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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

19 August 2015

(U) FEASIBILITY OF AN OPTIMAL TRAINEES, TRANSIENTS, HOLDEES, AND STUDENTS (TTHS) LIKE” CAPABILITY IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG). (U) At any one time, ~21% of the ARNG is non-available due to training or medical issues. Comparatively the AC has ~23% of their soldiers that are non-available due to training, medical and other reasons. To increase unit readiness, the AC manages a portion of these non-available personnel in a TTHS account which averages around 13% (~63.7K based on 490K FSA) of the AC force structure at a cost of about \$10B annually (~\$165K per soldier). An optimal “TTHS-like” capability for the ARNG of 10K to 15K (2.9% to 4.3% of ARNG FSA) would provide the flexibility required to achieve and maintain desired unit readiness. The anticipated cost for this ARNG capability is ~\$298M to \$447M annually (~\$29.8K per soldier). This TTHS-like capability of “authorized and resourced end strength above force structure allowance” (FSA) in the ARNG facilitates maximizing unit readiness across the operational force structure. Requiring the ARNG to internally resource a TTHS-like capability would require a force structure offset which in turn increases the Army’s risk and reduces ARNG capabilities.

Consideration:

- How would an ARNG “TTHS-like” capability be implemented across the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia?

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INFORMATION PAPER

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SUBJECT: Feasibility of an Optimal “Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) like” Capability in the Army National Guard (ARNG)

1. Purpose: To define the optimal size of a “TTHS-like” capability for the ARNG to maximize unit readiness.

2. Summary: A “TTHS-like” capability, of between 10k and 15k of resourced authorizations in the ARNG facilitates maximizing unit readiness across the operational force structure. For the ARNG, a “TTHS-like” capability is defined as “authorized and resourced end strength above force structure allowance” (FSA). Initial analysis indicates that a “TTHS-like” capability of this size provides the flexibility required to ensure that the ARNG can achieve and maintain desired unit readiness across the force. Optimally, this “TTHS-like” capability is authorized and resourced as an addition to budgeted End Strength (ES) and resource levels. To the contrary, requiring the ARNG to internally resource a “TTHS-like” capability would require a force structure offset which in turn increases the Army’s risk to execute the National Security Strategy and reduce capacity and capability within the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia to respond to domestic emergencies.

3. Background:

a. Chapter 3, AR 600-8-6, Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting states that Active Component (AC) Army Soldiers not assigned to units will be counted as part of the AC ES, but not as part of the AC’s operating strength. These Soldiers will be accounted for separately, in individual accounts. These accounts include trainees, transients, holdees (e.g., patients, prisoners, and separatees), students, and US Military Academy cadets.

(1) Trainees. Includes officer accession students. Trainees are those AC Soldiers who have not completed initial military training. Initial military training includes basic training, advanced individual training, and other proficiency or developmental training accomplished before arrival at first permanent duty assignment.

(2) Transients. Includes Soldiers not available for duty while en route to a new permanent duty station. Transient time includes permanent change of station travel time, temporary duty en route, and leave en route. Transient time does not include temporary duty training en route to new permanent duty station, travel associated with a unit move, or travel time associated with movement to or between initial entry courses of instruction.

(3) Holdees. Includes Soldiers who are reassigned from the strength of a unit and assigned to a holding activity.

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(a) Patients. Includes: Soldiers that are reassigned to a Warrior Transition Unit when hospitalization or inpatient treatment has exceeded, or is expected to exceed, 180 days; Soldiers hospitalized and return to duty is not expected; Soldiers enters a patient status while in transit between duty stations; or Soldiers hospitalized as the result of an injury received in a combat area. Exceptions will be based on the Soldier's needs or desires and personnel requirements with the concurrence of the medical treatment facility commander.

(b) Prisoners. Includes Soldiers assigned to a personnel control facility or other type of control facility. Prisoners include Soldiers sentenced to 30 days or more of confinement by a military or civilian court, or Soldiers in a dropped from the rolls status.

(c) Separatees. Includes Soldiers assigned to a transition center awaiting transition from the Army.

(4) Students. Includes Soldiers assigned to a non-initial entry course of instruction (normally, a course length of 20 weeks or more) or Soldiers attending a temporary duty school course en route to a permanent duty station.

b. The AC is authorized a higher personnel ES than the total number of positions in the FSA of its units. This additional ES provides flexibility to fill operational force units with fully trained, ready and deployable Soldiers, maximizing unit readiness - while using a separate personnel account to place and consolidate all unready Soldiers. At any one time, ~23% (~112K based on 490K FSA) of the AC is non-available. A portion of these non-available Soldiers are accounted for through a TTHS personnel account. The TTHS account in the AC averages around 13% (~63.7K based on 490K FSA) of the AC force structure at a cost of about \$10B annually (\$165K per soldier).

c. ARNG Soldiers experience the same personnel events as an AC Soldier. However, ARNG Soldiers are always accounted for in units as the ARNG is not authorized or resourced for a TTHS account. These divergent personnel accounting methodologies result in a perceived higher level of 'unready' units or 'unavailable' Soldiers in the ARNG.

d. In comparison to the AC 23% non-available Soldiers, the non-available population in the ARNG is ~21% (~72K based on 350K FSA) and includes ~40K Trainees, ~28K Medical and ~4K Students.

4. Discussion:

a. Our initial analysis indicates that an optimal "TTHS-like" capability for the ARNG of 10K to 15K (2.9% to 4.3% of ARNG FSA) provides the flexibility required to achieve and maintain desired unit readiness. The anticipated cost for this capability is ~\$298M to \$447M annually (\$29.8K per soldier).

b. For the ARNG to have the flexibility to manage its untrained or otherwise non-deployable populations of Soldiers, the ARNG requires the statutory authorization and resourcing to maintain a sufficient amount of ES in excess of FSA which is consistent with the AC methodology.

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c. The ARNG does not have a need for a “Transients” account, but it could benefit from a like capability for reporting readiness in the Total Force in the form of additional resourced authorizations for “Trainees, Holders, and Students” (THS).

d. A “THS-like” capability reduces demands of cross leveling, resulting in greater unit stability, improved unit cohesion and reduced training costs associated with retraining the individual and collective tasks of the cross-leveled Soldiers.

e. A “THS-like” capability should not be implemented without an increase in ARNG end strength, as force structure offsets become problematic in that they would subsequently reduce unit capacity and capability within the states and territories.

f. Unlike our AC counterparts, ARNG recruits are enlisted into federally recognized units. THS-like capability for ES over FSA would require distribution of capability to the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia. Analysis is ongoing regarding methodology to implement an account or an additional authorization.

g. Notwithstanding our initial analysis, we recommend additional study of this option in order to confirm the optimal size of an ARNG “THS-like” capability for ES over FSA.

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