



The Adjutants General Association of the United States

July 15, 2015

General (Retired) Carter F. Ham
Chairperson
National Commission on the Future of the Army
2530 Crystal Dr., Suite #5000
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear General Ham:

During your visit to North Carolina on June 10, 2015, you posed eight strategic questions for the Adjutants General to consider. I met with my colleagues on June 15, 2015, at the annual summer meeting of the Adjutants General Association where we discussed each of these questions in depth. Attached is our collective response.

Thank you for taking time from your schedule to entertain this dialogue. If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to contact me.

Signed on behalf of the Adjutants General of the 54 United States, Territories and the District,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Glenn H. Curtis".

Glenn H. Curtis
President

Enclosure

Copy Furnished:
MG (Ret) Ray Carpenter, Executive Director
GEN Frank Grass, Chief, National Guard Bureau
LTG Timothy Kadavy, Director, Army National Guard
MG (Ret) Gus Hargett, NGAUS
54 Adjutants General

CONSENSUS OF THE 54 ADJUTANTS GENERAL
ON ISSUES PERTINENT TO
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY

15 July 2015

1. Are TAGs interested in maintaining a TTHS account?

We are unwilling to trade force structure for end strength. We must keep the appropriate force structure—in type and size—to meet requirements for national and state missions and to ensure sufficient training capacity to meet readiness requirements. To this end, force structure and end strength should match as closely as possible. We welcome TTHS accounts in excess of currently authorized force structure/end strength.

2. What are the proper mobilization/deployment to dwell ratios for the ARNG?

We fully support the deployment to dwell ratios outlined by General Grass in his “All In” memorandum dated May 2013. Specifically, we agree to the following:

1. BOG for one year within a three year period (1:2 deploy to dwell) for unplanned contingency operations
2. BOG for one year within a five year period (1:4 deploy to dwell) for longer, steady-state operations
3. More frequent operational use, up to the maximum limits of presidential or congressional authorities when required to meet the needs of any national emergency

We further acknowledge that certain units, such as Special Ops and Aviation that routinely exceed these ratios, can continue to do so. We will continue to answer the Nation’s call by providing capabilities when and where they are required.

3. Do TAGs support the business rule that requires leaving 50% of a state’s end strength in that state for emergency operations?

No. There is no 50% business rule. Army National Guard contributions to the Total Army are not constrained by the unwritten, informal agreement once known as the 50% rule. We have the capability through EMAC and other partnerships to effectively balance federal and state requirements without imposing the limitations of this outdated and unnecessary practice.

4. Do TAGs support Individual mobilizations and augmentees?

ARNG units are best utilized in the manner in which they are trained, organized, and assembled, just like their active component counterparts. Unit mobilization should continue to be the routine process to mobilize Army National Guardsmen. The ARNG does not have an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program. However, methods—such as Derivative Unit Identification Codes (DUIC) and the

Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS)—to voluntarily mobilize ARNG soldiers are appropriate to meet requirements and should be continued.

5. Are TAGs willing to make trade-offs between end strength, force structure, deployment to dwell ratios, and readiness?

Foundational to the role of the National Guard is the ability to provide reliable depth to the Total Force. Effective and appropriate force structure is the best strategy to fulfill this role. Optimal force structure allows for the implementation of sustained readiness models, such as ARFORGEN, and offers the optimum solution to ensure adequate capacity to respond to unplanned contingency operations.

In support of this tenet, we reiterate our commitment to the deployment to dwell ratios in the previously referenced “All In” memorandum. The resulting increase in ARNG operational tempo from more frequent deployments is our trade-off for maintaining force structure.

We are unwilling to trade force structure for end strength.

We are willing to make adjustments to readiness as needed to maintain force structure / end strength.

6. What are the TAGs’ thoughts on Multi-Component Units (MCU)?

Multi-component formations are advantageous to the Total Army. The Air Force has demonstrated success in executing multi-component units and we believe similar constructs using Classic and Active Associations as defined below would optimize resources while building a generation of leaders better versed in all components of the Total Army.

Classic Association – An integration model that combines Active and Reserve elements, with the Active Component serving as the higher headquarters.

Active Association – An integration model that combines Active and Reserve elements, with the Reserve Component serving as the higher headquarters.

While we believe MCUs can be successful, they must remain balanced. The National Guard expects to maintain command level echelons at Division Level and below, but we welcome the integration of ARNG formations into active HHQ echelons balanced with integration of active duty formations into National Guard HHQ echelons.

We are willing to consider reinstating “Round-Out Brigades”, TSBs and the Title XI program with the caveat that they do not detract from overall National Guard end strength or force structure.

Additionally, we support the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept. All of these initiatives would enhance the Army Total Force concept, and will improve the Army’s ability to provide units and capabilities through integrated operational training, increased AC/RC professional relationships, and collaborative training focus.

7. What are the TAGs' thoughts on the Army Chief of Staff's recommendations with regard to Full-Time Support (FTS)?

The CSA's recommendation is in direct contradiction to the Army's previous position on the role of FTS in the Reserve Components. As early as 1999 the Army recognized the requirement for increased FTS manning in the Reserve Component saying:

"FTS personnel are critical links to the interoperability of the Army components. For all of these reasons increases in Reserve Component Full-Time Support are deemed essential to the future of the Total Army. The Army's Reserve Components are the most used of all the Service, yet resourcing does not reflect this reality." (Attachment 1)

In 2001—in recognition of these FTS requirements and well prior to the events of 9/11—the Army's Director of Force Management, then BG Odierno, implemented a plan for FTS authorizations to reach 72% of the requirement (Attachment 2). The notion that growth in the ARNG FTS program was directly tied to the Army's involvement in two wars is simply false.

The increased workload to meet readiness requirements has placed a much heavier burden on FTS than was experienced in prior eras. Therefore, we fully support the Army's goal of funding 72% of the FTS requirements and believe this would allow the ARNG to ensure baseline readiness. We understand the fiscal reality that may prevent future growth from today's FTS baseline to the goal of 72%; however, FTS manning levels remain essential to maintaining foundational readiness for ARNG units. Additionally, FTS is critical to delivery of Army programs to our Citizen-Soldiers. The ARNG simply cannot afford further reductions in FTS.

Although less durable manning solutions such as ADOS and 12304B have proven effective, they are not the solution to FTS. These solutions should be additive to current baseline FTS numbers, and used in times of increased demand for RC forces.

8. "What should the role of 1st Army be?"

We support the concept of National Guard units validating National Guard units.

1st Army should focus on providing enablers and support packages to the National Guard during pre/post mobilization training, especially at echelons above battalion and brigade. Most of 1st Army's full-time manning should be placed into Army National Guard Pre-mobilization Training Assistance Element programs.

ATTACHMENT 1



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0111

March 26, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE MANNING AND TRAINING
PROGRAM EVALUATION GROUPS

SUBJECT: Recognition of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and Military Technicians
(MILTECH) for the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard POM 01-05

The Army's efforts to transition to a seamless, integrated Total Force, combined with new missions generated by an evolving National Military Strategy, have placed increased demands on Reserve Component Full-Time Support manpower. With 54% of the Army now in the Reserve Components, the Army must rely to an increasing extent on the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve to meet the requirements of a dynamic National Military Strategy. Current and future Army operations depend on a fully integrated force with the flexibility to respond quickly to meet rapidly changing operational requirements. FTS personnel are critical links to the interoperability of the Army components. For all of these reasons increases in Reserve Component Full-Time Support are deemed essential to the future of the Total Army. The Army's Reserve Components are the most used of all the Services, yet resourcing does not reflect this reality. Additionally, recent FTS reductions have degraded the reserve components' ability to support the increased demand.

Recently, the ASA (M&RA) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, with assistance from the USAR and the ARNG refined a process for determining FTS requirements. This process identified ARNG FTS requirements at 82,022 (39,675 AGRs and 42,347 MILTECHS) and the USAR FTS requirements at 34,056 (21,517 AGRs and 10,357 MILTECHS, DAC 1579, and AC 603). (*#s are for 05*)

On March 24th the Army National Guard and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) briefed the Co-Chairs of the Organizing PEG on Full-Time Support (FTS) requirements. As a result, the ASA (M&RA) and ODCSOPS validated the following critical Manning level of FTS for both components to compete for resources in POM FY01-05.

These critical requirements represent a very low percentage of Total Army FTS requirements. The Organizing PEG realizes that insufficient TOA exists to fund the total critical requirements.

ARNG Critical Requirements (CR)
 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05

| | | | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| MILTECHS | 25,500 | 25,500 | 25,500 | 25,500 | 25,500 |
| Wedge | <u>-437</u> | <u>-864</u> | <u>-864</u> | <u>-864</u> | <u>-864</u> |
| Adjusted CR | 25,063 | 24,636 | 24,636 | 24,636 | 24,636 |

| | | | | | |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| AGR CR | <u>23,500</u> | <u>23,500</u> | <u>23,500</u> | <u>23,500</u> | <u>23,500</u> |
| Total ARNG FTS/C | 48,563 | 48,136 | 48,136 | 48,136 | 48,136 |

ARNG DOES NOT USE AC OR DAC AS FTS.

USAR Critical Requirements (CR)
 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05

| | | | | | |
|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| MILTECHS | 9,326 | 9,326 | 9,326 | 9,326 | 9,326 |
| Wedge | <u>-93</u> | <u>-200</u> | <u>-200</u> | <u>-200</u> | <u>-200</u> |
| Adjusted GR | 9,233 | 9,126 | 9,126 | 9,126 | 9,126 |

| | | | | | |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| AGR CR | <u>13,104</u> | <u>13,404</u> | <u>13,704</u> | <u>14,004</u> | <u>14,304</u> |
| DAC FTS CR | 1,311 | 1,311 | 1,311 | 1,311 | 1,311 |
| AC FTS CR | <u>603</u> | <u>603</u> | <u>603</u> | <u>603</u> | <u>603</u> |
| Total USAR FTS C | 24,251 | 24,444 | 24,744 | 25,044 | 25,344 |

Recommend the Manning and Training PEGs recognize the above increases to Reserve Component FTS and submit unfunded requirements to the senior leadership for a decision.

Once the SA/CSA decision on the reserve component Wedge reduction is final, any restoration of reserve component Military Technicians must be added to reserve component adjusted critical requirements identified above.


 Jayson L. Spreng
 Deputy Assistant Secretary
 (Force Management, Manpower
 and Resources)


 BENJAMIN S. GRIFFIN
 Brigadier General, GS
 Director, Force Programs

CF: DACS-PAE

CF: Mr. Henry
 LTC Burnette
 LTC Harbner

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ATTACHMENT 2

FEB-26-01 13:18 FROM:

ID:

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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

January 18, 2001

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE MANNING AND TRAINING PROGRAM
EVALUATION GROUPS**

**SUBJECT: Recognition of POM 03-07 Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and Military
Technician (MILTECH) Requirements for the Army National Guard and U.S.
Army Reserve**

The Army's transformation strategy and efforts to fully integrate the Reserve Components (RC) have placed increased demands on RC full-time Support (FTS) manpower requirements. The frequency and the number of deployments cause the Army to rely to a greater extent on the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) to meet global commitments. Current and future Army operations require full spectrum, integrated forces that can quickly respond to rapidly changing operational requirements. FTS personnel are critical links to integration and interoperability among Army components. For these reasons, an increase in RC full-time Support is essential to the future of the Army.

The Army's Reserve Components are the most heavily employed of all the Services, yet resourcing does not reflect this reality. The DoD average FTS Manning level is 17 percent of endstrength, while the total for the ARNG and USAR is 13 and 10 percent, respectively. FTS in the Marine Corps is 17 percent and the other Reserve Components are above the DoD average.

The OASA (M&RA) and the ODCSOPS, with assistance from the ARNG and the USAR reviewed the process for determining FTS requirements. This review identified ARNG total validated FTS requirements at 83,650 (41,321 AGRs and 42,329 MILTECHS) and the USAR total validated FTS requirements at 34,145 (21,088 AGRs and 13,057 MILTECHS).

On February 28, 2000 the Army National Guard and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve briefed the Deputy Assistant for Force Management, Manpower and Resources and the Director, Force Management on FTS requirements. As a result, the DASA (FMMR) and Director, Force Management, ODCSOPS validated the process for determining the DA High Risk Manning level. The DA High Risk level allocates 90%, 80%, 70%, and 65% of their FTS requirements to Force Packages (FP) 1-4 respectively. This methodology accommodates future DA High Risk FTS requirement changes resulting from the Total Army Analysis. In addition, they establish a ramp to reach the DA High Risk Manning level.

Recommend the Manning and Training PEGs:

1. Establish in POM 03-07 validated FTS level as identified below.
2. Fund FTS to Congressionally authorized levels.
3. Establish and present UFR across POM years to senior army leadership (by subtracting authorized End Strength from End Strength with ramp).

ARNG REQUIREMENTS

| AGR | FY02 | FY03 | FY04 | FY05 | FY06 | FY07 | FY08 | FY09 | FY10 | FY11 | FY12 |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Validated Level | 41321 | 41078 | 41800 | 41510 | 41838 | 41568 | 41566 | 41566 | 41566 | 41566 | 41566 |
| BA High Risk Level | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 | 30402 |
| Annual RAMP | 724 | 724 | 724 | 724 | 724 | 724 | 724 | 724 | 724 | 724 | 188 |
| ES with Ramp | 23698 | 24422 | 25146 | 25870 | 26594 | 27318 | 28042 | 28766 | 29490 | 30214 | 30402 |
| Authorized ES | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 | 22974 |
| Annual UFR | 724 | 1448 | 2172 | 2896 | 3620 | 4344 | 5068 | 5792 | 6516 | 7240 | 7428 |

| MILTECHS | FY07 | FY08 | FY09 | FY10 | FY11 | FY12 |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Validated Level | 42329 | 42329 | 42329 | 42329 | 42329 | 42329 |
| BA High Risk Level | 29319 | 29319 | 29319 | 29319 | 29319 | 29319 |
| Annual RAMP | 487 | 487 | 487 | 487 | 487 | 0 |
| ES with Ramp | 25215 | 25702 | 26189 | 26676 | 27163 | 27650 |
| Authorized ES | 24728 | 24728 | 24728 | 24728 | 24728 | 24728 |
| Annual UFR | 487 | 974 | 1461 | 1948 | 2435 | 2622 |

USAR Requirements

| AGR | FY02 | FY03 | FY04 | FY05 | FY06 | FY07 | FY08 | FY09 | FY10 | FY11 | FY12 |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Validated Level | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 | 21088 |
| BA High Risk Level | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 | 16078 |
| Annual RAMP | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 0 |
| ES with Ramp | 13408 | 13708 | 14008 | 14308 | 14608 | 14908 | 15208 | 15508 | 15808 | 16078 | 16078 |
| Authorized ES | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 | 13108 |
| Annual UFR | 300 | 600 | 900 | 1200 | 1500 | 1800 | 2100 | 2400 | 2700 | 2978 | 3870 |

| MILTECHS | FY03 | FY04 | FY05 | FY06 | FY07 | FY08 | FY09 | FY10 | FY11 | FY12 |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Validated Level | 13057 | 13057 | 13057 | 13057 | 13057 | 13057 | 13057 | 13057 | 13057 | 13057 |
| BA High Risk Level | 8980 | 8980 | 8980 | 8980 | 8980 | 8980 | 8980 | 8980 | 8980 | 8980 |
| Annual RAMP | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 148 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ES with Ramp | 7344 | 7694 | 8044 | 8394 | 8744 | 9094 | 9444 | 9794 | 10144 | 10594 |
| Authorized ES | 7094 | 7094 | 7094 | 7094 | 7094 | 7094 | 7094 | 7094 | 7094 | 7094 |
| Annual UFR | 250 | 500 | 750 | 1000 | 1250 | 1600 | 1750 | 1898 | 1898 | 1898 |

Robert Bartholomew, III
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 Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
 (Force Management, Manpower and
 Resources)

Raymond T. Odierno
 RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
 Brigadier General, GS
 Director, Force Management

CF: DACS-PAE
 ARNG
 OCAR