



NGAUS Assessment of CSA and SECARMY Statement to NCFA on 19 May 2015

##	Pg	Para.	As Written in SECARMY Statement	Comment
1	4	4	With appropriate warning and post-mobilization training, they can achieve collective readiness levels over time depending on the complexity of the mission	Army systems account for required training time not mission complexity to differentiate between components. This wording suggests that some missions are so complex that no amount of training time would permit an ARNG unit to accomplish it. This is not reflected in Army doctrine or policy.
2	4	4	ARNG units have difficulty routinely maintaining high levels of collective readiness, which, as a consequence, requires much greater funding to employ them.	Readiness is a function of resources. DoD's report to Congress on "Unit Cost and Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components" (Dec 2013) states, "The incremental training time needed to take an RC BCT from company to brigade proficiency is between 50 to 80 days, and from platoon to brigade level it is 110 days." It reports on page 25, for example, that the annual cost of an AC BCT ready to deploy is \$285 million while the cost of an RC BCT ready to deploy is \$163 million (including post-mob training incremental costs) -- or roughly 57% of the cost of an AC BCT.
3	5	2	<p>Complementary Components. Today, we need each Component in our Total Army to be complementary. They have never been interchangeable, nor should they.</p> <p>See also statement on p.19, para 3: Each of our Components is distinct and each is essential. They provide complimentary capabilities to one another, which we ask that you affirm in your final report.</p> <p>[NOTE: See similar statement of "complementary" components on page 3, para. 6.]</p>	<p>By law, policy and actual practice the RC is supplementary not complementary. 10 USC 10102 states that the purpose of the RC is to provide trained units and qualified persons whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components. In 2004, CSA GEN Schoomaker testified that an objective of modularity was to "allow us to plug and play Reserve component units with active component units in a seamless fashion." In 2007, OCPA press release announced that a key theme of the Army FY'09 Budget request was to "Transform Guard and Reserve units to be interchangeable with regular Army units," Accordingly, the Army Posture Statement for FY09 stated that Army restructuring to modularity was to have brigades sharing "a standardized interchangeable structure." Today, Army Total Force policy strives for uniformity in training, equipping and organization, not distinction. In practice, few unit types are found exclusively in the RC. Most unit types can be found in both RC and AC. Also, Army unit deployment historical data will show that RC units are routinely mobilized to fill missions both previously and subsequently done by AC units, and vice versa. This is true for small units as well as BCTs and Division HQs from World War I through current ongoing operations. Performance of these units has not been documented as substandard.</p>

4	5	6	<p>In determining force mix, Reserve Component formations should be focused on the strength of their civilian skills. One of their enduring strengths is that less military training is needed when their military duties aligns with their civilian jobs. These critical civilian skills brought by the Reserve Component have proven invaluable over the last fourteen years of war. [Note similar statements on pages 6, 8, 9 and 13.] So as we look at force mix, we need to focus... on alignment with civilian skills for reserve Components... [Page 6]</p>	<p>The phenomenon of RC soldiers with skill sets transferable from civilian jobs is entirely anecdotal. With the exception of a few specialty occupations, RC Soldier qualification is based on military training. 10 USC 10102 says that the purpose of RCs is to provide "trained units" and "qualified individuals" with no reference to civilian skills. In practice, nearly all RC units are staffed by Soldiers based on MILITARY training. The Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program enlists significantly more Soldiers into the AC than into the RC. Outside of these extremely rare cases, military training requirements for RC Soldiers are virtually never reduced based on their civilian skills. Beyond the extraordinary case of the few and tiny Agricultural Development Teams deployed to Afghanistan, virtually no Army program uses civilian skills of RC troops.</p>
5	6	2	<p>Soldiers are Soldiers; but formations in the different Components are organized and trained differently, leading to different degrees of collective training mission effectiveness....Simply put, the difference between the Active and Reserve formations is in how we organize, train, and employ our formations.</p> <p>[NOTE: See similar statement that each compo is organized differently and must be employed differently on page 3, para. 6.]</p>	<p>Per law, policy and practice, the organization and training of the Components are not substantially different. 32 USC 104 states, "the organization of the Army National Guard and the composition of its units shall be the same as those prescribed for the Army." Additionally, the Army Total Force Policy requires that procedures and processes for validating the predeployment readiness of assigned forces are uniform and that standards for qualification and professional development are the same for AC and RC personnel. Army Regulation 350-1 applies to all components of the Army and requires training standardization to standardize procedures used by Soldiers and units to operate weapons and equipment systems; identify tasks that should be performed in the same manner and to the same standard throughout the Army; and to ensure that modular organizations can operate effectively within any assigned formation. In actual practice, units of like-type generally have identical organizational structures and training requirements regardless of whether the unit is Active, Guard or Reserve. RC units, however, must conduct more training prior to a deployment than in years when they have no such mission.</p>
6	6	5	<p>We increased these full-time support personnel to facilitate building and sustaining unit readiness required to meet rotational demands.</p>	<p>HQDA made an explicit decision in Jan 2001 to increase RC FTS in order to increase RC interoperability with AC due to increased RC operational deployments well before 9/11. Post 9/11 GWOT rotational demand was not a factor in the decision. See M&RA memo 18 Jan 01. See also p.9 of Addendum to Army Posture Statement for FY 2001.</p>
7	9	3	<p>Reserve Component units with highly-technical systems and "gated" collective training requirements are unable to be as effective as Active Component units.</p>	<p>The effectiveness of any unit (AC or RC) for a given mission is a function of training resources and time. It is not a function of component.</p>

8	9	3	Even when Reserve Component units participate in Combat Training Centers (CTC) rotations that culminate in a higher level of training with additional training days, that training is not sustainable once units demobilize and disperse.	This phenomenon is not specific to the RC. Post-CTC training proficiency is not sustained in AC units either. Following a CTC rotation, AC unit training readiness degrades as Soldiers train at lower levels of intensity, depart for individual military education requirements or as a result of permanent changes of station to new assignments every 2-3 years - a rate of turnover much higher than in typical RC units.
9	9	5	A National Guard BCT, however, will conduct a CTC rotation every 7-10 years with the goal of reaching company level proficiency. This disparity in CTC rotations is critical when determining the effectiveness of units to achieve their gated training requirements, as well as for key leader development. Therefore, ARNG BCTs require significant post-mobilization training. This has been exacerbated by the fact that in operations and mobilizations since 2001, they trained for a variety of missions which did not include Joint Combined Arms Maneuver tasks.	ARNG BCTs conducted all training required for all missions for which they have been mobilized since 2001. This included combat operations missions for which the preceding and subsequent Brigades were from the AC. Regardless of their recency of CTC experience, all deploying BCTs (regardless of component) were typically required to complete a brigade-level mission readiness exercise prior to deployment. The historical fact of specific training for specific missions of the past does not "exacerbate" the requirement for future post-mobilization training requirements for future missions by ARNG BCTs. That training requirement will be a function of the mission.
10	10	3	Similarly, the RAND findings also concluded that National Guard BCT preparation times depended on the nature of the mission...the findings revealed that counter-insurgency missions required 165 days of preparation, security force missions required 118 days, and advising/assisting required 127 days.	DoD's report to Congress on "Unit Cost and Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components" (Dec 2013) states, "The incremental training time needed to take an RC BCT from company to brigade proficiency is between 50 to 80 days, and from platoon to brigade level it is 110 days."
11	10	4	Also in some cases, two RC units are needed to match the output of one AC unit. ...When compared to the same equal output basis as the military police combat support companies, two RC AH-64 battalions cost 107 percent as much as an AC unit when not mobilized; and 126 percent if mobilized.	The RAND determination that 2 RC units are needed for equal output of 1 AC unit only holds true under the assumption of continuous rotational unit warfare and the continued application of the 2007 DoD policy, emplaced at the height of the war, specifying different mob-dwell goals for AC & RC units. These assumptions are not a sound basis for force planning and costing. Thus the comparison of the cost of two RC units against the cost of a single AC unit is not valid analysis. If two RC units cost 107% as much as one AC unit, then the RC unit is 53.5% the cost of its counterpart. DoD's report to Congress on "Unit Cost and Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components" of Dec 2013 presents comparison analysis from OSD CAPE which is more valid.

12	11	2	There is a long standing myth that the Reserve Component is cheaper. This is only true in units where collective training and combined arms integration requirements are minimal.	Multiple studies have documented that the RC is cheaper. The lower cost is why America has had an organized RC for more than a century. Most recently, DoD's report to Congress on "Unit Cost and Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components" (Dec 2013) presents comprehensive data on the lower cost of RC units compared to AC counterparts. It reports on page 25, for example, that the annual cost of an AC BCT ready to deploy is \$285 million while the cost of an RC BCT ready to deploy is \$163 million (including post-mob training incremental costs) -- or roughly 57%.
13	11	3	Given the current structural framework of our Reserve Components, we are not cost effective due to geographic dispersion, the pace of change of technology that impacts combined arms maneuver, and the unsustainable costs associated with the full-time support program.	A statement that the RC is "not cost effective" would require significant substantiation since the RC provides more than half the Total Army force for less than a quarter of the Total Army budget for FY 2016. RC FTS costs have not been demonstrated to be "unsustainable." RC FTS is an \$8B expense within a \$127B Army TOA. This funds about 86,000 full-time staff supporting a 552,000 Soldier RC force.
14	12	1	Training costs for the Reserve Component are absorbed in the Active Component training base. The associated costs fall predominantly on the Regular Army, which devotes a large portion of capacity and costs to supporting Reserve Component Soldiers.	Training costs for the RC are appropriated largely in RC accounts. This includes all travel and pay for RC Soldiers attending training. Additionally, the RC O&M and MilCon accounts pay for Regional Training Academies and other training base costs. The RC also directly funds many instructors and drill sergeants.
15	12	2	There are also additional costs associated with the authority across state lines. For the Army National Guard, even with coordination through the National Guard Bureau, many factors inhibit collective training and hinder sustained readiness. For specialized units such as UH-60 battalions that are dispersed across several states, command authority is strained, as commanders in one state have little or no authority over their units in neighboring states. Therefore, the unit must rely on irregular and inefficient training events to attain marginal readiness levels. Therefore, keeping more structure in our Reserve Components than is necessary actually drains readiness from the Total Army.	The assertion that unit dispersed across multiple states have higher training costs than units that are not is not a fact reflected in the Army's training cost model or experience. Distances from home station to training areas is a cost factor for unit of all components of the Army. The crossing of State lines does not contribute to that cost. In practice, ARNG units from multiple states routinely are sourced for missions and satisfactorily meet required timelines. For example, the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the ARNG, comprising units from at least 7 states, successfully met all timeline requirements and is currently in its available year for FY15.

16	12	3	...we grew the AGR program by 28% during the two wars in part to compensate for the loss of the Title 11 AC/RC program	The AGR program was increased on a "ramp" decided at HQDA in early 2001 and subsequently authorized by Congress for RC missions prior to 9/11. This growth was unrelated to wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. See M&RA memo of 18 Jan 01. That ramp was completed in the NDAA for FY 2009. AGR authorization has not grown since then. The reduction of the "Title XI" AC/RC program occurred when Congress granted Army's request in the FY 2005 NDAA (Sec.515 of PL.108-375) to reduce the requirement for that program's AC/RC training advisers from 5,000 to 3,500. That program was not "lost." It was reduced in response to an Army request to shift that AC manning to wartime needs.
17	12	3	The current structure and allocation of the Full Time Support program is costly and does not provide a cost-effective boost to readiness. The significant costs associated with this program are actually cannibalizing Reserve Component readiness during a time of fiscal stringency.	RC FTS are essential to RC foundational readiness. The US Army 17 Sep 2012 report to Congress states that RC FTS personnel, "provide RC units the administrative and organizational support they need to make the best use of drill weekends and annual training. They ensure RC soldiers receive their pay, maintain personnel and training records, schedule and coordinate training events, maintain arms rooms and account for supplies. ...They also bolster RC units' capacity to track readiness shortfalls and prioritize operational requirements." The Army has several studies examining the link between RC FTS and readiness. None have indicated that RC FTS cannibalize RC readiness now or at any time in the past.
18	12	4	Full-time Support in aggregate for the ARNG and USAR is expected to grow from the FY01 levels by 16.7% by FY21.	Presents an inaccurate impression of the current and future trend of the FTS program. FTS levels in both RCs have decreased since FY13 and are programmed to decrease further in coming years. For the ARNG, FTS authorizations will drop from the FY13 level of 63,164 down to 58,254 by FY17. For the USAR they will drop from 26,776 down to 25,671.
19	12	4	Perhaps the 2005 level of Full Time Support, augmented during contingency operations by ADOS, is a better proxy for the actual requirement.	Undermines established Army process for determination of manpower requirements by the US Army Manpower Analysis Agency (USAMAA).
20	13	1	[FTS personnel] do not provide collective or individual training.	There are FTS positions devoted exclusively to training and training management down to the unit level. Most RC readiness centers have at least one full-time NCO devoted primarily to preparation and even execution of individual and collective training. Most RC Battalion and higher headquarters have full-time NCOs and officers devoted primarily to training management.
21	13	3	We assessed that from 2003 to the present, the Army National Guard provided 37 Brigade Combat Teams in rotational support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.	The actual number is at least 51.