

NCFA Staff Paper

“Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student (TTHS) Account for Reserve Components of the Army”

QUESTION: Does the Army want Active Component-like personnel readiness for the Reserve Components?

WHAT THIS IS: The Active Component (AC) of the Army is authorized a higher personnel end strength than the total number of positions in the actual force structure. This allows Operating Force units to be filled with fully trained, ready and deployable Soldiers, maximizing unit readiness. Untrained or otherwise non-deployable Soldiers are accounted for outside of Operating Force units and Generating Force units through a TTHS account. Details of this account are provided in AR 600-8-6, Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting, Chapter 3-1.

POSITION/PERSPECTIVE:

The Institutional Subcommittee found that there is interest from both Reserve Components of the Army to establish TTHS accounts. The ARNG explicitly requests that additional end strength authorizations are above force structure authorizations, similar to the Army. This practice will improve personnel readiness enabling unit capabilities required by Total Army Analysis for both mobilization, and to serve domestically in homeland defense and military assistance to civil authorities.

As DoD budgets continue to reduce, there will be a higher reliance on the Army's Reserve Components to meet operational demands. Having trained and ready personnel in Reserve Component units minimizing the need to cross-level Soldiers is by far the most cost effective method to maintain capabilities when needed.

The recommended costing for trainees should be calculated for Soldiers in Pay Group P (non-qualified drilling Soldiers) and Pay Group F (Soldiers at Initial Entry Training), and a partial issue of uniforms to include 2 combat uniforms and 2 physical fitness uniforms.

The Institutional Subcommittee seeks approval from the full Commission to establish TTHS accounts for the Reserve Components of the Army as described below.

HISTORY:

Both RCs are currently employing management processes to account for personnel who are not available for deployment within current policy. Both reserve components maintained between 13-17% of its personnel would fit within the non-available categories of TTHS. The following outlines management practices employed by the RCs.

For the Army Reserve:

The Army Reserve managed a TTHS account from 2004-2011. The account evolved from a high of 20,500 end strength authorizations down to 4,000 during this period. The space allocation was reduced over time as historical data refined the quantity of spaces needed, and to support the space requirements for Grow the Army. The Army Reserve did not experience the same TTHS benefits of increased personnel readiness as the Active Army partly because it required too many full-time manning resources to manage it for the gain in personnel readiness garnered.

The management practice currently employed by the Army Reserve is specific to units identified for deployment in their ready year of the ARFORGEN cycle. An administrative rear detachment Derivative Unit Identification Code (DUIC) is built from the parent unit to manage the non-deploying Soldiers in these units. Personnel assigned here include trainees, holdees, Soldiers transferring to other units and Soldiers returned from theater. The rear detachment manages not only personnel, but also any non-deploying equipment. For units not identified for deployment, all Soldiers are managed under the units' UIC.

For the ARNG:

Trainees are enlisted and *assigned* into a specific position within a federally recognized MTOE or TDA unit. These new Soldiers are not available for deployment overseas until they have completed their Advanced Individual Training (AIT). They are counted as non-available on the Commanders Unit Status Report (CUSR) creating a hollow effect to unit readiness. These new Soldiers are immediately *attached* to the Recruiting Battalion for management and training within the Recruit Sustainment Program (RSP) in preparation for Initial Entry Training (IET). They are released from attachment back to their unit of assignment upon completion of IET. The ARNG has elected, with concurrence from the Army, not to station units up to the congressionally authorized end strength ceiling of 350,000. Rather, FY 15 force structure authorizations to the States totaled 343,589 creating a buffer of end strength above force structure allowing units some ability to be over strength. The nearly 6,500 end strength authorizations are not managed specifically to any State, but rather are managed at the aggregate national level by National Guard Bureau.

Transients are those individuals who wish to transfer to another State, usually due to work or school. Each State has a full time position within the recruiting battalion charged with coordinating transfers of Soldiers to or from another State among other duties. The transferring Soldier remains assigned to their original unit until such time as the transfer

request is processed by the gaining State, or the Soldier fails to complete the transfer within 90 days at which time the Soldier is counted Absent Without Leave and processed for discharge. During this transition time the Soldier is counted as unavailable for deployment on the CUSR. These personnel are loosely managed between the individual States with little involvement from NGB.

Holdees include Soldiers who are: a) prisoners, b) patients, or are c) separating from service.

- a) The ARNG does not transfer Soldiers away from their normal unit of assignment for incarceration pending the outcome of trial until such time as the Soldier is convicted and subsequently discharged. Prisoners pending trial are counted as not available on the CUSR.
- b) Patients that require short-term care remain assigned to their unit. Patients that require long-term care or rehabilitation, but not in a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU), remain assigned to their unit and *attached* to the Joint Force Headquarters for special attention from the State Surgeon's Office to help navigate further treatment toward healing and/or the Medical Evaluation Board process. Soldiers with long-term injuries stemming from mobilization remain assigned to their deployment UIC, but are attached to a WTU.
- c) Soldiers who are separating from service remain assigned to their unit even though they are pending ETS or retirement, and are not available for deployment.

Students constitute a small portion of the ARNG end strength population. Soldiers, warrant officers, and officers selected for resident schools are currently handled in a variety of ways. Some remain assigned to their unit. Some are transferred to the JFHQ TDA when they are not expected to remain in their original position following the course. They are counted as not available on the CUSR.

ARNG TTHS Management Proposals:

Trainees –

1. Trainees –above existing Force Structure Authorizations to generate greater unit personnel readiness, and subsequently, unit training readiness. This proposal comes at a cost of RC personnel pay and allowance for Pay Group P and F and partial uniform issue.
2. In peace time or times of persistent conflict, such as the 2003-2014 timeframe, Trainee authorizations should be utilized toward building readiness in units that require a high level of collective training, that have long lead times for personnel selection or long training requirements, and focused at specific times within the training cycle (skill level 10 personnel recruited in TR1 and 2 so they are available to train in TR3) as the collective training level increases through platoon, company, and higher levels. The priority units and MOSs are Brigade Combat Teams, Aviation, Special Forces, Military Intelligence, Signal, and Cyber.
3. In times of war, Trainee authorizations should be increased to the full requirement of ~13% of the Operational Force within the ARNG so that every unit has the opportunity to fill its ranks with MOS qualified personnel.
4. Each State's Recruiting Battalion is a federally recognized unit currently charged with managing non-MOSQ recruits. Each State G1 would forecast the number of new Soldiers in each MOS needed for the next year based on historical data of attrition loss trends and new structure gains for their State. Those MOSs, by quantity, would be added to the Unit Manning Roster with associated paragraph and line numbers. Bonuses could be tied to positions on this UMR that are the priority for that State. New Soldiers would be assigned directly into these positions on the Recruiting Battalion UMR, and then transferred to the deployable MTOE unit upon completion of IET. This practice will allow echelons above the MTOE unit to see true unit deployable strength consistent with AC strength accounting and reporting.

Transients – This is a no cost recommendation. NGB-GSS should take an active role in managing the transient population and arbitrate disputes between States in favor of the Soldier when the gaining State refuses to accept a transferring Soldier. Transient Soldiers would be initially transferred from their MTOE unit to a DUIC against the losing State JFHQ UIC allowing the MTOE unit the opportunity to fill the new vacancy.

Holdees –

1. This is a no cost recommendation. The legislative reform proposal by NGB of the Inactive National Guard (ING) in the NDAA 2014 is a sound proposal to manage the medical and incarcerated holdee population, (Soldiers separating from service will be addressed separately.) Because this population cannot drill

on a consistent basis either due to medical reasons or incarceration, the ING provides a way to separate this group of Soldiers from the MTOE units. Placing Soldiers in the ING relieves the Soldier from an expectation to attend drill on a regular basis while allowing the unit to retain visibility of them, and the opportunity to fill their position. Soldiers with long-term medical issues stemming from military service do require pay for attending medical treatment appointments. This proposed change allows Soldiers and officers to be paid while in an ING status.

2. Soldiers separating for retirement or for completing their Enlistment Term of Service should be treated with all the dignity and respect they have earned. While it is beneficial to the unit to transfer the Soldier to the JFHQ derivative UIC between 90-120 days prior to their end date to allow the unit to fill their position, they should be attached back to the unit for proper award ceremonies and retirement.
3. Soldiers separating for disciplinary reasons should be transferred to the JFHQ derivative UIC allowing the unit to fill their position.

Students – This is a no cost recommendation. Officers, warrant officers and NCOs attending resident courses longer than 6 months should be assigned to a JFHQ derivative UIC to unencumber positions within MTOE units.

Army Reserve TTHS Management Proposal: Building off the current management process, authorize every Army Reserve MTOE unit an administrative DUIC where trainees, holdees and pending losses could be managed without effecting the readiness of the operational unit. This would require an increase to end strength above force structure authorizations. Historical data from the Army Reserve TTHS account indicates between 2-4% of end strength would be sufficient.

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