



*Joint Statement of*  
**Governor Terry Branstad, State of Iowa**  
**and**  
**Governor Mark Dayton, State of Minnesota**

*On behalf of*  
**The National Governors Association**  
**and**  
**The Council of Governors**

*Before the*  
**National Commission on the Future of the Army**  
**17 September 2015**

On behalf of the nation's governors, we thank the National Commission on the Future of the Army (Commission) for the opportunity to provide our views on the future of the U.S. Army and the role of the Army National Guard (ARNG). We appreciate your efforts to seek governors' input during your examination of Army force structure and aviation restructuring proposals.

Governors strongly advocated for the creation of this Commission, and we recognize the challenge you face in weighing the concerns of all stakeholders. The Commission's thorough and thoughtful consideration of the ARNG's value to states and the nation will help ensure the National Guard continues to have access to the personnel, aircraft and resources necessary to fulfill its dual mission at home and abroad.

## **Overview**

As commanders-in-chief, governors recognize the need to reorganize, restructure and modernize today's military to meet new threats and economic realities. The Army's proposed cuts, however, would return the ARNG to a strategic reserve, create turmoil across the states and waste 14 years of investment into the nation's most cost-effective force.

As governors, we have witnessed the critical role the National Guard plays both in our states and for the nation. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), Minnesota National Guardsmen (MNNG) have performed more than 26,000 deployments – some numerous times – to 33 different countries, including Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the same time period, more than 17,000 Iowa National Guardsmen (IANG) have mobilized for combat and combat support duties in Iraq and Afghanistan, peacekeeping duties in the Balkans and on the Sinai Peninsula, and for other missions in more than 35 nations around the globe. Approximately 4,000 currently serving IANG soldiers and airmen are combat veterans, representing more than 45 percent of the force – the highest percentage in modern history.

These mobilizations have demonstrated the operational readiness the ARNG maintains across all critical military capabilities to support national needs. In 2009, the MNNG's 34th Infantry Division

assumed responsibility from the regular Army's 10th Mountain Division for Multinational Division South in Iraq. In this role, the MNNG provided command and control over all multinational forces operating in Iraq's nine southern provinces until relieved by the 1st Infantry Division in 2010. The 1/34 Armored Brigade Combat Team has twice answered the nation's call to perform critical security operations throughout Iraq and Kuwait during the surge period of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the final period of Operation New Dawn. Minnesota's 34th Combat Aviation Brigade has mobilized twice to provide theater aviation as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and U.S. Central Command's Operation Spartan Shield. Today, Minnesota Guardsmen continue to provide aviation and aviation maintenance units in support of Spartan Shield. Minnesota Guardsmen remain ready and have been notified to prepare for mobilization to provide engineering capacity to operations in Kuwait as well as detainment operations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

During the Iraq surge in 2006-2007, an Iowa Army National Guard infantry battalion was mobilized for more than 22 months, making it one of the longest deployments for an Army unit during the Iraq war. In 2010-2011, the IANG 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT) deployed in its entirety to Afghanistan, supporting the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division's mission by conducting full-spectrum operations along the eastern border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Last January, an IANG medical unit was alerted to deploy in support of the West Africa Ebola mission before it was cancelled because of changing demands managing the disease and its spread. Since the beginning of Operation Noble Eagle, Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the IANG has met every required operational assignment for deployment and has performed superbly.

At the same time, the ARNG has responded when called to domestic emergencies here at home. Minnesota Guardsmen have supported state and local civil authorities in response to 67 state disasters. Totalling more than 22,000 man-days, the Guard's 10 essential mission capabilities were used to provide critical support helping protect the health and safety of Minnesota citizens. These include major responses to spring flooding in the Red River Valley, including three successive floods beginning in 2009 through 2011. The MNNG stood up a joint task force to provide military support to the 2008 Republican National Convention. Guardsmen efficiently supported the state

in ensuring the security, safety and health of vulnerable Minnesota citizens jeopardized by a 2001 health care provider strike. Minnesota soldiers and airmen also have supported civil authorities in five federal disasters since 2001, including Super Storm Sandy in 2012, Hurricane Ike in 2008, Operation Jump Start on our nation's southwest border in 2006, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

Iowa National Guardsmen have deployed in response to three major state disasters in a 17-year span, including the Great Midwest Floods of 1993, as well as floods in 2008 and 2011. During the 2008 floods, the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT was extremely effective in its support to our communities. The unique organization and capabilities of the BCT, including manpower, command and control, logistical capabilities and enhanced communication platforms were essential in providing a flexible force capable of conducting missions necessary to meet the needs of the communities.

While governors understand the Army faces difficult budget challenges ahead, we believe that recent efforts to cut ARNG force structure are a step backwards and would make lasting, irreversible changes to the ARNG to meet short-term budget challenges. The proposal to cut ARNG end strength and transfer ARNG AH-64 Apache helicopters to the active component is not in the best interests of states, the Army or the nation in the long-term. It would undo years of progress by returning the ARNG to a pre-9/11 role and fail to leverage its cost-effectiveness in retaining mission capability at home and overseas.

As the Commission conducts its review, governors recommend that the following principles guide its work:

- The National Guard must continue to serve as an operational force and the combat reserve for the Total Force.
- The National Guard is a highly trained, battle tested asset that should continue to be properly resourced and equipped to meet the needs of both the federal government and states.

- The National Guard's cost-effectiveness should be leveraged to the fullest extent to meet the fiscal and operational challenges confronting the Total Force.

## **Governors and the Defense Budget**

Through the National Governors Association (NGA) and the Council of Governors (Council), governors have worked to improve coordination and understanding on military issues between states and the federal government. Working together, state and federal partners found early success through the Council when they reached an historic agreement on the role of a Dual Status Commander during emergency response. This agreement resolved a long-standing dispute regarding command and control of federal and state military forces during domestic operations and brought fundamental change to how the country prepares for and responds to emergencies.<sup>1</sup> Since partnering on this effort, governors have sought to strengthen the state-federal relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD) to address other fiscal and national security challenges.

In 2012, the Council found itself at odds with an Air Force budget proposal for fiscal year (FY) 2013 that would have had a detrimental effect on states if implemented. At the time, the Air Force proposed to impose 59 percent of the total aircraft budget reductions and about six times the personnel reductions on the Air National Guard (ANG). Governors' concerns with the Air Force budget were ultimately addressed by Congress and through the establishment of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. To avoid a similar dispute in future years, NGA and the Council worked diligently over the better part of 2012 to create a process for governors, their adjutants general and DoD to discuss future defense budget and program development. In 2013, the Council adopted a budget consultative process agreement to facilitate an ongoing interactive dialogue between states and DoD on budget and policy matters affecting the National Guard [Appendix A].

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<sup>1</sup> See U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 12304; and NGA paper: "America Wins: The Struggle for Control of the National Guard", <http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1210NationalGuardAmericaWins.pdf>

Despite this agreement, governors were once again disappointed by the lack of early engagement on budget and planning decisions affecting the ARNG prior to the release of the President's FY 2015 budget. The Army's proposal failed to recognize the role and importance of the ARNG in our states and the experience and cost-effectiveness that the ARNG provides to the Total Army. In response, nearly every governor signed a letter to the President strongly opposing the Army's budget proposal [Appendix B].

After the release of the FY 2015 budget, DoD leadership updated governors on Army budget planning and included state adjutants general in a reexamination of the Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office. Governors appreciate these efforts to improve engagement with states, but are frustrated that DoD and the Army have pressed forward with their original plans virtually unchanged, despite reasonable alternatives that addressed some of governors' concerns.

Consequently, governors endorsed establishing this Commission and have worked with Congress to delay changes to ARNG force structure until the Commission can complete its examination. We hope the Commission and its review will help bridge the divide between the Army components and put the Total Army on a path to meet the future military needs of both states and the nation.

## **Maintaining the Guard as an Operationally Capable Force**

For well over a decade, the men and women of the ARNG have worked interchangeably with their active duty counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan. That combat experience overseas has paid dividends as the National Guard has regularly responded to domestic missions here at home. Since 9/11, the ARNG has evolved into an operational force that is better trained, led and equipped than at any time in its history. Governors firmly believe that these capability gains and the taxpayer investment they represent should be maintained.

Last year, the Army released ARI, which consisted of three major components: divesting three types of aging, single engine aircraft across the Army components (Jet Ranger training helicopters and two models of OH-58 Kiowa armed scout/reconnaissance helicopters); transferring all ARNG

Apache helicopters to the active component to replace the Kiowas; and transferring approximately 110 active Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to the ARNG. Governors recognize the need to restructure Army aviation, but oppose consolidating the Apache mission in the active component. We believe this plan not only undermines the ARNG's ability to augment the Army as its combat reserve, but also fails to leverage the Guard's cost-effectiveness to retain additional manpower, expertise and attack aircraft at a reduced cost to taxpayers. It is true that Apaches have limited application for the homeland mission; however, governors value and recognize the broader, long-term importance that strategic depth for the Total Army provides to their states and the nation.

In an attempt to address governors' concerns with the loss of Apaches, the Army proposed to provide states with additional L-Model Blackhawks. Trading Blackhawks for Apaches is not an acceptable trade for states. While Blackhawks play an important role in domestic emergency response, there is currently no unmet need for additional Blackhawks. Mutual aid arrangements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, already provide a means for states to request additional equipment and manpower during times of disaster.

Rather than more Blackhawks, states need modernized aircraft to replace aging Blackhawks. However, the Army has not invested in this effort and states have had to rely on Congress to address this need. Giving the Guard older-model Blackhawks that are not required for an Army war-time mission will further reduce the Army's incentive to fund their maintenance and modernization in the future. In addition, unlike Apache units, Blackhawk units have been broken into smaller detachments and spread over multiple states. This reduces the additional personnel and affiliated support, logistics and communications capabilities that governors can draw from to conduct domestic operations.

While only nine states have ARNG Apaches, their transfer to the active component will affect many more and the Total Army will experience a considerable and irreversible loss of combat experience. For example, while Minnesota does not have Apaches, the MNNG 34th Infantry Division headquarters and the 34th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) provide mission command to the 1-189th Attack Helicopter Battalion located in Idaho. Additionally, the 834th Aviation

Support Battalion in the 34th CAB has Apache maintainer skill sets that would be eliminated under ARI. The removal of the Apaches and these skills from the ARNG diminishes the strategic depth and the ability of the Army to meet future security needs. Furthermore, the loss of attack aviation in the National Guard will make Apache air ground operations training much more difficult to facilitate. This lack of training may affect National Guard CAB, BCT and division headquarters' relevance.

By removing the Apache mission from the National Guard, the ARNG risks losing combat experienced pilots and highly skilled maintenance crews developed over the last 14 years. The Army simultaneously loses the only means available to retain its own combat experienced air crews, maintainers and leaders upon separation from active duty service.

The second and third order effects of ARI, once the transfer of Apaches is complete, will be of significant concern to the long-term sustainment of ARNG equipment and strategic depth for the Total Army. A CAPE study of both ARI and a National Guard Bureau (NGB) counterproposal acknowledges that the NGB plan would provide 20 percent more capability for the Total Army at a relatively modest 2-3 percent (\$90-\$170 million) additional annual cost [Appendix C]. The results of a subsequent review of ARI by the Government Accountability Office confirm that questions remain about the plan's long-term costs and operational impact.<sup>2</sup> Maintaining a place for combat experienced pilots and mechanics to serve in the ARNG benefits all soldiers and guardsmen through improved operations, training, retention, leadership and morale. As the Commission reviews ARI and the Apache transfer plan, governors encourage you to consider these concerns and alternative proposals that would retain additional capability in the ARNG at relatively little additional cost.

## **Resourcing the Guard's Dual Mission**

In addition to ARI, the Army also has proposed reducing ARNG end strength to its lowest level since the Korean War. While it makes sense to increase or decrease active duty personnel

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<sup>2</sup> GAO Report GAO-15-430R: "Force Structure: Army's Analyses of Aviation Alternatives", Published: Apr 27, 2015, pg. 5; <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-430R>

depending on our engagements overseas, governors rely on a stable and consistent ARNG force to meet state needs.

Governors routinely depend on the National Guard to respond to both natural and man-made emergencies. National Guard personnel, equipment and capabilities are key resources built into states' emergency response plans and the federal National Response Framework. The National Guard also has the unique ability to perform law enforcement functions that have proven valuable in the response to natural disasters, recent episodes of civil unrest and other national special security events. These capabilities are enhanced by well-developed relationships with state and local emergency managers, state homeland security advisors and law enforcement agencies. In addition, more than 80 percent of the Army's chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) response capability resides in the ARNG, with every state possessing at least one CBRNE team. Both the Federal Emergency Management Agency and state and local law enforcement rely on these capabilities during hazardous materials response.

Cutting National Guard personnel risks stripping states of critical capabilities, weakening partnerships and upending years of carefully crafted emergency response plans. End strength reductions of 8,200 personnel proposed in FY 2016 coupled with 7,000 soldiers in FY 2017 would bring the ARNG's size to its lowest level in decades. The unique structure of the ARNG means that proposed cuts to end strength will affect nearly every state and degrade ARNG readiness nationwide. Ensuring a minimum level of readiness across all states in order to meet state mission requirements will require an estimated 15,000 positions be retrained and shifted to accommodate for the loss of 8,200 personnel in FY 2016. To fully implement such changes could take three to five years, creating instability and uncertainty for states and undermining the ARNG's ability to support emergency response requirements, including its critical CBRNE mission.

As part of this reduction, the Army has proposed to downsize the Guard's full-time staff by 1,700 positions, which are critical to maintaining the Guard's operational readiness for both domestic operations and combat missions overseas. These are professional positions required to manage complex Army manning and equipping systems; work which cannot be performed efficiently by

either traditional Guard members or a part-time rotational support staff. Currently, the number of full time positions in the ARNG is about 68 percent<sup>3</sup> of the level identified in guidance developed between the Army and NGB in the late 1990s. This guidance was developed prior to the events of 9/11 to ensure the ARNG maintained enough full-time positions to support a strategic reserve [Appendix D]. Even while supporting two major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ARNG never met 100 percent of the recommended strategic reserve requirement and now the Army is proposing to reduce these levels even further. These full-time positions are responsible for keeping units ready to deploy in support of Army demands overseas. During domestic emergencies, they provide immediate response capability, organize and deploy response assets and regenerate unit resources after traditional Guard members return home.

As DoD stated in a May 8 letter to the Council co-chairs, it is the department's goal to reduce stress on the force to the maximum extent possible and preserve readiness while reducing costs [Appendix E]. The effects of the Army's proposals on the ARNG, however, are turbulence and instability in states without significant cost savings. Unlike other military components, cutting National Guard force structure in one state frequently requires shifting personnel and assets from other states to fill gaps and maintain readiness across the force. It also means removing a capability for up to a decade. While the active component has the ability to replenish units through world-wide reassignment of personnel, ARNG soldiers are connected to their local armories and new units cannot be created quickly.

The turbulence created by force structure and personnel cuts affects people, readiness, training, equipment and facilities. This all comes with a cost to implement, which NGB estimates would be about \$179 million in its first year. Funding to cover these costs was not included in the Army's FY 2016 budget. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cuts to ARNG personnel would save the Army only \$170 million in its first year – \$9 million *less* than the unfunded implementation costs. When these costs and effects are considered, governors believe it simply does not make sense to implement the Army's proposals. While some reductions to ARNG force

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<sup>3</sup> FY 2015: 60,185 total authorizations that are funded against 88,263 total requirements.

structure may ultimately be necessary, they should be done through a collaborative approach that considers future needs, limits turbulence and maintains readiness in the Guard.

## **Leveraging the Guard to Meet National Challenges**

Time and time again, the Guard has proven itself a critical partner and a value to the taxpayer. According to an analysis of fully burdened lifecycle costs by the Reserve Forces Policy Board<sup>4</sup> and by CAPE<sup>5</sup>, a Guardsman costs one-third that of an active duty service member when not mobilized and is still less costly when mobilized. Given that the ARNG also provides 39 percent of total Army capabilities for only 13 percent of the total Army budget<sup>6</sup>, governors believe more should be done to leverage the National Guard's cost effectiveness, combat experience and ability to provide surge capacity during conflicts.

The State Partnership Program demonstrates the ARNG's cost-effective strategic reach. Fifty-two states and territories have established civil-military and military-military relationships with 69 countries around the world.

Iowa has one of the newest State Partnership Programs in the National Guard. Since starting its state partnership program with Kosovo five years ago, the IANG already has conducted more than 70 training exchanges and events. The Iowa program takes a holistic approach, linking not just the military sector, but economic, government, business, education and agriculture sectors into the overall program. Recently, leaders from the Kosovo Foreign Ministry Office were in Des Moines, Iowa looking for a location to open a consulate office. This office will be the first foreign consulate office in the state.

Likewise, Minnesota's State Partnership Program relationship with Croatia has yielded measurable dividends. Not only has this nearly 20-year partnership assisted Croatia in meeting

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<sup>4</sup> Reserve Forces Policy Board Report: "Eliminating Major Gaps in DoD Data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should be Mandated by Policy." Jan. 7, 2013; pg. 5

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Report: "Unit Cost and Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components of the Armed Forces." Dec. 20, 2013; pg. 4

<sup>6</sup> Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Financial Report, pg. 2

North Atlantic Treaty Organization military standards, but Minnesota National Guard soldiers also have embedded as operational mentorship liaison teams with the Croatian Army in Afghanistan.

The National Guard's international relationships add to the rich traditions within each state. The MNNG continues to enjoy the longest standing NATO reciprocal troop exchange with the country of Norway. Over the past 42 years the MNNG has successfully maintained an exchange program that continues to evolve through the incorporation of inter-agency state and local law enforcement partners with that of the Norwegian Rapid Reaction Force. This exchange directly complements and contributes to the readiness of the National Guard. Programs like the Norwegian exchange teach our soldiers intercultural communication skills, which will be indispensable in a future when U.S. deployments are increasingly elements of multinational forces. They also expose junior leaders to NATO allies and create confidence in both parties' operational structure.

The growing cybersecurity mission is another important example of the National Guard's ability to meet both federal and state needs. As the federal government and governors take action to improve the nation's cybersecurity posture, the National Guard can be an important asset to fill capability gaps for defense of government networks and critical infrastructure. Both the Air Force and the Army have recognized the benefits of the Guard's ability to tap into private-sector skillsets and leverage its dual-status role to support both federal and state cybersecurity missions. We urge the Commission to consider the ARNG's value to this critical mission for both DoD and states.

## **Establishing Common Goals for the Future of the Army**

As the Army is forced to evolve in the wake of declining budgets and continuing global instability, governors hope this Commission will help bring the Total Army together to address these challenges in partnership.

Two years ago, governors opposed similar efforts to cut Air National Guard personnel and equipment. The Air Force Commission's final report reflects the notion that the Guard is a cost-effective and invaluable force that should be part of an active and reserve component mix that

meets the needs of the Total Air Force.<sup>7</sup> The work of the Air Force Commission, combined with the leadership of Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh and Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James, contributed to a positive cultural shift and greater collaboration between the Air Force and the ANG.

We hope that the work of this Commission and a renewed commitment from senior civilian and military leaders across the Army components can strengthen collaboration and communication in a similar fashion. This will take a cultural shift within the Army, but we have seen this pay dividends in the Air Force in recent years as additional restructuring has been proposed.

Given the role of the Guard and the presence of our armed forces in states, governors want to partner with DoD and the military services to find solutions that are in the best interests of all involved. Governors understand the real effects, not only for the National Guard, but also for the active duty installations and defense-related industries within their states. Army restructuring will affect communities throughout every state and territory, leading to job loss, economic turbulence and potential uncertainty in the ARNG's ability to respond to emergencies.

Governors urge the Commission to consider recommendations that will preserve the ARNG's role as the combat reserve of the Army, resource and equip the ARNG to meet both federal **and** state needs, and leverage the Guard's cost-effectiveness and operational capability as part of a Total Army solution for the future. To do otherwise would risk wasting billions of dollars invested over the past decade in making the ARNG an experienced, globally deployable and combat-ready force.

Governors will continue to advocate for a strong Guard that is "Always Ready – Always There." The Commission is an important voice in this endeavor. On behalf of the nation's governors and the Council, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Governors look forward to continuing to work with the Commission to fashion solutions that provide for a scalable, cost-effective Army that best serves the interests of states and the nation.

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<sup>7</sup> DoD, National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force Final Report; Jan. 30, 2014; cover letter, pgs. 7-9, 11

# State-Federal Consultative Process for Programming and Budgetary Proposals Affecting the National Guard

February 25, 2013

## Purpose

The Department of Defense (DoD) and the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia (hereafter referred to as the various States), represented through the Council of Governors, will engage in a sustained process to exchange views, information, and advice, consistent with applicable guidelines on programming and budgetary priorities and requirements on matters specified in Executive Order 13528.

## Objectives

The intent and objectives of this process are to<sup>1</sup>:

- Improve and clarify procedures by which State-level observations, analysis, and requirements related to the National Guard are communicated to and incorporated into DoD's processes for requirements definition and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE);
- Improve and clarify procedures by which Federal-level observations, planning facts and assumptions, capability analysis, and strategic requirements and priorities underpinning DoD's strategy, plans, programming, and budgetary processes regarding matters affecting the National Guard specified in Executive Order 13528 are communicated to the Council of Governors and affected governors and their Adjutants General throughout the current program build; and
- Improve and clarify procedures by which Federal resource allocation or reallocation proposals that would affect the National Guard or military operations in support of domestic civil authorities will be discussed and views and information exchanged with the Council of Governors in advance of DoD formally requesting, submitting, or implementing Federal resource allocation or reallocation actions that affect the National Guard; and
- Strengthen the Council of Governors as an ongoing, interactive forum for Federal-State dialogue on matters specified in Executive Order 13528.

## Implementation

Consultations and dialogue between DoD and the States will occur on four tracks:

- 1) Planning, Analysis, Requirements Definition: Coincident with the Department's major plans, analysis, and budget processes, and consistent with his statutory and regulatory

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<sup>1</sup>As permitted by applicable laws and policies, including: 10 U.S.C. § 113; 10 U.S.C. § 135; 10 U.S.C. § 151; 10 U.S.C. § 3013; 10 U.S.C. § 3033; 10 U.S.C. § 8013; 10 U.S.C. § 8033; DoD Directive 7045.14; and OMB Circular A-11.

authority, roles, and responsibilities<sup>2</sup>, the Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB), will work with the States to ensure that their State-level observations, analysis, and requirements related to the National Guard are communicated to DoD for inclusion in Department plans, analysis, and budget processes. To the extent necessary, the Chief, NGB, in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, will assist the Council of Governors in establishing a structured methodology to produce inputs that articulate States' needs, whether civilian or military in nature, while conforming to established DoD timelines and formats. OSD and the Joint Staff will work with the Chief, NGB, and the Directors of the Air and Army National Guard to ensure that appropriate States' representatives participate in DoD-wide domestic prevention and response planning and capability analysis activities. These activities will assist DoD in refining its prevention and response capabilities to meet State-articulated needs most effectively, consistent with other DoD requirements.

- 2) Strategic dialogue: A strategic-level dialogue between States and DoD will occur primarily through twice-yearly Council of Governors' plenary meetings, plus other Council meetings and/or work sessions held by mutual agreement. This dialogue is intended to enhance the mutual understanding of States' and Federal requirements, the broader Federal defense program and budget, as well as the unique considerations for the Governors as promulgated in Executive Order 13528 and to ensure consistency with requirements set forth by applicable laws and policies.<sup>3</sup>

During meetings of the Council of Governors, potential discussion topics include, but are not limited to, the following, which are related to matters specified in Executive Order 13528:

- insight by the various States on domestic prevention and response needs;
  - perspectives on requirements for Defense Support to Civil Authorities offered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and other Federal Departments and Agencies as appropriate and consistent with the National Response Framework and Presidential Policy Directive 8 (National Preparedness);
  - insight into DoD's priorities – related to warfighting and domestic prevention and response;
  - the fiscal environment and its implications for the program build;
  - prevailing strategic trends, strategic guidance development, strategic planning factors and assumptions, and potential implications for force structure, Army and Air Force roles and missions, and Active Component/Reserve Component mix; and
  - an overview of the key components of the Chief, NGB's, inputs to the budget process.
- 3) PPBE process: As a more detailed supplement to the strategic dialogue, the PPBE process provides a range of opportunities for appropriate working-level planning and capability analysis participation and higher-level strategic dialogue to provide timely and substantive

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<sup>2</sup> Including: 10 U.S.C., § 151; 10 U.S.C. § 10501; 10 U.S.C. § 10502; 10 U.S.C. § 10503; and DoD Directive 5105.77.

<sup>3</sup> Including: 32 U.S.C. § 104; 10 U.S.C. § 113; 10 U.S.C., § 135; 10 U.S.C., § 151; 10 U.S.C. § 3013; 10 U.S.C. § 3033; 10 U.S.C. § 8013; 10 U.S.C. § 8033; 10 U.S.C. § 10501; 10 U.S.C. § 10502; DoD Directive 5105.77, DoD Directive 7045.14, and OMB Circular A-11.

views, information, and advice to inform and improve budget-related decision making on both sides. There are various existing venues available for this dialogue, including working sessions of the Council of Governors, quarterly meetings of the States' Adjutants General, and video-teleconferences.

Since the PPBE is a rolling process – with submitted, current, and future budgets simultaneously being executed, developed, or considered – a strategic-level dialogue will similarly be a rolling process and will generally occur in three phases.

- *Phase 1: Initial input to current program build:* In the January-February timeframe, at the early development stage of the Army and Air Force Program Objective Memoranda (POM) and Budget Estimate Submission (BES), DoD will provide a strategic overview of the trends that will affect the defense budget, including a macro view of DoD's fiscal environment and the evolving roles and missions of the Army and Air Force. Also throughout Phase I (January-June timeframe), States will collectively communicate through the Chief, NGB, their assessments and concerns regarding civil support missions and related capability requirements. The Chief, NGB, will work with the Joint and Service Staffs to develop National Guard requirements and carry them forward into the DoD PPBE process deliberations. DoD will consider the States collective input in consultation with DHS, FEMA, and other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate.
- *Phase 2: Second consultation on current program build:* In the July-September timeframe, before the official kick-off of the Program Budget Review (PBR), the Deputy Secretary will provide States' representatives with an update on strategic guidelines, based upon the Defense Planning Guidance that will inform the current program build. These guidelines will be substantive and informative but also consistent with PPBE guidelines not to divulge specific programmatic items under consideration. States will have an opportunity to provide additional feedback and concerns to inform the programmatic issues carried forward into the PBR by NGB.
- *Phase 3: Analytic retrospective on most recent budget submission:* In the February-March timeframe (i.e., concurrent with the presentation of the President's Budget to Congress), DoD will share details of its final analysis related to force structure, capabilities requirements, Active Component/Reserve Component mix, and other areas and relevant studies that were used to develop the President's Budget decisions that touch on States' interests related to National Guard issues.<sup>4</sup> This analysis, in turn, can shape State feedback through the Chief, NGB, on current program build and considerations for budgets in future years.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>As permitted by applicable laws and policies, including: 10 U.S.C. § 113; 10 U.S.C. § 135; 10 U.S.C. § 151; 10 U.S.C. § 3013; 10 U.S.C. § 3033; 10 U.S.C. § 8013; 10 U.S.C. § 8033; DoD Directive 7045.14; and OMB Circular A-11.

<sup>5</sup>To facilitate implementation of this consultative process, the Phase 3 analytic retrospective will be utilized upon presentation of the President's Budget for FY2014 to Congress in the February-March 2013 timeframe.

- 4) Ad hoc consultations: DoD, through the Chief, NGB, will conduct *ad hoc* discussions and working sessions with States specifically tailored to address other matters of mutual interest specified in Executive Order 13528.

#### **Notice of Non-Disclosure**

Throughout the execution of all four tracks, if applicable laws or policies prevent the Chief, NGB, the Director of the Air National Guard, the Director of the Army National Guard, or other DoD officials involved in the dialogue from communicating or sharing programming or budgetary information with the States, the officials concerned shall acknowledge to the Council of Governors being unable to do so and give notice as to the applicable law or policies prohibiting such disclosure.



Mary Fallin  
Governor of Oklahoma  
Chair

John Hickenlooper  
Governor of Colorado  
Vice Chair

Dan Crippen  
Executive Director

February 28, 2014

The President  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The nation's governors strongly oppose the potential cuts to the Army National Guard advocated by the U.S. Army's fiscal 2015 budget request.

For more than a decade, our National Guard has demonstrated it is a cost-effective, operational force that is critical to our national security at home and abroad.

As commanders-in-chief, we appreciate the need to reorganize, restructure and modernize the military to meet new threats and economic realities. All sectors of the military need to be involved in meeting the targets set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the realities of having fewer forces engaged abroad. In doing so, however, the Army Guard's operational capabilities and 350,000 end strength level must be preserved.

The Army's proposed cuts suggest a pre-2001 strategic reserve construct. Governors are extremely proud of the role that the National Guard plays in protecting this nation and its citizens. The modern National Guard is a highly experienced and capable combat force and an essential state partner in responding to domestic disasters and emergencies. A return to a pre-9/11 role squanders the investment and value of the Guard and discredits its accomplishments at home and as an active combat force.

Two years ago we opposed similar efforts to dramatically cut personnel and equipment from the Air National Guard. Congress subsequently chose not to impose the cuts and called for a National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. That commission recently concluded that the Guard is a cost-effective and invaluable force that should be a critical component of the total force structure. The commission's conclusions and the ongoing Army debate strengthen the case for a similar independent review of the Army's future force structure and active and reserve component mix.

We respectfully request that you reconsider proposed cuts to the Army National Guard and changes to the Guard's combat aviation capabilities and that you work with us to fashion solutions that provide a scalable, cost-effective force that best serves the interests of our nation.

Sincerely,

Governor Mary Fallin, Chair  
Oklahoma



Governor Terry Branstad  
Co-Chair, Council of Governors  
Iowa



Governor Martin O'Malley  
Co-Chair, Council of Governors  
Maryland



Governor Robert Bentley  
Alabama



Governor Sean Parnell  
Alaska



Governor Jan Brewer  
Arizona



Governor Mike Beebe  
Arkansas



Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.  
California



Governor Dannel Malloy  
Connecticut



Governor Jack Markell  
Delaware



Governor Rick Scott  
Florida




Governor Nathan Deal  
Georgia



Governor Eddie Baza Calvo  
Guam



Governor Neil Abercrombie  
Hawaii



Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter  
Idaho



Governor Pat Quinn  
Illinois




Governor Mike Pence  
Indiana



Governor Sam Brownback  
Kansas




Governor Steven L. Beshear  
Kentucky




Governor Bobby Jindal  
Louisiana



Governor Paul LePage  
Maine



Governor Deval Patrick  
Massachusetts




Governor Rick Snyder  
Michigan



Governor Mark Dayton  
Minnesota



Governor Phil Bryant  
Mississippi



Governor Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon  
Missouri



Governor Steve Bullock  
Montana



Governor Brian Sandoval  
Nevada



Governor Maggie Hassan  
New Hampshire




Governor Chris Christie  
New Jersey



Governor Susana Martinez  
New Mexico



Governor Pat McCrory  
North Carolina



Governor Jack Dalrymple  
North Dakota



Governor John Kasich  
Ohio



Governor John A. Kitzhaber, M.D.  
Oregon




Governor Tom Corbett  
Pennsylvania



Governor Alejandro Javier Garcia Padilla  
Puerto Rico



Governor Lincoln Chafee  
Rhode Island



Governor Nikki R. Haley  
South Carolina



Governor Dennis Daugaard  
South Dakota



Governor Bill Haslam  
Tennessee




Governor Rick Perry  
Texas




Governor Gary Herbert  
Utah




Governor Peter Shumlin  
Vermont



Governor Terry McAuliffe  
Virginia




Governor John de Jongh, Jr.  
Virgin Islands



Governor Jay Inslee  
Washington



Governor Earl Ray Tomblin  
West Virginia



Governor Scott Walker  
Wisconsin



Governor Matthew Mead  
Wyoming

# AC/RC Aviation Tiger Team

## Preliminary Findings



This briefing is classified **UNCLASSIFIED**

12 November 2014  
OSD-CAPE

# Agenda

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*OSD CAPE*

- Background
  - Tiger Team Purpose, Membership, and Engagement
  - Study Question and Approach
- The Options
  - Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI)
  - National Guard Alternative
- Data Generated by the Group
- Capacity and Cost Analysis

# Tiger Team

OSD CAPE

## Purpose

- The Deputy Secretary tasked CAPE to set up an interdisciplinary Tiger Team following the July Council of Governors meeting
- The charter is to analyze the ARI and the National Guard alternative and identify areas of agreement and disagreement

## Membership

- CAPE, HQDA, NGB, P&R, and FFRDC liaisons (RAND and IDA)

## Engagement

- The group has met weekly since the end of July, to include:
  - 10 flag level and 20+ working group sessions
  - 1 update brief to TAGs from Iowa, Maryland, and Mississippi and to the Assistant TAG from South Carolina
  - 5 subject area deep-dives by CAPE, RAND, and the TRADOC Analysis Center

# Study Question and Approach

## Study Question


- How does the National Guard proposal compare to the Aviation Restructure Initiative in terms of agreed upon metrics?

## Analytic Approach

- Generate agreement on facts:
  - Manning
  - Equipping
  - Training
  - Peacetime tempo (stress on the force)
  - Cost
- Develop metrics
- Analyze differences in capacity and cost

# ARI and the Guard Alternative

OSD CAPE



- **ARI**
  - Large cuts to the Active Army via divesting 3 types of aging, single engine aircraft
  - Transfers Guard Apache helicopters to the Active Force to replace Kiowa Scout aircraft
  - Transfers 111 Active Army Blackhawk helicopters to the National Guard
- **Guard Alternative**
  - Retains 120 Apaches in the Guard; transfers remainder to Active Component
  - Transfers 51 Active Army Blackhawks to the Guard: 2 less battalions in total

# Summary of Findings

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Metric for Apaches	ARI	Guard Alternative
Manning	Fully mans 20 Active battalions	Fully mans 18 Active and 6 Guard battalions
Equipping	Fully equips 20 battalions + 2 battalion sets for Korea rotation + remanufacture	Fully equips 20 battalions and partially equips 4 battalions; no Korea set, smaller remanufacture
Training	More collective training planned than for OIF/OEF	Pre-deployment training planned is 50% less than OIF/OEF unit average*
Peacetime Tempo	Active Apache battalions deploy 9 months out of every 2.3 years	Selected Apache battalions mobilize for 1 out of every 4-5 years
Cost		Guard option increases Army Aviation cost by 2-3% annually

\*Based on analysis of pay and post-mob training data

# Main Areas of Agreement and Disagreement

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- Agreement
  - Force structure in each option
  - Metric categories and data sources
  - Cost methodology, ARI yearly costs
    - AC agrees with Guard “Upper” cost; Guard agrees with Guard “Lower” cost
  - Active Component Deploy:Dwell and Guard MOB:Dwell ratios
- Disagreement
  - Feasibility of Guard sustaining wartime-like tempo in peacetime
  - The amount of training time Guard Apache battalions need to deploy with the Multi-Component Combat Aviation Brigades
  - Analysis of OIF/OEF pay and post-mobilization data to represent Guard Apache pre-deployment training time
  - Need for the Korea rotation equipment set
  - Selected cost outputs, such as the cost penalty for stretching the Apache remanufacture

# Active Army Rationale for ARI

OSD CAPE

- Army had to find savings after its topline was reduced \$10.5B per year
  - ARI reduces force structure to keep modernized platforms
  - Cuts include divesting all Kiowa Scout helicopters, which the Army cannot afford to replace
  - Shooting battalions will drop from 37 (Kiowa/Apache) to 20 (Apache)
- The reduced supply of attack/recon assets can only meet high demand by deploying at high tempo in peacetime
  - Active units are better suited for high tempo peacetime operations
- Apache role in decisive action operations will require extensive training with ground units and UAVs, which is more demanding than training for OIF/OEF missions
  - Active units are better suited to high levels of collective unit training in peacetime
- Apache helicopters (in contrast to Blackhawk, Chinook, and LUH) have no role in the National Guard's key mission of homeland support

# Guard Rationale for the Guard Alternative

OSD CAPE

- Removing all Apaches from the Guard deprives the Army of a low cost strategic hedge
  - Guard Apache crews are experienced, with deployments in OIF/OEF
  - A Guard Apache battalion's annual pre-deployment O&S cost is less than an Active battalion
  - Guard units are more stable and leverage transitioning, experienced, former Active duty personnel
- The Guard Alternative provides more force structure (crews and aircraft in units) for roughly the same cost as ARI
  - Higher proportion of equipment in operational units and lower "overhead"; considers 2 full equipment sets for Korea excessive
  - Less disruptive for the Guard to implement, with fewer aircraft and pilot movements across the states

# Aviation Force Structure Comparison

OSD CAPE

Units	ARI	Guard Option
Active Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) /Apache battalions	10/20	8/16
Multi-Component CABs/Apache battalions	0	2/4*
Guard CABs/Apache battalions	0	2/4**

\* 2 Active and 2 Guard

\*\* Equipped with 18 (vs. 24) Apaches

- Multi-Component CAB structure when deployed:
  - 1 battalion each of Active Attack (Apaches), Assault (Blackhawks), and General Support (Blackhawks, Chinooks)
  - 1 battalion of Guard Attack (Apaches)
- Multi-Component CABs deploy in peacetime at the same rate as Active CABs
  - Training/availability of Guard Apache battalions must sync with the AC battalions
  - Sourced with 4 of the 6 Guard Apache battalions

# Apache Inventory Comparison

OSD CAPE

Apaches Quantities In:	ARI FY19	Guard Option FY19
Active Battalions (BNs) (24 a/c per)	480	432
Guard BNs in Multi-Compo CABs (24 a/c per)	0	48
Guard BNs in Guard CABs (18 a/c per)	0	72
Equipment Set for Korea (2 BNs)	48	0
Training + Test	80 + 15	80 + 12
Readiness Float	67 (10%)	57 (8%)
<i>Depot Maintenance (CCAD)</i>	6	6
<i>Boeing Mesa Remanufacture</i>	54	48
<i>Average Attrition Per Year</i>	3	3
<i>Other Operational Float Aircraft</i>	4	0
<b>Total Apaches</b>	<b>690</b>	<b>701</b>
<b>Apaches for peacetime attrition thru 2030</b>	<b>36</b>	
<b>Current Inventory</b>	<b>726</b>	
<b>Quantity to Procure in mid-2020s</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11</b>

# Demand for CABs

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*OSD CAPE*

- Placeholder – full slide is classified SECRET

# Peacetime Tempo

OSD CAPE


## Based on assumed demand:

- AC Apache battalions' Deploy: Dwell ratio will be about 1:2 in peacetime
  - SecDef redline for AC is 1:1, goal is 1:2
- Guard MOB:Dwell in Multi-Component CABs will be just over 1:3 to 1:4 in peacetime
  - SecDef redline for Reserve Component MOB:Dwell is 1:4, goal is 1:5
- Guard could reduce peacetime tempo to almost 1:6 by devoting all 6 Apache battalions to supporting the Multi-Component CABs
  - However, at 1:6 tempo, Guard Apache battalions are not available to deploy with Guard CABs

# Training Cycles

OSD CAPE

- Guard plan to train 196 days over 4 years compares to OIF/OEF experience shown below
  - OIF/OEF missions are considered less complex than Decisive Action
- In OIF/OEF, Guard units had personnel turbulence 3 years prior to deployment; stabilization in manning did not occur until mobilization
  - Active force has higher turbulence, but stabilizes with full manning prior to 9 months of training
- Impact of longer post-mobilization training includes expanding mobilization time beyond one year or reducing deployment time below 9 months




\*Paid days after normalization (pre-mob training) + post-mob training

Guard Personnel Turbulence	MOB-3	MOB-2	MOB-1	Mobilization
Aim Point for Pilot Deployers On-Hand	75%	85%	100%	100%
OIF/OEF average 2009-2013	42%	51%	72%	95%

Tiger Team Discussed – Guard disagrees with using paid days

# Cost Analysis Results

OSD CAPE



- Guard option annual costs: \$89-\$176M more than ARI
  - 6-11% growth in Attack-Recon costs; 2-3% growth in total Army Aviation operating costs
  - Range spans Guard Lower with Blackhawk Savings to Guard Upper w/o Blackhawk Savings
- “Guard Lower”: assumes Guard plan for pre-deployment training (*Guard agreement*)
- “Guard Upper”: assumes more Guard training based on OIF/OEF experience (*Active agreement*)
- One-time costs: ARI pilot re-qualification, Apache transport; Guard option: Shadow, Apache buy

# Capacity Modeling

OSD CAPE

- ARI and Guard options modeled using CAPE's Force Generation Model
  - Discrete event simulation model that examines force readiness over time
  - Measures demands met/unmet across multiple operational periods

	Case 1	Case 2
	Assumes Guard needs <u>60*</u> days of post-mobilization training and is allowed to exceed SECDEF redline tempo	Assumes Guard needs <u>more than 60 days</u> of post-mobilization training
Steady State	Same Capacity	ARI generates more capacity than Guard option
Surge	Both can meet surge timelines	
Post-Surge	ARI generates more capacity than Guard option	

\*Not supported by OIF/OEF data

# Metrics Summary

OSD CAPE

Metric	ARI	Guard Option
Fully Manned BNs	20 AC	24 (18 AC + 6 Guard)
Fully Equipped BNs / Partially Equipped BNs / Equipment Sets	20 / 0 / 2	20 / 4 / 0
Assigned Crews	480	576
Total Inventory / Aircraft in operational units	690 / 480	701 / 552
Deploy:Dwell (AC) or MOB:Dwell (Guard MC) to meet peacetime demands	About 1:2 (AC)	About 1:2 (AC) 1:3 – 1:4 (Guard)
Number of Apache BNs to achieve AC availability	1 @ \$69M	2 @ \$40M-\$50M each*
CAB Capacity at DoD Deploy:Dwell Policy (AC and MC CAB 1:2)	3.0	2.8 – 3.0
Annual Cost	\$1.58B	\$1.67 - \$1.75B
One-time Cost	\$77M (FY16-19)	Shadow: \$150M (FY16-18); Apache: \$420M (FY25-26)

\*Guard also has 2 additional, typically lower readiness, Apache BNs @ \$33M each

# Additional Metrics

OSD CAPE

Average Flying Hours per Apache Pilot in Combat Units	Active Component	Guard
Total Flying Hours	1,091	1,016
Combat Flying Hours	593	280
% of Pilots with Combat Experience	77%	65%
Night Vision Flying Hours	319.5	255.9



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS  
111 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

March 26, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE MANNING AND TRAINING  
PROGRAM EVALUATION GROUPS

SUBJECT: Recognition of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and Military Technicians  
(MILTECH) for the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard POM 01-05

The Army's efforts to transition to a seamless, integrated Total Force, combined with new missions generated by an evolving National Military Strategy, have placed increased demands on Reserve Component Full-Time Support manpower. With 54% of the Army now in the Reserve Components, the Army must rely to an increasing extent on the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve to meet the requirements of a dynamic National Military Strategy. Current and future Army operations depend on a fully integrated force with the flexibility to respond quickly to meet rapidly changing operational requirements. FTS personnel are critical links to the interoperability of the Army components. For all of these reasons increases in Reserve Component Full-Time Support are deemed essential to the future of the Total Army. The Army's Reserve Components are the most used of all the Services, yet resourcing does not reflect this reality. Additionally, recent FTS reductions have degraded the reserve components' ability to support the increased demand.

Recently, the ASA (M&RA) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, with assistance from the USAR and the ARNG refined a process for determining FTS requirements. This process identified ARNG FTS requirements at 82,022 (39,675 AGRs and 42,347 MILTECHS) and the USAR FTS requirements at 34,056 (21,517 AGRs and 10,357 MILTECHS, DAC 1579, and AC 603). (*#s are in 00*)

On March 24<sup>th</sup> the Army National Guard and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) briefed the Co-Chairs of the Organizing PEG on Full-Time Support (FTS) requirements. As a result, the ASA (M&RA) and ODCSOPS validated the following critical manning level of FTS for both components to compete for resources in POM FY01-05.

These critical requirements represent a very low percentage of Total Army FTS requirements. The Organizing PEG realizes that insufficient TOA exists to fund the total critical requirements.

ARNG Critical Requirements (CR)  
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05

MILTECHS	25,500	25,500	25,500	25,500	25,500
Wedge	<u>-437</u>	<u>-864</u>	<u>-864</u>	<u>-864</u>	<u>-864</u>
Adjusted CR	25,063	24,636	24,636	24,636	24,636

AGR CR	<u>23,500</u>	<u>23,500</u>	<u>23,500</u>	<u>23,500</u>	<u>23,500</u>
Total ARNG FTS C	48,563	48,136	48,136	48,136	48,136

ARNG DOES NOT USE AC OR DAC AS FTS.


USAR Critical Requirements (CR)  
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05

MILTECHS	9,326	9,326	9,326	9,326	9,326
Wedge	<u>-93</u>	<u>-200</u>	<u>-200</u>	<u>-200</u>	<u>-200</u>
Adjusted CR	9,233	9,126	9,126	9,126	9,126

AGR CR	<u>13,104</u>	<u>13,404</u>	<u>13,704</u>	<u>14,004</u>	<u>14,304</u>
DAC FTS CR	1,311	1,311	1,311	1,311	1,311
AC FTS CR	<u>603</u>	<u>603</u>	<u>603</u>	<u>603</u>	<u>603</u>
Total USAR FTS C	24,251	24,444	24,744	25,044	25,344

Recommend the Manning and Training PEGs recognize the above increases to Reserve Component FTS and submit unfunded requirements to the senior leadership for a decision.

Once the SA/CSA decision on the reserve component wedge reduction is final, any restoration of reserve component Military Technicians must be added to reserve component adjusted critical requirements identified above.

  
Jayson L. Spiegel  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
(Force Management, Manpower  
and Resources)

  
BENJAMIN S. GRIFFIN  
Brigadier General, GS  
Director, Force Programs

CF: DACS-PAE

CF: Mr. Henry  
LTG Burnette  
LTG Heebner

21

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OFDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS  
111 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

January 18, 2001

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE MANNING AND TRAINING PROGRAM  
EVALUATION GROUPS****SUBJECT: Recognition of POM 03-07 Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and Military  
Technician (MILTECH) Requirements for the Army National Guard and U.S.  
Army Reserve**

The Army's transformation strategy and efforts to fully integrate the Reserve Components (RC) have placed increased demands on RC full-time Support (FTS) manpower requirements. The frequency and the number of deployments cause the Army to rely to a greater extent on the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) to meet global commitments. Current and future Army operations require full spectrum, integrated forces that can quickly respond to rapidly changing operational requirements. FTS personnel are critical links to integration and interoperability among Army components. For these reasons, an increase in RC full-time Support is essential to the future of the Army.

The Army's Reserve Components are the most heavily employed of all the Services, yet resourcing does not reflect this reality. The DoD average FTS Manning level is 17 percent of endstrength, while the total for the ARNG and USAR is 13 and 10 percent, respectively. FTS in the Marine Corps is 17 percent and the other Reserve Components are above the DoD average.

The OASA (M&RA) and the ODCSOPS, with assistance from the ARNG and the USAR reviewed the process for determining FTS requirements. This review identified ARNG total validated FTS requirements at 83,650 (41,321 AGRs and 42,329 MILTECHS) and the USAR total validated FTS requirements at 34,145 (21,088 AGRs and 13,057 MILTECHS).

On February 28, 2000 the Army National Guard and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve briefed the Deputy Assistant for Force Management, Manpower and Resources and the Director, Force Management on FTS requirements. As a result, the DASA (FMMR) and Director, Force Management, ODCSOPS validated the process for determining the DA High Risk Manning level. The DA High Risk level allocates 90%, 80%, 70%, and 65% of their FTS requirements to Force Packages (FP) 1-4 respectively. This methodology accommodates future DA High Risk FTS requirement changes resulting from the Total Army Analysis. In addition, they establish a ramp to reach the DA High Risk Manning level.

Recommend the Manning and Training PEGs:

1. Establish in POM 03-07 validated FTS level as identified below.
2. Fund FTS to Congressionally authorized levels.
3. Establish and present UFR across POM years to senior army leadership (by subtracting authorized End Strength from End Strength with ramp).

ARNG REQUIREMENTS

AGR	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12
Validated Level	41321	41078	41280	41510	41538	41568	41566	41566	41566	41566	41566
DA High Risk Level	30402	30402	30402	30402	30402	30402	30402	30402	30402	30402	30402
Annual RAMP	724	724	724	724	724	724	724	724	724	724	188
ES with Ramp	23698	24422	25145	25870	26594	27318	28042	28766	29490	30214	30402
Authorized ES	22974	22974	22974	22974	22974	22974	22974	22974	22974	22974	22974
Annual UFR	724	1448	2172	2896	3620	4344	5068	5792	6516	7240	7428

MILTECHS	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12
Validated Level	42329	42329	42329	42329	42329	42329	42329	42329	42329	42329	42329
DA High Risk Level	29319	29319	29319	29319	29319	29319	29319	29319	29319	29319	29319
Annual RAMP	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	208	0
ES with Ramp	25215	25702	26189	26676	27163	27650	28137	28624	29111	29319	29319
Authorized ES	24728	24728	24728	24728	24728	24728	24728	24728	24728	24728	24728
Annual UFR	487	974	1461	1948	2435	2922	3409	3896	4383	4870	4591

USAR Requirements

AGR	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12
Validated Level	21088	21088	21088	21088	21088	21088	21088	21088	21088	21088	21088
DA High Risk Level	16079	16079	16079	16079	16079	16079	16079	16079	16079	16079	16079
Annual RAMP	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	273	0
ES with Ramp	13406	13706	14006	14306	14606	14906	15206	15506	15806	16079	16079
Authorized ES	13106	13106	13106	13106	13106	13106	13106	13106	13106	13106	13106
Annual UFR	300	600	900	1200	1500	1800	2100	2400	2700	2973	2973

MILTECHS	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12
Validated Level	13057	13057	13057	13057	13057	13057	13057	13057	13057	13057	13057
DA High Risk Level	8990	8990	8990	8990	8990	8990	8990	8990	8990	8990	8990
Annual RAMP	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	146	0	0	0
ES with Ramp	7344	7594	7844	8094	8344	8594	8844	8990	8990	8990	8990
Authorized ES	7094	7094	7094	7094	7094	7094	7094	7094	7094	7094	7094
Annual UFR	250	500	750	1000	1250	1500	1750	1896	1896	1896	1896

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS  
111 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0111

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

DAMO-FMI

FEB 25 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE MANNING AND TRAINING  
PROGRAM EVALUATION GROUPS


SUBJECT: Full-Time Support (FTS) Requirement Adjustments


1. The Army's transformation strategy and efforts to fully integrate the Reserve Components (RC) have increased RC Full-Time Support (FTS) manpower requirements. Current and future Army operations require full spectrum, integrated forces that can quickly respond to rapidly changing operational requirements. FTS personnel are critical links to integration and interoperability among Army components. For these reasons, an increase in RC FTS is essential to the future of the Army.
2. On 19 Nov 02, the FTS CoC established an Army position on increased FTS requirements and adjustments that are necessary to support emerging missions and/or initiatives that unfolded since the completion of Total Army Analysis 04-09. The CoC recommended increasing FTS requirements in four areas in the Army National Guard (ARNG) AGR category by 798 positions. No increases or adjustments are necessary for the Army Reserve (AR) FTS ramps.
3. The Army G-3 was briefed on these additional requirements and approved them as presented (Tab B).
4. The increased requirements for ARNG AGRs affect both the total requirement and the DA High Risk requirement and will require an adjustment to the current Full-Time Support requirements ramp (Tab C). The current FTS ramp was designed to achieve the minimum level of FTS (DA High Risk level) needed to maintain reserve component unit readiness as quickly and as fiscally possible. The incremental increases to FTS requirements associated with this readiness initiative are programmed across the 04-09 POM years in the existing ramp (Tab C), with additional requirement increases for FY10-12 to be addressed in future POM's. New and expanding missions are being directed to the RC, which specifically require additional FTS for execution. These missions specify the number and timing for FTS personnel necessary for mission accomplishment. Providing FTS for these missions without requisite additional resources will un-fund existing requirements, and exacerbate the current lack of FTS, which negatively impacts RC unit readiness.

DAMO-FMI

SUBJECT: Full-Time Support (FTS) Requirement Adjustments

5. The approved FTS requirement increases were for the following areas:
  - a. Ground – Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) = 245
  - b. NGB Homeland Security and Liaison Offices = 67
  - c. Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) = 478
  - d. Transformation Installation Management (TIM) = 8
6. Again, these requirement increases will require an adjustment to the FTS ramp to facilitate the ARNG's ability to reach the new DA High Risk level. This adjustment will also enable the ARNG to program the increased AGR requirements in the years necessary to support the implementation time lines for each mission/initiative.
7. Three of the four areas recommended by the FTS CoC (GMD, HLS, WMD-CST) for increases are directly tied to the number one priority of the National Security Strategy – Homeland Security/Defense. With the exception of the WMD-CST area, we expect these requirements to compete for funding during the 05 – 09 Mini-POM. Increased requirements for WMD-CSTs is addressed in the FY 03 National Defense Authorization Act which requires the Secretary of Defense to come up with an implementation plan (within 180 days) to establish one WMD-CST per state and territory. However, the FY03 NDAA does not direct an operational effective date. Total number of requirements to compete for funding is 320. **The estimated dollar cost spread across the ramp (Tab E) for FY 03 to FY09 is \$96 million.**
8. The point of contact for this memorandum is LTC Bellamy, (703) 693-3109, [oliver.bellamy@hqda.army.mil](mailto:oliver.bellamy@hqda.army.mil).

  
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MAY 08 2015

The Honorable Terry E. Branstad  
Co-Chair  
Governor, State of Iowa  
Des Moines, IA 50319

The Honorable Dan Malloy  
Co-Chair  
Governor, State of Connecticut  
Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Governor Branstad and Governor Malloy:

Thank you for your letter of March 12, 2015. I appreciate your views on the future of our defense forces and the great collaboration we have with the Council of Governors and our Guard and Reserve forces. For that reason, Secretary Carter and I firmly believe in, and are committed to, the sustained exchange of candid views, information, and advice.

I appreciate your concerns about the planned reductions to the Army National Guard (ARNG) end strength. As you know, the Department of Defense (DoD) is faced with tough fiscal realities, and we have had to make some difficult choices. The DoD plans to reduce the end strengths of the Regular Army and Army Reserve – as well as the Army National Guard. We do want to manage the reductions smoothly. The timeline for the ARNG force reductions mirrors the total Army's. If the Active Component reduces 40,000 soldiers from 490,000 to 450,000 by Fiscal Year 2017, the ARNG will reduce 15,000 from 350,000 to 335,000 by Fiscal Year 2017. To mitigate these reductions, the President's budget invests in near-term unit readiness by adjusting the end strength reduction ramps. This, in turn, will increase funding to improve home station training and training-related infrastructure. DoD's goal is to reduce stress on the force to the maximum extent possible, and we are looking at the issue seriously. To keep you informed, I will discuss the results of DoD's examination of the issues during the May 26, 2015, inter-session conference call.

Additionally, I understand your concern regarding the Army Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) and the change in composition of National Guard helicopter platforms. From a homeland requirements perspective, DoD works with the National Guard Bureau to ensure that we take into account your critical role in serving the citizens of your state and the type of capabilities that may best fit your needs. We assess the UH-60 Black Hawks would be a more suitable capability to support your state requirements. As we continue to better understand your concerns, we could certainly use your perspective and view on this issue.

In order to best serve the nation, I agree with you that force structure changes should be based on cost, value, mission capability along with other factors. With this in mind, I proposed at the July 10, 2014, Council plenary meeting that a Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation-led joint analytical tiger team examine the ARI and the National Guard Bureau alternative. The tiger team's conclusions, which I provided to the Council on December 2, 2014, found that the ARI would provide more capability, at a higher readiness level, at a lower cost, and with less risk than the National Guard Bureau alternative. Secretary Carter and I are committed to making



sound, well-founded decisions, and I encourage you to provide any additional details or analysis that may better inform the previous findings.

I understand that you would prefer that the National Commission on the Future of the Army deliver its report prior to implementation of the ARI. Unfortunately, our current financial resources make a delay difficult to support. Congress has authorized the transfer of up to 48 AH-64 Apache helicopters after October 1, 2015. The report of the National Commission is due to the President and the Congress by February 1, 2016; deferring any transfer until after this date would further strain the Army's fiscal resources. For this reason, I support the transfer of the limited number of AH-64 Apaches from the Army National Guard to the Active component.

I share your view that the National Guard is a unique and critical state resource for responding to disasters and emergencies. DoD is committed to providing support to states as needed, and we will continue to make our substantial capabilities and capacities available for responses to disasters and emergencies.

Thank you for your continued leadership on the Council of Governors. I believe it is essential that we maintain this open dialogue for the defense of the nation. I look forward to our continued work together.

Sincerely,  
