32 listed below, Congress has expressed its intent and vision for the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve.

U.S. CODE TITLE 10 § 3062

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces—(1) of preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; (2) supporting the national policies; (3) implementing the national objectives; and (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

The Army consists of—(1) the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Army Reserve; and (2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Army without component.

U.S. CODE TITLE 10 § 10102

The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.

U.S. CODE TITLE 32 U.S.C. §102

In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed.

ARNG AND ARNGUS

In Title 10, the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS) is defined as a reserve component of the Army, whereas the Army National Guard (ARNG) is the collective militia forces of the 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia. While the Commission recognizes this legal distinction, this report uses the Army National Guard to encompass all ARNG units and personnel regardless of whether they are in a Title 32 or a Title 10 status.




Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. Micah VanDyke, Third Army/ARCENT Public Affairs

First Lieutenant Christie Plackis gives the OK hand gesture to Staff Sergeant Eric Bailey, the dive supervisor, as he checks her for any medical concerns after a dive at the Sea Point of Debarkation/Embarkation in Shuaiba Port, Kuwait.

Total Force. Sustained use of the reserve components caused Department of Defense leadership to review and adjust policies.

DoD Total Force Policy

In 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates issued his *Utilization of the Total Force* memo in which he stated “...the Department has been assessing a number of options on how best to support global military operational needs. A significant question addressed by the review has been whether we have the right policies to govern how we utilize members for the Reserve, National Guard, and our Active Component units.” The Secretary’s direction set a goal of 1:2 deployment-to-dwell rate goal for active components. That would mean that a deployment of one year would be followed by two years in non-deployed status. The Secretary also set a goal of 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell rate goal for reserve components, meaning that a mobilization of one year would be followed

by five years in non-mobilized status. The specified twelve-month mobilization period includes post-mobilization training and demobilization processing. Within a twelve-month mobilization, boots on the ground (BOG) for Army National Guard and Army Reserve units typically became nine months. In contrast, Regular Army forces would spend an entire twelve-month deployment period in theater. Furthermore, the Army has often not been able to meet the DoD dwell-at-home goals. From 2010 to 2014, twenty-five different types of Regular Army units and sixteen different types of reserve component units exceeded the Secretary of Defense’s dwell goals.

In his 2008 Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, Secretary Gates codified the new paradigm that “the RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict...Ensure total force policies encourage optimum

integration of AC and RC personnel to provide the most efficient training opportunities to all personnel, allow for shared use of resources, and provide the most operational benefits and mission capability.” Army Directive 2012-08, *Army Total Force Policy*, further implemented lessons learned and established Army policy for integrating the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve as a Total Force. In support of this policy, the Army has integrated Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers with their Regular Army counterparts in numerous ways.

Army Total Force Policy

The Army’s existing initiatives are partially meeting the intent of Total Force integration. However, the Commission concludes that for the sake of a more effective and efficient Army and to achieve greater strategic depth, more must be done to fully implement a comprehensive partnership and integrated programs. The Commission finds that the goal should be to increase billets designated for multicomponent use and substantially increase incentives for service in multicomponent units.

Recommendation 26: The Army must manage and provide forces under the Total Force approach.

Recommendation 27: The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions that would allow individuals from all components to fill positions to foster an Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components. A review should be completed within nine months after publication of this report, and any new designations should be completed within eighteen months.

Recommendation 28: The Secretary of the Army should develop selection and promotion policies that incentivize Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve assignments across components and within multicomponent units. The Secretary of the Army should make changes within one year after publication of this report.

One means for expanding Army National Guard and Army Reserve roles within the Total Force is Title 10 U.S.C. 12304b (Active Duty for Preplanned Missions in Support



U.S. Army photo by Spc. Olanrewaju Akinwunmi

Private First Class Ricky Olivo, a gunner with the 25th Infantry Division, travels in an up-armored HMMWV during a patrol in Iraq.

of the Combatant Commands). The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) created this relatively new authority in which the Services can involuntarily call to active duty up to 60,000 reserve component personnel at any one time for a maximum of 365 days. To use this authority, the Services are required, in advance, to detail manpower and costs in budget materials, including intended missions and length of activation periods, so that the funding can be approved in the programming cycle at least two years in advance of intended call to active duty.

This authority provides access to the reserve components for predictable global demands on an enduring basis. Army Forces Command planning for priority missions outside the scope of Overseas Contingency Operations reflected a need of 3,000 man years in fiscal year 2014, fiscal year 2015, and fiscal year 2016 base budget funding. However, other funding needs led the Army to program only one-third of these man years for 12304b missions. Consequently, some Regular Army formations deployed with less than two years dwell at home stations even when Army National Guard and Army Reserve formations of the same type were available. Some examples of enduring, preprogrammed missions that could be performed by reserve component units utilizing the 12304b authority include Kosovo peacekeeping, Multi-National Forward Observer

U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Steven Young



7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) personnel participate in a training exercise on the beach of Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

(Sinai), the Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Response Force, and selected Theater Security Cooperation events.

In the wake of the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Army turned several of these missions over to Regular Army units as a

way to garner savings. Army officials told the Commission that the impact of budgetary cuts has effectively limited the Army's ability to provide Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces to meet Combatant Command requirements. Off-ramp decisions to avoid costs after scheduling Army National Guard units for deployment increased friction and, in some cases, raised suspicions between components that other motives were in play. The Total Force Policy must be resourced if it is going to be effective, and the absence of adequate 12304b funding will limit using Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces on missions for which they are ideally suited. Meanwhile, such cost avoidance decisions increase operational tempo for many Regular Army units that may not have sufficient home station dwell time.

Recommendation 29: The Congress should expand 12304b authority to include operational requirements that emerge within the programmed budget timeline, including the year of execution.

Recommendation 30: The Army should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund no fewer than 3,000 man years annually for 12304b utilization of the reserve components. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Army and the Office of Management and Budget, should also provide for the use of Overseas Contingency Operations and supplemental funding for reserve component utilization under 12304b.

SECTIONS 12304(b), 12304a, AND 12304b

The authority to order the reserve component to active duty is governed by several statutory provisions. Among these provisions is section 12304 of Title 10 U.S. Code, which permits the President to involuntarily order to active duty reserve component units, when necessary, to augment active forces for any named operational mission or in several instances mentioned in sub-paragraph (b). This subparagraph authorizes involuntary activation when it is necessary to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving the use, or threatened use, of a weapon of mass destruction or a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States that results, or could result, in significant loss of life or property.

Two subsequent sections of Title 10 set forth additional situations in which the President could authorize the

involuntary activation of reserve component units. Section 12304a authorizes the involuntary activation of reserve component units for not more than 120 days when a Governor requests federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency. Section 12304b authorizes the involuntary activation of a reserve component unit when the Secretary of a military department determines that it is necessary for a preplanned mission in support of a Combatant Command. Section 12304b requires that the manpower and associated costs for activating a reserve component unit for a preplanned mission be included in the defense budget materials for the fiscal years in which the unit is anticipated to be called to active duty and further requires that this information include a description of the mission and the anticipated length of time that the units will be on active duty.

Furthermore, the Commission finds that making deployment policies consistent among the components—particularly the duration of BOG in theater—would further foster an integrated Total Force culture, as would Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve cross-component assignments. Additionally, the Commission finds personnel from each Army component need to better understand the other components. Having all three components serve together at all levels will improve readiness, create shared understanding, and help break down cultural barriers between Army components.

Notably, the Commission heard no declarations among soldiers and leaders in Army National Guard or Army Reserve units that they were being overused. Indeed, the Commission heard more often from reserve component soldiers that they were not being used enough. Army National Guard and Army Reserve members repeatedly told the Commission that they could meet a 1:4 mobilization to dwell ratio; employers likewise endorsed such a ratio for their Army National Guard members and Army Reserve employees. Governors echoed the sentiment, promoting greater use of their Guard forces in federal missions. The only request from all three parties—the soldiers, the employers, and the states—was predictability of deployments whenever possible. The Commission does not recommend a change in the mobilization-to-dwell policy goals but advocates for greater flexibility to allow the Army more efficient use of its forces across all components without incurring undue risk to the force.

Recommendation 31: The Secretary of Defense should update the January 19, 2007, memo “Utilization of the Total Force” to allow flexible involuntary mobilization periods in an effort to achieve common BOG periods for all components.

ONE ARMY USING MULTICOMPONENT UNITS

The Army has a long history of mixed results using multicomponent units—units that have members and organizations from the Regular Army along with members and organizations of the Army National Guard or Army Reserve. In many cases, the Army tried to implement multicomponent constructions in units or with policies that were not suited to the model. Currently, the Army has thirty-seven multicomponent units documented, including many successful examples like the Army Space and Missile Defense Command’s 100th Missile Defense Brigade (Ground-based Midcourse Defense). However, even within these units much work is required to achieve success with multicomponent units.



U.S. Army photo by MSG Robert Hyatt

Captain Thomas Lorenson of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment directs an AH-64 attack helicopter strike on a target during the U.S. Army Europe Best Junior Officer Competition.

Training together can help improve readiness while also helping develop one Army. It may be necessary to design multicomponent units so that the Regular Army portion of the unit can deploy independently if military needs require. Also, the reserve component portions of the multicomponent unit must have adequate resources to maintain reasonable levels of readiness. Overall, using multicomponent units as part of implementing the Army’s Total Force Policy requires an understanding of the specific goals, benefits, and challenges associated with multicomponent units.

Other organizational structures should also be considered to further integrate components. The Commission encourages the Army to continue command emphasis on ongoing multicomponent training partnerships and associations and re-examine past efforts, such as the use of round-out units and cross-component personnel assignments—including command billets—as part of the Army’s Total Force Policy.

Despite the challenges, multicomponent units represent one of the best ways to develop one Army, especially if members of the units can train together in peacetime and, if necessary, fight together in war. Multicomponent units can also draw on the differing strengths of the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve in ways that improve readiness. The Commission therefore urges the Army to continue creating and sustaining multicomponent units, and the Commission has offered a specific approach to

increasing use of multicomponent units in Army aviation (see page 92).

Recommendation 32: The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.

Recommendation 33: The Army should add specific guidance on goals for future use of multicomponent units and related initiatives to the Army's Total Force Policy Implementation Guidance for fiscal year 2017.

Recommendation 34: The Army should develop a substantial pilot program to test multicomponent approaches in its aviation units. See page 92.

ONE ARMY ADMINISTRATION

Achieving the aims of the Total Force Policy requires organization and coordination of activities across the operating and generating forces. These activities occur within an entanglement of laws, policies, and procedures. People to administer, management systems to control, and authorities to regulate all come into play when administering the Total Force. The Commission believes Full-Time Support, Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A), and

MULTICOMPONENT CHALLENGES

The 100th Missile Defense Brigade (Ground-based Midcourse Defense), a multicomponent unit that defends the continental United States against ballistic missile attack, demonstrates the strengths and challenges of Total Force integration.

Based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the brigade commands a battalion in Alaska, detachments in California and New York, and early warning radar batteries in the Pacific Command, European Command, and Central Command areas of operations. Authorized over 560 soldiers—Regular Army and Army National Guard—the 100th Missile Defense Brigade falls under U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), which supports U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

Operationally, the brigade is part of a joint, global network of space, sea, and ground-based sensors and missile systems designed to defeat intercontinental missile threats. Legally, the brigade's chain of command reflects the complexities of state and federal authorities embodied in Title 32 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

The 100th Brigade benefits from having a combination of Regular Army and Army National Guard members. Regular Army soldiers facilitate planning, training, and integration with the rest of the Army. In 2014, for example, the Army began to transition the brigade's detachments to batteries and convert the operations and maintenance personnel from contractors to soldiers. During this on-going transition, one of the brigade's Regular Army officers

coordinated new equipment training at Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma for the brigade's Guard members. This required extensive coordination with the posts to take care of the National Guard soldiers, including their housing, vehicle support, and leave. Meanwhile, the Army National Guard soldiers provide long-term stability to the brigade's small, highly technical force for the brigade's daily missions.

At the same time, the 100th Brigade demonstrates challenges for multicomponent units implementing Total Force integration. Because the brigade falls under SMDC, a Regular Army chain of command, all deployments and exercises are credited to the Regular Army without any National Guard credit. This skews Service-level reporting on the components' respective operational tempo in favor of the Regular Army. The 100th Brigade also demonstrates limitations created by separate Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve human resource networks and data systems. The Army is working to integrate these systems in the Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A), but the system will not be fully fielded until 2020. In the meantime, the chain of command must rely on multiple and separate personnel and pay systems to manage Regular Army and National Guard soldiers.

The 100th Missile Defense Brigade's experience demonstrates that soldiers can achieve Total Force integration and make multicomponent units work; it's systems and policies that need to get up to speed.

authorities within duty status reform will play critical roles in administering one Army.

Full-Time Support

Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel are assigned to work day-to-day operations for reserve component units, performing such duties as recruiting, organizing, administering, maintaining, instructing, and training for a particular Army National Guard or Army Reserve unit. FTS personnel accomplish those foundational tasks separate from the unit drill periods allowing the traditional drilling soldier to focus on individual and collective activities. The productivity of the drill periods is dramatically enhanced because the conditions are set for the reserve component unit to achieve higher levels of readiness.

The Army's universal workload-based process, which sets manpower requirements to accomplish the directed tasks for Tables of Distribution and Allowance organizations, determines FTS levels. In 2005, the FTS requirement methodology was revalidated, and in 2012 the Secretary of the Army reported to the Congress a total FTS requirement of 123,000. The November 2014 Army Management Action Group FTS Review reported that FTS requirements determined by work-load based processes were filled at 67 percent for fiscal year 2016.

About 85 percent of reserve component soldiers are traditional drilling reservists with twenty-four drill days and fifteen annual training days a year. FTS personnel (soldiers and technicians) comprise 17 percent of the Army National Guard and 14 percent of the Army Reserve end strength. About 90 percent of FTS personnel are deployable, unlike the preponderance of Army civilians. During the peak of reserve component contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006 to 2009, the FTS shortage was mitigated through temporary FTS personnel, primarily Active Duty for Operational Support and selective early mobilization.

A key aspect to achieving integration of the components is providing officers and enlisted soldiers opportunities to serve in other components, but statutory limitations impede such integration. Statute permits detailing but not assigning Regular Army officers and enlisted soldiers into Army National Guard positions. A detailed status has more limits than assigned status. Assigning Regular Army officers and enlisted soldiers to a National Guard unit would most likely require the soldiers to serve in dual Title 32 and Title 10 status and take the state or territory Oath of Office. In the case of the Army Reserve, no statute prohibits assigning Regular Army officers and NCOs to do Full-Time Support functions, but it has been a matter of policy to not routinely make such assignments. Assignment to another component should be considered a key developmental experience and could be considered criteria for promotion.

“Are you going to optimize where you can put super units who can do the great job we’re going to ask them? Or are you going to be fair and leave everybody at the same level? On both those questions, goodness or fairness, I always vote for goodness.”

General Robert Shoemaker (USA, Ret.), former commander of the U.S. Army Forces Command and inductee into the Aviation Hall of Fame, speaking at the Commission’s listening session in Killeen, Texas, July 9, 2015.

Recommendation 35: Congress should enact legislation to allow assignment of Regular Army officers and enlisted soldiers to Army National Guard positions to execute all functions without prejudice to their federal standing. The legislation should also permit the similar assignment of National Guard officers and enlisted soldiers to Regular Army units.

Recommendation 36: The Army should develop and implement a pilot program to assign Regular Army officers and enlisted soldiers to Army Reserve full-time support positions within one year of publication of this report and evaluated in two years to determine the effectiveness of such a program.

Integrating Personnel Management and Pay

Fundamental to managing the Total Force as one Army are personnel management and pay. The three Army components currently operate separate personnel and pay systems, thus creating barriers to personal readiness and a career of service that allows soldiers to transition among components, popularly known as “continuum of service.” The Commission has determined that achieving a singular personnel management and pay system for the whole Army will promote and provide the greatest administrative step toward implementing the Total Force Policy.

The Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) program offers a means to provide this improvement. IPPS-A is a web-based human resources system that will provide, for the first time, a personnel and pay capability that cuts across all components of the Army. IPPS-A will create an integrated

DEVELOPING ONE ARMY

personnel and pay record for each soldier, covering the entire career and allowing personnel actions to drive associated pay events. It will be self-service and available twenty-four hours a day, provide commanders personnel asset visibility, and facilitate movement of soldiers across Army components by maintaining benefits, personnel information, and training in accordance with the Army Total Force Policy. IPPS-A implementation calls for the following timeline:

- Replacing the Army National Guard personnel system in the second quarter of fiscal year 2018;
- Replacing the Regular Army and Army Reserve personnel systems in first quarter fiscal year 2019;
- Establishing one pay system for Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve in fourth quarter fiscal year 2019;
- Establishing a unified evaluation and retention management system in third quarter fiscal year 2020.

The Commission acknowledges that many view IPPS-A with skepticism based on the Army's unfortunate history with the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS). The 2010 decision to terminate the DIMHRS program, a similar and more expansive personnel and pay integrated system, was succinctly explained by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen when he stated: "This program has been a disaster." However, the Army will not fully implement the Total Force Policy without a single, integrated personnel and pay system.



Photo by Capt. Chad Nixon

Specialist Sierra Chanel, an optical laboratory specialist with the 362nd Medical Logistics Company, measures the eye curvature of a patient during an exercise in Bryson City, North Carolina.

The Commission considers IPPS-A a critical underpinning and a key to achieving the Total Force in reality. IPPS-A will facilitate the continuum of service for soldiers by enabling and streamlining soldiers' movement between statuses (transfers among the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army

CONTINUUM OF SERVICE

When she was 17 years old, Holly Donica joined the Army to become an aircraft mechanic. That was 2005, and a year later she was serving with the 4th Infantry Division in Camp Taji, Iraq. In 2008, she became a single mother and active service no longer fit her family's needs, so she transitioned from the Regular Army to the Army Reserve as a civilian maintenance technician at the Conroe Aviation Support Facility in Conroe, Texas.

After becoming a warrant officer and inspired by her daughter to take on still bigger challenges, CW2 Donica applied for flight school at Fort Rucker, Alabama. However, she needed help with child care. Her mother gave up a job to move to Fort Rucker and care for her granddaughter for the two years CW2 Donica needed to complete basic

flight training and qualification courses for two aircraft, the UH-60 A/L Black Hawk and the AH-64D Apache. Thanks to her mother's commitment that allowed time for study, CW2 Donica became the Distinguished Honor Graduate of the UH-60 A/L course.

CW2 Donica said she is planning to complete a bachelor's of science degree in aeronautics soon, and plans to continue her studies in aeronautics. This 27-year-old soldier also aspires to become a maintenance test pilot in the UH-60 A/L, and in the long term study medicine to become a flight surgeon. CW2 Donica, her daughter, and her mother are a family that is part of the Army family. They bring strength, talent, and depth to the Army thanks to CW2 Donica's continuum of service.

Reserve). The IPPS-A program management made significant adjustments after under-executing the funding provided, and now it is on schedule.

Recommendation 37: The Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should continue to support and adequately fund the Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPSS-A) as the cornerstone to the effective management and enhanced integration of the components of the Army. The Army must maintain the program’s current schedule as a critical underpinning capability for the Army to support the Total Force.

Authorities / Duty Status Reform

The Congress continues to provide a wide variety of authorities to bring reserve members to active duty. The multitude of authorities is not a recent phenomenon; most were established prior to 1980. Over time, new authorities for duty were created to codify new roles and missions for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve or a new purpose of the duty. Each individual modification was made to address a specific issue but resulted in a patchwork of laws and administrative fixes that complicate personnel management and employment of the reserve components.

“Duty status reform” is frequently, but incorrectly, used as a synonym for a reduction in the number of authorities. The authority to order a reserve member to perform duty is the first of four parts of the reserve duty system. The second part is the purpose of the duty; the third is restrictions or limitations that may be associated with the duty; the fourth is the funding source. Collectively, the four parts comprise a duty status. Modifying one of the four parts does not constitute full “duty status reform”; however, it can begin to simplify the complex system. A parallel effort, which will materially simplify the reserve duty system, is implementing IPPS-A.

Regular Army members have a single duty status: active duty. Reserve component members have three duty statuses: inactive duty, active duty, or full-time National Guard duty. More than 30 legal authorities further delineate these three duty statuses. The 30-plus authorities simultaneously provide more detailed accountability. Each authority is a distinct delegation of authority to order a reserve member to duty and provides an accountability mechanism when used.

Currently, section 515 of the 2016 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to assess the impact of consolidating the current statutes into six within 180 days of enactment, and



Photo by Capt. Carlos Cuebas

Lieutenant Colonel Louis Feliciano, commander of the 393rd Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, shares the contents of an MRE with children during the Beyond the Horizon mission in the Dominican Republic.

desired alternate approaches are due to the Congress October 1, 2016. The Commission endorses the findings on this topic of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force in its January 30, 2014 report and applauds and supports the Congress’s efforts to simplify the authorities and reduce this friction to achieving a Total Force.

ONE ARMY RECRUITING

Recruiting is the primary function required to raise and sustain an Army. The Army accessed 114,800 soldiers in fiscal year 2014, more than the other Services combined and, in fact, more soldiers than constitute the total end strength of some allies’ ground forces. The Army achieved the 2014 recruiting mission by employing 11,114 total Army recruiters across the nation. The 2015 Army recruiting force has decreased to 10,955 (5,833 Regular Army, 3,210 Army National Guard, and 1,912 Army Reserve recruiters). As part of the recruiting effort, the total Army spends more than \$280 million annually on marketing, generating more than 118,000 potential recruits.

Local Army National Guard and Army Reserve commanders are accountable for manning their units. These commanders usually have end strength performance objectives

included in their evaluations. This responsibility manifests at a local level with Army National Guard recruiters assigned to specific units for which they recruit. These unit recruiters succeed by having a working knowledge of the unit, its members, leadership, activities, and mission, as well as the community. Likewise, the unit members and the community know the recruiter.

Unity of Effort

The Commission observed a lack of recruiting unity of effort at the Army Headquarters and local levels. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command is responsible for Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiting; consistent with law and tradition, each state is responsible for Army National Guard recruiting. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has strategic oversight of the recruiting function, but each component and state establishes its own recruiting goals. Similarly, Regular Army and the Army Reserve marketing is controlled by the Army Marketing and Research Group while Army National Guard marketing is managed by the National Guard Bureau on behalf of the states. This results in inconsistent branding and different marketing campaigns for the Army and the Army National Guard. At the local level, recruiters from each component vie for the dwindling population of potential recruits, possibly influencing an

individual to join a component that may not be the best fit for that individual.

The Commission concludes that, to the maximum extent feasible, the Army should be managed as one Army. Certain practices, policies, and statutes currently prevent the Army from managing the three components as one Army. These legal and policy structures create inefficiency and encourage competition—contributing to continued tension—among the components. This is readily apparent in the area of recruiting and marketing; therefore, any effort to truly manage one Army must include aligning recruiting efforts for all three components. Such unity of effort can achieve efficiencies and effectiveness while ensuring recruiting consistently produces the requisite quality and quantity of soldiers that all three components need.

The Army has had some success aligning recruiting efforts in the past. As part of its attempt to grow structure during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army initiated the “Active First” program. Army National Guard recruiters offered active duty contracts to individuals who then agreed, at the end of their active duty commitment, to do a Selected Reserve tour in the Army National Guard, unless they elected to re-enlist in the Regular Army. During the program’s run from 2007 to 2011, Active First assessed more than 4,900 individuals into the Army, thus illustrating that

SHRINKING RECRUITING POOL

Only 0.7 percent of the U.S. population served in one of the nation’s armed forces in 2015. This is a small pool of talent, and it is likely to shrink even more.

Current U.S. population projections indicate potential future challenges for military recruiting. RAND Corporation projections show that by 2025, the military age population will decline by 2.1 percent for ages 17–24, and 3.1 percent for ages 23–27, even as the total population grows. This decline in the recruiting-eligible population is particularly concerning given that less than half of the military age population is eligible for military service due to physical, educational, or behavioral fitness (e.g. criminal records). As a result, the enlistment-eligible population could drop from about 10.3 million in 2015 to 9.9 million in 2025.

Increased disqualifications for health will overwhelm small improvements in educational attainment and aptitude (as assessed by the Armed Forces Qualification Test). The

military’s recent decision to allow women into all combat roles may slightly increase the eligible population, but women might not voluntarily join direct combat career fields in overly large numbers. The military could relax some criteria (e.g. tattoo restrictions or body piercings) without harming the quality of recruited personnel, but significant changes in the standards for physical fitness will likely result in a less-capable force. However, there may be room for carefully considered adjustments to physical standards for specific career fields, such as cyberspace operations.

The Army will continue to have the most difficult recruiting challenge within the Department of Defense based on the volume of enlistments needed and public perceptions concerning risk to the force. The nation’s Army is recruited from the society it serves. The Army will need to adopt policies to support effective recruiting of the best and brightest of those ready to serve while upholding the standards that make the U.S. All-Volunteer Force the envy of the world.

unity of effort is possible in the realm of recruiting, despite the different legal status of components. The Commission concludes that the Army should do more such efforts.

Recommendation 38: Congress should authorize and direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a substantial multiyear pilot program in which recruiters from all three components are authorized to recruit individuals into any of the components and receive credit for an enlistee regardless of the component. Congress should specifically authorize the pilot program “notwithstanding any other laws” in order to avoid potential fiscal law concerns. The Army should complete a detailed design for a pilot program within one year after publication of this report and, pending Congressional approval, fully implement the pilot program within one year after completion of the design work.

Recommendation 39: Congress should authorize, and the Secretary of the Army direct, the consolidation of marketing functions under the authority of the Army Marketing Research Group (AMRG) to gain unity of effort. The AMRG must employ marketing strategies to achieve recruiting goals of the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Regular Army.

The NDAA FY15 considerations for the Commission include identifying a structure that “provides for sufficient numbers of regular members of the Army to provide a base of trained personnel from which the personnel of the reserve components of the Army could be recruited.” The Army National Guard and Army Reserve recruit among Regular Army soldiers leaving active duty. Department of the Army G-1 data for fiscal year 2015 reflected over 4,000 soldiers joined the Army National Guard after serving in the Regular Army, and more than 5,500 joined the Army Reserve. The Commission determined that a Regular Army of 450,000 soldiers will provide sufficient trained personnel for Army National Guard and Army Reserve recruitment.

Rather, the challenge is in the lack of a unified personnel management system that can align soldiers with available positions, and perceived policy limits to continuum of service. The Army’s successful “365 AC to RC Pilot” program implemented in 2014 at Fort Hood, Texas, focused on increasing the number of soldiers transitioning to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. Incentives for high-demand skills included the chance to transition up to a year earlier than the original contract, opportunities to become a

warrant officer, and chances to retrain for a new military job skill. This program revealed that policy road blocks are more imagined than tangible with visibility of opportunities as the key. As noted above, the Commission considers IPPS-A a much-needed means to provide the visibility needed for continuum of service.

“What makes us different than any other army in the world are our noncommissioned officers. They are our standard bearers. They are what changed our Army over the last 40 years that I have had the opportunity to serve. It’s been the changing nature of our noncommissioned officers that has transformed our Army, and they continue to do that today.”

General Raymond T. Odierno, retirement remarks at the Army Change of Responsibility ceremony, August 14, 2015.

ONE ARMY LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, and progressive process that grows soldiers and Army civilians into competent, committed, professional leaders. Leader development is attained through the combination of training, education, and experiences acquired through opportunities in the operational, institutional, and self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships.

Army training and education are highly regarded globally for producing excellent leaders with proven adaptability. However, new technology, advances in management science, and cultural changes suggest careful adjustments to the Army’s accession, training, education, assignment, and personnel evaluations and assessments can improve the Army’s agility, adaptability, and effectiveness. Improving the Army’s ability to acquire, develop, retain, and employ talent potentially offers the most important method to prepare for a complex, unknowable future.

The Army continues to make substantial strides toward improving leadership development and talent management for both uniform and civilian personnel. However, the high operational tempo and continual deployments over the past fourteen years placed a huge stress on the time soldiers had available to attend formal leader development courses. In



Corporal Brock O'Shaughnessy and Corporal James Farran, combat engineers with the 374th Engineer Company (Sapper), take part in a night land navigation course at Camp San Luis Obispo Military Installation, California.

some cases, course attendance was waived. In other instances, the length of a course was reduced significantly in order to allow soldiers to complete the requirement. For example, the original four-week Primary Leader Development Course with extensive leadership training to prepare enlisted soldiers to become noncommissioned officers adjusted numerous times, temporarily shortening by more than 30 percent.

Some Army National Guard and Army Reserve units must choose between soldiers and their leaders attending schools or annual training periods where collective unit training is paramount. The Commission also noted some military education courses are stretched over a year or more in the reserve components, yet completed in weeks or months for Regular Army soldiers.

Additionally, the importance and relevance of Joint professional military education (JPME) continues to increase. The 1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act created a standard for officer JPME. While the Army has made senior enlisted JPME a prerequisite for attending the Sergeants Major Academy, career-long mandatory JPME standards are not mandated similar to officer standards.

The Army recognizes the sacrifice made in leader development across the institution and how critical training and education are to sustaining the All-Volunteer Force. Nevertheless, the Commission encountered uneven resourcing

for military and civilian leader development, especially professional education. The Commission is concerned that as budgets tighten, sustaining investments in Army human capital could again wane without continued senior leader emphasis.

In an era of tremendous budgetary pressure, the Army must continue to focus on developing today's leaders for tomorrow's war. This includes greater innovation and assuming more risk to provide the right education to the right leader at the right time.

Recommendation 40: The Army should retain formal leader development activities as a high priority for all uniformed and civilian personnel.

Recommendation 41: Congress should direct the Department of Defense to review enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements, determine which should become mandatory requirements, and report within one year.

The Army School System

In the 1990s, the Army started a series of initiatives to improve, streamline, and consolidate its school system due to budgetary constraints. The primary goal was to develop The Army School System (TASS) that improved the performance and efficiency of the Army's existing school system by raising standards and consolidating facilities. TASS consists of initial military training; reclassification training; officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, and Department of the Army civilian professional development training; functional training; and education. The long-term goal of TASS was to be more efficient and integrated across the components of the Army. The resulting program centered on a regional system for reserve component schools with the first pilot program established in the southeastern United States (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida).

In 2009, the Army implemented the One Army School System (OASS) as a set of processes synchronizing all three components to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of TASS. Army Regulation 350-1 states, "the One Army School System is comprised of RC and AC institutions that utilize training resources to train soldiers in the most efficient and effective manner possible without regard to component." OASS leverages existing infrastructure in all components to efficiently project training requirements and program training capacity.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commands twenty-nine Army schools, colleges, and institutions and provides accreditation and quality control

across all Army schools inside and outside of TRADOC. These schools and training sites fall into six training regions. The highest density of schools outside TRADOC is in the Army National Guard, which has eighty-five training institutions at sixty-six locations across the fifty-four states, territories, and the District of Columbia. Each state, territory, and the District has a Regional Training Institute. As of September 2015, TRADOC has fully accredited eighty-three of the eighty-five Army National Guard training institutions.

TRADOC has made notable progress by reorganizing its existing structure and capacity to meet training requirements and improve the quality of its programs. For example, the Army projects a \$5 million savings in travel and 77,000 training days returned to operational units by fiscal year 2018. OASS implementation and refinement continues to address capacity, law, and policy, standardizing programs of instruction, and expanding the Army Training Requirements and Resources System. The Commission concludes that OASS is not only a worthwhile effort, but its timeline should be accelerated. This may increase initial costs, but OASS's recent savings indicate more money would be saved in the long run.

During its site visits to training facilities for the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve, the Commission encountered an alarming number of incidents of under-utilized training facilities and inefficient choices in training dollars spent. Many facilities belonging to different components are co-located on the same installation or in close geographic proximity. These facilities often offer the same courses of instruction and technical training that soldiers travel to other regions to attend. Consequently, though fully staffed, many of these schools were not filled to student capacity. Additionally, the Commission found that Regular Army soldiers were traveling to Regular Army training facilities at other installations—consuming travel funds doing so—though the required course was being taught at a TRADOC-certified reserve component school on or near their home installation.

If there is one Army schools system, the Commission concludes that it must be managed under one organization that controls staffing, student attendance, and the types of instruction offered at each training or education location.

Recommendation 42: The Army should conduct an end-to-end review of The Army School System and report to Congress within a year of publication of this report on the efficiencies gained by consolidating under-used capacity. The review should take a holistic look at successes and shortfalls from current strategy and ensure consistent naming conventions to minimize confusion.



Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Matthew Chlosta

Two members of the 773rd Civil Support Team, 7th Civil Support Command, take part in a Training Proficiency External Evaluation of the unit's readiness to respond to a real-world chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event.

Recommendation 43: The Army should establish true regionalization of the Army's school system and continue to consolidate the infrastructure where efficiencies can be gained. The Army should acknowledge and explain any unused capacity, and develop a plan to retain or eliminate the unused capacity, ensure the correct balance of infrastructure and capacity to meet the nation's needs, and take into consideration the ability to regenerate and expand the Army. The Army should complete this plan within a year of publication of this report.

Recommendation 44: The Army should immediately implement the entire One Army School System to realize savings sooner.

ONE ARMY IN ACTION

The Army has generated forces and evolved its processes and readiness models as demand, operational conditions, and military strategies have changed. During the Cold War, the Army developed a static, tiered readiness methodology



Captain Kris Chamales, a paratrooper with the 82nd Airborne Division, maneuvers through the obstacle course at the division's Pre-Ranger Course on Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

designed to prepare forces according to war plan timelines. This readiness model enabled the Army to sustain a large, standing force (augmented by the draft until 1973) even in periods of active peace to deter possible acts of large-scale aggression and respond quickly to small-scale, short-duration aggression.

From the Vietnam War to initiating Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army deployed soldiers for short-duration missions that did not require a rotational or replacement force. In 2004, the Army needed to replace the units deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom with follow-on forces. The response was the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, which generated cyclical readiness rather than tiered readiness. ARFORGEN also enabled the Army to effectively integrate the reserve component, reset returning units, and incorporate lessons from prior rotations.

In 2015, the Army moved toward a force generation method known as the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM). SRM's intent is to optimize available readiness resources that would enable more units, across all components, to generate and maintain higher levels of readiness over time. The model addresses improvements in assessing and maximizing unit readiness necessary to meet global Army requirements while maximizing available capabilities for unforeseen requirements. SRM provides improved readiness visibility on a quarterly basis and forecasts readiness out three to four years. This improved

visibility is expected to better inform the budgeting and programming of funds.

SRM is a work in progress that adopts elements from both cyclic and tiered readiness methods. The Army's force generation regulation does not yet reflect SRM. With Total Force end strength at 980,000 soldiers, the Army will need more reliance on the reserve components to meet Combatant Command requirements while reducing stress on the Regular Army.

Training

The Army's shift toward a more quantifiable assessment of collective unit training for evaluating readiness is known as the Objective T-Level Assessment (Objective-T for short). This composite assessment includes three foundational aspects of training to determine the training days required to achieve the highest rating of T1:

1. Collective task proficiency for mission-essential tasks demonstrated through a command post or field training exercise;
2. Individual and crew qualifications; and,
3. Collective live-fire proficiency demonstrated through fire coordination and maneuver live-fire exercises.

Objective-T enables training assessments to enumerate actions that build and sustain measured readiness. The Objective T-Level Assessment provides a much more quantifiable and objective assessment of unit collective training readiness.

Recommendation 45: The Army should implement the Objective-T methodology for assessing the progression of training readiness and revise readiness reporting using the quantifiable criteria.

Combat Training Center (CTC) programs are intended to generate ready units and agile leaders confident in their ability to operate in complex operational environments. The CTCs conduct scenario-driven, instrumented, force-on-force and live-fire training using a professional opposing force. Training occurs under tough, realistic, combat-like conditions across a wide range of likely tactical operations.

CTCs currently serve as capstone training events to determine if units are ready to progress to the available force pool within the force generation model or as a mission rehearsal exercises. Regardless of component, the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) training proficiency level upon completing a CTC rotation improves. However, the force generation process produces a different training level for a Regular Army BCT (available for deployment) than for an Army National Guard BCT (entering its available year but still requiring post-mobilization training for deployment).

Due to much shorter deployment response requirements, Regular Army BCTs are resourced to arrive and depart a CTC rotation at a higher collective training level than Army National Guard BCTs with longer deployment timelines. Additionally, the number of BCTs has exceeded the CTC capacity to the point that some BCTs are not benefiting from CTC training within their projected readiness cycle (e.g. more than a decade between rotations for Army National Guard Infantry Brigade Combat Teams).

During site visits to the National Training Center and Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Commissioners noted the emphasis for every rotation to include units from all components. However, the Commission also heard concerns about insufficient number of observers, coaches, and trainers to support events, as well as not having enough operational support and sustainment units, particularly from the Army Reserve. Some units participating in the same CTC event are not aligned in their readiness cycles, which can lead to manning and funding shortfalls. Synchronizing the preparation and scheduling of multiple Army National Guard and Army Reserve units is challenging, but necessary. Continued priority support for CTC activities and proper alignment of resourcing will enable the Army to increase readiness to support current and projected operational demands. Greater participation of the Army National Guard BCTs and Army Reserve supporting units for CTC rotations will enhance Total Army readiness, provide greater leader development opportunities, and build interoperability among the components.

Recommendation 46: The Army should increase the number of annual rotations for Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams at combat training centers beginning fiscal year 2017 without decreasing the number of Regular Army Brigade Combat Team rotations.

Leaders from all Army components have identified excessive mandatory training requirements contained in AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, as an issue. Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve leaders were near unanimous in their assessment that AR 350-1 training requirements leave too little time to conduct collective training or focus on the training that commanders assess as most needed. Their desired end state is to reduce mandatory training requirements and allow commanders to appropriately balance training readiness with other Army requirements.

The outcomes of the 2015 Army Training Leader Development Conference confirmed leaders' concerns:

- Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces have too many training requirements in one year;
- Over 1,000 Army directives, regulations, pamphlets, and messages address mandatory training ; and
- The Army needs to underwrite risk and give three- and two- star commanders the ability to prioritize these training requirements.

The Army will always have necessary mandatory training requirements, but it must find a better approach. Delegating mandatory training exception approval means commanders will assume some risk in a risk-averse culture, especially given the consequences if an adverse outcome occurs later. While there are risks in lessening mandatory training requirements, there are risks in having such burdening mandatory training requirements cut into valuable collective training time, too.

Recommendation 47: The Army should reduce mandatory training prescribed in AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* by the following means:

- Reducing the number of mandatory training requirements and moving the reduced tasks to local command policy per AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*;
- Developing a formal process for approving additional mandatory training tasks and reviewing existing mandatory training requirements annually for retention or deletion;
- Chartering the Army's Training General Officer Steering Committee to provide governance for approving all added Army and Combatant Commander mandatory training requirements;
- Changing the reserve components' mandatory training requirements from an annual cycle to a two-year cycle;
- Codifying mandatory training requirements with (1) task, condition, and standard; (2) Training and Evaluation Outline and lesson plan; and (3) the means to make this information available through the Army Training Network as the consolidated repository for mandatory training requirements;
- Delegating mandatory training exception approval authority to two-star commanders; and
- Completing the AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, revision within one year of this report.



Photo by Army Sgt. Rigo Cisneros

Army Reserve engineers with the 416th and 412th Theater Engineer Commands work on an improved ribbon bridge across the 300-meter-wide Arkansas River during an exercise at Fort Chaffee. The bridge, requiring 42 segments, took three hours to complete.

Training Support

Forces Command (FORSCOM) employs First Army to assess training and ensure units are ready before they deploy. To support the intent of the Total Force Policy, First Army undertook a major reorganization and adjusted its primary mission focus from post-mobilization to pre-mobilization training support for Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. First Army partners with reserve component units throughout their readiness cycle to support the units' pre-mobilization training and provide an estimate of post-mobilization training time needed for those units to complete their culminating training exercise or capstone event.

First Army has the majority of Regular Army soldiers assigned as required by the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. They provide the engagement and habitual relationships with reserve component units

throughout the force generation cycle to enhance readiness while minimizing redundant training costs. In addition to the Regular Army personnel, First Army manning includes Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers (both Active Guard and Reserve, or AGR, and traditional drilling soldiers), making it a multicomponent unit. All three components have an obligation to provide adequate full-time manning within First Army to foster Total Force integration. However, in fiscal year 2014, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve manning rates for First Army authorizations were about 16 percent and 80 percent, respectively.

Recommendation 48: The Army should resource First Army's Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) positions from the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve at the aggregate manning level provided for each component not later than fiscal year 2017.

“When you join the Guard today, you expect to deploy, and when you don’t have that opportunity, there’s a lot of disappointment.”

*Major General John L. Gronski (PAARNG),
Commander, 28th Infantry Division during
NCFAsite visit to Fort Indiantown Gap.*

Mobilization

In addition to generating near-term readiness, the Army must plan for mobilizing the entire Army to a state of readiness for war, contingency, or national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the reserve components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. The Army does not mobilize forces in isolation, but does so as part of the DoD enterprise. The Commission noted that in his assessment of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey highlighted the acceptance of risk in the capacity of land forces and called for a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize the entire force.

Recommendation 49: As recommended in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense should plan in fiscal year 2017 and execute no later than the end of fiscal year 2018 a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of national mobilization.

Mobilization Support

The Army National Guard mobilized in excess of 102,000 soldiers and the Army Reserve over 77,000 soldiers in 2003. Twenty-five installations conducted mobilization and demobilization operations that year. These mobilization locations, known as Mobilization Force Generation Installations (MFGI), operated at various levels of preparation: seven primary, five secondary, and thirteen contingency MFGIs.

Today, the Army has only two active MFGIs, at Fort Hood and Fort Bliss, both in Texas. Only Fort Hood has a Pre-Deployment Training Equipment (PDTE) set permanently located on the site. Before determining which MFGIs would remain active, the Army located PDTE sets at the three Army Corps locations of Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Fort Hood. Because Fort Bliss has no PDTE site, the Army transports equipment to and from Fort Hood and other locations to support Army National Guard and Army Reserve post-mobilization training.

The Commission found that the lack of a PDTE set at Fort Bliss increases transportation costs and reduces post-mobilization training time while units await equipment delivery.

Recommendation 50: The Army should provide a Pre-deployment Training Equipment set to Fort Bliss, Texas, for its Mobilization Force Generation Installation role no later than fiscal year 2017.

ONE ARMY EXPANDING

Because the future strategic environment cannot be predicted with certainty, the Army needs to protect its ability to regenerate capabilities and expand the force whenever necessary. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance stated:

...DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.

The 2014 QDR specified, “We will protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands.” The guidance of these two documents is further amplified in Defense Planning Guidance FY17-FY21 for the Army.

The Army established an Investment and Regeneration Task Force in 2012 and issued an Army Posture Statement on Investment and Regeneration in 2013 to concentrate planning for expanding the Army. The Under Secretary of the Army expounded on the need for planning with a 2014 information paper titled: *How Fast Can the Army Grow? Implications of Regeneration Decisions*. Nevertheless, the Army’s most recent response on planning for expansion noted that end strength reductions and funding decrements resulting from the Budget Control Act made resourcing expansion infeasible. With the shortfalls in funding and manning, the Army appears to have halted planning for expanding the force.

One key finding from the October 2013 RAND study, *Estimating Institutional Army Manpower Requirements* addresses part of the expansion paradox: “If the Army indeed means to support expansion, the size of the institutional Army should paradoxically grow as the Army shrinks.” While rapid expansion of the Army is not feasible, without personnel management actions to retain mid-grade leaders, the Army risks diluting leaders’ average levels of professional experience, as occurred during World War II and the Vietnam War. Many

of the billets and personnel eliminated from the Regular Army to achieve mandated budget cuts are the same mid- and senior-level NCOs and mid-grade officers needed to support future regeneration efforts.

Ideally, force expansion would start months or years before the forces are required to be deployed, but at such times much of the Army's infrastructure would be occupied by existing units preparing for deployment. Retaining excess infrastructure in peacetime could facilitate future expansion, but at a cost—and such costs do not easily compete in an environment of declining resources. Differentiating between unused capacity necessary for expansion and excess capacity would lead to better planning and decisions.

The expansion paradox: preserving the ability to grow the Army can be in direct conflict with garnering efficiencies from a smaller force. However, the benefits of investing in certain key areas, such as recruiting and accessions, placing facilities in caretaker status, financing certain industrial production lines, and overmanning mid-grade positions within the institutional force could outweigh the risk and time that would confront the Army in a national crisis. The Commission considers a formal plan that enhances the understanding of the difficulties involved in expanding the force should inform force sizing and shape DoD and Army drawdown decisions.

Recommendation 51: The Congress should require the Army to develop, by the end of fiscal year 2017, a plan for expansion to execute a large-scale sustained operation. The plan would include maintaining a running estimate for long-lead-time equipment production and modification as well as personnel accession and training for anticipated capability shortfalls that occur after reorganization and mobilization. The plan should address each of the statutory Department of the Army functions as articulated in 10 U.S. Code, Section 3013 and examine and report annually to the Secretary of Defense on the necessary requirements to expand the Army's capacity.

Recommendation 52: The Secretary of Defense should incorporate in defense planning and fiscal guidance the analysis of Army expansion requirements for force-sizing and capability-mix analyses in fiscal year 2017. This guidance would give priority to the retention of expansion-required leaders, infrastructure, and materiel in the defense budget and program.

Individual Ready Reserve

In addition, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) could support future regeneration efforts. However, the IRR program has significant challenges. It primarily comprises individuals who have previously served in the Regular Army or Selected Reserves and are not assigned to a unit but still have a military service obligation remaining. The IRR currently has about 93,000 soldiers managed by the Human Resources Command (HRC). Subject matter experts from various Army agencies described to the Commission the multiple challenges associated with meeting IRR readiness management requirements outlined in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the February 22, 2006, Secretary of the Army memo, *Individual Ready Reserve Transformation*. For example, HRC is not resourced to manage a population of this magnitude. The Army struggles to maintain an accurate database of IRR troops, so contact information is outdated. Additionally, the Army does not gain or share information with other government agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, to maintain contact information for IRR members.

Recommendation 53: The Secretary of the Army should perform a top-to-bottom review in fiscal year 2017 of the Individual Ready Reserve program to ensure compliance with existing statutes.

Recommendation 54: Congress should amend 10 USC 10205 to authorize the Secretary of Defense to coordinate with other federal agencies to obtain updated contact information on Individual Ready Reserve soldiers.

Recommendation 55: Congress should amend Title 10 USC to authorize a virtual muster that does not include a physical examination or review.

Recommendation 56: The Secretary of the Army should rescind the February 22, 2006, memo *Individual Ready Reserve Transformation*.