

Readiness Testimony

I am MG McGuire, the Adjutant General for the state of Arizona and today, I am speaking in my capacity as Arizona's senior military officer. I am not on active duty orders and no one in the Defense Department has seen, reviewed or approved my remarks.

In testimony presented to this Commission, the Honorable John McHugh and General Raymond Odierno made several remarks regarding Reserve Component mobilization timelines and Army National Guard responsiveness. Since responsiveness, which we define as how quickly a unit can prepare to deploy upon mobilization, is such a critical factor in determining force mix ratios, we feel it prudent to correct the record. Then I will address the logical fallacy that distorts predictions for future mobilization timelines during short-notice emergencies, and then I will conclude by suggesting a number of methods which would shorten mobilization timelines even for routine deployments.

The first statement I wish to address is from page ten of the written testimony in which the Secretary and Chief state, "*It required almost 300 days to prepare an ARNG Apache Battalion to deploy for security force missions.*"

Their statement is true. We don't dispute that. But the Apache Battalion mentioned in the testimony is a statistical anomaly. Valid reasons exist as to why this particular battalion, the Arizona National Guard's 1-285 ARB, required 300 days

Readiness Testimony

to prepare for deployment. The most obvious reason was that the unit received a new model of Apache at the same time that it was Mobilized and therefore was required to go through extra training on the new model. Any unit - National Guard or Active Component - would require the same train-up time on the new model.

The next Army Guard ARB to deploy in the Apache, North Carolina's 1-130 ARB, took just 111 days of pre-deployment training. Contrary to the implication in the written testimony, a typical National Guard ARB does not require 300 days of pre-deployment training. Using anecdotal evidence to support statistical outliers distorts reality. To determine the truth you must examine historical averages rather than worst case numbers.

Speaking of historical averages that brings me to the next quote from the Chief's commission testimony regarding mobilization timelines. He states, *"Looking at non-combined arms maneuver missions, the findings revealed that counter-insurgency missions required 165 days of preparation, security force missions required 118 days, and advising/assisting required 127 days."*

This statement suggests mobilization timelines that are significantly lengthier than other studies submit as the norm. In 2013 the Department of Defense

Readiness Testimony

reported to Congress that an Army Guard Brigade requires from 50-110 days of post-mobilization / pre-deployment training depending upon the unit's level of collective training proficiency upon mobilization. 50-80 days for a unit beginning with company level experience and 80-110 days for a unit beginning with platoon level experience. What then, is the basis of the previous statement claiming it took up to 165 days to complete training? The Secretary and Chief cite a 2014 RAND study titled, "*Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix*," as a source for their numbers. But why are RAND's numbers so much higher than what the Department of Defense found the same year the RAND study was released?

When comparing responsiveness between the Active Component and the Reserve Component, one must establish a "starting line"—a chronological point at which the timeline begins, and a "finish line"—a point at which the timeline ends. Conventional wisdom and most studies, to include the DOD study mentioned earlier, use mobilization as the starting line and completion of pre-deployment training as the finish line. Those anchors provide a common point of reference for everyone discussing responsiveness differences between the AC and RC.

However, the mobilization timelines taken from the RAND study and cited in the Chief's testimony include anywhere from 50 to 75 days of *pre-mobilization* days depending upon the type of mission. Let me repeat that. RAND included up to 75 days—to include the standard 39 days a year—of *pre-mobilization* training.

Readiness Testimony

Not only do RAND's timelines include pre-mobilization training, they also include transit time to the theater—an average of 7 additional days according to the author.

Like pre-mobilization days, transit time is not part of the normal dialogue when comparing mobilization timelines. Adding them to the timeline does nothing but unnecessarily distort the truth. Every unit has transit times following training, so why include them in the numbers? When pre-mobilization days and average transit time are subtracted from RAND's timelines, we see that BCTs mobilizing for counterinsurgency missions took 88 days; for security force missions, 61 days; and 70 days for Advising/Training missions—all well within the previously mentioned norms.

I struggled to find a good analogy that describes how the RAND timelines, while factually correct, completely garble the truth. The best analogy I could come up with involves the NFL and the forty yard dash. Most sports fans know that the 40 yard dash is the standard measure of speed and quickness used by pro scouts when evaluating prospective players. You might hear an ESPN reporter say something like, "This kid's got lightning speed. They clocked him running a four-three." Without further elaboration, anyone marginally interested in football knows the announcer is referring to the amount of time it took the athlete to run the forty yard dash. The announcer doesn't need to add that the time refers to a forty yard dash because it's simply the standard and everyone that cares, knows it.

Readiness Testimony

For mobilization preparation, the standard race is the time between mobilization and completion of pre-deployment training. The Department of Defense used that standard in their report to Congress. The Active Component uses it when they make the claim to “Fight tonight.” With transit time included they would be unable to make that claim. The motto would have to be, “Fight as soon as we can get to where we are going,” which doesn’t make nearly as catchy a slogan.

Returning to the 40 yard dash analogy, the Chief’s claims of 165 day mobilization timelines is the equivalent of a scout saying “The kid clocked a six point two,” but failing to add that he was talking about a sixty yard dash and not a forty yard dash. Technically it might be true, but it would be wildly deceptive to anyone that heard the remark because it lacks proper context.

Or another way to think of it is that the RAND study’s timelines are confusing because they start the Reserve Component’s clock before the race begins, and continue the clock running after the Reserve Component has passed the finish line. Either way you wish to think about it, the RAND’s numbers are ambiguous and, when quoted out of context, don’t paint a true picture.

In discussing Active and Reserve Component responsiveness, RAND focuses on the potential importance of “short-notice, rapid-response surge missions” that we have coined the “Godzilla Scenario.” We concur with this

Readiness Testimony

emphasis, as planners must consider worst case scenarios in weighing AC-RC mix decisions. However, it is entirely unreasonable to apply the Godzilla Scenario to force-mix analysis without considering that scenario's potential impact to mobilization timelines.

RAND fails to do this, claiming that "overall trends in the historical data should hold." This is not a logical assumption. RAND uses historical preparation times from conflicts in which the Reserve Component had sufficient time to methodically prepare units for deployment with a known projected deployment date. With that future date in mind, the unit systematically trained and prepared for the upcoming deployment. However, in a true Godzilla Scenario, historical timelines are most likely *not* accurate predictors of the future. National Guard BCTs would move through the mobilization process as quickly as possible and not waste precious time on redundant or unnecessary training. They would find every way imaginable to hasten their preparations for deployment. Thus, a Godzilla scenario would logically and naturally elicit every possible efficiency, none of which are captured in the historical data relied upon in the RAND study.

Again, an analogy helps to illustrate our point. We've all seen news stories of homes threatened by approaching wildfires, where first responders move through the streets, using bullhorns to urge citizens to evacuate their homes due to a wildfire projected to hit their area in three hours. Homeowners pile their vehicles

Readiness Testimony

full of children, bedding, clothes, family photos, computers, pets, and anything else they can shove into their cars, finally leaving at the last minute ahead of the fires, having taken the entire three hours to prepare to leave.

Now compare that to a homeowner who wakes up to a fire alarm blaring through his house. There's smoke billowing up the staircase and flames lapping at the door of his children's bedroom. From a historical perspective, it took most homeowners three hours to prepare to leave for the approaching wildfire. Should we then assume that it will take this guy three hours to prepare to leave his burning home? Obviously not. He's going to prioritize what's most important—start at the top of that list, and get everything he can before it's too late. He'll grab his wife and kids, family pets, then probably important financial papers and photos, maybe a laptop. If he still has a few seconds to spare he might snatch a few more things lower down on the priority list. Regardless, he's going to get out of there a lot more quickly than the three hours suggested by historical trends, and still have everything he needs to start over. Response during a relatively routine event is simply not a good indicator of response during an emergency.

Additionally, the RAND study only analyzes deployments between 2008 and 2010. Their calculations do not capture the increase in post-mobilization efficiencies that allowed Army Guard BCTs to prepare more quickly than they had

Readiness Testimony

in previous years. Had this information been added to the calculations, ARNG mobilization timelines averages would have been even further reduced.

Mobilization timelines are not just important in force mix decisions when considering a Godzilla Scenario. These timelines are necessary considerations in *all* force size and mix calculations and a Godzilla Scenario is not required to garner efficiencies that would serve to compress timelines and thereby speed responsiveness, even in routine deployment cycles.

Such methods include the elimination of redundant and/or unnecessary training, granting Adjutants General the authority to validate their units' combat skills, increasing ARNG access to Combat Training Center rotations, and adjusting collective training requirements based on actual events in a given theater of operations. Another method that would enhance Army Guard responsiveness is to increase the baseline readiness of specific ARNG units. As the RAND study suggests, "The Army could invest in extra annual training days for certain RC units to shorten their post-mobilization preparation times." While the additional training days would add to the cost of these units, the cost would be offset by a reduction in required Active Component units due to increased RC responsiveness—a logical correlation echoed in Commissioner Brownlee's additional viewpoint in the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. Though a detailed analysis

Readiness Testimony

of these and other possible methods of compressing training are beyond the scope of this paper, they bear further analysis by the Commission.

Readiness and responsiveness of the Guard is a critical aspect of the force mix decision. It is absolutely vital that we get the data correct in order to make well informed decisions. The facts clearly show that National Guard BCTs take between 50-110 days of post-mobilization / pre-deployment training. There are many ways to increase efficiencies in the training timeline, so that we could be ready even more quickly. In the event of a Godzilla Scenario, we could prepare to deploy even more quickly yet.