

A REPORT

SUBMITTAL OF OPTIONS FOR CREATION OF A TRAINEES, TRANSIENTS, HOLDEES, AND STUDENTS ACCOUNT FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

As Prescribed by
Section 416 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010

Introduction

Section 416 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84, 28 OCT 09) directed that:

SEC. 416. SUBMITTAL OF OPTIONS FOR CREATION OF TRAINEES, TRANSIENTS, HOLDEES, AND STUDENTS ACCOUNT FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report evaluating options, and including a recommendation, for the creation of a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) Account within the Army National Guard.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall address, at a minimum, the following: (1) The timelines, cost, force structure changes, and end strength changes associated with each option specified in the report. (2) The force structure and end strength changes and growth of the Army National Guard needed to support the account referred to in subsection (a). (3) An assessment of how the creation of such an account may affect plans under the Grow the Force initiative. (4) An assessment of the impact of such an account on readiness and training ratings for Army National Guard forces.

The law directed the Secretary to provide to the Congress a report containing the results of the review. The report is to include a description of the adjustments in Department of Defense policy to be implemented as a result of the review and recommendations for changes in statute that the Secretary considers to be appropriate.

This report documents the results of the Department's review and potential legislative changes to Army National Guard (ARNG) authorized end strength.

Overview of the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students Account.

The Active Component (AC) of the Army is authorized a higher personnel end strength than the total number of positions in the actual force structure. This is to allow Operating Force (OF) units to be filled only with fully trained, ready and deployable Soldiers, maximizing unit readiness. Untrained or otherwise non-deployable Soldiers are accounted for outside of the OF units and Generating Force (GF) units through a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account. Details of this account are provided in Army Regulation 600-8-6, Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting, Chapter 3-1 (See attached annex A).

The ARNG had no such account prior to 2009 when 8,000 spaces were set aside to be used as a TTHS “Like” account. For previous decades, the inverse situation was true; end

strength significantly below the total spaces of force structure. As recently as 2005, the ARNG maintained a funded End Strength (ES) of 350,000 under a Force Structure Allowance (FSA) of 376,474¹ resulting in a tremendous amount of unreadiness built into the force. The cold war readiness architecture proved insufficient for the wartime needs of the Nation and has been found to be untenable as the ARNG has become a frequently deployed operational force.

As part of Army force design assessment associated with Total Army Assessment 2012-2017 (TAA 12-17) (Fall 2009), the ARNG rebalanced its force reducing its overall FSA to approximately 350,000 authorizations while Congress maintained end strength for the ARNG at 358,200. This resulted in a variance between FSA and end strength of 8,000. These 8,000 spaces provide the ARNG some flexibility in managing the unreadiness that currently resides in unit formations, while providing for the evaluation of the challenges in implementation and determining what efficiencies can be emplaced to reduce the overall need for a TTHS “Like” account.

The Problem: Structural Unreadiness of the Cold War in an Operational Force of Today

During the Cold War the ARNG operated as a Strategic Reserve. Guardsmen generally served a total of 39 days annually — one weekend a month and an additional two weeks a year.² As a Strategic Reserve, the ARNG prepared for major conflict as a mobilization asset of the Army anticipating that the fill of personnel and equipment shortages would be accomplished at the mobilization station.

Today, ARNG units mobilize at a more accelerated pace than in years past in days rather than months and serve as an operational force that must “train, mobilize, and deploy” alongside Active Component (AC) units.³ No longer are the concepts expressed within the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) accurately applied. The ARNG must now generate personnel readiness greater than 103% assigned strength for mobilizing units in order to complete the transition to Active Duty at 100% assigned strength. The 3% positive variance is the historical pre-deployment attrition rate experienced during the mobilization process. (Examples: injuries sustained during training and Family emergencies.)

As an operational force, the ARNG must provide mobilization capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict with a predictable rotational model.⁴ The ARNG units also serve domestically in homeland defense, military assistance to civil authorities and humanitarian assistance missions providing vital military capability available to Governors during times of emergencies. In January 2007, the Secretary of


¹ Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) Command Plan (CP) 2005 Locked Force, December 22, 2003.

² OSD White Paper, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs), October 2008.

³ Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force (Department of Defense Directive Number 1200.17), October 29, 2008.

⁴ Ibid.

Defense established the total force utilization guideline calling for the involuntary mobilization of ARNG units to a “one year mobilized and five years demobilized ratio.”⁵ The Army adopted the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) (Figure 1).⁶ The ARFORGEN model is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units.




(Figure 1)

The ARNG experience of recent years in the ARFORGEN model has raised issues in personnel readiness and stability, particularly in combat units and other formations that deploy to a combat theater of operations. Ideally, the personnel that trained with the unit should be the same personnel that take the formation to war. However, ARNG units typically experience a 30% increase of personnel turbulence prior to mobilization. The ARNG personnel turbulence is a rate defined as the sum of a unit’s gains, losses, transfers-in and transfers-out divided by the unit’s end strength. Approximately 30% of the Brigade Combat Team or 1,034 Soldiers will transfer into the mobilizing units to replace untrained and medically non-deployable Soldiers. Cross leveling qualified and available Soldiers forces those Soldiers to rotate through the ARFORGEN cycle faster, which reduces individual Soldier dwell time between mobilizations. This turbulence also undercuts the value of the collective training and leader development that takes place during the ARNG unit’s training cycle. This inflow of personnel also undercuts the effectiveness of pre-mobilization training because new arrivals miss deployment-specific training events that have occurred prior to their transfer into the unit. Figure 2 demonstrates the

⁵ 2009 Army Posture Statement, Addendum E - Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).

⁶ Ibid.

impact of replacing untrained and unavailable Soldiers, or cross leveling, on the typical 3,448 - Soldier Brigade Combat Team.



(Figure 2)

Training readiness and personnel readiness in the ARFORGEN model are evaluated by a set of ARFORGEN Metrics. These metrics provide a set of goals by phase of ARFORGEN in order to accurately pace the generation of personnel and training readiness over a five year cycle. The Reset Execution Order (EXORD) authorizes reset for one year with a graduated four year ramp toward mobilization across the remaining phases of ARFORGEN. These readiness capabilities reporting requirements facilitate the coordination of the Army implementation plan to execute the transition of the RC from a Strategic Reserve to an operational force (Figure 3).⁷

⁷ Improving ARFORGEN: Gaining a Common Framework for RESET (U.S. Army Forces Command's ILW Panel), 7 October 2009.

G1 ARFORGEN Metrics

Force Pool Definitions from RESET EXORD 22 DEC 08	Reset Force Pool (Return +365 Days)	Train Force Pool (+366 to +730 Days)	Available Force Pool (+731 to +1095 Days)	Available Force Pool (+1096 to +1460 Days)	
	Re-Integration		Sourcing	Alert	MOB
	M-4	M-3	M-2	M-1	M
Assigned Strength %	70-79	70-79	80-89	90-100	101-125
Average Dwell Months	0-12	0-12	25-36	37-48	>49
Non-Deployable %	41-50	41-50	21-30	11-20	0-10
DMOSQ %	65-70	65-70	75-79	80-84	>85
MOSQ %	65-70	65-70	75-79	80-84	>85
ETS Eligible %	26-30	26-30	13-19	7-12	<6
Fully Medically Ready %	61-70	61-70	81-90	91-100	100
Dental CL3 %	56-60	56-60	31-49	16-30	<15
Dental CL4 %	56-60	56-60	31-49	16-30	<15
P-Rating	P5	P3	P2	P1	P1

(Figure 3)

Soldiers within the operational force structure that are not currently Military Occupational Skill Qualified (MOSQ) are a significant challenge to ARNG unit readiness. The majority of ARNG units contain a sizable group of new recruits—usually around 10%—who are “untrained.” These groups of new recruits signed up for service, attend drills and receive pay, but have not yet completed initial entry training (basic training and skill training for their military occupation). Untrained Soldiers cannot be deployed. They must either be sent to Initial Entry Training (IET) on a high priority basis in order to return to their unit in time for mobilization or they must be cross leveled out of the unit creating personnel turbulence. This “unreadiness” is a problem unique to the ARNG because the Guard is a community based organization managed by the 54 States and Territories. The AC units generally receive their junior members from a centrally managed personnel distribution system, which assigns Soldiers to units only after they have completed training.

The mobilizing unit must ensure that all Soldiers have proper personnel and pay records, legal documents, immunizations, personal equipment, basic skills and are proficient in a multitude of mission centric tasks. Soldiers must also undergo training required by the overseas combatant command and training on theater-specific tasks. Because these actions take place in a compressed time schedule leading to a fixed arrival date in theater, cross leveling poses a significant distraction that slows down training and makes it less effective. Most observers see personnel stability—keeping Soldiers together over time in a fighting unit—as the foundation for unit cohesion. It is obviously advantageous to have all the Soldiers in a unit together for an extended period of time so they can “train as they will fight.” Keeping Soldiers together fosters familiarity, effective communication and trust among people who will need to operate together in a fast-paced, high-stress and potentially lethal environment.

Personnel turbulence also affects leadership cohesion in mobilizing units. The overall combat effectiveness of the ARNG unit is degraded and to some extent these re-formulated units must not only build new command and control relationships, but repeat some specific training events either before or after mobilization. This redundancy makes training less efficient, more costly and slows the mobilization time for moving the unit into theater. Replacing critical leadership positions early in the mobilization cycle creates unit stability and greater unit cohesion.

The Solution: TTHS “Like” account for the Army National Guard

A solution to improving readiness, reducing personnel turbulence and cross leveling in the ARNG is to remove the medically non-deployable and untrained Soldiers from operational force unit formations. An ARNG with an end strength above force structure that can accommodate medical holdees will provide flexibility necessary to increase readiness.

A TTHS “Like” account comparable to the AC TTHS account achieves the same goals or end state – improving readiness within operational force unit formations. Current statutory requirements prevent the ARNG from implementing a TTHS account in the exact manner of the AC. Additionally, the ARNG does not require all four categories of a traditional TTHS account. The transients population, for instance, does not exist in the manner of the AC. The effect of an ARNG TTHS “Like” account would be comparable to that of the AC’s TTHS account.

Options

There are three possible options for achieving this.

- Major End Strength Increases
- Major Force Structure Reduction
- Current Modest Differential from Rebalance

Major End Strength Increase – Discussion. This option establishes a TTHS “Like” account similar to the Active Component. This method would grow the ARNG end strength with no change to the FSA. Increasing the end strength is costlier and would take longer to implement. The cost for every one percent increase in end strength (3,582 Soldiers) the National Guard would expect to pay approximately \$51.4 M in FY10 dollars in burdened military personnel cost. The ARNG could grow end strength at the rate of approximately 1.5% annually depending on various Department of the Army controllable variables (number of recruiters, bonus payments/policy, training school seat availability, etc) and uncontrollable variables (economy, operations tempo, etc.). The end strength increase option allows the ARNG to maximize the flexibility within formations, however, the ARNG recommends that selection of option three would properly allow an evaluation process to be conducted prior to further consideration of a TTHS “Like” account.

Major Force Structure Reduction– Discussion. This option for creating an ARNG TTHS “Like” account is to decrease the ARNG FSA by eliminating units. This option decreases the long-term capability of the ARNG and United States’ enduring national security interests in the war fight and homeland defense are put at significant risk. The roles and missions of the National Guard and Reserves are fundamental to the historic challenge we face to preserve our freedom against the world-wide threat of terrorism.⁸ Achieving defense strategy objectives requires a capable and ready National Guard seamlessly integrated into the broader All-

⁸ Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force (Punaro, Chairman, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves), 31 January 2008.

Volunteer Force.⁹ “[The Department of Defense also draws] on existing National Guard forces to build a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.”¹⁰ The National Guard Bureau is committed to the fundamental principle that each and every state and territory must possess ten core capabilities for homeland readiness—“the Essential 10.”¹¹ At a time of world-wide engagement in ongoing conflicts as well as real threats to lives and property in the homeland, the resulting decrease in military capability to the Nation increases strategic risk to such a level that the costs of this option far outweigh the benefits.

Current Modest Differential from Rebalance– Discussion. The Army recommends continuing the current 8,000 TTHS “Like” course of action and believes it will ultimately provide the flexibility to evaluate the execution of a TTHS “Like” account.

This option recognizes the current ability to implement an 8,000 TTHS “Like” account within its authorized end strength of 358,200 starting in FY10 (2K TTHS “Like” account in FY10, 4K TTHS “Like” account in FY11 and 8K TTHS “Like” account in FY12 and beyond). The initial program will concentrate on the medically non-deployable within the ARNG. The ARNG will evaluate the effectiveness of the TTHS “Like” account on personnel and training readiness in FY11 specifically reviewing the impact on the readiness levels associated with the Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and other large unit formations preparing for mobilization. After this evaluation is completed, the Army may request a temporary end strength increase for the ARNG depending on the demand for Guard units. If required an increased end strength would allow the ARNG to establish a more robust TTHS “Like” account, increasing the readiness of ARNG formations and allow sustained integration of ARNG units into the war fight.

Decision Support Matrix

Option	Cost-Risk	Time to Implement	Readiness-Capability
Major End Strength Increase	High Cost-Risk	Longest Amount of Time	Highest Readiness-Capability
Major Force Structure Reduction	Moderate Cost-Risk	Moderate Amount of Time	Lowest Readiness-Capability
Current Modest Differential from Rebalance	Lowest Cost-Risk	Shortest Amount of Time	Moderate Readiness-Capability

⁹ Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Department of Defense), February 2010.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ FY 09 National Guard “Essential 10” Equipment Requirements (National Guard Bureau, Office of Legislative Liaison), 26 February 2008.

Report Requirements

1. timelines: As part of TAA 12-17, the ARNG established an 8,000 TTHS “Like” account beginning in FY10 (2K in FY10, 4K in FY11 and 8K in FY12 and beyond). Initially the implementation plan will concentrate on reducing the medically non-deployable population and where possible, improving the management of the trainee population.

2. force structure and end strength changes: The Army is not seeking any change to the existing force structure allowance and is not requesting an increase to the ARNG end strength.

3. an assessment of how the creation of such an account may affect plans under the Grow the Force initiative: The ARNG completed its growth as authorized under the Grow the Army Initiative in FY 2008. The ARNG will evaluate the effectiveness of the TTHS “Like” account on unit personnel and training readiness in FY11 specifically targeting the un-readiness in BCT and other large unit formations preparing for mobilization.

4. an assessment of the impact of such an account on readiness and training ratings for Army National Guard forces: An ARNG TTHS “Like” account is expected to moderately improve the personnel readiness by reduction of the medically non-deployable within operational unit formations and improve pre-mobilization training rates by removing a portion of the unavailable population from the operational force. The TTHS “Like” account would target the removal of Medically Non-Deployable Soldiers from mobilizing units and ensure trainees are not placed within formations that are preparing for mobilization. An appropriately sized TTHS “Like” account would assist the ARNG in making future rotations more predictable for the Soldier, his/her Family and their employers.

Conclusions

The 8,000 Soldier TTHS “Like” account is expected to support the following conclusions:

There are two ARNG populations consistently not available for mobilization: medically non-deployable Soldiers and non-prior service recruits that are untrained and awaiting Initial Entry Training (IET). Implementing a TTHS “Like” account within its end strength will begin by focusing on the removing of medically non-deployable Soldiers from ARNG operational force units and ensuring that the untrained population is reduced in mobilizing formations.

A TTHS “Like” account is expected to reduce the cross leveling requirement. Less cross leveling will increase individual Soldier dwell time and may result in an extended Boots on the Ground (BOG) time by reducing training time required at the mobilization station. Reduced cross leveling results in greater unit stability, improved unit cohesion, while also reducing the training costs associated with retraining the individual and collective tasks of the cross leveled Soldiers prior to mobilization.

An ARNG TTHS “Like” account will provide a more predictable mobilization cycle which will increase the operational capability and strategic depth to meet mission requirements.

ANNEX A - Policy:

Reference Army Regulation 600-8-6, Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting, Chapter 3-1, Accounting for Personnel, the TTHS account consists of:

(1) Trainees. *Trainees include officer accession students. Trainees are those Soldiers who have not completed initial entry training. Entry training includes basic training, advanced individual training, and other proficiency or developmental training accomplished before arrival at first permanent duty assignment.*

(2) Transients. *Transients include Soldiers not available for duty while en route to a new permanent duty station. Transient time includes permanent change of station (PCS) travel time, temporary duty (TDY) en route, and leave en route. Transient time does not include TDY training en route to new permanent duty station, travel associated with a unit move, or travel time associated with movement to or between initial entry courses of instruction.*

(3) Holdees. *Holdees include Soldiers who are reassigned from the strength of a table of organization and equipment (TOE) or table of distribution allowance (TDA) unit and assigned to a holding activity.*

(a) Patients. Soldiers assigned to a medical-holding detachment. Soldiers will be reassigned to a medical-holding detachment when hospitalization or inpatient treatment has exceeded, or is expected to exceed, 90 days; when a Soldier is hospitalized and return to duty is not expected; when a Soldier enters a patient status while in transit between duty stations; or when a Soldier is hospitalized as the result of an injury received in a combat area.

(b) Prisoners. Soldiers assigned to a personnel control facility (PCF) or other type of control facility. Prisoners include Soldiers sentenced to 30 days or more of confinement by a military or civilian court, or Soldiers returned to military control (RMC) from a DFS or DFR status.

(c) Separatees. Soldiers assigned to a transition center or point awaiting transition from the Army.

(4) Students. *Soldiers assigned to a non-initial entry course of instruction (normally, a course length of 20 weeks or more), or Soldiers attending a TDY school course, en route to a permanent duty station.*

ANNEX B – Cost Estimate:

Option 1: Major End Strength Increase

This paper does not define size or recommend a major end strength increase; however, for every one percent increase in force strength (3,582 Soldiers) the National Guard would expect to pay \$51.4 M FY10 dollars in burdened military personnel cost.

Option 2: Major Force Strength Reduction

This paper does not define the size or recommend a major force strength reduction. If this path was pursued there would be some restructuring cost incurred, but overall authorized end strength and military personnel cost would remain unchanged.

Option 3: Current Modest Differential from Rebalance

This option is the status quo, with 358,200 ARNG authorized end strength and a modest 2,000 TTHS account in FY10 growing incrementally to 8,000 by FY12. Since there is no change to the current authorized end strength, there would be no additional cost. The addition of TTHS accounting to identify medically non-deployable personnel more accurately reflects readiness reporting and will enable the ARNG to reduce personnel turbulence due to cross leveling in the year prior to deployment. This option is currently within the ARNG budget and provides the flexibility to manage the nondeployable population and increase readiness in deploying units.