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Report and Transcript

# The Abrams Doctrine: Then, Now and In The Future

A  
National Guard Association  
of the  
United States  
Symposium

National Guard Memorial  
Washington, D.C.  
July 16, 1993

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# The Abrams Doctrine: Then, Now and In the Future

In 1993 the National Guard Association of the United States sponsored a symposium called "The Abrams Doctrine: Then, Now and in the Future." The purpose of the symposium was to discuss the process and pressures General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the United States Army in the post-Vietnam era, faced in restructuring of the Army, and the validation of his guidelines in today's context.

The post Cold War period, like that of any other immediate post-war period involving Americans, has seen pressures develop to "bring the boys home" and to downsize the military. The Cold War, and World War II before it, saw the largest standing military force in our national history. The Cold War force, unique in the sense that the period could really be called a time of peace and stability, was created because our nation faced a threat like the world had never seen.

The ups and downs during this period were fluctuations caused by the ability to pay for such a large standing force and the political determinations of how immediate that threat was. The Vietnam era was a fissure that tested political will and was the beginning of a period of national, political and economic reconsideration. Dealing with political and economic pressures, national leaders had to create a new military while simultaneously still face the Soviet Empire.

The situation with which General Creighton Abrams had to deal as the Vietnam war ended and what we face today, we feel strongly parallel and have lessons for tomorrow. The nation has budgetary challenges; the public wants to downsize the military. A dramatic difference is that the single monolithic threat has disappeared, replaced by multi-faceted uncertainty.

It is our supposition that Creighton Abrams set out to institutionalize and integrate the relationship between the active forces and the Guard and Reserve for three reasons. Number One, to make integration of the Active Forces and the Guard and Reserve structure so tight that no major commitment of

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American forces could be accomplished without a reliance on the Guard and Reserve. Number Two, to ensure that integration of the Active Forces, Guard and Reserve was so close that a future mobilization, to even be contemplated, would require public support to commit our nation's forces. And Number Three, to assure that maximum use is made of Guard and Reserve cost-efficiencies.

This report is an edited transcript of those proceedings. A distinguished group of panelists met in the Walsh-Reckord Hall of States in the National Guard Memorial building on July 16, 1993 and discussed the creation of what has become known as the Abrams Doctrine, reconsidered its implementation and conjectured upon its continued validity.

The following is a summary of the conclusions reached by the respective panels.

### **An Historical Perspective of the Abrams Doctrine**

**Moderator:** **MG Bruce Jacobs (ret.),**  
*Chief Historian, Historical Society of the  
Militia and National Guard*

**Panelists:** **GEN John W. Vessey, Jr. (ret.)**  
*former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*  
**Dr. Lewis Sorley**  
*Historian and author*  
**LTG Herbert R. Temple, Jr. (ret.)**  
*former Chief, National Guard Bureau*

#### **Conclusions:**

- The Abrams Doctrine is a valid notion which led to the creation of the right forces to be available to fight the Gulf War.
- Its implementation challenged bias and tradition in the Active Army and the National Guard.
- Its implementation challenged Guard soldiers to accomplish training beyond anything they had been called upon to do before.
- We are at a watershed moment in history. Doctrine of the past 50 years, including the Abrams Doctrine, has served us well but possesses strengths and weaknesses. Our nation needs a top-to-bottom look at our national security needs.

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## **First Hand View of Implementing the Abrams Doctrine**

**Speaker:**        **LTG Donald E. Rosenblum (ret.)**  
                              *former Commander, First US Army*

### **Conclusions:**

- Integration of Guard and and Reserve with Active Army was not an easy proposition and required the creation of readiness regions and groups to maintain as much integration as possible with the Active side of the house.
- Integration was enhanced with the development of Roundout.
- Guard and Reserve forces provide a great stability in our armed forces.
- Roundout/Roundup units must be utilized when parent units are called.
- Conditions should be created where the active Army has to learn about the Guard and Reserve to increase its appreciation of citizen-soldiers. Similar conditions must be created for the Guard and Reserve to learn more about how the active Army works.

## **The Abrams Doctrine: Blueprint for the Future**

**Moderator:**     **MG Francis S. Greenlief (ret.)**  
                              *former Chief, National Guard Bureau*

**Panelists:**      **GEN John R. Galvin (ret.)**  
                              *former Supreme Allied Commander Europe*  
                              **GEN Dennis J. Reimer**  
                              *CINC, US Forces Command*  
                              **LTG Richard G. Trefry (ret.)**  
                              *former Inspector General, US Army*

### **Conclusions:**

- Mobilization for Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the best mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces to date. The mobilization process helped generate great support from the American public even when the end-state was unknown.
- There is a need to standardize Total Army Authorization documents.

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- Potential adversaries learned as much from Desert Shield/Desert Storm as we did.
  - Volunteerism is a two-edged sword.
  - CAPSTONE is a good program.
  - Title XI initiatives, on the whole, are constructive efforts to improve the readiness of the Total Army.
  - Simulation, computer assisted exercises and new innovative training programs must be taken advantage of to improve combat capabilities.
  - At all times, but especially in times of change, a focus must be kept on people - those leaving and those staying.
  - When we go to war, it is something we do as a people; the Guard and Reserve make sure that happens in the broadest sense.

**Note:**

*The following abbreviations will identify speakers in the transcript, after the first reference:*

MG Robert F. Ensslin, Jr. (ret.) ..... RFE  
 MG Bruce Jacobs (ret.) ..... BJ  
 GEN John W. Vessey, Jr. (ret.) ..... JWV  
 Dr. Lewis Sorley ..... LS  
 LTG Herbert R. Temple, Jr. (ret.) ..... HRT  
 LTG Donald E. Rosenblum (ret.) ..... DER  
 MG Francis S. Greenlief (ret.) ..... FSG  
 GEN John R. Galvin (ret.) ..... JRG  
 GEN Dennis J. Reimer ..... DJR  
 LTG Richard G. Trefry (ret.) ..... RGT

## The Abrams Doctrine: Then, Now and in the Future July 16, 1993

### Morning Session An Historical Perspective of the Abrams Doctrine

MG Robert F. Ensslin, Jr.  
(Ret.), Executive Director,  
National Guard Association  
of the United States:

We believe that one of Creighton Abrams' goals as Chief of Staff was to establish a nationally supportable army in the context of 1970s defense strategy. The development of any type of defense strategy, especially the conventional part of it, is subject to many outside influences. Among these are resources, technology and politics. Resources, from our perspective, equates to personnel availability, equipment and the money to train. Technology is a question of what is available to prosecute war and how it is applied. Political influences are a dichotomy, the people and the kind of national defense they want and the leaders we elect and their perception of what the people want. Within this context is a key variable, the ability of leaders to make the decisions that are in the best interests of the nation.

Creighton Abrams was a leader whose influence we still feel today. It's our view that General Creighton Abrams saw first-hand the

stresses created on the Army when it was forced to expand in size for Vietnam. He was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army during the expansion period, and when it was forced to shrink, he was Chief of Staff of the Army. All this occurred within about a ten-year period of time. It's also our view that Creighton Abrams was very cognizant of the change Americans underwent in their views toward the war in Vietnam.

It's been said that when Creighton Abrams became Chief of Staff of the Army he set out to fix the "problem" as he saw it. And I place the word "problem" in quotation marks for a reason. This has been interpreted by some to mean that Abrams set out to institutionalize and integrate the relationship between the active forces and the Guard and Reserve for three reasons. Number One, to make integration of the Active Forces and the Guard and Reserve structure so tight that no major commitment of American forces could be accomplished without a reliance on the Guard and Reserve. Number Two, to ensure that integration of the Active Forces, Guard and Reserve was so close that a future mobilization, to even be contemplated, would require public support to commit our nation's forces. And Number Three, to assure that maximum use is made of Guard and Reserve cost-efficiencies.

We believe that addressing the circumstances with which

General Abrams was faced and how he approached solving his challenge is very appropriate today. And the first panel will be addressing this. We feel that General Abrams faced a situation that is similar in many respects to that which we are facing today and faced at the end of World War II and the end of the Korean War: Declining resources for the military, a changing political environment, and a changed perception of what the American public wants in the way of national defense, coupled with a change in the threat. It's a great tribute to the man that what he envisioned, and what he began to create, and the foundation that he established turned out to be exactly what this nation needed when we were faced with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

We now want to generate discussion as to whether or not Abrams laid out a formula that has validity in a new American and world environment. Our first panel this morning is moderated by Major General Bruce Jacobs, Chief Historian of the National Guard Association. Joining him as panelists are General John W. Vessey, Jr., a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., a former Chief of the National Guard Bureau and a Director of the Army Guard during the period of time when resources and standards for the National Guard were dramatically increased; and Dr. Lewis Sorley, historian and biog-

ographer of Creighton Abrams, whose biography *Thunderbolt* is must-reading for everyone who is interested in our Army.

We have asked our morning panel to focus on the circumstances that created the Abrams Doctrine, the political and military environment at that time, how it came to be implemented, and its impact on the nation. We've asked our luncheon speaker, whom I'll introduce later, to give us his personal views and experiences on implementing what Abrams set in motion. We have also asked him to take us up to the pre-Desert Shield/Desert Storm period.

Our afternoon panel, which our Moderator, Major General Francis Greenlief will introduce after lunch, has been asked to look into the future. Much has been said and written about the changes in the world. Arguments have been presented contending that it is such an uncertain future that all of our forces must be immediately available to respond to any threat to U.S. interests in the world. In our view, this implies a lessened reliance on the Guard and Reserve. Extending this argument might also imply removal of citizen involvement in defense, along with the removal of the ability to easily debate defense policy issues.

MG Bruce Jacobs (Ret.), Chief  
Historian, HSM & NG:

In the context of General  
Ensslin's opening remarks,

we have defined an NGAUS view of an Abrams Doctrine which concerns, among other things, the criticality of Active, Guard and Reserve integration as a major step towards ensuring national public support for action taken by an Administration to use military force when U.S. national interests are at stake. And to Bob Sorley, I would like to address the first question.

b, as you have looked so extensively, and intensively, into the life and times of Creighton W. Abrams, can we start by throwing the first question to you and asking, do you think our postulation is a fair one? Do the actions and expressions we have identified constitute in effect an Abrams Doctrine?

Lewis Sorley - Historian and Author:

ive to begin by saying I think General Abrams would smile to hear his policies given so grand a title as "the Abrams Doctrine." During his service, he often made use of what others came to call his sayings, pithy comments that he would use to illustrate a point or, quite often, to deflate somebody who was over-impressed with his own importance.

en a staffer would come in with a grandiose scheme that Abrams thought was too pretentious or was maybe promising more than the Army could deliver, he would predictably observe, "We are going to

be stuck with living up to the rhetoric." And that's what he might tell us today as we propound an Abrams Doctrine. But I think that there is, nevertheless, justification for considering the sum total of what Abrams did and planned with respect to Reserve Forces as a unified doctrine.

Abrams was a very consistent man. Consistent in his values, consistent in his focus on readiness and the well-being of the soldier, and consistent in his insistence that everything the Army did should contribute to one or another of those priority concerns. His consistent approach to the role and importance of Reserve Forces, taken as a whole, does seem to me to constitute what might be formalized as a doctrine.

Thinking about our meeting here today, I consulted my source of first resort, Webster's Dictionary, and there I learned that a "doctrine" is something taught, or teachings; a second meaning, something taught as the principles or creed of a religion, political party, etc., tenet or tenets, belief, dogma. And then it said, "Doctrine refers to a theory based on carefully worked out principles and taught or advocated by its adherents." I think what General Abrams put together, in terms of the policies governing Reserve Forces on his watch, does amount to a carefully worked out set of principles, and certainly he taught and advocated those with great force in the lim-

ited time available to him during his truncated period as Chief of Staff.

I think that it could be useful to talk just for a minute or two about the background that led him to the formulation of those policies.

Everyone knows, of course, that he had served for five years in Vietnam, the last four as the commander there, during one of the most difficult periods our Army has ever undergone, a period of increasing drug abuse, racial disharmony, indiscipline and internal dissent, eroding public support, a virtually impossible mission as he tried to command a force that was progressively being withdrawn from under him, and so on.

And I think almost everyone knows that before he went to Vietnam, he spent three years as the Army's Vice Chief of Staff during the period of the build-up for Vietnam, a time when, because Lyndon Johnson would not mobilize the Reserve Forces, all the expansion had to come from made-up units and stripped units, and cadre units, and, as Abrams often described it, "all the new acquisitions were in privates and second lieutenants." As a consequence, the maturity, the experience level of the Army was on a progressively declining slope.

I believe—I'm not a sociologist, but I believe that there is a causal relationship that could be identified between that progressive decline and the later great increase in

the problems I've described before. And had we been able to draw on the experience and maturity of leaders from Reserve Components, instead of bringing in all privates and second lieutenants, some of that might have been averted.

So those are the key, most recent experiences that General Abrams had: Two assignments spanning eight years, during which he saw the support of the American people for the war in Vietnam and, I guess you could say its attitude towards the Army as well, decline precipitously. I think that the failure to mobilize the Reserve Forces had something to do with his outlook.

But I also think that judgment has to be approached with a little caution, so, along with the Truth-in-Lending, I will say that I think we need to remember, too, that for quite a long time, in my view a significantly long time, the American people supported the effort of our Armed Forces in Vietnam and it was only when year after year after year went by without demonstrable progress toward a successful resolution of that enterprise that that support began to taper off quite precipitately.

Then, of course, we had the cataclysmic event of the Tet 1968 offensive, which is very complex, and we can talk about that.

I want to take you back just a little further into General Abrams' background be-

cause, while those eight years focused on Vietnam, I am sure his earlier experiences also had a lot to do with how he came to view the appropriate policies for the Reserve Forces.

He spent a period in the early 1960s as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and during that time spent most of his time going around on a sort of special assignment as the personal representative of the Chief of Staff on-site where civil rights crisis, had either erupted or were impending. And on many occasions, he either was involved with mobilized Reserve and National Guard forces, or they were planning for or contemplating such use, as well as in some cases Active Forces as well. That brought him into close contact with a lot of units and leaders in the Reserve Forces, especially the National Guard, and there were people, especially people in the media, who were raising questions at that time as to whether these forces could be relied upon, whether they were politically reliable, and whether they would remain disciplined and responsive to orders under the circumstances confronting them. General Abrams never reflected the slightest doubt of that, and to the credit of the units and the leaders, they performed as he had predicted that they would. But that was not an assured thing before the fact, I suggest, and I believe that he gained a great deal of respect for them in the course of that assignment.

Earlier, his first assignment as a Brigadier, he was a Deputy Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs and worked for an interesting fellow, the result of which was that Abrams was often the man doing the testifying, often the man going to the field, and I believe it's fair to say that during that time not only did he get to know large numbers of the Reserve Force leadership and gained confidence in them and respect for them, but that they gained the same appreciation for him, building a relationship that went on over the years.

And now I'll tell you one more thing. I think this may be a little controversial, but I believe it to be true. In World War II General Abrams commanded a Regular Army tank battalion, but there weren't more than a handful of Regular Army soldiers of any rank in that battalion. The battalion was formed in the spring of 1941, and it was formed out of people who had been brought into the Army because we were about to go to war. These are the same kinds of people, I suggest, who make up the Reserve Forces. And Abrams served with them through that war, and when the war was over—with only a few exceptions, and those were people who had been influenced by Abrams and decided therefore to make military service their career—the vast majority of them went back to their civilian pursuits. They'd come to the colors when

the nation needed them, and when they'd done their duty, and they did it brilliantly, they went back to where they had been before. And I suggest that that's very much the mold of the citizen-soldier as well.

So, even from his early days as a young officer in World War II, I believe that there was a building-up of an outlook and a confidence and a respect on the part of General Abrams for what reserve forces can do, and that we saw that reflected in the policies he put in place when he became Chief of Staff of the Army. Now, there were other factors involved there, budgetary factors, they had gone to a volunteer force, there were recruiting factors involved, there was the necessity to stop what he saw as the precipitate decline in end strength, and that was involved. So I don't want to over-simplify it, but I'm trying to give a little background of how I think he came to view Reserve Forces as he did.

General Ensslin suggested in his comments that we are at a period now which is similar in many respects to the period in which General Abrams propounded these policies. And I agree with that. But I'd like to agree with him by saying "Yes, but," because I think there are many things that are dissimilar today as well. So what we are going to try to work out ourselves by the end of the day is, given the similarities and given the dissimilarities, and weigh-

ing the respective impacts on what we ought to be doing, if there is an Abrams Doctrine, is that applicable under current circumstances?

**BJ:** Thanks, Bob. I wonder if either of our other panelists, let me start with General Vessey. Would you care to comment on the original question, which is the validity of our postulation that there is, in effect, a collection of expressions which can be defined as an Abrams Doctrine? How do you react to that, and anything that Dr. Sorley had to say?

**GEN John W. Vessey, Jr. (Ret.), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

Bruce, after listening to Dr. Sorley and to General Ensslin, I have so many comments to make about what's been said that we can't finish it this week. But let me say a little bit about the Abrams Doctrine, and I believe that we are justified in calling it an "Abrams Doctrine."

Let me preface my remarks by saying that, and perhaps give another little historical vignette and shed some light on how this all came about. I think that Dr. Sorley summed it up, but the important question for the nation today is, "What do we take from the past that is right to move into an uncertain future?" Let's not try to rebuild the past because we will not be successful in doing that, and we will probably be successful only in defending

the nation inadequately if we take everything from the past and try to move it into a future that is, clearly, remarkably different from the past. So the question at hand is, "What strengths and orientations do we take from the past to move us into a very uncertain future?" And I believe there are many things that we can take from the past, and among them, some of the lessons from Abrams, the period of the Abrams Doctrine.

I think it is important for us to understand that the fundamental question for General Abrams was how to get enough Army, total Army, to face the future that we faced. Bob, you cited the demonstration of the Force that Abrams built, and I really believe that that was a demonstration of the Abrams Force, in the Desert in Iraq, but the goal was the demolition of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union. That was really the culmination of the Abrams Doctrine. The question for General Abrams at a time when, as Bob pointed out, the end strengths were on the way down, the budgets were on the way down after the Vietnam War, is how to have enough Army to deal with the very real Soviet threat, the Warsaw Pact threat, our commitments in East Asia, and how to survive that and defend the nation. That was the overall goal.

And, clearly, he saw what Washington saw, when Washington wrote his thoughts

on a peace establishment, a standing force. Washington, at that time said, to awe the Indians—George wouldn't say that today, but he would say to awe the bad guys, and protect our borders and our commerce and our overseas interests, and a Ready Force to deal with immediate problems. His second part was a standardized and well-regulated militia. The third was stores of military supplies. The fourth was a system of academies for instruction in the military arts. And the fifth was manufactories for arms, military arms and equipment, a defense industry. And, really, since George's time, we haven't supported all elements of that strategy but that's basically been the United States' strategy.

General Abrams could see that in a world in which the other fellow had the opportunity to attack, and attack suddenly, that we had to have a Ready Force that went through these five parts of Washington's Peace Establishment, yet he knew that the budgets would not support a Regular Army of the size needed. We were headed toward 730,000, 750,000 I guess it was, the number we were given. And the largest Army we had supported, at 750,000, was about ten divisions, before, under the conditions that existed. We had many people on the Army Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who were convinced that we could only have ten divisions. General Abrams put a study group together to

look at the world, and that study group—as almost anyone with common sense would have said, ten divisions is simply not enough for the United States with the responsibilities it faces.

We had at that time the so-called OSD studies about how to integrate Guard and Reserve units with the Active Force, and General Abrams sent his immediate troops, his staff, to find a way to not have ten divisions, but to have sixteen divisions, with the budget and end strength that we had. There was no other way to do it, other than a far closer integration of the Guard and Reserve with the Active Force than we had experienced in the past.

Now, I want to say right now that I believe that is the important part of the model that we need to understand in moving into the future. That the question for us will be, "Will there be enough?" And there will be many voices in the United States who will say, "What you have is too much." And the inclination will be to cut more. Cut more from the Active Force, and cut more from the Guard and Reserve later on. So I think it is extremely important for us to see that model that General Abrams built, at that time, not as the carbon copy of what we need in the future but a guide for an action in the future. How do we tie Active Forces and Guard and Reserve Forces together to make the whole enough for what the nation faces, within the budgets that the people of

the United States are willing to spend?

That's the challenge. There is clearly an Abrams Doctrine. And that Doctrine, a part of that Doctrine, was integrating the Guard and Reserve Forces closely with the Active Forces to build a large enough force to meet the nation's needs.

BJ: Thank you, General Vessey. General Temple, would you like to comment on this particular issue?

LTG Herbert R. Temple, Jr. (Ret.) - Former Chief, National Guard Bureau:

My response will probably be the briefest of all. For one thing, I did not know General Abrams. As a matter of fact, I don't recall that I had ever seen him. What was interesting was that, at the time he passed away, I was a student at the United States Army War College and the Commandant at the time was General Dee Smith, who held General Abrams in very high esteem. There were a great many ceremonies that took place at Carlisle, attendant to General Abrams' death. And I was impressed with one aspect of his life that sometimes is really not appreciated. The word that kept coming out of all of the events that were taking place was "integrity." Now, as I read Bob's book and other material relevant to General Abrams, that, again, seemed to be reinforced in everything I read.

You know, if you look back on those people who have

probably had the greatest impact upon the United States Army, and maybe upon national security in general, I believe that most people would conclude that Gen. George Marshall fulfilled that role, because when George Marshall spoke, the United States Congress, and the people of America, took him as being absolutely forthright and honest, and his objectives were always for the best interests of the country. All that I can tell from my investigation of General Abrams—and Bob perhaps can deal with this better than anyone, was that that was the hallmark of his leadership of the Army. As he served as the Chief of Staff of the Army, I suspect that his integrity and his honesty were appreciated in the halls of this nation's leadership in the same way that General Marshall's was. And it was a tragic loss that we lost him when we did.

It's often been said that one of the failings of the United States Army is that they've never had the right Chief of Staff at the right time. I think they did have General Abrams as the Chief of Staff at the right time. There are a couple of other times in history we would have been well served had he been the Chief of Staff of the Army. He would have been the right man at any time.

In concluding my remarks, let me say that I really feel very humbled being on this panel. I didn't realize my antiquity until I found the

panel that they put me on. It's a very startling realization to find that you are a principal in history, rather than being someone who's involved in the current issues. So I guess I feel my age today more than any time.

**BJ:** But, Herb, being involved in history doesn't mean you are history. So take some heart in that.

**JWV:** Let me just add one thing, to what Herb said. And that's just that Abrams was once approached by a new political appointee who was about to go testify at his confirmation hearings. This fellow said, "General Abrams, I'm going to testify to the Congress. Do you have any advice?"

And General Abrams, in his usual laconic fashion, said, "Yes, you should start by telling the truth." That's all the advice he gave him.

**BJ:** General Vessey, let me turn to you again with our next question. And you have already referred to the environment in which the Abrams Doctrine began to emerge in terms of what the world was, in the world of the 1970s. It was a period in which many people felt very draconian steps were being taken. CON-ARC was replaced by TRADOC and FORSCOM. The STEAD-FAST reorganization, Affiliation, ROUNDOUT, the other new partnership-type programs to increase Guard and Reserve readiness through significantly

increased Active Army support and participation. We were winding down and ending our combat role in Vietnam. Only a very, very small National Guard and Reserve presence had been there. General Harold K. Johnson had likened his situation to that of an owner of a string of race horses who was not allowed to take them out of the barn. General DePuy undertook to have FM 100-5 done over, I guess reflecting his feeling that rather than a call-up of units, you had to write it for the level of individual, largely untrained Reserve officers and draftees. At least, that's the conventional wisdom that comes out of it.

As you look back at this period, do you feel the Army was ready for a doctrine which would place such heavy reliance upon the Guard and Reserve that, to quote a passage from Bob Sorley's book, "the force could not function without them and, hence, could not be deployed without calling them up." What mindsets had to be overcome in the active Army to make such a drastic shift a success?

**JWV:** Well, it wasn't only mindsets in the Active Army. There were mindsets in the Guard and Reserve and in the civilian community as well, because, the Defense establishment itself, and the Army in particular, was aboil at that time. You cited some of the changes and most of those were believed by General Abrams to be necessary changes, that is,

the reorganization of CON-ARC, and the movement toward a training command that would focus on training for the Army. General Abrams understood very clearly, probably better than any of the leaders that I ever served under, the importance of training, how important an ingredient that was in battlefield effectiveness.

And there were other changes under way. We were moving from a drafted Army to a volunteer Army. We were integrating women at a level never before experienced. So we had all sorts of matters to deal with. It was a hard time for those who were defenders of the status quo and an exciting time for those who wanted to induce change. Were we ready? I guess an institution as big and as bureaucratic as an army is always more comfortable with the status quo than it is with change.

But we, fortunately, had some marvelous leaders both in the Active Force and in the Reserve Components, who could see the wisdom of what was being done and were enthusiastic supporters of that change. Some of us needed a kick in the shins, or a kick in the tail from time to time to make sure we were enthusiastic, but we all got enthusiastic about it.

The Headquarters cuts were huge. We slashed General Officers positions right and left and scarfed up Staff. I often told the story that,

well, the next thing that General Abrams would tell us to do is hand out numbers to the Army people as they came into the Pentagon, and all Number 1's would report to their post, and all Number 2's would fall in in the North Parking Lot and draw muskets in the Eighth Corridor, because we were forming a new division. The change was that stark.

So, the answer is Yes and No.

**BJ:** Let me move along to General Temple. First, on the National Guard Bureau Joint Staff, then as Director of the Army National Guard, and for four years as Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Temple had to work to create the kind of Army National Guard which could measure up to the force needed to sustain an Abrams Doctrine. During General Temple's tenure, the ROUNDOUT program flourished, as Guard brigades trained with their parent Active Army divisions. In addition, the Guard Force structure was increased by the reactivation of two divisions, the 35th and 29th. We talked a good deal in those days about the heavy percentage of Army combat and combat support which is to be found in the Guard, and which presumably had to be at a high state of readiness to support an Abrams Doctrine.

General Temple, would you please address, Number One, what mindsets had to be overcome in the National

Guard community, which is obviously a significant one, as General Vessey has alluded to it, and whether this rather new concept of the Active Army having such a major stake in the success of the Guard and Reserve challenged traditional responsibilities for the training of the Guard, and what this increased participation of the Army in what might have traditionally been called "the Guard's business" did in terms of the functions of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in dealing with the Army, dealing with the States?

**HRT:** The period that I served as the Director of the Army Guard was more important in dealing with this matter. By the time I became the Chief, the relationships had reached their apex and maybe were beginning to decrement a bit. But keep in mind, it would be necessary to consider the environment that we were in at the time. Every morning when we woke up, we thought we were going to war that day, and that was driving everything. If you were privy to the war plans, and you were a National Guardsman and you could see the plans to employ National Guard units throughout the world to meet those war plans, you had to be struck with the fact that never before in the history of the National Guard was the nations dependence upon the Guard more critical than it was at that time. If you had parochial views, you had to submerge those to the best

interests of the country, because the National Guard was being prepared to meet commitments that they had never faced before. If you didn't become energized about those matters, you were exercising a disservice to your country, but equally as important, a disservice to your soldiers, because the soldiers were not going to fight as part of the California National Guard or the Florida National Guard, but they were going to fight as part of the United States Army. There was already in place because of the work of General Greenleaf, General Weber, and General Walker, the framework for much of this relationship. However, there didn't appear to be a sense of urgency. And that, perhaps, best came to light at the time that one of the members of the audience here, General Dick Trefry, was the Assistant DCSPER of the Army.

General Trefry set aside about four or five days when he sat in his office and invited everyone who was involved in mobilization to come and tell him about mobilization. He invited me to sit with him, and it was a remarkable expose of what had not been achieved in preparing to meet the nation's war plans. I think after about the third day, General Trefry sat back in his chair and as only he can do, raised his hands and said, "Christ, I'm frightened." That became a benchmark as I went back to the Army Directorate, to come to grips with the issues of how

were we going to mobilize the Guard. To mobilize, deploy and fight as part of the Total Army.

Now, about of the mindset in the National Guard. Probably the most dominant one was fear, that fear manifested itself in several ways. At the upper levels, as Bruce indicated, the leadership of the National Guard was uncertain if they were going to lose control of what had been historically their purviews. We in the National Guard Bureau had been captured by some of those same fears. I recall an instance I asked the folks that were involved in the automation program to come in and talk about automation, and I was surprised to find that we had always acquired computers that were different from the Army's. We were then at the stage where we were beginning to go out and acquire new computers. I said, "Why don't we buy the same ones that the Army has?" And the fellow who was talking to me said, "Well, if we do that, the data in our computers will be available to the Army Staff and there's no telling what mischief will come from that."

Well, we changed that policy. We went out and acquired computers that were compatible with the Army. I recall that during the mobilization exercises our units that were affiliated or rounding out Active units used to have to carry the punchcards down to the 24th Division and hand them to the computer folks in the 24th Division; and

they spent all night transferring them to their cards so they could begin to account for our soldiers. That, it seemed to me, was a disconnect from what we were trying to achieve, the rapid mobilization of the Guard.

An interesting sideline to that, after we went ahead and got the computers, about four years later the Logistics Chief in the National Guard Bureau came in to see me in great excitement and anxiety, and he said, "I regret to inform you that the DCSLOG of the Army is redistributing our equipment." I said, "How can he do that?" He said, "He now has our data and is unilaterally redistributing Guard assets." So the fellow who warned me at the beginning, gave a legitimate warning. It simply meant I had to go up to the DCSLOG of the Army and, as General Vessey may recall, we had to take a lead pipe and say, "No, you won't do that any more." The practice stopped abruptly.

Although fear at the upper levels was one of control, at the lower levels, it became more related to a fear of not doing well. The National Guard had always trained in a relatively mundane, lethargic, way. Now, maybe our National Guardsmen will take exception to that, but we never trained to our full potential in the National Guard that I grew up with. Much of the constraint was forced on us by the narrow perception by the Army of what you could expect in training

National Guardsmen. My personal view, and the view of other National Guardsmen that I associated with during my development, was that the National Guard had never been challenged to do what it was capable of doing.

So the challenge was, how do we generate a greater sense of urgency and increase the output, the training output of a National Guard which was unaccustomed to training at the pace which was essential if the Army was going to be reinforced by a National Guard that will meet its wartime demands.

That was one of the reasons, or the genesis, I should say, for the expansion of the KPUP Program. KPUP was not invented here. It was a program which the Army Reserve had under the Title, I believe, of Counterpart Training, and the idea was that you took a Reservist or a National Guardsman and you put him or her with Active units so that they could improve their personal skills and their military skills working side by side with Active people. It is interesting to note that FORSCOM didn't fund the USAR's Counterpart program. The Guard changed the name and secured separate funding from the Congress.

We had one hell of a time getting National Guard units to go out and participate in Army and joint exercises because they were afraid that they couldn't measure up to the standards. So, by taking our soldiers and putting

them in with Active Component units, our theory was that they would see that they were not training in an environment with standards they could not achieve themselves. And that came to fruition very early when a Cavalry unit from the Army was down at Fort Bliss and was involved in an exercise. We sent National Guardsmen from Oregon and Idaho under KPUP to participate in the exercise. And the message that went to the soldiers was that General Temple was interested in their perceptions of the level of training which the Active Army unit was involved in and their ability to participate at that level in their own unit. And would they call me at that first opportunity and give me their observations.

My wife and I were sound asleep one night, but at one thirty or two o'clock in the morning the telephone rings, which was not unusual. Sometimes the Operations Center would call at that time. My wife reached over and got the phone and she says, "Who is this?" and she says, "Who?" And she says, "Herb, it's Lieutenant So and So." And so I reached across and got the phone and the fellow said, "Hi, I'm Lieutenant So and So with the." I think he was with the Idaho National Guard, and he said, "I'm here with this Cavalry outfit from the Army. We've been exercising for about five and a half days in the desert, and this is the first time I could get near a telephone to call, and some-

body said to call you. And I'm doing that to tell you that I am really impressed with the training. It is first class. But I want you to know that my unit can train this well, too."

I believe KPUP was the most successful means of integrating the Guard into the Army. It provided hands on experience that Guardsmen could transfer to their units at little cost.

It was worth being woke up for. So that was the mindset - fear. Getting the soldiers willing to train at an increased tempo and perhaps even at higher levels, which we eventually were able to achieve. There was a great deal of distrust in the National Guard about the motives of the Army, as they began to accept us into more of these activities. And the question then was, "Is this simply a cover for the Army assuming more control over the National Guard?"

From the perspective that I had, there was never any question in my mind that the Army would have enjoyed command authority over the National Guard, but for those of us who understood the system, the statutes and the responsibilities of each of the separate components, there was never really a threat. Of course there were intrusions during the course of events into what had been the prerogatives of the Guard, but these were resolved by the leadership of the Army, principally. And though there may be those of us who have been criti-

cal of Army leadership in their relationship with the Guard, I must tell you, from having over twelve years of experience in working with the leadership of the United States Army, the Guard today could not have achieved what it's achieved if it had not been for the Chiefs of Staff of the Army with whom I served, and that goes back all the way, to General Rogers, to General Myer, to General Wickham, and General Vuono, and of course Secretary Marsh. He was absolutely key.

I must tell you that each of those chiefs of staff, within his ability, was absolutely committed to the National Guard meeting its wartime responsibilities. The difficulty we had at the time—and I don't know how it is today,—was that the mindsets of the Army, as General Vessey may have described them, and the mindsets of the Guard, with which NGB was dealing, were separated by a great gap of ignorance. Neither one knew very much about the other. As a National Guardsman, I can tell you most Guardsmen knew about the National Guard, and beyond their state knew even less about the Army. So it was important to us that if we were going to resolve these matters, we had to find a way to integrate the Guard into the Army, the Army they were going to fight with, and they had to get to know each other because they were going to have to live and fight together.

Those were our objectives; perhaps it's questionable how successful we were. I do believe the Guard attained unprecedented capability and readiness through a closer relationship with the Army and that was achieved without loss of control of the Guard.

**BJ:** That's a very, very interesting summation. I think we have now heard enough to launch us into a more public discussion. I'll just mention one little personal aside to General Temple. Knowing of your interest in General Marshall's management of the Army and the integration of the National Guard, and your mention of Keep-Up, it's interesting that we reflect back that the year before the National Guard divisions were mobilized, General Marshall got all the Division Staffs to run through a week with counterpart training with Regular Army Division Staffs. There's very little record of that, but we know that every National Guard Division Staff got a week on active duty doing the job that they would do on active duty with one of the few Regular Army Divisions then in the system.

But now the time has come to turn to you, the members of the Symposium, and who would like to shoot the first question to the panel? Do we have any? I see a few people edging around out there. Yes, Sir.

**Q:** I wonder whether the time that we were—I'm General John Lenhardt,

from OSD Reserve Affairs. I wonder, and probably either General Temple or General Vessey might know the answer to this: When the Army and General Abrams in particular were beginning to take a look at the levels of integration in the ROUND-OUT concept, my information would tell me that it was done at two levels. There were ROUND-OUT battalions, the ten battalion divisions, and then there were the brigades. How much debate occurred on that? And did anybody take a look at going perhaps even lower than that? And did you have any feeling about where you were going to get the greatest level of utility and the greatest level of integration?

**JWV:** I think I can say something. I can probably say more than you want to hear about that. But many of you in the audience, Fran, others in the audience, will recall the so-called OSD Tests we ran in the early '70s on integration. We ran tests on various levels of integration.

The tests were questionable tests. I'd put "tests" in quotations, because what they were, were attempts at integration at various levels, and there wasn't a broad sampling. There were onesies and twosies around the country. Some were done very, very well. They were more dependent upon the capabilities and enthusiasm of the local commanders, both the Active and Guard and Reserve people, than they were on a concept. So

we had some that did superbly and some that did poorly. The debates centered more on some of the fears that Herb raised earlier on the question of, what's going to happen if you integrate Guard and Reserve units at low levels; do you then automatically rule out the opportunity for this marvelous group of American patriots who give up their vacation time to serve the nation's defenses for the opportunities to rise to higher ranks? And that's a very legitimate question and fear.

I think that, overall, we know that with 38 training days a year, the lower the unit is, the [more the] readiness from that particular unit, and that in theory you could integrate at the level of one. You know, there are all sorts of positions, I believe, in the Active Force today that could be filled by Guardsmen and Reservists on the 38 training days a year, or perhaps two for the position or something like that, and the nation would never miss a beat. But what we don't want to have is a system that says if you are going to enlist in the National Guard you are doomed forever to rise no higher than the rank of squad leader or platoon sergeant or tank commander, or something like that. That's a different problem to be solved.

So there were all sorts of debates and questions raised and finally, when there are debates and questions about things like that, it was decided by fiat. General Abrams decided where we

would integrate and the recommendations were taken to him and he made the decision and we integrated it at that level. And, you know, it worked far better than the people in the Active Army, there were many people in the Active Army who thought this was a bummer. I, along with some of you in this room, were at the meeting of the Army Reserve Forces Policy Board when I presented the integration concept.

I stood up and, you know, I was very proud of my Guard beginning. I'd fought for three years with the National Guard Division in World War II and enlisted in the National Guard and am very proud of my National Guard heritage. Unfortunately, I didn't have my 34th Division patch on this day, but I got up and briefed the concept, the integration concept which was the heart of the Abrams Doctrine, to the Reserve Force Policy Board. John Baker stood up and said, "General, I don't know who you are or what your background is, but I can tell you one thing. You don't know a damn thing about the National Guard." So, it was a concept that was not enthusiastically embraced by either the Active or the Reserve Component Force.

It took great leadership. People like Fran Greenlief and Vern Weber in the Guard and leadership on the Active Force to make it work at the levels that we did. Now we know a lot more. I think it is time to examine other concepts, but we have

to keep in mind all the lessons, not just some of the lessons.

We have to keep in mind all the lessons that we know about what a militia is for, you know. What is the State's role? The very legitimate role of States to have a militia. How do we serve that? How do we we build a larger force for the nation? How do we adequately reward both monetarily and psychically the people who enlist in the Guard and Reserve.

So, there are a lot of questions to answer. There aren't any simple answers to this thing. But we have a lot of information that we didn't have before General Abrams imposed what we are now—and I agree with Bob, that he would be appalled to hear us call it "the Abrams Doctrine."

HRT: I'm going to invite General Vessey to correct me, because I was not privy to the level of discussion that he was during this time, but as I recall ROUNDOUT, it was designed to do something that was more strategic in nature in that the Soviets were counting divisions and we were striving to reach a prudent risk force. I don't recall, but 32, 33 divisions, something of that sort. And the idea was to raise division flags in the Army, not only for a fighting capability but also a deterrent.

Because of dollar constraints the Army could increase the number of active divisions only through this method

of integrating Guard units into their divisions. The brigade was the most effective level and though there were some battalions that were integrated into Active units, brigades seemed to achieve better results more clearly and more quickly than at the lower levels.

As General Vessey discussed, maybe it's time to begin to look at different techniques and different methods to achieve this integration, or is that kind of integration relevant today? If no one is counting divisions, do you really need ROUNDOUT as we've known it in the past?

I won't even discuss ROUNDUP because I'm not certain that I know what that is. The fact is ROUNDOUT had proven to be successful when the division commanders made the effort to make it successful. I can recall that many of the division commanders in the 24th Division thought they were my shadow, from Jim Vaught to Don Rosenblum to General Galvin. These guys were on the phone frequently to the National Guard Bureau pounding the table and demanding that the National Guard Bureau meet its responsibilities to ROUNDOUT. These men made the program work.

But the question, I think, that we now need to ask, that General Vessey alluded to, was, "Is now the time to examine different courses and perhaps the National Guard ought to return to a more traditional role?" But that's

your afternoon question.

BJ: Yes, Sir.

JWV: In answer to your question, you are absolutely right that part of it was building divisions. We could not build 16 divisions without making the third brigade of a number of those divisions Guard brigades. But we also wanted—General Abrams made it clear that they were to be real fighting divisions with the capability of fighting. We wanted not just divisions, not just hollow divisions, we wanted big, tough, divisions, and that's why additional battalions were added to some of the divisions, to make the big, tough divisions.

MG Francis S. Greenlief (Ret.):

Perhaps I can add something to this discussion by relating an anecdote. General Vessey and I were members of a group called the Dance of the Pachyderms that developed the STEADFAST Plan. Part and parcel of this was the integration of the Guard into the Active Army through ROUNDOUT. A great debate occurred between General Vessey and myself, at that time both Major Generals. Jack proposed that battalions of Guard, organic to Guard Divisions be available for ROUNDOUT. I was utterly opposed, although I was very willing to integrate Guard separate battalions as ROUNDOUT. My argument was I didn't want to destroy the ability

of the Guard Division to be mobilized as a whole division.

General "Dutch" Kerwin was the Chairman of the group, as I recall, and after General Vessey and I had our discussion, at the end of the discussion General Vessey, having heard my diatribe, said, "Hey, Fran, if I were a Guard battalion commander"—and I knew General Vessey's background — "if I were a Guard battalion commander I would be absolutely delighted to have my battalion mobilized as part of an Active Army division, even if I ran a Guard division." I've said that wrong. What Jack said was, "If I were the division commander of a Guard division I would be delighted to have one of my battalions mobilized with an active division." And Dutch said, "Jack, it's pretty obvious you ain't going to command no Guard Division."

But considering those relative positions, then, I'd have to tell you that today I'm not sure I'd hold to that position. Considering the kind of environment we are involved in, the kind of mobilization that would occur, I'm inclined to believe that today I might agree that a Guard battalion of a Guard division, in the right time and place, could be mobilized as part of the Active Army. I agree. It's a new environment, and it's time to take new approaches. Thank you.

BJ: Thank you, General Greenlief. Just to refer back

for a moment to the original question, I recall an initiative, a strong initiative, but I don't remember the exact year. But if you recall the Finsterle Study, that went in great depth into ROUNDOUT at below battalion level, and had a concept for rounding out artillery battalions with batteries from the Guard, as an example, and it got quite a lot of scrutiny during a specific period of time.

Q: I want to ask a question of General Temple. You were speaking about the mindset and you were speaking about the commitment during his time at the Bureau of Army leadership to the concept of integrating the Guard and Reserve. Is there the implication, perhaps, that that same commitment may not have existed then, or maybe even now, on lower levels toward integration of the Guard and Reserve?

What I'm asking, somewhat diplomatically, is that when you talk to Guard commanders who participate in foreign force deployments, or even the Persian Gulf War, and when they speak rather explicitly and vehemently about second-class treatment that they perceived that they received from their Regular Army counterparts, is there just a bureaucratic problem in trying to take that commitment from that leadership and reach down to lower levels? Because that is just something that has always existed in American history and it's difficult to deal with.

HRT: No. I never found a case of a soldier in the National Guard who wasn't proud and excited and wanted to participate as part of the Army, at the levels you are talking about. Again, back to my original comment, the fear and the anxiety was at the senior levels. The soldiers, as I said earlier, were in many cases uncertain about their own abilities because the Army had done a pretty fair job of convincing them that they could not do very much, and many of their own leaders who lacked the experience themselves to provide the leadership to train to the levels and at the tempo that was necessary, had convinced them that perhaps they could not.

I never found a case of a Guardsman who wasn't fully committed to the United States Army. I often had a hell of a time sorting out the fact that every National Guardsman thought he was in the Army even though he only was in the Army a few days a month was irrelevant to him. He was in the Army and he wanted to be a part of it, and he wanted all the trappings that went with it, and perhaps the personal slights or insults that might have been leveled at him were off his back very quickly. I never found an instance where a National Guardsman was afraid of losing his Guard integrity because of his relationship in relationship to the Army. Just the opposite. They were always willing to soldier.

LS: I would like to say something about that. As I think you know, I'm working on a book — I've been working on it too long and it should be finished — a book about Reserve Forces in the Gulf War, and that's given me an opportunity to talk to an awful lot of people about the kinds of things your question addresses, at least in that limited conflict. And I will have to say the evidence is not homogeneous. It's quite differentiated in terms of how people, mobilized people, were treated by Active Forces that they served with. And it ranges all the way from people who thought that they really were treated very poorly to people who thought that they were treated better than the Active Forces that they joined, they were treated almost like VIPs. Neither of those extremes represents, in my view, the center of mass of reality.

A lot of times people described to me experiences where initially they might be treated—I think second-class citizens is too strong a term, but might be treated with some, I don't know quite what to say, suspicion is not the right term either, but not fully accepted. Let me just put it like that. And after they'd worked a little while they found that that evaporated, and I really feel—this is a personal opinion — I really feel one of the sort of sad things in the aftermath of the Gulf War is the following: The relationships between the components in many respects had reached,

I thought, an unprecedented level of mutual respect and comity and to a degree that was undercut by the later controversies that surrounded the performance, readiness and policy regarding the utilization of the ROUNDOUT units, which were after all not the main part of the story, although they are an important part of the story.

But I'll have to say, I'm even somewhat critical of some of the senior leadership of what we might call the Reserve Forces community, active and retired, for putting undue emphasis, I felt, on that aspect when so many of the other forces deserved so much credit. And you could tell anecdotes all day that would illustrate that, but one anecdote that I think almost everybody here has probably heard involves an armored division that was just about out of fuel, and into their CP late in the day, maybe early in the evening, walks a female captain. And they look at her and they say, "What are you doing here?" And she says, "I got fuel. Want some?"

And they did. And, believe me, it was accepted with more than open arms. So there are a lot of stories that, I think, are true, are valid, and that help to reflect a reality that is more differentiated than the experience of some individuals who maybe felt they weren't accepted in the beginning and never were. Undoubtedly there were cases like that, too. But that's not the center of the mass, at least

as my research to this point identifies it.

JWV: Well, the issue has been, I think, very well discussed by both these two people. I just recall my own serving as a soldier in a National Guard division between two Regular Army divisions committed to combat in the early days of World War II, and how important we all believed it was that we look as good as the Regular Army did out there. We didn't. We took more casualties. It was harder for us simply because we did not have the totality of training and experience that the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division had. And that should be no surprise to anyone. But we did all right.

That colored my later views of what to do. I later had the good fortune of commanding one of those heavy divisions that was rounded-out by a National Guard brigade. I want to tell you, I would have been very comfortable going to war with my National Guard brigade as the third brigade of that division. I recognized that there certain levels of training that they hadn't achieved, that you just couldn't do in 38 training days a year. If you could, there is no reason to have an Active Army. On the other hand, we had worked closely enough together to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each other and how we could accommodate to those, and I believe that the Doctrine was sound and

that we could have done it.

In a way, I understand the decision that was made in the mobilization for the Gulf War with the ROUNDOUT brigades, but it is too bad that it happened the way it did. The way it turned out there was plenty of time to give them all the training that they ever would have needed before they fired the first shot, even if they had started at a lot lower level. But we shouldn't dwell a lot on that experience. What we should do is couple that into all of the things that we know about how to integrate the Guard and Reserve and deciding how we march on into the future.

Q: Sir, I'm Colonel Jack Mountcastle from the Army War College, and I've got a question for Dr. Sorley as General Abrams' biographer. I think all of us, given our experience in the '80s when the CAPSTONE Program involving the National Guard and the Army Reserve, and a program like the National Guard captains in Europe, was working and very aggressively. There was almost no time, in my experience while serving in Europe, when you could not find a National Guard commander and his staff or individual Guardsmen on duty in Europe. Did General Abrams, during his short tenure as Chief—because I know he went to Europe, so, did he take any steps towards the formation that we would then later know as the program of CAPSTONE and aligning

Reserve Components to directly with the active ...

LS: I'm going to have to say, Jack, that I'm not sure of the answer to that, but let me speculate. And General Vessey may well know and can tell you.

As you know, General Abrams had a lot to do and little time to do it in. He died after just under two years in office as the Army Chief. One of the last and most significant things he did was to call his senior associates together and tell them that he had committed to a 16-division force with no increase in end strength and no budgetary impact, at a time when we had then maybe 13 and 1/3 divisions. In other words, we were going to take this out of our hide. He disestablished seven major headquarters and cut back drastically on many others, including his own, in order to try to get as many spaces as he could to underwrite that expansion of the division force.

He was able to do that because he reached agreement with Jim Schlesinger, then Secretary of Defense, that if he could make any savings of that kind he could keep them and apply them toward a greater combat force. And at this meeting shortly before he died, he said to them, "I'm committed to this course of action, unless anybody here knows of any reason why we shouldn't do that. And if anybody thinks that, they should have the courage to speak out now and tell me so." Now, you know, if

you had been one of those people and had it put to you like that, I guess you would have had to really suck up your gut to say to General Abrams, under those circumstances, "We can't do this," or "We shouldn't do it." But the fact is no one did, and so he then said, "All right. That's what we are going to do."

And then it was only a matter of weeks before he died, and so it was left to others to carry that on. And so far as I know, the manifestations of efforts to increase the capability of Reserve Forces, the step-up to this tougher, more demanding mission than they'd ever had before, (a mission that was in some ways tougher than what we had in the past asked of our Active Forces), the next half-generation of leadership, let's say, was left with that charge from him, which, in my view, they carried out, they executed brilliantly.

JWV: I would just add to that, that on the Active side, it was the triumphant effort of Kerwin, DePuy, and Fred Weyand, who were given this legacy, and then along with people like Fran and Vern and some of us lesser lights who were marching to the same tune because it was the only band in town, who were the foot soldiers in that exercise. Many of these other refinements came later.

The Guard captains to Europe, and CAPSTONE. CAPSTONE is Bob Shoemaker, we fortunately had a series of dedicated Active and

Reserve Component people who made this work, and I think it's important that we understand that we had a good bunch of TAGs, a good bunch of State Adjutants General, who were able to grasp the concept and make it work because it is out in that arena where these sorts of ideas work. You can have all sorts of grand ideas at the national headquarters, but if they don't work at the posts, camps, and stations in the Regular Army and in the States, in the Guard, they don't work.

LS: I think you might like to know one little vignette apropos of what we've been discussing, one that also occurred very late in General Abrams' life.

General Vessey mentioned that he commanded one of those heavy divisions and it had a ROUNDOUT brigade in it, and that he would have been very comfortable taking that unit to war with this ROUNDOUT brigade. There is a reason why he had that division.

Late in General Abrams' life, when he was mortally ill and able to do very little, he would do a little work on the veranda of Quarters I at Fort Myer. His associates would bring to him those things they knew he cared most about and viewed as most important. And on a given day, Colonel Bill Livesy, his Executive Officer, brought to him some such matters, including the proposed new slate of division commanders. The people who put those

slates together knew General Abrams well, and they usually got those slates through without any change. On this occasion, Abrams looked at the slate. Then he turned to Livesy and he said, "Have you got a pen?" Livesy handed him his pen. Abrams took the pen, struck through one name on the list, we don't know whose, and wrote in, "Vessey" opposite that division. Then he gave the slate back to Livesy and said only, "He's a soldier."

Q: I'm Pat Garvey, from New York. This is kind of a follow-on to General Vessey's comments about integration on mobilization, and I wonder if (General Vessey) would like to comment on the role of the full-time cadres, the mix of the cadres, and what you think they might contribute to facilitate in the integration of the Guard and Reserve Forces on a, not only on a day-to-day basis, but of course in terms of mobilization. Where do you see that whole business going?

JWV: Well, we are at a time when there's a great opportunity for us to examine what we've done in the past, what is good about that, and then look at the uncertain future that we see, and ask ourselves, what should we do in the future? I personally believe that it is time for a complete, top-to-bottom look at the way we mix Active and Reserve Forces. This will not be popular in much of any place. The Active Forces will have difficulty with

this. Many Guardsmen and Reservists will have difficulty with it. Political leadership will have difficulty with it, when their plate is full of other problems, taking on something that obviously has great political overtones and the prospect of big debates and "why fix it when it isn't broke that badly?" will be raised. And that's a good question.

On the other hand, I would suggest that we are at a watershed of history. We have a model that has served us very well over the past 50 years, 50, 60, 75 years, and it has served us well. And we take, we gain from it enormous strengths. We also take from it knowledge of very clear weaknesses that need to be fixed. And I think that we have an opportunity to ask that question in the context that I have just raised. I think looking at bits and pieces is the wrong way to look at it now.

There are enormous problems with doing what I've suggested doing, but also, I think, enormous potential benefits for the country a few years ahead.

And there are great dangers to this country, and the greatest danger that I see, on the Defense side of the house, is inadequate defenses for the years ahead. The population is growing; the percentage of population that's involved in defense activities is becoming ever smaller; compulsory military service has long since disappeared; the numbers of Congressmen and

women who have served in the Armed Forces becomes an ever smaller percentage.

National Guard Armories are being closed in communities that have had National Guard Armories since those particular states were states. How to tie any defense force with the population at large is a major question. How to get support for defense?

ROTCs are being folded up because "we don't need the officers that they produce." The ties between the citizens of this country and its defense forces are becoming increasingly weaker. So, what we have to look at is, how do we have enough? And the difference? There will be arguments about, well, you don't want too much because the nation needs its resources for other things. But if you have to choose between too much and too little for defense, the penalty for having too little is exponentially greater than the penalty for having too much.

Now, how do you do it? And I say, let's start with a look at how we tie the total force together, and that's not just Army, but Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard.

How do we build this nation's defenses from the roots of the nation and the histories and traditions that we have that are worth taking into the future? And how do we gracefully get rid of those things that have served well but aren't necessarily worth

taking into the future?

That's a long-winded answer to your excellent question on a narrower subject.

**BJ:** Bob, in your research, what do you feel, looking at the keen sense that General Abrams had with respect to the values of this integration and the ability to build public understanding and support for military operations, do you feel that he had similar views with respect to the importance of a strong industrial base, with respect to manufacture, competition, and so forth? Certainly, in his Big Five Program he identified a certain level of interest. Would you comment on that?

**LS:** I will. But what I'm going to say is going to be speculative, because I don't have any detailed, factual knowledge of that.

I think you are right to look at the Big Five, and on an earlier occasion General Vessey had commented on the Abrams' legacy as we viewed it in the Gulf War, to which he also alluded briefly this morning. And he identified a number of different things.

The effective air support was one. The integration of the Reserve Forces was another. The training I think he identified as the most important, the great training which taught our soldiers how to stay alive on the battlefield. But he also talked about high technology that worked, and worked when we needed it.

It was determined that the readiness of the force, which depended primarily on the soldier and his leaders, would also be enabled by the right kind of equipment. And, of course, this is one of the similarities between that period and what we are now seeing, the limited amount of resources, a lot of competition for those resources.

I think focusing on a few key systems was a very important aspect of that, and while many of those systems went through the kinds of growing pains that I guess is endemic to any high technology enterprise, I can't help but feel he would have been extremely gratified by how well those systems performed when the time came to have them tested in combat.

**BJ:** I'd like to give each of the panelists, starting with General Temple, an opportunity to take perhaps three or four minutes to summarize your thinking on the issues that we've discussed this morning, and orient them, if possible, towards a summation we might come out with before the noon break, to contribute toward a summary statement.

**HRT:** At the time, and of course this was during the Cold War era, the integration of the Guard into the Army was essential for the preparation for the nation to go to war. At that time the perception was that we'd be fighting outnumbered and outgunned in far off places, under very difficult circumstances, with

very, very little time in the mobilization process, and very little time between mobilization and commitment to combat. That was the driving feature for everyone who was addressing the National Guard's preparations for war.

That concern for readiness convoluted how we trained the National Guard. We went from training from the bottom up sequentially, and we began to focus on the fact that we could not deploy divisions in 60 and 70 days if they had never trained Division Commanders and Staffs. We made a conscious decision that it was essential to focus training on the highest level of training that you could because that was the most difficult and complex level of training.

The difference between the National Guard of the 80's and the one which General Vessey related to when he was mobilized in World War II was the fact that the modern Guard was a totally different organization. Everyone had basic and advanced individual training as a requirement for service in the National Guard. Officers were already service school trained and many more officers C&GSC products.

We rejected out of hand the contention that 38 days of training was the training limit for the Guard. It was and is not. The stability in the Guard provided the opportunity to build on training over a period of years. You would go out

and talk to National Guardsmen who were in training and ask them, "how long have you been in the Guard?" If he said ten years—and the average was running about seven years, you were taking 38 days times seven, and then all of the additional training activities which were then incorporated into the Guard. And on top of that you had the basic and advanced individual training.

In many instances, you were now talking to peacetime National Guardsmen who were better prepared to go to war than many soldiers we sent to war in World War II, Korea and Vietnam. They had more actual training and experience.

So we were not dealing with novices, or recruits, in preparing them to meet their wartime commitments. It's just that we had to refocus how we were going to train them with the view that you had to train divisions and brigades, and that the soldiers could be refreshed in basic skills after mobilization. You could do that in 28 or 30 days. You could not train divisions in 28 and 30 days. So what you found was an inverted approach to how we prepared the National Guard to go to war. But, if I could just take an additional moment.

Two people, in my experience, were key to achieving training success. One was General Bill Richardson, who was my next-door neighbor when I lived at

Fort Myer. He had an opportunity to go up and evaluate the 28th Division of the Pennsylvania National Guard back in the late '70s, and came back and explained to me that, "You have very good soldiers in the National Guard, that I've seen" — he had never seen a National Guard unit before—he said, "But they are not very savvy. They can't put things together. They could not operate as a Division. They need practical experience." And he wrote a very lengthy report to General Jeff Smith, who was the First Army Commander, to whom he was reporting on his evaluation, and that report became the first training document the National Guard Bureau ever put out.

I regret to tell you I plagiarized most everything from General Richardson's report. But that was the genesis for our infusing a sense of urgency into the Guard. Train at the level organized, reinforce service schools with realistic experiences. Train units at an accelerated tempo oriented on CAPSTONE missions.

The second person that I thought played a very key role in permitting the Guard to expand beyond what it had ever envisioned for itself was General Sennewald.

When he became the Forces Command Commander those opportunities opened. I can recall his telephone call to me at Fort Bliss where I was visiting. He

said, "Look, I'm about to sign a policy that for every annual training period, a National Guard unit will train several days at the level it's organized. You've got any problem with that?" "No, Sir. That's a good policy."

That was the impetus we needed to train units to accomplish their missions. This was proven in world-wide exercises and permitted the mobilization and deployment of large organizations with little or no post-mobilization training for Desert Shield/Storm. It was now a new National Guard, ready and mission capable.

LS: I guess I'll just close by making an observation about then and now. It seems to me it's been established without question that the concept for the integration of the forces which stemmed from General Abrams' experience proved to be the right concept for the Gulf War. The working title of my book about reserve forces in the Gulf War conveys that. It's called, "Good To Go."

I would like to suggest that whether it proves to be the right policy for the future—and I would very much like to see the kind of top-to-bottom review of this issue that General Vessey advocated be done in the next year—depends in part on what role America decides to play in the international affairs of the future.

You hear, for example, people saying that the Cold War was an aberration, that the

maintenance of a large standing Army during the period of the Cold War was an historical aberration. And the Cold War is over. And therefore, the implication is that we can go back to our historic primary reliance on Reserve Forces, with a small, almost a cadre of standing Army.

Now, I'm not prepared to say that's right or wrong, but I will just point out that the one major difference between the pre-Cold War period, as a model, and the post-Cold War period is we haven't decided to go back to being non-involved in world affairs the way we essentially were before World War II. So whatever determinations are made, I suggest they have to be made with that in view.

Now, if the United States continues to try to advance what some have called a "New World Order," and I'm not sure what that means, but what it means to me, or what I suggest it might mean, is a world in which aggressor nations and aggressor elements are not permitted by the world community to work their will through the use of illegitimate armed force. Any "New World Order" that is going to be imposed, because that's what we are talking about—imposing it, is going to have to see leadership by the United States in bringing that about. That seems to be unquestionable to me.

And under those circumstances, it seems to me that frequent

resort to force in varying degrees will be a virtual certainty. So I close by raising a consideration that troubles me in this respect.

General Vessey pointed out quite eloquently how the budgets are going down, and how the percentage of the population under arms is going down, how the experience of our Congressmen with military affairs is going down, and a number of other factors, all contributing I think to the same drive in one direction. But if we are going to have frequent resort to armed force, Reserve Forces are inevitably going to be a part of that. And ought to be, in my view.

And yet in the Gulf War you saw some types of capabilities that reside in the Reserve Forces. Even such a mundane thing as line-haul trucking capability were used 100 percent, or close to 100 percent. The reason I mention that is that if we go back to some campaign like that again soon, we are going to have to go back to the same people and say, "Come again." And the way to avoid that course is to have redundancy of capability, so this time we can draw on these people, and then if we have to go again pretty soon, we can go and draw on some other people elsewhere. But redundancy of capability is costly, and I suggest probably not politically attainable — under current circumstances, anyway.

So, if we did a review of the kind General Vessey advocates,

which I strongly support, I would hope that we would look very carefully at not only discreet instances of the potential use of force, but the cumulative impact over time, if indeed we are going to try to impose a "New World Order," or play a role in world affairs which causes us at fairly frequent intervals to have to mobilize parts of our military capability.

JWV: Well, I'm not sure I'm capable of doing that, Bruce, but the very title of this Symposium here sort of says two things. One is it's sort of a tribute to General Abrams, and I think that's right and good that we should do that. But it also raises a huge question for what do we do in the future, and I gave my little speech about that. Bob has just reminded us of some of the things that we need to examine. There are some others.

General Abrams was a very human individual, among other things. He was a person who could find you in serious trouble but put you at ease by telling of some similar circumstances that he had once been in that was very akin to the kettle of fish that you now found yourself in. He understood soldiers wonderfully.

As we look at how to make the best defenses by using Active, Guard and Reserve Forces, we need to understand that it is in the strengths and weaknesses of those people that we call soldiers, whether they be

Active or Reserve Component, that will decide the issue.

Many of you have heard me tell the story before, but I'll tell it again, about the enormous strengths that one finds in soldiers, that can be part-time soldiers.

I visited a tank battalion at Fort Drum, before Fort Drum was an Active Army post. A New England tank battalion (was) there in training, and it was far down the DAMPL. They had old turkeys for tanks. But I engaged in one of my favorite activities, which is riding the bustle rack of a tank as it's going down a Table 8, and I did that. Got the headsets on, and listened to the crew.

And this was absolutely a top-notch tank crew that would have compared very favorably with any tank crew any place in the world. It just went down that range, bang, bang, bang. The commands were right. The techniques were just absolutely top-notch. And they scored very high on that Table 8.

We got back to the start point and I dismounted, and I hadn't been introduced to the crew before I got on, and I introduced myself and talked to them and talked to the tank commander and asked him how long he had been tank commander.

He said, "It depends on how you count it, Sir." He said, "I was supposed to be a gunner in the Second Armored Division at Fort Hood, but

I was, most of the time, the tank commander for three years. And then," he says, "I was tank commander for three years or something like that in the Third Armored Division in Europe. And then I've been with this outfit" — I've forgotten the number, whether it was seven years, or eight years or whatever it was that he was a tank commander with this outfit. "So," he said, "I think you can probably say 13, 14 years." I asked him where he lived. And it turned out he lived about a four-hour drive from the Armory where his tank company drilled. And I said, "You drive that far for drill?" And he said, "Yes, Sir." I said, "Why do you do that, Sergeant?" He said, "General, it's the closest good outfit with tanks."

Now, therein is sort of the heart of the strength of the Reserve Components, and the Active Force. We understand that.

In our county seat back home in Minnesota is the 194th — was the 194th — Tank Battalion, before you dummies here in Washington took them off the rolls. But it was the first tank battalion to fire a shot in anger on the beaches of Luzon. It covered the withdrawal to Bataan. It made the last counterattack on Bataan, with the battalion commander and his three remaining tanks. All of them Guardsmen, who never fired a shot in anger out of the main gun of those tanks 'til they fired at the Japanese. And an outfit that

maintained 110 percent strength all through the years because of its association with Bataan and those battles. And we took it off the rolls. We can't do those things.

Now, how we take those sorts of strengths and build for the future is the question. That model won't fit the future. Maybe the 194th ought not to be a tank battalion in the old form, but somehow there's an armory there with a unit there and guys reporting, and somehow the legacy of that battle has to be infused into those people. So, that's your problem. But we have to do it.

**BJ:** Thank you, General Vessey. I think General Vessey has made a very eloquent case for our large discussion of our intense desire to somehow hang on to our National Guard unit lineage during this great period of restructuring and turbulence.

In summary of this morning's discussion, an almost impossible task, there have been so many thoughts and ideas that have been thrown out at us. I think what we can say in retrospect about the morning session is that, "Yes, we can agree, from the panel's standpoint, there is a validity to our reference to the emergence of an Abrams Doctrine," albeit it was a doctrine that really forced the National Guard into a position of more prominence in the Defense structure, and really put it to a great test. To a test which I think one of

our panelists said required National Guard soldiers to do more in the way of preparation and training than perhaps soldiers of even the Regular Army had had to do under normal conditions, under non-Cold War circumstances. But that even successful doctrine must be subject to reevaluation, as we look not only to the past as to the accomplishments, but to the future as to what needs to be done.

## First Hand View of Implementing the Abrams Doctrine

**RFE:** Our luncheon speaker today, Lt. General Don Rosenblum, has had an awful lot of experience that relates to the subjects that we've been discussing this morning. He was one of the architects of STEADFAST when he was on the Army Staff. He was one of the earliest participants in ROUNDOUT brigades as they developed.

When I was appointed the Adjutant General of Florida, he was my CONUSA Commander, and I don't know whether he inherited me or I inherited him, but he was, let me say, vitally interested in the training of the National Guard units in the State of Florida and evidenced that by a lot of personal interest and attention.

We've asked him if he would reflect upon those steps that began to carry us up to the Desert Shield/Desert Storm arena. And it's with a great deal of pleasure that I introduce Don Rosenblum.

**LTG Donald E. Rosenblum (Ret.), Former Commander, First U.S. Army:**

Thank you. I am used to being a utility ball player, because when I was in high school I was a damn good baseball player.

When I went to college the curve balls were a little bit sharper and the fast balls were a little bit faster. So I became the utility infielder for my alma mater. I went

in in the late innings, like Rafael Belliard does, and went to shortstop in the eighth and ninth or pinch-ran and everything. So pinch-hitting doesn't bother me. It probably bothers you because you are stuck with me for the next two hours and 38 minutes as I reflect on things.

And I would like to reflect. I probably, when I was on active duty, had as much experience with the Guard and Reserve as any other General Officer or maybe more. And so I think that I understood, in those days anyway, about the Guard and Reserve.

But my first brush with the National Guard was as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry, as I reported to my company in the Korean War. I reported to Easy Company, 224th Infantry Regiment, 40th Infantry Division, California Army National Guard. Another Second Lieutenant who reported in at the same time, we came up through the Replacement chain together, took over the Weapons Platoon and I took over the First Platoon. His name was "Shy" Myer.

As a matter of fact, when Bob Ensslin asked me to speak here, I picked up the phone and called Shy and I said, "You ain't going to believe this, but I've got to speak to a bunch of guys, so give me some insights," which he did, and if you figure out what he told me to say, you will have figured out Shy Myer.

My battalion commander in those days was a fellow by the name of Alvin E. "Bulldog" Howell. Now, Herb Temple may know him. Bulldog Howell was a California Guardsman. He'd been a battalion commander in World War II, in the 40th Division in the Pacific. And they didn't call him "Bulldog" for any other reason except he was as tough as nails, and he taught me a lot. I'll never forget him.

I will not forget my regimental commander, who was "Walking Jim" Richardson, who'd been the Senior Army Advisor to the California Army National Guard, and when the Guard was activated and sent to Korea for the war, he volunteered for it and was accepted as the Regimental Commander of the 224th Infantry Regiment.

Some twenty years later I got re-involved as I was assigned to the Pentagon, to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, as it was called in those days. I was assigned to the Operations Directorate. And my assignment was the Special Assistant to the Director of Operations. My friends told me, "You are a Special Assistant for one of two reasons: You are either undergoing court-martial charges or you didn't have a job." Mine was the latter.

A fellow by the name of Donnelly P. Bolton was the Operations Director, and he liked to stack up colonels just in case he needed them.

Well, he needed me because I became the DCSOPS representative to STEADFAST, and it was a fascinating experience. STEADFAST, the reorganization was headed by a fellow by the name of Snapper Rattan, who was the Deputy Chief of CORC. You younger guys don't even know what CORC was. It was the Chief of Reserve Components, headed by a Regular Army lieutenant general, and his deputy was a Regular Army major general. I haven't figured that out, but that's what it was.

And my only claim to fame under STEADFAST was the fact that, when we were getting close to making decisions, the CONARC representative—and CONARC was then in the throes of becoming TRADOC and FORSCOM, which was another great thing during the Abrams era — the CONARC representative came up to the Pentagon at one of our final meetings, and he was a general and I was a colonel, and he got up and he said, "The CONARC position is we will test one Readiness Group on the West Coast and one Readiness Group or Region on the East Coast." And I jumped up and said, "BS. It will take five years to implement and the DCSOPS position is we will do it now."

Now, hell, I didn't have a DCSOPS position. Neither did I have the authority to say it. But we did it. What we did in STEADFAST was probably one of

the greatest things that ever happened in integrating the Regular Army and the National Guard and USAR.

Now, in case you've forgotten what happened in those days, the CONUS Armies, the CONUSAs as they are called, prior to STEADFAST, had responsibility for land masses, for commanding posts within their geographical area. That was changed to what it is today, or almost is today, where the CONUS Armies command the USAR and supervises the training and readiness of the Army National Guard.

Within each CONUS Army you had a certain number of what were called Army Readiness Regions, commanded by Regular Army major generals, with a staff of colonels and senior lieutenant colonels who were branch coordinators, depending on the branches within that geographic location. And under the Army Readiness Regions were Readiness Groups commanded by Regular Army colonels, filled with very bright, dynamic, dedicated sergeants, captains, and majors. And then, within the Guard and Reserve, reduced to a very small number, were the advisory detachments.

Within the First Army area—we had four later on, and during that time, if you'll recall, the First Army stretched from Maine to Florida, east of the Mississippi to include Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, District of Columbia.

We had four Readiness Regions, and each one of those major generals stationed at Devens, Dix, and Fort Meade, and in Atlanta, had "x" number of groups under them. It was a wonderful organization.

My only complaint then and as it is today, and the then Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the current Forces Command CINC has heard me say this to him on many occasions, the rest of the Regular Army never has understood what Readiness Group guys do and what Readiness Region guys do. So when the Regular Army guys who were out there, dedicated to the cause of assisting, not advising, but assisting with hands-on, when the boards meet the guys sitting on the boards who have had no experience with this say, "Gee, I don't know. What is a Readiness Group guy? What is a BAT? Something that flies?" No. It's a Branch Assistance Team, within that Readiness Group. A very dedicated young captain or major, who probably has more technical expertise in his field than his counterpart who is the S3 of the Third Battalion of the 505th Airborne, where he would rather be, but works harder and more hours, and probably accomplishes more, than his counterpart.

But nobody knows what he does, so when the boards come out and they don't select him for Leavenworth, or they don't make him a major, he doesn't understand that. And so that's

my cross that I bear, that I've borne all these years.

But during the General Abrams era was when we had STEADFAST. If you look at what we have today, in addition to what General Reimer and his people are trying to do to increase and improve the readiness of the Guard and Reserve, STEADFAST, with the exception of no more Army Readiness Regions—which I think was a mistake to do away with, is in fact like it was twenty years ago. And if you think about that, you say, well, maybe Snapper Rattan, who headed STEADFAST, was pretty good. And so were the two guys from the USAR, CAR, and the National Guard, Joe Burke, who went on to bigger and better things in the Guard, and Rock Huddleston, who was the USAR guy, two colonels, did a superb job in attempting to meld the Regular Army and the National Guard. That was kind of my second look at the National Guard, USAR, and the Regular Army.

The next one was—and you've heard it this morning, when General Abrams said, "We are going to increase the size of the Army from 13 Active Divisions to 16 Active Divisions, and it isn't going to cost five cents in more people, more spaces or anything of that nature." Nobody believed General Abrams could do that.

Now, one of the believers was the DCSOPS of the Army, who was an Abrams guy.

He looked like him. Broad-shouldered, smoked cigars, Camel cigarettes. Most magnificent guy I've ever worked for. His name was Don Cowles, C-o-w-l-e-s. And that's another day for another story about General Cowles and General Abrams. But I'll relate one.

I used to say—I was General Cowles' Exec, and I'd say, "You meet with General Abrams three times a week. What in the hell do you do?" And he'd smile and say, "We run the Army." And they did. And the meeting that was talked about earlier this morning, when General Abrams said, "Does anybody have any objections?" I laughed. I sat in the back of the room there. I was a little colonel, you know, sitting there. My boss told me to go in, I'd learn something, which I did.

But, anyway, take 13 U.S. Army Divisions, make 16 and not cost you any spaces or faces. But they were what we called Bobtail Divisions, two Regular Army brigades, two-thirds of a DISCOM, two-thirds of a Division Artillery, two-thirds of everything else, and to be filled out, or rounded-out as it was called, with a National Guard brigade plus their support, combat support, combat service support.

The 5th Division at Fort Polk, and Fort Polk was a training center. The 7th Division at Fort Ord, California. Fort Ord was a training center. The 5th Division would get a Louisiana

brigade. The 7th Division would get a brigade out of Oregon. And then, the 24th U.S. Infantry Division, to be activated at a place called Fort Stewart-Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, in south Georgia, coastal Georgia, with the 48th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Georgia Army National Guard to be its ROUNDOUT brigade.

Well, I have personal knowledge of that because I went to Fort Stewart in January 1979 as the junior brigadier general in the Army, and I was assigned as the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Stewart-Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia.

And I didn't like that title. I knew that my mission was to build the 24th Division. And so I made myself the CG of the First Brigade (Separate), 24th Infantry Division. Had the papers, you know, all the papers printed with this, signs up, and nobody gave me permission to do it, but, hell, I thought it was fun to do that.

When I first got to Fort Stewart I looked around and I talked to the people there, who were not very interested in seeing the Regular Army build up at Fort Stewart. Their biggest thing was to see who could get to the bar first, by 3:30 in the afternoon. And, seriously, their only mission at Fort Stewart in those days was the Reserve and Guard training. You know, training areas, ranges, officers clubs, things of this nature.

So when I got there I looked around and there were no barracks. There were two permanent barracks but nothing else. I thought they'd have a bunch of wooden barracks. I remembered that from my days in the Pentagon. They were supposed to be there. And I said, "Where are all the wooden barracks?" And they said, "Well, we tore them down and we are waiting for the new barracks." And I said, "Hell, that's not going to be for another two years!"

So I called the Adjutant General of the great State of Georgia, in those days an Air Force Officer by the name of Billy Jones, and I said, "I am on my knees, I am either going to put my soldiers in tents or I am going to ask you if I can rent your National Guard barracks."

And he said, "of course you can rent my National Guard barracks." And we worked out the agreement. And so the soldiers of the 24th Division, First Brigade (Separate), lived in the Georgia Army National Guard barracks.

Forty-man, cinder block barracks. Ron Harrison and Bob Ensslin and everybody else in the southeast knows what they looked like. No heat. No air-conditioning. Sergeants loved it because you could walk in the barracks, you could look down and see the bunks lined up, and the boots lined up. If you wanted to go to the bathroom or take a shower, you went outside. And that's where the 24th Division started.

Interestingly enough, they had the best reenlistment rate for two years of any division in the FORSCOM, and the best reenlistment rate of the posts in FORSCOM in those two years. I thought it was rather interesting when I looked, and I used to tell them, "You live in spartan conditions, so you are the toughest outfit around."

So we rented the barracks from the Adjutant General of Georgia. A year later we were told that the 48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia Army National Guard was going to be our ROUNDOUT brigade. "Would you like to announce that?" And I said, "You are out of your mind. A fellow by the name of Sam Nunn and a Governor by the name of George Busby are going to announce that." I'm smarter than that. So we did.

The 48th Brigade came in and we had a meeting in the Officers Club, after a couple of drinks. We had a meeting of the leadership of the brigade, and we said to them, "Look, you all have a great history and I don't want you to take off your Gray Bonnet patch. But would you like to wear the 24th Division patch on your pocket?" I didn't have authority to do that, but I decided to do that anyway. And that weekend all the patches in the 24th Division were sold out. And then I said, "We wear 'V's on our helmet covers," which they still do today, "and you all might think about doing that." And that

was on within a week.

And then we talked about being the Third Brigade of the 24th. And I said, "We all believe in that, and you are the Third Brigade of the 24th, and we will all meet the same standards." Well, the 24th Division didn't have too many standards because we were just new. But those standards that we did have, the 48th Brigade were part of it.

Now, it was a little difficult because the 24th Division was what I used to call a light-foot division. It was an infantry division. The 48th Brigade was a mechanized brigade, had two mech infantry battalions and a tank battalion.

But regardless of that, the battalions of the 48th Brigade and the battalions of the First Brigade of the 24th, and the DIVARTY in the support battalion, all became sister units, and each helped each other in whatever it needed to be helped on.

When we got tanks into the 24th Division later on, guess who taught us how to maintain them? Guess who taught us how to drive them? Guess who taught us, if you've ever been to Fort Stewart, how to retrieve them from mud? The Georgia Guard.

So ROUNDOUT worked both ways, as far as I was concerned.

And every weekend and during annual training, soldiers of the 24th Division were with

soldiers of the 48th Brigade. Now, whether it was at Fort Stewart or whether it was in Tifton, Georgia, made no difference. And whether our guys went there by helicopter or jeep or sedan or privately-owned vehicle made no difference. But they were out there assisting, in conjunction and coordination with the Readiness Group and the Readiness Region.

When we evaluated the 48th Brigade, the chief of staff of the 24th Division was the chief evaluator. I didn't have an assistant division commander because I was a brigadier general. I was the only guy that didn't have an assistant division commander, so I worked it all myself, which was a great hardship on me because I loved it.

But the point was that between the 24th Division and its ROUNDOUT was a great, close, professional camaraderie, and an almost love for each other. And so we started it out this way, and in talking to the current 24th Division commander, I think it's probably still that same way.

The 24th U.S. Infantry Division, Lightfoot, within a year went on a joint training readiness exercise, or training exercise called, I think it was called BOLD SHIELD or BRAVE SHIELD, in Florida. We were maneuvered against the 82nd Airborne Division. The Second Brigade of the 24th had just been activated. We had 13 guys in that brigade. And they

CPXed along with members of the 48th, and our DISCOM along with members of the 48th Support Battalion, together went to Florida to support the 24th Division.

About that time, somebody said to me, "You know, the 24th Division, you might think about it being a mech division." And I said, "Well, I've never served in anything but infantry and airborne and air mobile divisions. I don't know anything about mechanization." And he said, "Well, you ought to look at it." And I said, "Okay." So I called the then DCSOPS of the Army, and I said, "Sir, you ought to come to Fort Stewart because I know you are testifying in a little while."

And the DCSOPS of the Army came down, and he said to me, "Rosie, we are in trouble. I've just looked at an engineer map and Fort Stewart can't take tanks or APCs or whatever we had in the Army in those days." And I said, "General Vessey, I've got a G-2 and Assistant G-2 who've almost walked this whole grounds and you need to listen to the briefing." Part of that briefing came from the OSD tests, the Georgia units that had maneuvered tanks and other tracked vehicles at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Well, General Vessey went back to Washington and obviously convinced those guys that the 24th could in fact be a mech division. And so, within a short period of

time, we got a tank battalion in and, as I mentioned, the Guardsmen of Georgia taught us how to maintain and how to drive and how to do other things.

When I left Fort Stewart I became an Army Readiness Region Commander. And I went from Fort Stewart, Georgia to Fort Dix, New Jersey. And if you don't think that's a culture shock—with all due respect to you people from New York and New Jersey, it was a great culture shock to me.

But the Army Readiness Region, I learned, had a hell of a lot to offer to the training and readiness of the USAR and the Army National Guard. You've got to remember that the weekends of those young captains, sergeants, and lieutenants and majors was Tuesday and Wednesday. Lots of people don't understand that. It ain't Saturday and Sunday because they are working with the Guard and Reserve.

After that I did other things, but then I had the opportunity, as Bob mentioned, to command the First United States Army. And I remember the Adjutant General of Puerto Rico saying to me, "When are you coming to visit?" I said, "I'm coming to visit you in the winter, because I'm going to Maine in the summer." And he allowed as how that—you may remember that, Billy—he allowed as how I probably wasn't very smart, but he understood why I was saying that.

Again, I'll go back and reemphasize for some people's memory, the Army Readiness Region was a great organization for the training and readiness and supervision of the Guard and Reserve. It was done away with because it "had no wartime mission." It ought to be looked at again.

I believe in that period of time that I was in the Army, we stopped paying lip service to the Guard and Reserve with reference to equipment and training readiness, although the Adjutant General of Florida always bitched to me about his Duster battalions which he wanted me to go about getting rid of. Now they are going to get Avengers, I understand.

On the other side of the coin, the Guard stopped looking at annual training as summer camp, where the guys would go and have a hell of a good time for two weeks, and play cards, and drink beer, and maybe go to the range every so often. And I can recall very vividly the 48th Brigade going on their AT, going from home station to the field, which had never been done before. I also remember the middle weekends where they trained right on through, and continued to train until they had to come in and maintain their equipment and get it ready for perhaps the next unit or for themselves.

That was a great step forward for the Guard and Reserve. It was a struggle to do that. But we did that. And I

think that is being done today, and it's something which has to continue to get done.

I think the Regular Army and the National Guard and the USAR started respecting each other, and seeing their capabilities from the PFC on up. Although Dr. Sorley has mentioned, and I agree with him, not to dwell on some things, but I think a terrible mistake was made, and maybe too much was made of it, by not calling the Roundout Brigades up and sending them with their Divisions.

Maybe I'm a little parochial about it because of my experience with the 24th and the 48th Brigade, but I think that was a mistake, and I think what that did was open a chasm between the Reserve Components and the Regular Army, which had been probably closed very well before that time.

I don't know the reasons, and I don't know the rationale. But I think, from an outsider's viewpoint, we ought not to do that again.

I think that some people, youngsters, young people in the positions of some authority forgot, when we talked about the draw-down of the Guard particularly, and the USAR, but particularly the Guard, as we reduce our forces, have forgotten that the National Guard has state missions.

Now, many of you as I look out there, understand that. Many of you can understand it now, when you

think about what South Carolina did, when we had Hurricane Hugo. When you think about Hurricane Andrew, when you think about the Los Angeles riots, when you think about what's going on right now in the middle west, and people ought to understand that there is a state mission as well as a federal mission for the National Guard.

Today, reconstituting the services with people and equipment, it doesn't appear to some that there is a firm policy on what to do with the Guard and Reserve. We all recognize that they cannot be as immediately deployable as the Regular Army, and as somebody, I think it was General Vessey mentioned this morning, if they were then we wouldn't need a Regular Army.

But when you talk about the Roundabout brigades and the division commanders tell me it will be about ninety days, that's not a bad figure. And I don't know what it is for divisions, National Guard divisions or Reserve divisions, from that point on. But I think people have to understand that.

I think people also have to understand when you talk about 39 days of training, you are not talking about the first sergeants, company commanders, battalion commanders, brigade commanders, on up. Those guys go by the armory almost every day. They go and check in. They see what's going on. They work the papers. They

check on the training. And a lot of folks don't understand that. They think the guy jumps in there on Friday night and takes his company over to Fort Stewart, Georgia for training. That doesn't happen to a well-trained unit. And so the dedication of those young officers, and even old, and sergeants, is something that people have to remember.

I think the Guard and Reserve have to be looked at as our greatest stability in our Armed Forces. I go along with, again, General Vessey—I mean, I worked for him a couple of times so, you know, it rubbed off on me, when he talks about an assessment—and that's what my notes say to me. An assessment as to what we want to do pertaining to the readiness of the Reserve Component.

And you have to understand, as you all know, it's a function of assets. There is a certain amount of uncertainty out there with the troops, and you have retention problems today in the Guard, and you have retention problems in the USAR. I believe, off the top of my head, with no facts to back it up with, that it's the basis of the instability and the unknown of the future. Let me give you an example.

A maintenance company in Georgia is told that it's going to be out of the system. They worked the issue very hard, turned in equipment, and just before it's to go off the book, they are told by "them," who

ever "them" is, or "they" is, "We are going to keep you for a couple of more years." Now, there may be a good reason for it. I will not fight that.

But I would ask you who are in authority today to remember that every single decision that you make regarding these units affects people. These guys love the Guard. Let me tell you. These guys really like it. I've got a son that's a Guardsman today, and I'm very proud of him. He's a captain. He spent five years in the Regular Army. He's now in the South Carolina Army National Guard. But every decision you make affects people. And that's important.

I also think that we don't have enough officers. We've never had enough officers, at the Pentagon, FORSCOM, TRADOC, I don't care where, who are told what the Guard and Reserve really are. I'm talking about the Regular Army guys. They don't understand them. They do not understand what the Guard and Reserve is about.

Conversely, and just as true, you've got a lot of Guardsmen out there, and Reservists, who don't know what the Regular Army does and what they are about. So that sometimes causes the head-knocking that we see, which I guess we can do away with at this point, because, in my view, with all the problems that we face today, you know, if we don't live together, then we'll perish together. As

an Army, as a country, or whatever it may be.

In addition to all of that, and there are some here in the audience today, the contractors of the defense industries don't know what is going on, either, in the great struggle as we draw down the Armed Services. And so, I think we have to do a better job, or you all have to do a better job in keeping them advised and informed. I don't know how. I haven't figured that out. But it's an unknown. There are tough times out there. And if you talk to the Don Wilsons of NGAUS, or the Frank Eatons of the ROA, they'll tell you that the House and the Senate marks today are tough. We need to keep industry involved in what we are doing.

Well, what is it all about? I want to give you this background. We are talking about General Creighton Abrams, STEADFAST, taking an Army from 13 to 16 divisions with no increase in people, and the Roundout concept, which I think is a very sound, solid concept. I've seen it, I understand it, I think I know it works.

But we've got to be a little smarter on the Roundout-Roundup concept as to ensure that if you call the 24th Division, or if you call the 1st Infantry Division, by God, send that National Guard brigade with them. If you don't think they are up to snuff with them, keep them in the Reserve, or whatever. And if we'd gone

with the 48th Brigade to the Gulf, they would have gotten better training than they did at the NTC, anyway, but that's long past.

But don't forget the lesson that was learned.

I read a book, I'm a great reader. I don't read well, but I'm a great reader. I'm full of, among other things, quotes. And I love to quote from the book, "The Killer Angels," where Robert E. Lee is talking to Longstreet after the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, supposedly. It's a historically correct novel. If you haven't read it, read it.

Lee knows that the battle is lost, the Confederacy has reached a high water mark. But what he says is as true today as it was 130 years ago this First, Second and Third of July. He says: "To be a good soldier, you must love the Army. But to be a good officer, you must be willing to order the death of the thing that you love. That is a very hard thing to do. No other profession requires it. And that's one reason why there are so very few good officers, although there are many good men."

And for you who sit out here with the Officer uniform on, it's something to consider as you go through your quest as to what to do with the National Guard and the Regular Army, and the USAR.

My last quote for you comes from Pat Buchanan's book, "Right from the Beginning."

This quote, it's right after Pat Buchanan's oldest brother dies, is a wonderful thing for life, as well as for those who serve this great country in the military. And, and it says: "You will learn there are only two important things in this life, an old priest once said. "To live well, and to die well."

The old priest did not mean to die full of honors, surrounded by admirers, but to die bravely and in the Faith. And he did not mean to live successfully and comfortably, but to live truthfully and honorably and with courage. And that's what we need, courage, and courage of our conviction.

Thanks a lot for asking me. I appreciate it.

[APPLAUSE]

RFE: Do we have any questions for General Rosenblum? He's offered to comment on anything that you'd all would like to have him comment on or answer.

Q: You said in your talk that the Readiness Regions performed a really good function and you were sorry to see them go. If we did have a top-to-bottom, reaping experience from the integration reports and such (inaudible), what are some of the other things you'd like to see and what are the features of .... (inaudible).

DER: I know in some places they are talking readiness training detachments. I know in the 24th Division,

because the division commander told me, he has 42 officers and NCOs living in the little cities where, the towns where the armories are located.

I'm not sure, to be very candid with you, what it is we ought to be looking at, but rather than do it piecemeal, as was said before and I agree with, let's really re-look at the thing. Let's not try to change things for the sake of changing them. Where did we, if we look back on history, where did we make our mistakes, and where did we have our triumphs in the dealings of the Regular Army and the USAR and the Army National Guard? Take a look at the Air Force. Take a look at the Marines. I'm not advocating inspector and instructor type things, or a division commanded by a Regular and a Reservist, but I'm saying to you, you have to look at those things that made the integration, the Total Force, the Total Army successful.

And that's the top-to-bottom thing that I think we ought to be looking at. But I am just an absolute believer in, I don't care if it's the Basic Course, the Advanced Course, Leavenworth, the War College, Regular Army Officers have to learn about the Reserve Components a lot more than they think they know. And Reserve Component Officers have got to understand how the Regular Army works.

And I think if we don't do anything else, we've got to do

that education. And then you will have less "them" and "us" type things. And I think, six months ago it was pretty poor, pretty bad, "them" and "us." Or a year ago, whatever.

It's a great privilege to be here with you all.

[APPLAUSE]

## Afternoon Session

### The Abrams Doctrine: Blueprint for the Future

RFE: Our Moderator for the afternoon panel, Major General (Retired) Fran Greenlief, former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, is a Guardsman of great experience, who has been in leadership roles in the National Guard during much of the time of all the events that we have discussed thus far today, and we are privileged to have him as our moderator this afternoon. Fran.

MG Francis S. Greenlief (Ret.), Former Chief, National Guard Bureau:

Thank you, Bob. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. General Jacobs has been good enough to provide me with a summary of the discussion this morning. I'd like to read that as the basis for the Afternoon Panel.

This morning the panel said the Abrams Doctrine is a valid notion. It led to the creation of the right forces to be available to fight the Gulf War. Its implementation challenged bias and tradition in the Active Army and in the National Guard. It challenged National Guard soldiers to accomplish training beyond anything they had ever been called upon to do, and sometimes may have asked more of a Guardsman than had in earlier times been asked of a Regular.

And, finally—and this really sets the pace and the style for this afternoon's discussion, we are at a watershed moment in history. During the past half century we have followed doctrinal patterns which have served us well. The doctrine of the past fifty years, including the Abrams Doctrine, possesses strength, but also demonstrates weaknesses. We probably need a top-to-bottom look at our national security needs, even though this will trouble an institution, and by that we mean the military, which inherently favors the status quo.

With that as the starting point, I won't re-introduce the panel members because you have their bios in front of them, but they are uniquely qualified to discuss the subject at hand, including General Galvin, who will join us later.

General Dennis J. Reimer, as Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command, is responsible for establishing the training requirements and standards of Army National Guard units. He assumes command of Army Guard units upon mobilization. As assistant executive officer and aide-de-camp for General Abrams, he has personal knowledge of General Abrams' philosophy and his actions while General Abrams was Chief of Staff.

General Galvin is today an author, an historian, a former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and is now the John M. Olin Distin-

guished Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. While he commanded the 24th Infantry (Mech) Division, following Rosie, that Division was rounded-out, as you know, by the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army Guard.

General Trefry is a truly outstanding and timely member of the panel. General Trefry is a former DCSPER of the Army, and as IG of the Army had a more in-depth knowledge of the National Guard during my time than anybody else that I knew in the Active Army. He stayed current and he stayed abreast. As a matter of fact, General Reimer tells me that General Trefry has just completed a study for the Department of Army, a current study on force management and integration. Force management and integration is part and parcel of what we are talking about in the application of the Abrams Doctrine. Dick is a many-talented man. After he retired from active duty he served as Military Assistant to the President and as Director of the White House Military Office.

With that in mind, I have prepared several questions which we'll put to the panel, and we hope you will join in the discussion just as you did this morning.

I want to start with a question to General Trefry. General Trefry, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, as this nation's most successful mobiliza-

tion, clearly demonstrated that the Total Force is a policy that works and, it seems to me and to the morning panel, that it validated the Abrams Doctrine. There were over 250,000 Guardsmen and Reservists mobilized. Of that number, 30,000 Guardsmen served in Southwest Asia. Thousands of others were deployed to Europe. Army National Guard Roundout units met the Army's readiness requirements before mobilization. And Georgia's 48th Brigade, although not mobilized until late November, was combat-certified to Southwest Asia before the ground war started.

And so, General Trefry, from your perspective, your past experience, your current role, what do the results of the Desert Storm mobilization portend for continued application of the Abrams Doctrine, and what lessons should force planners learn from these results?

**LTG Richard G. Trefry (Ret.),  
Former Inspector General, U.S. Army:**

I think the results speak for themselves and I think that if you have any knowledge of history, this is probably one of the most successful mobilizations we've ever had. One of the interesting things that never really gets a lot of publicity, and you can probably substantiate, I think there are actually more volunteers from the units than we ever had before in the Guard and Reserve who have come on board.

I was invited down to Tennessee on the 24th of August 1990 to speak to the annual leadership conference that Carl Wallace had, and they were mad as hell because they hadn't been called up — they got called up about two weeks later. But it was amazing how well they did do.

I can tell you, back in 1978, Bernie Rogers sent me down to Macon, Georgia, to the 48th, because there were a lot of allegations at that time that not only the Active Army and the Guard and the Reserve, but none of us could fight together, nor would we fight.

And he said, "Go down and take a look at the 48th." And I called Jim Vaught, and I called Billy Jones, and I went down there on a— I remember it was a Wednesday night, and I was there Thursday and Friday, when they started filing in, and Saturday and Sunday. Jim Vaught came up.

And I came back and I told the Chief that there was no doubt in my mind that I thought those fellows could do the job. And you heard Rosie talking about the state of the 24th at that time. And he was exactly right, I think, in the way he portrayed that to you.

I had another very interesting experience with the 256th Brigade. When we started the force integration inspection in 1981, one of the first places I went to was down to Lafayette, Louisiana, and I spent the night before with Buddy Stroud,

and we talked about the 256th. I went out to the 256th and I had had a team up there for about a week. When I got there the next day, I spent about an hour with my team, and then we brought in the leadership of the 256th, and I remember they put a series of charts around this room, and they said, "Now we are going to show you how the Regular Army screwed you." I'd heard about this for about an hour and, boy, it was true.

That was one of the greatest educations that I think anybody could get, and I'll always remember, when it was over, Buddy Stroud came to me and said, "You have my permission to use this anywhere that you can if it will make it easier for the Active Army and the Guard."

Now, you hear that this business is touch-and-go, but I can tell you, back then, when there were some real problems, when they went mech from straight leg, the first tracks that were delivered to them, they didn't even know how to turn them on. And they told us, in one little place, they winched the, I think it was a 113, they winched it sideways on a lowboy, and the state cops went down the road because it wasn't wide enough for two cars to pass, until they got it to the armory and then winched it off.

Boy, have we come a long way since then! I think that was reflected in that mobilization.

Now, have we got a long way to go yet? Sure, we've got a long way to go. All the things that you heard here. This study that I just completed, about two-thirds to three-quarters of the Total Army is on the old series TOE, MTOE. The Guard is on G Series, L Series, H Series. I think that we make it very difficult for ourselves when we do that. One of the recommendations that we are making in the study is that. Where we no longer have a deployed Army or an Army that is going to deploy to a place, like the Fulda Gap, but we would, the battalion that was in, say, the 8th Division is now back in, hypothetically, Riley or Sill, they could go anywhere.

And the National Guard battalion that was designated to be part of III Corps Artillery or one of the groups that is going to reinforce the 1st Cav or the 4th, that's not going to go where they went. They are going to go anywhere.

What we need to do is put everybody on a standard authorization document, and a standard requirements document. The Guard has been part of this study, and so has the Reserve, and I think there's a lot of promise. And I think it will go a long way toward making the mobilization, as well as the training, as well as the relationships a lot easier than they've ever been before.

You can't help but realize that this is a shift. If you go back to NSC-68, that Harry

Truman signed on the 15th of April, 1950, when he said, you know, we require large standing forces, mobilization-based, which meant of course a large Guard and a large Reserve, oriented toward this thing that we've called the Abrams Doctrine.

That wasn't even heard of in those days, but that's what it was, the forerunner of a draft supported Army, a large industrial base, large procurements, large R&D, short warning times. Then you go to the President's speech in Aspen on the 2nd of August 1990 and suddenly you have small standing forces, and a projected Army, a volunteer Army, but still the requirement, you see, for substantial assistance from the Guard and Reserve.

Some people will tell you that there is a long warning time, but, you know, you stop and think. Perhaps there was more stability with the monolithic threat than there is with idiots running loose in the world. Maybe the real fear is seven guys wrapped in sheets out here in Gainesville with a Ryder truck and some form of a launcher. How do you protect yourself against that threat?

And if you read the newspapers, they seemed to try to start something up in New York at the World Trade Center. Every day there's another target or something that they are working on. So our work is cut out for us. And, at the same time, the opportunities are there, and

we ought to take advantage of them.

FSG: General Reimer, given the results of the Desert Storm mobilization, what do you think that does portend, from your point of view, for application of the Abrams Doctrine from this point on? In this changing environment and this changing Army.

GEN Dennis J. Reimer, CINC, U.S. Forces Command:

Well, I think you have to look at Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, to understand the totality of that mobilization. As we look back on it, I think people sometimes miss some of the decision gates we had to go through. When we started out, we did not realize that we were going to grow as fast as we grew. Nobody knew what the end-state was when we started out. The first authorization was for 25,000 Reservists. We worked with those numbers and it was kind of metered out because we were working the coalition issue at the same time. How big was the force going to be and what was going to be required? I don't think all of that was known at the very start, at least from my perspective.

I think there were some very valuable lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm. I think we've factored them in. I just wrote down a couple of them.

First of all, it was a window to the future for us, and I

would certainly agree with General Trefry that warfare has changed just as the world we live in has changed. I think we've raised the level of warfare to the Ph.D. level. The way we fight now is different than any other time in our history, and I think we do it much better than anybody else.

Desert Storm showed us the need for the Total Army. I was the DCSOPS of the Army at that particular time, and I made three trips over there with the Chief. Each time we would go into a session and talk to soldiers, they would tell us that everybody there was wearing "U.S. Army." You rolled up your sleeves and you got the job done under some very trying and austere conditions.

I think the great support we got from the American people was largely because of the fact that we went through a mobilization process. I just don't think you can over-emphasize how important that was to us. When you compare that with my experience in Vietnam, I think all of us would certainly agree that this is the way we want to go.

We certainly achieved "decisive victory," but I hope that we are never gauged by measures such as "can you win a war in so many hours, or so many days, and with so many casualties?" But, on the other hand, I think we have set out some expectations for the American people. "Decisive victory" to them

is defined winning as quickly as possible with a minimum amount of casualties. I think that's one of the lessons learned.

I think the other thing all of us realize is that the next time we may not have six months to build up the force. If I was on the other side looking in, I'd say, "Don't give those guys six months, because if they can get their act together, they'll clean your clock. You just can't allow them to have six months to build up."

I think the other lesson I would take out of Desert Storm if I was on the other side is that weapons of mass destruction cause a lot of concern for our troops and for our people. The Scud rockets were one of our great fears as we went through this mobilization. Just a few of them caused a lot of panic. And so I think those are some of the lessons learned that you have to factor in from the mobilization for Desert Storm, and I think those are the things we have to look at as we move to the future.

**FSG:** You know, General Reimer, you have raised a point, or made a point that I must admit I hadn't really considered, carefully at least, and that is that when you started that mobilization for Desert Storm, you did not know the end-state. There's a similarity there with the mobilization for Vietnam. Certainly, when we started that we had no idea of what the end-state was.

But the decision on how to do that even prolonged it. When you approached the Desert Storm end-state, you started by using some Guard and Reserve units as needed for your force at that time, and it grew, so I think that makes good sense and it's the best explanation I've heard of that subject at any time.

**DJR:** Someone might have known the end-state, but if they did, they didn't share it with me.

**FSG:** I don't think anybody did know it, and certainly nobody foresaw how successful the end-state would be, I don't believe.

General Trefry raised an interesting point to me. One that I'm not terribly comfortable with, I might say. You mentioned the volunteerism that occurred from the Guard for the mobilization of Desert Storm. In my day we fought for unit integrity. We viewed any volunteerism as weakening that unit back home that we had to have ready to mobilize as a unit. And yet I know that the National Guard Bureau encouraged volunteerism, and it was very successful; it produced a lot of highly skilled individuals. General Reimer, what was your reaction to that volunteerism and what do you think about that as a method for the future?

**DJR:** I think, there was the volunteerism. Initially everybody was concerned about who was going and who was going to go, but as

I mentioned, we were building up the Force. We were very hesitant to take soldiers out of one unit to build up another unit because we didn't know if we were going to have to use that other unit later. We might have been breaking good units that we were going to need later on in the fight.

You really have to work the volunteerism issue both ways. I mean, you are delighted about having them but you've got to look at the overall impact on the Total Army when you start taking volunteers from one unit and putting them into other units.

I think, the other part of volunteerism that I would highlight, was the call-up of the IRR. We were told that, we were not going to get very many of those people to come back. When we called up the RT-12s we were very, very impressed with the number of people that actually came back. Some of them called and said, "Now I've got my orders to come, but three months ago you told me you didn't want me in the Army because I did such and such a thing. You really want me to come?" It was nice of them to call. We said, "Thank you very much, we don't need you to do that."

I think the volunteerism that we saw in the Total Force, was really good. But I think you have to always be careful about what you are doing for the readiness of the Total Force when you start taking volunteers out

of one unit to beef up another. You want to take your most ready units initially. So those were the items we took into consideration when we went through the process.

There was a very detailed process for doing that. We had what we called a "sanity check," some of the people I see in this room were a part of that process. We would look at the requirement that was given to us by the war fighting CINC, we'd look at the readiness of units in terms of personnel, equipment and training, and we'd make decisions based upon that, in terms of whether that unit was ready to be mobilized or not.

**FSG:** General Trefry, you mentioned the problem of the mix of TO&Es. That's certainly not a new problem. However, it's a problem we've lived with for a long time. How serious is that to the integration of Guard units into Active Army units?

**RGT:** Well, I think it varies. I think there are some units that have a very severe problem with that, particularly the units that have the old equipment. They are expected to be in support of units with comparatively new equipment, and not the newest equipment. Particularly if you have the newest equipment, you have a problem. You have a particular problem with communications.

Now, just going on a TOE, or going to a different docu-

ment, is not going to help unless you are able to sort out the equipment. We have, I think, particularly with the reductions coming, a better chance to do that and if we go back into force packaging that General Thurman developed when he was the PA&E, the business of the first to go, the first to equip, I think we can do a lot to improve that.

We have a real problem in documentation, in that the system is so arcane I could spend the rest of the afternoon talking to you about it, and you'd just get more hopelessly confused as I went along. And it's the same with all of us.

What we have to do is simplify the system and have it so we understand it. We, I think, went too far in saying to young commanders at all levels, "If you don't like your TOE or your MTOE, tell us and we'll change it for you." And when we'd do that, it was usually changed all the way up, but when you reached the point of getting delivery, it was an unprogrammed cost, and there was nothing there to give.

But what happened? We changed the document and perhaps the best way to describe it to you is this: I am authorized four Humvees, I'm required four Humvees, and I've got four Humvees on hand. But I want to go to eight. And so I submit a request up the chain, and as soon as it gets up there—everybody says yes, nobody says no, and it

gets to the DCSOPS and suddenly the documents change to eight and eight, but I only have four on hand.

What have I just done to the readiness? The unit went from C-1 to C-4 with the flick of a pen. And he's not going to get it next week, and he's not going to get it next year because it's an unprogrammed cost. Nothing in the form. And so the natural reaction for commanders is they don't post the requirement.

And then when you sit down and you try and figure out what is the wartime requirement, you've got a hell of a mess on your hands.

Now, that sounds very bureaucratic. But that's the way it works. And we have a real mess trying to sort that out. That's about the best way I can explain it to you. And I think if we get everybody on the same sheet of music, and we take a look at what the true wartime requirement is, I think we'll do a lot better than what we've been able to do because I'm not sure we really understand what the wartime requirements are.

**FSG:** Did that problem impede the mobilization, General Reimer, that you are aware of?

**DJR:** I think it's something that has to be taken into consideration and it was one of the primary factors of the sanity cell. In other words, they would take a look at the unit's equipment, as reported in the

unit's status report, see what they had on hand, what they really needed to do the job, and then you could make a decision as to whether they needed some additional equipment or we'd send them as is. But it's a very complex issue, as General Trefry knows better than anybody.

I would just simply tell you that I think we are making progress in this area. As I go around, and look at the Roundout and the Roundup brigades, the equipment compatibility with their parent divisions is there. We've done a good job in that particular area.

When you get outside, the non-Roundout/Roundup category, you start to find it cuts both ways. I was in Salt Lake City just a little while ago and I looked at a National Guard Apache battalion, probably one of the best-equipped battalions that I've seen in the Total Army. I told the commanders over there, including the TAG, John Matthews, that the Active Component guys would kill for those facilities. I mean, those are just outstanding facilities, outstanding equipment, great pilots, great training area. That is a case where the Guard battalion is better equipped than probably a lot of our Active Component units.

Most of our units have the Apaches and they have them in the same quantity as that Guard battalion, but the facilities of that Guard battalion were just outstanding. And that's the

way it should be. So I think you have to take into consideration the unit, and the specifics of that unit, when you make mobilization decisions.

We have a problem in terms of getting the rest of the force filled out. We have 500,000 short tons of equipment in Europe waiting to come back to the United States. We will take that equipment - and it's good equipment - and we'll replace some of the shortages that exist throughout the Total Army. So over time that's going to make things better. It just takes dollars, and it takes time to make that type of thing happen.

We have a plan to do it and we will continue to equip based upon the "first to fight" principle. The Contingency Force package will be equipped before the rest of the force. There's no other way you can do it. You can't make the Army well in five minutes, or five days, or five months. It's got to be a phased type of thing, and so we approach it from that standpoint.

The short answer is, yes, MTOE and equipment compatibility do impact upon your mobilization decisions.

**FSG:** I'd suggest that, in my experience, we have never fought the war that we planned to fight. Given that Guard and Reserve units were not mobilized for Panama, Grenada or Somalia, but Desert Storm required a very significant mobilization, and now we've got a military pres-

ence going in the Balkans with apparently no concern for mobilization.

Is there some way of defining a level of contingency that we might expect mobilization and that Guard and Reserve Commanders in the field can expect their role in the Abrams Doctrine to become very real, like mobilization?

**DJR:** In terms of mobilization, I think you can make the argument that you mobilize based upon a situation. I think you do it through all spectrums of conflict. If we fight in a global war, we are certainly going to mobilize. It's the only way you can do it. You can't fight the major regional conflicts we have on the books without mobilization.

If you look at our Contingency Force package, we talk about being able to move five and a third divisions anywhere in the world in thirty days and being able to fight. You need the mobilization to move and sustain those particular units. So I think you can make the point for the major regional conflicts, and I think you can even make it in the military to support civilian authorities case that you need to mobilize. I think it's been demonstrated. We did it in [Hurricane] Andrew. We did it in Task Force LA.

It's a situation-dependent exercise. You go through and you do what you have to do with the Total Army. We probably will not have to

mobilize based upon what I see in the Mississippi River Valley. That's being handled very, very well by the National Guard, and I think they are doing a great job. They are providing some regional support and that type of thing. As I talk to the TAGs who are involved there, that's working out very, very well. I don't think, unless something happens differently than what we expect, that we will necessarily require a mobilization decision. I think it will be handled on state active duty.

**FSG:** The Fiscal 1993 Defense Authorization Act includes Title XI, Army National Guard Combat Reform Initiatives. Congressional intent was to ensure that Army National Guard units were combat-ready and available for use at all levels of the contingency, just as General Abrams intended. We will start with you, General Reimer. What are your views on Title XI, and other initiatives being taken by the Army itself to ensure the establishment of, and acceptance of, readiness and by that I mean acceptance by the Army establishment and acceptance by the Army of the readiness and accessibility of Army Guard units? The ability of the Army to get at them when they need them.

**DJR:** Let me go back and try and tie that together with what was said this morning. I thought this morning's panel did a great job, and it was a very educational thing for me to hear;

I learned a lot. But just from my experience, based upon the short time that I had the opportunity, and the good fortune, to work for General Abrams, there were a couple of impressions that I have of that particular time.

I think, first of all, the overriding theme of General Abrams' tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army was the terrible price we pay for unpreparedness. If you go back and look at his speeches, look at his testimony in Congress, and particularly his first AUSA speech, that's what he hit and he hit it so very, very hard.

I can just close my eyes and see him saying, "Nobody wants war, especially those who have seen it. The pain and the human suffering are beyond telling." And he would pound the podium, and the powerful message was such that nobody could miss the point. I mean, you just couldn't possibly sit through that and not understand what he was saying. And I think he made that point time and time again.

I would tell you that based upon the time that I worked with him from the time he was Chief of Staff until his death, I thought he was focused on turning the Army. He used to always talk about changing the direction of a large organization. He said, "To do that, to change it even one degree, is a tremendous, challenge."

What he was faced with was

bringing the Army back from a rather bad experience in Vietnam and getting it focused on the main act in Europe. I think about the second or third trip after going to Vietnam, we went to Europe, and I can tell you that I think he was very, very concerned about what he saw. He knew he had a lot to do in that particular area. And he was very concerned about being able to deter the Russian threat, being able to build up the force, particularly the tooth-to-tail ratio which was important to him. It's already been talked about.

I think General Temple brought up the fact that he was going from 13 to 16 divisions, and keeping the end-strength of the Army constant at 780,000. I think he knew that he wouldn't have to deploy, or couldn't deploy the Army all at one time, that some of them would have more training available to them.

He was one of the first to recognize that there were skills that were transferable from civilian life to military units, and that those particular units would be easier and faster to deploy.

He emphasized the strategy of containment and the deterrence that has now been called the Abrams Doctrine, and I think it's a good name. I think the strategy of containment was very successful. Obviously, we won the Cold War and I think he deserves a lot of credit for that. That's the first thing I would say.

I would also say that the world has changed, and I think everybody here recognizes that. The change I often talk about is that the Wall came down in November of '89.

I had the guys at Forces Command do a little bit of work on that the other day, and I asked them to take a look at June of 1989 and compare it with a day in June of 1993. And what you find when you do that is that we are moving at an optempo that is about twice as fast in '93 as it was in '89. In other words, if I go back and look at the number of soldiers deployed out of Forces Command to various places in '89, it was about 4,500 on a given day in June. That same day in June of '93 we have over 9,000 deployed. They are deployed in Somalia. They are deployed in Kuwait. They are deployed in Saudi Arabia. They are deployed in South America and Latin America. It's a Total Army perspective now. So the optempo is much faster. And at the same time, we are having to downsize and reshape the Army. A terrific challenge.

The other thing that makes it more difficult is that when General Abrams was going through this in the '72 to '74 time frame, there was a single threat. It was the Russian threat. We refocused on that.

Now, it is more difficult. What is the threat? We've never been good at predicting the threat. We've talked about CAPSTONE. A very, very

good program and a very popular one. One that I believe very deeply in, and I'm trying to get reinstated throughout Forces Command. But it's difficult because you don't have a single war plan driving the training right now. You have people who focused on one area, now you have those same people focusing on several different areas of the world. I mean, you've got people who look at different areas and it does not line up neat and tidy. We'll sort that one out. That one's solvable.

Those are some of the changes that have occurred. Now, let me talk about the specifics of your question because I think it's important.

You know, we've talked about mobilization and the fact that it can go on at any end of the spectrum, and I think we've got to be able to handle all ends of that spectrum with the Total Army. And, as I said, whether you mobilize or not is dependent upon the specific situation you face. I think as we continue to get smaller, we have to become more integrated, and it's going to require more mobilization decisions. We must learn how to do that.

If we are going to have a Total Army, we are going to have to have one that is capable, available, and affordable. Those are the three major challenges that we are working on.

In general terms Title XI moves in the right direction. It

was primarily designed, to improve the readiness of the Army National Guard combat units but we've expanded that somewhat and we are now talking about the readiness of the Total Army. There are an awful lot of initiatives in this particular area that should help us with the readiness.

We've got the BOLD SHIFT initiative, that was started by Ed Burba before I came to Forces Command. That is doing very, very well. As I go around and check the training, I see a lot of good things happening. And I think that's a step in the right direction.

We've started what we call a Total Army Training Study that is being developed, it has not been approved, but I think it clearly gets at the Total Army readiness, issues such as the Tri-Component Division, and some things that we've talked about here today. We still need to flesh that out a little bit. There's a lot of people involved in that, and we haven't got total consensus yet but I think we are moving forward more of a Total Army that is ready to do whatever the nation wants us to do and we are moving to greater integration.

We are building a force that will meet the national military strategy. There's some exciting things going on right now in that particular area.

So I guess, from my standpoint, there's some goodness in Title XI.

**FSG:** General Reimer, let me include you in this, as well as General Trefry. Let me ask you a couple of specific questions about Title XI. First of all, Title XI requires the Army, or the Army Guard, to have a personnel mix by 1997, I believe, in which 65 percent of all the officers in the National Guard will have had two years Active Duty and 50 percent of all enlisted personnel in the Guard must have had two years Active Duty. And the end date of that is September 30, 1997.

Now, I happen to believe that's a very desirable thing. But I've got some real questions about can that be achieved? And, if so, how, what are we going to do to achieve it? General Reimer.

**DJR:** As you suggest, it is a tough thing to achieve. And it depends upon the size of your forces. RAND has studied that, and basically concluded that, given the sizes we're looking at right now, you probably can't, achieve that just through the normal course of events. In other words, if you go back historically and look at the number of people that have gone from the Active to the Reserve Components, you probably won't meet the 50 and 65 percent goals that have been established with the projected and strengths. You are probably going to have to do some special things.

I don't know what the size of the Army, the Total Army, is going to be, based upon the

Bottom-Up Review, but I certainly share your concern about that goal being hard to achieve.

On the other hand, I think it's a very desirable goal. We need to give it a good shot to see if we can make it. I don't think we've looked at the innovations that we need to look at yet. At least, I'm not aware that we have. We probably need to do, more in this particular area, but it will still be tough to achieve.

**FSG:** Would you think that's a desirable enough goal that perhaps there'd be a payoff in providing either incentives to Active Army personnel to early-out into Army Guard combat units? Or incentives for Guard personnel to volunteer for the additional time on Active Duty?

**DJR:** I think it's a desirable goal, and I hesitate to say yes or no to that specific question until I know what the ramifications of the rest of that really are. I don't know how much turbulence that creates throughout the Total Army when you say something like that. I think turbulence has to be factored in.

My assumption is that those types of things are being looked at in the Bottom-Up Review going on here in Washington right now. I'm not a part of that, in Forces Command, so I cannot comment directly on it. But I think incentives to reach those objectives, the 50 and 65 percent, are important. We ought to look at initia-

tives that will help us achieve those goals without degrading readiness.

**FSG:** General Trefry, I'm going to ask you the next question because I know that you had experience with this problem sometime in the past. Let me go back to, I guess, General Rosenblum's statement, or remarks.

Before STEADFAST we had thousands of advisors in the Army Guard. They existed in every level down to battalion, and not just one, but there'd be several at many levels. They had both officer and enlisted advisors. Thousands of them.

One of the ways STEADFAST saved spaces to create new divisions was to eliminate most of those advisors and then, using the organization that General Rosenblum talked about, they provided the support services, the hands-on work with Guard units. The intent was to replace and do better what advisors had done.

Now, we are kind of going full circle. The Army Readiness Regions are gone, and the House Armed Services Committee in the Army-Guard Combat Reforms initiative has mandated 5,000 advisors to the Army National Guard. Now, it's always been a problem, it's been a quality problem. In a particular discussion with me, General Abrams promised that the advisors that did come to the Guard and the personnel that were assigned those Readiness

Regions would be the cream of the Army.

I had pointed out to him that what we were getting were people, not bad officers, but they were officers at the end of their career, wanting to retire in place, we got no water walkers at all. And he promised that the Army would send their top talent. And for a while that occurred.

Now, I don't know if that occurs now or not. But given all of that, and your experience with the problem, what do you think, General Trefry, of the Army's ability to follow this mandate, and with quality personnel?

**RGT:** I think they are going to have a hell of a tough time. And I can't make it any plainer than that. You know, it's very hard to get where we are trying to go with what we've got now. And what am I talking about? When you take a look at the number of schools that an officer has to go to, he goes to the Basic Course, he goes to the Career Course, he goes to CAS<sup>3</sup>, he goes to Leavenworth, and today everybody has to get a master's degree somewhere along the line. If the Army doesn't send them to school in association with some assignment that requires it, it then has to put him somewhere where they can get one on their own.

When you start mandating, you have to do this, or you have to do that, that's when, whether correct or not, you get into this ticket-punch-

ing syndrome. And that's bad.

The average Regular Army Officer spends about 23 years on Active Duty, and then he retires, and part of that is that a fellow gets to be a lieutenant colonel or colonel, 18, 19 years service, he doesn't get selected for a brigade command, or he doesn't get selected for brigadier general. He says, "Oh, what the hell, there's nothing here."

And it's a young man's game. Fighting is a young man's game. No question about it. And it's very more physical today than it ever was. And so you have a tendency for people to get out.

Now, how do you squeeze all that in twenty years? And now you say, if you look at Goldwater-Nichols, it says you've got to have certain Joint time if you want to be a general. You see, we could never have another George Marshall because Goldwater-Nichols says that the guy who's going to be Chairman must have been a commander of a unified, Specified Command, or a service chief. Well, by my count that's thirteen guys. And George Marshall came up 50 or 60 in from the pile.

So you limit choices, and when you start putting all these things on that and say, "This is what you have to do," then it gets very tough.

Now, it's extremely desirable that you get people who have experience, if they are Guard soldiers, that they

have experience with the Active Army, and vice versa. But how do you do that, when you think of all the other things that you have to do? It gets very, very tough.

You can have a roomful of geniuses and put them on a bell curve and 50 percent will be above the line and 50 percent will be below. We bell curve everything, as you well know. And we grade on the curve. So no matter how you look at it, you are going to get some above and some below. I think we are going to have a very tough time, and I think it's going to take a lot of patience and understanding.

And the other part is, I don't think people who write these things really understand what they do. People want to do right by their people, and some people may not have the strength of character that other people do, and it opens the window to cheating. It opens the window to enervating reports, vitiating reports, because it's tough to tell a guy he hasn't been too impressive. And if you say, "Well, you've got to do this, or you've got to do that," then pretty soon you get people griping.

Now, all those kinds of things, unintentionally, attack the very core of what we stand for. As an institution. I'm not talking the Total Army. So I think we are going to have a tough time with that.

FSG: General Reimer, General Trefry, it seems to

me has talked mostly about the quality issue, but numbers, it seems to me, is a very serious problem. How does the Army, with a declining force structure and a declining end-strength, produce 5,000 advisors for the Army Guard?

DJR: Let me pick up on a couple of things General Trefry said, which I think he said very, very well. But I think the point that he made there is that it is going to be a tough challenge to meet the quality gates for most people in order to meet the criteria for basically promotion and selection for school.

And I think the point he made towards the end was very compelling, at least in my mind. And that is, when you look at that requirement individually, it's probably a pretty good requirement, but when you look at the totality of the other things we are doing, Goldwater-Nichols and that other important things, it may be an almost impossible task, given the quality guidelines that we generally use. I mean, we are getting to the point that we are really getting boxed in in terms of being able to assign our officers and NCOs to the right jobs.

The other thing I would say is that the quality of the people out there in the field is good. I've talked to a number of them, and I have not found anyone who does not have the credentials to be an advisor or to participate in the job that he or she is doing. I haven't found a

National Guard or USAR Officer whose not satisfied with their advisor or the full-time support which they are receiving from the Active Component.

We've got an awful lot of quality in the Total Army right now. The bench is very, very deep. Now, the issue is, how many of these people will be selected for promotion, and how many of them will be selected for school? And that's what we've got to watch very carefully.

We are committed to try and make that happen. I've talked to General Putnam, who heads up the Officer Personnel Directorate, and we've discussed this in great length, and we are trying to assign the right people. Just based upon the limited amount of checking that I've done, I'm convinced that we are.

I've seen battalion commanders from Europe that have been assigned there. I've seen some red hot captains that have been assigned there. We continue to work the Jump Start Program and I think we can expand that.

In the Jump Start Program you take a graduate out of Leavenworth and send him for two years to the 4th Division, for example, and then you send him two years to be an advisor or to work in what we call the Regional Training Detachment with the 116th Brigade, which is a Roundout brigade for the Fourth Division.

So, those are the types of things

we are trying to do. I think we can do more of it. Most of the divisions, based upon what I've seen so far, are getting somewhere around 20 or 30 Leavenworth graduates that are coming to them this year. We'll take those people and put them in key jobs in the division like XO or an S3 and then assign them to the Regional Training Detachment.

We can do things like that and move them back and forth. That's going to cost some money because there are PCS moves. But if we are serious about this, those are the types of things we've got to do.

In numbers, we need some help. If we are held to the DOPMA criteria here, you are talking about 5,000 advisors or full-time assistants, as I call them. That's about a division's worth of leadership. And to the extent that we are not able to get the DOPMA relief, you are going to hollow out the Force in terms of leadership that's not going to be available in the divisions, or that's not going to be going through the requisite Officer Professional Development or the NCO Professional Development which is very important to our future.

We are going to take that one on, and we are going to need some help in terms of being able to convince Congress that they need to make a change.

That's a winnable argument. They are the ones who have

told us to do that, and they ought to be able to give us relief, if that's what they really want. Otherwise, we are talking about hollowing out in terms of readiness. And I don't think that's what they meant for us to do.

**RGT:** I don't think people really realize the impact of DOPMA and ROPMA and Goldwater-Nichols and some of these things that put these things on. And, believe me, I wasn't referring just to quality. I was referring to numbers, because as the end-strength goes down and the grade levels are reached, you don't have the people to play with.

Now, there's one other point that goes back to what we were talking about this morning, and that I think vitally affects this.

Up until about ten years ago, we had the experience from World War II and Korea and Vietnam in mobilizing and building armies. Most of that has now retired. The emphasis in the last ten years has been on unit training and so forth. And when we went into the accreditation problem in the schools, we went to electives and that type thing where we taught people how to mobilize and do that kind of stuff, and that's not there any more.

We don't have enough time now to teach people how to fight as much as we'd like, but we don't really teach in the school system how you raise, provision, sustain,

maintain, train and resource the Army. And that is the meat of what we are doing here. That's why we have a problem in force management.

I can remember I came down to visit Jack Galvin one day, and I said, I'm down here because the Chief tells me you've got a computer game on mobilization. I'd just written a scathing IG finding because there was no mobilization computer game in the Army. And Shy said, "Go down and see Jack Galvin. He's got one." I went down and I said, "Look, show me this mobilization game you've got. He says, "Hell, I don't have any game." And he didn't. And I think you've got one started now, but that's the first one. And this was, what, fourteen years ago, when I was writing those kinds of findings. So we need to look at this kind of thing.

**FSG:** Ladies and Gentlemen, General Galvin has arrived, as I'm sure you've all noticed. General Galvin, welcome. We have introduced you briefly before. Your full bio is in the folder. And I did mention that you are the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; you are now the John M. Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point; and that you commanded the 24th Division, Mechanized Infantry Division when they were rounded-out by the 48th Infantry Brigade.

This morning we had a distinguished panel that discussed the Abrams Doctrine on the basis of then and now. They summarized that by saying that the Doctrine is valid, is a valid notion today, although Bob Sorley mentioned well that General Abrams himself would have laughed at such a high-flung title. He made the point that it led to the creation of the right forces to be available to fight the Gulf War, that it's implementation challenged bias and tradition in the Active Army, and in the Guard. It challenged Guard soldiers to do more and better and harder training than they ever had before.

But even a successful doctrine must be subject to reevaluation, and that's really what we are doing today. He makes the point that we are, they made the point that we are at a watershed moment in history, that during the past half century we've followed doctrinal patterns which have served us well. That the doctrine of the past fifty years, including the Abrams Doctrine, possesses strength, but also demonstrates weaknesses.

And this afternoon we are doing really quite a lot of discussion about how do we address those weaknesses.

The participants here in the audience may wonder if I haven't gotten a little off the Abrams Doctrine, since I've been concentrating on Title XI. But when we talk about the Abrams Doctrine, General Abrams stood for a whole bunch of things.

And my impression was that he stood for training and readiness above all. And the facts of the matter are the Abrams Doctrine can't work unless the Army National Guard combat units can in fact attain and maintain the standards required by the Army, and that they can be as accessible to the Army as is possible.

So we've discussed a number of aspects of that question this afternoon, General Galvin. And at the moment we are talking some about the Title XI, but before I do that, you have long experience and you know the subject matter. Would you like to just make any sort of an opening statement?

I want to also say that this distinguished gentleman has made the maximum effort to be here. To start with, he's on leave at Fort Story. Now, when you compare Washington, D.C. and Fort Story, nobody makes that trip from there to here just for the fun of the drive. And they've been told about your difficulty en route. That you have come at all is a very real plus to us, and a very real tribute to the National Guard. We are delighted you are here.

Would you like to say a few words before we pick up the discussion?

**GEN John R. Galvin (Ret.),  
Former Supreme Allied  
Commander Europe:**

Thanks. I really don't want to try to jump into what's been going on without, you

know, knowing a lot more about it than that. I would simply say that I do think we need to apply every effort to Guard readiness in order to still keep the Total Army concept, which is really, basically, very much what Abrams was talking about. Guard participation in whatever contingency that comes up is going to be important. I want to get in a little bit later as we go along on the how, but I think I'd rather not try to come in the way I have here and start off with a statement. I'll just go along here now, if I can.

**FSG:** Thank you, very much, Sir. About twenty years ago, in the Army Staff I proposed a system of training our division and brigade staffs using simulators. I did that because, in my view, in my experience, Army leadership has always had a very real reluctance to accept the ability of National Guard division, and to a lesser extent brigade, commanders and staff to do their thing in combat. I don't have to tell you that a lot of Guardsmen here might wonder about my saying it, but I shared that view. And one of the reasons is that over the years, about the best we ever did for a Guard division commander and staff is, first of all, they had to be a Leavenworth graduate, -which might have been done by extension course- and then we had an annual refresher course at Leavenworth. I must have done that half a dozen times myself.

But in my view, nowhere in the system did we have a way of providing National Guard division commanders and their staff the kind of training and experience, and I want to underline experience, in maneuvering battalions, management of fire power, and logistical and administrative support of units. You know, at that point in time all you could do is have a maneuver and we neither had space nor time nor money for maneuvers. And yet we required divisions in the structure.

And in my point of view, to make the Army comfortable with mobilizing them, we need to do something about the training. Well, with that in mind, I note that Title XI has some language in it that requires - I don't know if it's just exploration or development, but it talks about - the use of simulators in the conduct of training. I don't know if they are just talking about firing simulators. I'm talking about simulators to train commanders and staff in the maneuver, fire power, logistical and administrative support. I know you are all qualified to discuss the subject. General Reimer, would you like to start with that?

**DJR:** Yes. Let me take that one on, because I think it is one of the areas where real improvement has to take place.

I mentioned earlier the outstanding battalion I saw in Salt Lake City, the Apache battalion. The closest simulators that they have are lo-

cated at Fort Campbell and Fort Hood. So it makes it a very, very tough situation to train that battalion if you have to go there to use the simulators. We will square that away. I've got the J3 at Forces Command laying out for me the current simulation, or simulator distribution, and then what's planned in the future. But, again, Apache simulators are not just small change, and it's something that's going to take a little bit of time to fix, but I think we are going to be able to fix that one.

If you go to Fort Knox, Kentucky, right now, and I'll start at a lower level, and then bring you up to the division level; you can bring a battalion's worth of tank crews, for example, and go through the SIMNET training. You can fly in on the weekend and conduct simulation training.

If you really want to be innovative, and any unit in the Total Army can do this, you can hook up with simulators at Fort Rucker, and start to work your air-ground team through simulation. You could do that for 48 hours, or whatever time you want to spend. So there are some exciting things that are on the horizon, and they will only grow.

In terms of training at the brigade level, part of the innovation that we have with the Total Army training study is something called the Battle Command Battalion Staff Training Pro-

gram, where units go through staff training. For example, I was with a brigade of the 29th Division at Fort Dix, and they were doing a CPX that was driven by the 78th Division. The brigade commander indicated they were getting a lot out of it. It's a simulation exercise, just like we put our Active Component brigade commanders through.

The Battle Command Training Program has been a part of the Combat Training Center experience in the Active Component for the last three or four years, and we require every Active Component division commander, and every corps commander and his staff to go through it, and it has now been expanded to the Reserve Component. I'm going out to see the 35th go through that training in August.

So, I think those programs are in place and they are moving. We understand the need to do that. It's going to take us a little time and a little money to do it, but I think it's terribly important. So, I would agree with you that we have not done well in the past, but I think we are moving in the right direction right now, and I think there's a lot of momentum.

The Battle Command Training Program that General Galvin and his people did such great work on over there in the Warrior Prep Center brought the Army into a new era in terms of simulation training. We are building on that right now,

and trying to expand as fast as we can.

**JRG:** I would add to that by saying, we have seen this experience where the Active Army over the past several years, because of such things as the computer-assisted exercises and so forth, the simulations, and a lot of other things, too, the National Training Center and on and on, has taken a quantum jump in its own capabilities, its readiness capabilities, its ability to work with the other Services. The Gulf War is a good example.

There is a feeling, I think, sometimes, that the Active Army is so far ahead of where the Guard is that, that there just is no way for the Guard to catch up. But the Active Army, in terms of that quantum jump, didn't increase the number of days it had at its disposal, which I think, some people put it at like 270 a year, or whatever that is. So that happens to be the same situation of the Guard. The Guard hasn't increased its number of days, either.

But, following along with what Denny Reimer just said, I think the challenge there is to see how far, with the kind of help that the Active Army is looking at providing, and with the legislation that we've seen here, what is the size of the jump in capability that the combat, as well as combat support and combat service support, units of the Guard can make? I don't think we know that. And I think it's

something that we, that obviously the Congress is telling us to dedicate ourselves to looking at, and to supporting. And so I think it's probably premature to say that the vast majority of the Guard would be combat service support and combat support, especially for an early contingency, that is, a short-fuse contingency.

I think that what we really need to do is to look at that and see what level can the Guard reach, that is, unit organizational level? And, as I said before, I'm a little hesitant because maybe a lot of people have talked about this already.

But I would see that as a parameter that will move over the next period of time, the short-range future. So I think it's very clear and the Army, the Active Army has been very clear, I think, on where we stand in terms of the capabilities that the CS and CSS can reach. Let's leave a little bit open here as to what the combat capabilities are until we see, given every way that we can improve that very few number of the activities, within the very few number of days the Guard has, let's see what it can do.

I think that it may be true that the Guard cannot field in a very short period of time a division. Maybe it can't field a brigade in a short period of time. But I think that it would be premature to pin down some particular point right now. I think that's the big question. That's the thing that nobody can

answer except, give the Guard the opportunity to answer.

**FSG:** Let me pin you a little bit, Sir. Let's assume that Guard battalions, combat battalions, in fact can meet the Army's training requirement, meet their standard, pass the test. And now we've got all the maneuver elements and support elements that we need to fight. So then the requirement is, can the brigade commander and his staff use them to support the division?

In your experience, do you think that the use of a sophisticated computer system could teach that to a Guard brigade and division since they don't have the opportunity to maneuver?

**JRG:** When I commanded the 24th and the Gray Bonnets were rounding-out the 24th at that time, I didn't know how it would turn out, what the 48th could do. I was very proud of the 48th, and we had a very close association with Joe Griffin and the others.

What I always felt was that, if we went, it would depend on how the 48th was at that moment. If we were going to go and if we were going to take the 48th, then there were all kinds of combinations and permutations that could be involved. For one thing, I looked at the tasks. If you can't train more than about 39 days a year with the 48th, then if you are not going to have much time—and that's a question, how much time are you going to

have? We saw that in the Gulf War.

Then one of the things that we can do is limit the tasks under the conditions and standards that the units within the brigade are going to train to. Instead of trying to make sure that they could do everything, make sure they can do some things well, really well.

The next thing is that tailoring is part of the concept of combat in a division, anyway, and within brigades. And so we could have tailored across the division. If we felt the 48th wasn't as trained as we'd like to have it be, wasn't as trained as the level of the other brigades within the division, if the battalions weren't trained up to that, we could nevertheless cross-level, so the 48th would end up with other battalions from the division, and the division would have some battalions from the 48th.

How that would be tailored would depend, again, on the mission that the 48th was going to get. Maybe it would get limited missions for the first operations of the division in the field, in combat. Maybe it would be able, with the tailoring, to take on all the missions that the brigades were taking.

The point I'm making is that there is some flexibility in there, in terms of the use of the brigade. That flexibility, such as the tailoring and so forth, such as the tasking, such as the missions and the tasks within

training, none of that violates anything that we would normally think of as the routine operations of a division. So, I would have to see. I think it's very hard to say what could the 48th have done at a given time in the past, just as it's going to be hard to say what can it do in the future.

But we now can pin that down pretty well. And we know we are going to be giving Guard units a lot more assistance, in a lot of different ways, in order to see what kind of a quantum jump they can actually make. It would be something, I'm sure, that in some ways parallels what the Army, the Active Army has been able to do.

**FSG:** Dick, you've got a lot of technological knowledge about computers and the level of performance they can accomplish. What's your view of this subject?

**RGT:** Well, I think, in the first place, that we, if you compare it to, let's go back to between 1975 and 1993, and if you compare that to going to kindergarten and graduating from high school, we are just graduating from kindergarten, from the standpoint of the understanding of what computers can do.

You know, you stop and think, in 1978, at the end of the Christmas Season, the computer industry had sold its 38,000th PC. Ten years later, in 1988, they had sold their 39,000,000th PC. And the curve has continued to

go up, although I read this morning Apple is in trouble.

Just before I left the White House, a guy came around with a thing about the size of a shoe box and he said by 1999 this will outdo a Cray. When you stop to think about that, you think of the potential of employing these things. I don't think we have even imagined it. We have SIMNET.

A little company I'm associated with has got contracts to run four of these centers but they are largely for the Reserve. I think the Guard could really get into this more than they are because I think the potential is there.

You see, my own experience is, I could take you to, when I was the IG, 105mm and 155mm Field Artillery battalions in the Guard that were just as good as anything on Active Duty. I could take you to aviation outfits that were just about as good as anything on Active Duty. The problem we had is when you try to put all this stuff together to maneuver, and it has nothing to do with anybody's intelligence, it has nothing to do with anybody's motivation or their patriotism, or anything else. What it has to do is what I call dexterity.

Understanding how you change the frequencies on a radio. Understanding how you can get these people to do what you want them to do, just mechanically. That's where the problem is.

And if you can teach that to a guy on a simulator so that when you do put him in the field it doesn't take him three weeks in the field, it takes him three days, that's where you are going to make the gain. At least that's what I think, and maybe Denny and Jack could comment, if I'm wrong, but I think that's where it is.

**DJR:** I would agree with that.

**FSG:** Let me shift to another point. Title XI requires compatibility between Army Guard units and Active units. Now, given the disparity in the levels of field equipment, the numbers of equipment we have, and the disparity in the modernity, certainly in non-Roundout/Roundup units of the Guard, of their equipment with the Active, can those compatibility objectives be achieved? General Reimer.

**DJR:** Well, I think I touched on that a little bit earlier when I said that we've got about 500,000 short tons of Class VII to return from overseas. That will be a gigantic step forward in terms of modernizing the Total Force. We will take that equipment and we'll fill the holes that exist out there. We are not going to be able to make the whole Army modern all at once. We just don't have that amount of equipment, unless the Army gets terribly, terribly small, and I don't think anybody wants to see that.

**FSG:** Nor money to buy it.

**DJR:** More money to buy it, that would also be helpful. But I think we also have to be realistic. It's going to take us some time to do that. We will fill based upon the "first to fight," and the Contingency Force will be filled before anybody else. Those members of the Reserve Component community that are part of the Contingency Force will get filled before those members of the Active Component that are not members of the Contingency Force.

We have always had a disparity of equipment in the Army. When I commanded the 4th Division, we were an M-60, M113 unit; then we went to M-1s and we still had M113s. So we've dealt with that throughout the Army basically because you cannot modernize a force as quickly as you would like. It takes time to do that. But I think that we are going to take a big step forward with the movement of equipment back from Europe.

I think we are doing some things to ensure that units are properly trained on equipment that they have to support in wartime. I think the CAPSTONE alignment will help us in terms of ensuring that we are compatible there. If we get the CAPSTONE program back so that we train with those units that we are going to fight with, I think that will help us in terms of ensuring that the force is compatible across the board.

Those are the things that have to

be put in place and that we are doing right now. But, again, it's something that's just not going to occur overnight. Those are the initiatives that are in place. They are working. Once we get everything back from Europe, get settled and get an end-state that makes sense, I think we are going to probably be okay.

**FSG:** I probably owe an apology to the audience. This is such an interesting, knowledgeable panel to talk with, I really haven't given you in the audience a chance to ask some questions and enter the discussion. So let's do that now. Are there some questions from the audience?

**Q:** I'd like to refer to a question, or a statement, General Trefry made relative to the possibility of cheating, the anxiety. I'd like somebody to address that subject.

You've been talking about technology. You've been talking about equipment. You've been talking about numbers. But you have the human element. What you have built-in right now, with the downsizing, the political implications are showing no humanitarian interests. What support do you have for that man or woman who has made a commitment to a career? He now has these problems, "Am I going to be surveyed out? Am I going to be promoted?" What implications does that have toward your readiness?

**RGT:** I think you have a heck of a problem. And I think

it's there. And I think it's a tribute to the leadership that we have, all the way from sergeant level to the Chief of Staff of the Army, that they've been able to cope with it as well as they have.

We've got rid of damn near 200,000 people in the last two years, or since March of '91, not counting all the Guard and Reserve who went back to civilian life.

**Q:** Plus no jobs on the outside.

**RGT:** Right. And we don't know where it's going to stop right now. That puts a tremendous strain on people. It is a tremendous tribute to these young men that they are coping with it, and their families, that they are coping with it as best they are. I think that we've been remarkably free of the kind of thing that you are worried about, that we are all worried about, compared to what it might have been and was back in '73, and what it was in '54, when we went through these RIFs, we had all kinds of problems. I think we've been able to keep away from that to a great extent.

It's going to take a tremendous amount of leadership to keep us on that keel, and I think we are very fortunate that we are in as good shape as we are in today. We have to recognize it. And that's perhaps the most important thing, to be able to recognize it.

**FSG:** General Reimer, I suspect you are trying to cope with the humanitarian problem all the time.

Would you have a comment, then?

**DJR:** Yes, sir, I do. I think it probably is the most difficult thing that I've wrestled with in the past three or four years. It's not easy to take down an Army. It's not easy to reshape it, particularly when you are talking about an Army that's a volunteer Army, people want to be a part of it, this is a successful organization.

I have a brother that's an oilman in Indonesia, and I tell him, "Charles, what we are going through is like if you established certain goals for your company and you achieved those goals, and they are the highest goals that you have ever achieved, and then they said, 'Okay, because you are so successful we are going to cut you a third.' That's the type of challenge that we are facing right now." And it is terribly, terribly difficult.

I think we are doing some good things. We are not sitting on our hands. We are not fighting getting smaller. Basically, the country has made a decision and we are in the process of executing it.

The first thing that I would say is that we are a value-based organization, and we stress values very, very much. It's terribly important to us. Go back and look at a document called FM 100-1. It's a very thin document, but it talks about the Army, and it talks about the values the Army has, the integrity,

how we've always been under civilian control. I was fortunate enough to be able to speak to the graduating class from West Point at the graduation banquet this year. I asked them to go back and reread FM100-1 before they go to their first assignment and to reread it on a regular basis, because I think it's terribly important, particularly during these times right now.

We've got to keep the integrity. We've got to keep the values that have been so much a part of our history. And we've got 218 years of distinguished history to guide us.

We went down to an Army the size of 80 people, in 1784. We survived hardship, and we'll come back from this. I think we'll make it.

Now, what are we doing specifically because, as you mentioned, these are good people that we are letting go? It's terribly, terribly emotional when you deal with the people and you deal with the families involved. But I'll tell you we have fought hard for transition programs.

We've got SSI and SSB for soldiers and VSEP and VERA for civilians. These are programs to help people transition. We've got the Army Civilian Alumni Program, and I don't know whether you've ever been to one of our centers, but if you haven't, I invite you to go to any one. It is for the Total Army, somebody that's getting out and entering into civilian life.

We will go through and we ask them, "What are you interested in doing? Where do you want to work? Here's some of the things you need to know about writing resumes." For example, there's a truck company called Schneider Truck Company, in Green Bay, Wisconsin. I was at a National Guard Enlisted Association meeting one time and sat next to Schneider. Schneider said, "Look, I'll take any of the people that you've got that I have vacancies for, because you have a great product. You have a drug-free product, a disciplined product, they are ones you can count on."

We now have that in our computer base and when people say, "Hey, I'm interested in going to Wisconsin, I used to be a truck driver," Bill Schneider's name will pop up and it'll be a part of the information that we hand that particular soldier.

We have worked very, very hard to try and take care of our people. It is important to the people that are staying in the Army, and to those people that are leaving, and it's not easy. It is terribly, terribly difficult when you deal with human emotions. But, when you compare that with any of the reshaping efforts that we've done in our previous history, I think we are doing this one much, much better. But it doesn't take any of the pain away.

JRG: Well, Dick Trefry mentioned 1954. That was the year I was commissioned a second lieutenant. And it was also a year in

which the Army was being very rapidly drawn down, because nuclear weapons were going to take the place of the ground forces, and that was going to solve the problem.

One of the things that I tell officers and NCOs is, especially young officers and NCOs, young soldiers for that matter, "When you look at your career in the Army, don't judge it by current events all the way. The Army changes over time, because the situation in the world, and America's reaction to that situation changes. And so there will be times when the Army is drawing down, and times when the Army is building up. And leadership is important to us, both drawing down and building up."

We need to be aware of all the help that we can give, that Denny mentioned, and many other things that I know he could mention about people who are getting out of the Army.

We also need to spend time with people who are staying in the Army, to tell them what their future is going to look like in the Army. And it is going to go through a series of changes. And so we need people whose thinking is flexible, people who are able to react to vastly different situations, because one of our goals as we draw the Army down, is to keep the best people, the best people possible. And, as far as I can see it now, we are doing that. We still are challenging the good

people, the people who realize that if you are good, the Army would have to get awful small before we'd let you go.

So, there are just so many aspects of this. Thank God, again, for the computer, because to try to draw down the way we've done with stubby pencil would have been awful. At least we have a lot more support for the kind of personnel actions we have to take than we've ever had before.

Q: There was a discussion this morning and General Temple made the point that there was a great chasm of understanding between the Active Components and the Guard and Reserve, and very little of a bridge across it.

I know that all of you have had experience in building that bridge, and in examining ways to make the three components of the Army all understand one another better. I think that's imperative and it's the root of our successful future. It's how we spread the understanding across the components.

I wonder if our panelists have some ideas that they might express about how we do that.

JRG: There are a lot of decisions that have to be made at every level of the Reserve Components and the Active Component. One of the most important things is that when those decisions are being made, that everybody is involved.

I like very much what I see in terms of the working groups, the committees that have representation from the Reserve Components, the Reserve and the Guard and the Active, at the right levels. I think that one thing, to be sure, is that we do that to the *n*th degree so that we are able to keep the confidence of people that nothing is going on behind closed doors, that nothing is under the table. Everything is on the table as we go down the line. In fact, that's the only way to do it. The more that we can keep checking to make sure that everybody is in on every decision, I think the better off we are.

**DJR:** No. I'd just echo that, because I think that is terribly important, and as Bob knows, there are a number of different groups discussing these issues right now. They are not easy issues. There's no easy solution. If there was an easy solution, we'd have already arrived at it and gotten on with it. And so, they are painful, just like the emotions associated with downsizing the Army.

But, at the same time, it is very helpful that we are all meeting together, people are rolling up their sleeves, throwing the issues on the table, and we're discussing them in an open forum.

I'm trying very hard, as the FORSCOM Commander, to meet with as many of the leaders of the Total Army as I possibly can. I've had a couple of sessions with TAGs already, and have

been to the ROA meeting in Nashville a couple of weekends ago. I will continue to go through the list of TAGs. I'm trying to get around to see as much as I possibly can.

**Q:** ... the hurdles here on the agenda, according to General Abrams and General Vessey, and then the press who was there, it seems as though a very essential—is that right?—a very essential point here is that by the Abrams Doctrine, at least it helps circumvent the Congress's Constitutional requirement to declare war, which, of course, many Presidents have participated in.

I'm a Vietnam Era veteran of the Marine Corps. And I noticed that on the news release it indicated that you all felt, or that somebody felt, that the mobilization of the Guard and Reserve in large numbers during Desert Storm throughout the country affected communities and forced the Congressional vote on whether to commit forces to Southwest Asia.

Is that a one-time shot, now that General Galvin is here? Do you think that was a one-time thing? Or do you think that this concept will be effective for the foreseeable future to force the Congress to at least partially do its duty to follow the Constitution on the declaration of war issue?

**JRG:** Well, of course, that's not an issue in which there is undivided approach right now. I mean, the powers of

the President versus the powers of the Congress is something that could be discussed for a long time. And I know Bob Sorley was here this morning and he talked about his—were you here this morning, by the way?

**Q:** I wasn't.

**JRG:** I wasn't either. There was some discussion about Bob's chapter in his book on Abrams, in which the question that you've brought up comes up in there, and I think it's Schlesinger who comments in that chapter that these are decisions that political leaders will make, and I tend to agree with that. We in the military can configure ourselves so that we can most effectively carry out missions that we are given by our leadership. But we don't create those missions. That's a political decision.

Now, as to where that decision takes place I think we, all Americans, have not been able to be too clear about what is the President's prerogative and what is the Congress's prerogative when it comes to conflict.

And so I tend to feel that it was right and correct for Abrams—and he wasn't the only one, by any means, but we've used Abrams as the point man on this. There were lots of people, though, involved in how the Army, and the Armed Forces indeed, would be configured in order to carry out whatever mission that they are given.

It seems to me that we are cor-

rectly configured when we go to war as a people. That's my own view. I think that when we go to war, it is something we need to do as a people, and therefore our Reserve Components make sure that that happens in the broadest possible sense. And I think that's right. But I don't think that the debate was about the role of the Congress vis-a-vis the role of the President. I think that's a debate that belongs somewhere else.

**RGT:** I was just reviewing a book last night on the President as Commander-in-Chief, put out by the University of Kansas. If you haven't read it yet or looked at it, it starts with William McKinley and progresses through Richard Nixon. I was struck by a line in there that said Presidents have committed troops 170 times in the 200 years since 1787, 1789, and only five times has the Congress declared war. So, it just reiterates what General Galvin said, that's a political question.

But the point, I think, that General Abrams was talking about when he made the decisions about what we called the Doctrine this morning in 1972-73, after roughly eleven years of war in Southeast Asia, (and that's a horse of another color altogether, and the monolithic threat at that time) was, "How do you keep the Russians out of Western Europe?" And, you know, there's a big difference between that and something like Grenada.

**FSG:** And, of course, as far as the National Guard is concerned, they played really no role in that except what they might play as a citizen, and their job is to be available for the Army when it's required, and when they are called under law.

**Q:** I'd like to pick up on this thing because it goes back to something that General Reimer talked about earlier in the game. One of the important and critical elements in the Readiness equation is the factor of how much training time will you have available between mobilization and deployment or commitment.

General Reimer touched on decision gates, the incremental force building, the necessity to build up a domestic consensus, and the international coalition part of the equation, which is also very important.

What I would like to ask of whomever on the panel would like to touch on that, and I think it relates to this last question as well: Why is that time getting shorter, or longer, in your view? The time between mobilization and deployment or commitment.

**JRG:** Well, first of all, I think that it would be wrong to say today that we are in a situation where we won't have the luxury of having Reserve units in the Reserve Components, the Guard, for example, that would have relatively long preparation times after

some crisis came up.

I can think of a variety of times when long preparation times would be acceptable. For one thing, if we look at what can happen to us now, we can have all kinds of varieties of crises, everything from an outright heavy conflict to a light conflict to a humanitarian assistance effort to a counter-terrorist, counter-drug operation, to a wide variety of things that can happen. Crises within crises.

We could have a situation in which we sent forces to participate in a crisis and then we needed to rotate those forces at a later time. And we would recognize that if we were going to send in forces we might want to rotate them, so therefore we might, in that case, call up Guard units who might be farther down the line in terms of their readiness, and begin to bring them up.

But we might have other Guard units that were Roundup or Roundout units that had a shorter time and, based on that, we would figure out how are we going to sustain our efforts in this crisis.

We reached, if you take the Gulf crisis for example, a point at which, when we committed the VII Corps to the Gulf, and if we had then not gone to war but had sat there for some time, simply keeping Saddam from doing anything further — that may sound far-fetched, but I can think of lots of things that sound far-

fetched that have happened. But if for some reason we had committed the VII Corps and then had not gone to war, we would have had a question come up immediately about how long are we going to sustain that force there, and is it for the duration? Or is it for a year? Or is it for a year and a half, or two years? Or what is it?

And the answer to that would have been, "Well, what Reserve Components do we have that can be made ready and in what time frames?"

And so we, in some cases, have to configure ourselves to the realities. And in this case, in a case like that or resembling that, the force that was committed would have to stay there, obviously, until it could be replaced. And so this could mean a long time.

However, I think that the more likely thing to happen is a requirement that is short-fused, and therefore I think we do need to make this effort, right now, that I think we are making to see how good the Guard can get. And I would tell you, as I said before, that we don't know the answer to that. But we know how to find out.

We have a lot of capability, everything from the computer support, the simulation, the brigade-level training for key commanders and staff officers, the equipment that Denny mentioned coming back from Europe, and the equipping of the

Contingency Force, all with the best of everything before somebody else gets something, on and on. There are a wide variety of actions that can be taken. But I think that we need to continue to look at a spectrum of time, of early readiness Guard units, middle and late readiness Guard units.

**Q:** If I can address, sir, perhaps more to General Reimer, because the other two generals may not be aware of this legislation on the Hill. Certainly, what we call the General Abrams Doctrine really had its implementation, if you will, or impetus in mobilization legislation that went to what we call today the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up, or the 200,000K Call-Up.

Currently, there is in the DOD '94 Authorization bill presented to the Hill, legislation to amend that, what we call 673b, or the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up, to extend the call-up time frame. Two important areas of the amendment: One to extend the call-up time frame from 90-90 to 180-180 and, additionally, to give a step-down, a secretarial level, a SECDEF level if you will, call-up authority for a limited number of Reserve Components, like the Reservists.

My question really is, how significant do you see this modification? And do you see this as somewhat of an unconscious enhancement, if you will, of what we are

calling the Abrams Doctrine today?

**DJR:** Let me take the Abrams Doctrine first, because I'm not clear in my mind whether General Abrams was trying to solve the problem of how you go to 16 Divisions from 13, with a fixed-in strength of 780K, or whether he was trying to solve the problem of how you prevent the Army from being committed without calling up the Reserves.

My guess is he was trying to solve both. But I personally never heard him talk about anything other than the tooth-to-tail ratio. There are a lot of other people that have been in those sessions that I wasn't in, so I'm not sure in what terms of the application to the Abrams Doctrine you are talking about.

What I am convinced of, though, is that the two specific points that you mentioned are lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm.

The 90 plus 90 was basically a tough thing to work your way through because about the time you got people over there, you had to start bringing them back because, as you know, you have to have them off Active Duty by the 180 days, (90 plus 90). So you had to bring them on back. They have to go through the demobilization, that type of thing. The 180 plus 180 will give you much, much greater flexibility, and I think will work much better.

The other point had to do with the fact that it was about two weeks into Operation DesertShield before we got 673b, and we had some units that we'd brought up, under the only thing we could, the Secretary of the Army's Active Duty for Training program. Some of those units were USAR units that ran ports and some other things that were critical. The Air Force I think also had some issues with volunteers and we all needed 673b. So I think there's a realization that we cannot get the force out of CONUS without the Reserve Component. And I think that's what that 25K is designed to do.

I think that reflects changes required by the power projection strategy; it reflects a crisis response strategy, and I think it will help us do that, so I feel that those are good initiatives.

Now, the Constitutional question has got to be solved by somebody besides me, but I certainly think from a military war-fighting standpoint, both of those are good initiatives.

**FSG:** Gentlemen, you are such an erudite panel, and your discussion has ranged so far, I'm not going to attempt to sum up for each of you. Rather, I'd like to have each of you take a couple of minutes to sum up your views on the afternoon's discussion. General Reimer.

**DJR:** Well, I would say that, first of all, I appreciate the opportunity to participate

in this discussion, and I guess I did it for a number of reasons.

One, I figured that anything that could bring General Vessey all the way from Minnesota to Washington had to be important, so I came.

But, secondly, as FORSCOM Commander I find this issue terribly, terribly important. The Total Army is important to me, it's important to the Chief, and it's important to everybody in the Active Component.

But, most importantly, I came because of the tremendous respect and admiration I have for General Abrams. I was very fortunate to have had the opportunity to work for him, and it was just a great experience in my lifetime. I've been fortunate in a lot of ways, but that's the reason I'm here.

If I had to talk about the Abrams Doctrine, and as I said, this is kind of the first time that I've heard it, I would say the Abrams Doctrine was associated with the readiness of the Total Force. And I would go back to the point that he used to stress: the terrible price of unpreparedness. When we are unprepared, we pay that price in blood. And he used to talk about the cemeteries and the monuments and the things that we've built to soothe our conscience, and I think that's what drove him. It's what drove a lot of our decisions during Operation Desert Storm.

I would tell you, as the DCSOPS of the Army, that I would

think very often about him describing the terrible, terrible pain and human sacrifice associated with war. And I was committed, as I know a lot of other people were committed, not to send people over there who weren't ready for that particular battle.

At the time we were going through that, it wasn't at all clear that we were going to win this in a hundred hours, and that we were going to have less than a hundred casualties. There were some tough decisions that had to be made, and that's what drove our decisions at that time.

I think the world has changed, obviously; we've talked about that, and I think everybody understands that and knows the Army is changing. I don't think we are given credit for the changes that we are making. When you look at all that we are doing right now, and the fact that we are reshaping the Army, I think we are managing that fairly well. So I'm not going to hang my head and apologize for what we've done. We have taken, as was mentioned already, over 250,000 people out of the Total Army. That's 150,000 Active Component, 50,000 Reserve Component, and 50,000 DA civilians, since Operation Desert Storm. And we still have a higher optempo in '93 than we had in '89.

So I think we are doing okay. There is uncertainty out there in the Total Force; we need to solve that. I

think the Bottom-Up Review will help us in that particular area. I think it's obvious that we are going to get smaller. The challenge that all of us face here, I think, is how do we get smaller and still keep this great organization together? How do we keep the Total Army strong?

I really believe that we've got to leverage the strength of each component. I see that as I go around from place to place, each component brings a certain strength to the table. Our challenge is to talk to each other, to build that trust and confidence among each other so that we do leverage that strength and we do keep the Army strong and we do continue that great history that we've had for over 218 years.

We can't do it overnight. As we've talked about, and as I've mentioned many times, there are initiatives on the board that are working. They haven't all matured, they haven't all been approved, but they are positive. We've got Total Army groups that meet and talk about these things. I think there's some great things on the table that have to be fleshed out and have to mature, and be approved. But I think we are moving in the right direction. I'm very comfortable that that is true.

I think the primary bottom line for me is that we've all got to resolve that we are going to do what's right for the nation. If everybody approaches it from that standpoint, I think we are going to be okay.

**JRG:** Well, I would start by saying that the Total Army is the only way. There is no other way in the United States, I don't think, that would be satisfactory to the people, that would be a continuation of our historical view, our tradition. And that's one of the reasons I wanted to be here today. And because, like Jack Vessey, I started out in the Guard and have always felt that that was a big advantage, and I always have felt that it formed a lot of my thinking, which you probably can see in what I have had to say, or what I'm saying now.

I don't know what was said this morning because of my absence here, on the state role of the Guard. But I think that we always have to think of that, also. I mean, there are certain things that are vitally important in terms of the Guard and the relationship it has to the state and to the governor as its commander. And therefore, I think that we have to consider the effect of that on the question of the balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support, because I think that the Guard still needs to be a well-rounded force, a militarily capable force on its own. And, no, I don't necessarily mean it has to mirror somehow the Active Component. And I don't really think that it's necessarily so, that it should mirror it. But I do think it needs, and that's something that has to be constantly looked at, the combat element as well as the other elements.

In terms of the Abrams Doctrine, I think that it is important to see that what we are talking about there is war and the American people, and I don't know of a subject that could be more important than that.

We need to see, from the point of view of military people, what it is that we can do and how it is that we configure ourselves so that we are able to respond in the most effective ways possible, but also in ways that take that into account, and I think that was one of the purposes of today.

And so I think it needs to be emphasized, again and again, that when we go to war, we go to war as a Total Army, just as we train and configure ourselves as a Total Army.

We can take great pride in the way that the Army has changed for the better in the past couple of decades. I know that in the 24th Division I used to say sometimes, and actually I was quoting people who had talked to me, to soldiers and NCOs and Officers, "Do you feel ready for combat with the kind of training we've been getting?" And they would say, immediately, "Yes, Sir." And I'd say, "Are you ready for the National Training Center?" And they would say, "Well, we've got a few things we've got to work on here. We need a little time." We have built the National Training Center and the other things we've discussed.

I can remember, as you can, too, because it hasn't been long ago, that when we came out with a new tank table, everybody said, "This is impossible. How are we ever going to reach this?" I said it, myself. I looked at that and gulped, and said, "This is what they want us to? This is how we are going to score, on these templates? Firing on the move, firing as a platoon, and so forth and so on?" And I didn't think we could do it. And we did do it. We made great strides.

I think we have to be frank enough to say that the Guard didn't make the same great strides, proportionately, in that period. And it's clear what the Congress thinks about that. Probably we all in the Active Component, I should put myself in the past in that, but I think the Active Component realizes, too, that there's a support question there. There is a resourcing question. And I think the Active Component is dedicated to addressing that even more strongly than in the past.

Ground maneuver is extraordinarily complex. It's a big difference between what happened when Napoleon did his planning for Waterloo and he conducted that battle. He wasn't worried about air strikes and a lot of other things. Or, Nelson at Trafalgar wasn't worried about what was over the sea or under the sea, just what was on the surface. We operated on a map that was two-dimensional. It was a flat map.

But today, any soldier has to know that the map's not flat. It's a cube. It's three-dimensional. And this makes an enormous difference.

And trying to—I forget what you called it, Dick, but I call it "orchestrate." You called it—

RGT: Dexterity.

JRG: Dexterity. I call it the ability to orchestrate, or people call it "synchronizing." But whatever it really is, to try to pull all that together is a very, very difficult thing to learn. And the challenge there is for Guard leadership at the squad, platoon, company, and battery and so forth, squadron, battalion, brigade, division level, to work that.

Maybe it would be in the long run that the Guard would keep division flags but basically be brigades. This is true in many cases already. But I don't think that we would either say, the combat side is something that we could only use in very limited terms, or the combat side is something that could work only in terms of being ready, let's say, at platoon or company level. I still think battalion is a level that we can challenge the Guard with and a level they can reach if they get the right resources, because they already have the right spirit and dedication to do it. And I would end there.

RGT: Let me start by saying I was very privileged in

1951 to be the liaison officer from the 70th Armored Field Artillery in Merrill Barracks to what for one month was Lieutenant Colonel Abrams, and then Colonel Abrams when he was Commander of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

If you want to have an education, you want to sit down beside him as his Field Artillery liaison officer when you are out in the field, which we spent a great deal of time doing. I got a great education, I can tell you that. And I say that because of the comments that have been made here on his emphasis on training. I remember one day. It rained like hell, lightning hit the OP, nothing went right, the mess truck got lost, battalions were wandering around in the wilderness, and at 5:00 a.m. he called the officers together. He stood under a tree, and I can see it and hear him now. He said, "Gentlemen, what does it all prove? God-damn it, we are not qualified!" That's what he said.

That's all he had to say. We knew it. Because if we had been any good, we'd have done it whether it was raining or shining or any other damn thing. But that was his standard. And that's what he was trying to get across.

And, yeah, he wanted to make sure that when we went to war, we went as a Total Army.

Some of you have not been privileged to spend the last thirty

years as close to this as I have, and to see the difference now compared to thirty years ago. Unbelievable. If you think we've got problems now, sure we do; but when you think of what it was thirty years ago and what it is now, it's unbelievable.

But we are at a time to change. We are at a time, not change for change's sake, but because of technology, because of politics, because of education, because of all the things that make our world, externally and internally, all the dynamics that affect the Total Army, this is a time of opportunity.

But to do that you have to have areal inquisitive, questioning mind. And you have to ask yourself, "Why do we do this?" And if we do that, then I think we have nowhere to go but up.

FSG: Gentlemen, you've been a truly wonderful panel. It's been my very real privilege and pleasure to be associated with you. Thank you, so much. General Ensslin.

[APPLAUSE]

RFE: We've been privileged today to have assembled here at the National Guard Memorial, I think, the greatest assortment of experience in the Reserve Component world that could be assembled. Certainly, the experience of the National Guard and the experience of the Army has been here with us, and I don't know how we could have added more experi-

ence to the two moderators and the six panelists and the luncheon speaker that we had today.

We have been greatly stimulated by these discussions. I think all of us have had an awful lot of ideas racing through our heads as a result of the things that were said here. I think we've been challenged by people of wisdom and experience in the world that means so much to us, and I think that, as we reflect further, some very positive and worthwhile things for the Total National Defense will come forth.

As General Temple said, the Guard does change. General Vessey said, you know, we have got to change. Obviously.

Well, we do change, and we have adapted over our 355-plus years of being. General Galvin has traced those early years of the Militia for us. I know I joined a National Guard artillery battery organized at 55 percent strength, and our challenge was that, if two were needed, we were going to have to be ready to deploy and fight in probably six to twelve months.

And the training year General Temple referred to had two events. One was the annual IG inspection, when the Army came to take a look. We spent six months getting ready for that. The other key event was the ATT, the Army Training Test that we took at annual training. We spent the other six months getting ready

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for that. It was a different world.

We've come a long way and, as several of our speakers have said, we've got to keep in mind how much progress we've made. But we also

have to keep in mind what General Galvin said. We don't really know yet, with all of our experience, exactly what level we are capable of achieving. We haven't done enough or gone far enough to have a

very clear picture of just what the limits are in the National Guard. At least, I read that into General Galvin's remarks, and it's my feeling.

But, again, a round of applause for all of our participants today, and our thanks for being here with us.

[APPLAUSE]