

Maj Gen Tonini Testimony -- 20 May 2015

Chairman General Ham, Vice Chair Lamont, Commissioners --
Good Morning --- I'm Major General Ed Tonini, The Adjutant
General of Kentucky and President of the Adjutant Generals'
Association of the United States. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today.

As TAG, I serve as the Commander of the Kentucky National
Guard, and answer to my Commander-in-Chief, Governor Steve
Beshear. I am speaking to you today on behalf of my Governor
and on behalf of my fellow TAGs in AGAUS.

As President of AGAUS, my objective today is to clearly
articulate the collective thoughts of the 54 Adjutants General
with regard to matters this Commission will consider.

I'll touch briefly on a few of the topics we believe are key to this
process—issues like affordability, capability, accessibility, and
readiness. I'll end with some thoughts on the Army's Aviation
Restructure Initiative.

But before I discuss those matters, I'm going to tell you *exactly*
what we hope for from this Commission. I'm going to lay my
cards on the table. No secrets—no bluffing.

First and foremost, **we** want an unbiased look that recommends a Total Force Army that is in --- the best interest of the United States. You'll notice I didn't give you a specific authorized end strength. I didn't mention how many attack helicopters or Strikers, Bradleys or even BCTs we should keep.

We just want what's in the **best interest** of our country. It's not that we don't have an opinion about those issues—**we do**. In fact, I will tell you that if you were to ask each TAG individually you'd find dozens of different opinions regarding those matters.

My job – however -- is to have that group of very independent individuals, speak with a single focused voice.

As an aside, we believe it's only reasonable to allow the Commission to make its recommendations on force structure *before* the Army Guard reduces manpower and moves equipment between components.

I firmly believe that providing Congress with the recommendations that they commissioned you to come up with -- in order craft the Army funding for the future -- is IN FACT the "WILL OF CONGRESS".

We TAGs and our Governors believe a Total Army -- that is in the best interest of the United States --- includes an Army

National Guard that functions as the **Army's primary combat reserve**.

We also believe the Total Army should thoroughly understand the National Guard's role as the military first responder in the homeland.

To that end we hope that this commission will recognize—as the National Commission on the Structure of the **Air Force** recommended—that Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities should be treated as **real priorities** and our **Governors as essential stakeholders** in the planning process.

Governors—particularly in their role as Commanders-in-Chief of their state's Guard—are necessarily and justifiably concerned with our ability to respond in the homeland. We believe making our Governors essential stakeholders is a necessary idea.

As a TAG, I was pleased to read the Air Force Commission's recommendation that the Secretary of the Air Force should QUOTE “advance current informal practices and mechanisms for *engaging* with the Adjutants General in development of the Air Force Program.”

Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Mark Welsh *engaged* with the TAGs at our last AGAUS meeting here in DC this past

February—he brought the Commander of Air Combat Command with him.

Oh --- and Secretary of the Air Force Debbie James was there as well. If they weren't genuinely interested in hearing what the TAGs had to say then I believe someone should give them all Oscars for their performance.

We invited Army leadership to engage with the TAGs as well—but apparently they couldn't find the time -- as no one from the Active Component Army showed up across our five-day combined AGAUS / GSLC meetings.

The Secretary of the Air Force and *two* Air Force Four-Star Generals each spent an hour or more with the fifty-four TAGs. -
- I don't know that I can fully explain how far that visit went toward further nurturing relationships between the Air Force and the National Guard.

Engaging with the TAGs—that's quite a concept.

The TAGs understand that in many cases our resumes might differ from those of our Active Component peers.

Don't misunderstand me—I'm not implying that our collective experiences on the road to becoming TAGs are inferior to those of our AC friends—it is just that our career paths are often

different—and that is appropriate for what we are called upon to do as the Commanders of our states' National Guard formations.

We don't expect to be consulted about maneuvering the Pacific Fleet to deter a rapidly growing Chinese Navy.

We realize that no one cares about our thoughts on the best strategy for slowing Russian aggression in Crimea.

We probably won't be invited to sit at the table and wax eloquent about our thoughts on Jomini and Clausewitz—hell, most of us don't even want to sit at that table.

We won't even be asked our opinion on how to effectively manage our own brigades while deployed overseas. And that's okay.

But if you want to discover what makes the Army Guard tick—if you want to wrap your head around the unique capabilities our soldiers bring to the fight from their civilian occupations—and how best to harness and take advantage of those capabilities

—if you'd like to know how a Deputy Sheriff's real world experience translates into improved performance during SECFOR operations

—if you want to learn how the Drill Status E-7 that happens to be an IT consultant to Microsoft can enhance a National Guard’s Cyber Protection Team.

—if you want to see the skills that a San Diego firefighter brings to the table when he transitions to a California Guardsman and helps stop raging wild fires

—if you want to know about how best to take advantage of the incredible talent that resides within the 350,000 soldiers that comprise the Army National Guard

Then you **really should be talking to a TAG.**

To review:

We’d like to see a Total Army in the best interest of the nation and in which the Army National Guard functions as the primary combat reserve.

We’d like to treat homeland response as a real priority and the Governors—our bosses—as essential stakeholders.

And we’d like Senior Army leaders to increase their dialogue and engagement with the TAGs.

Now that I've discussed what the 54 TAGs hope the Commission finds, I will briefly discuss some of the issues that you'll consider in the weeks and months ahead.

Specifically, I'll address accessibility, capability, affordability, and readiness, because I know these are important to your deliberations. I've heard some interesting perspectives on these issues from some of my Active Component brethren, and I want to make sure that I clear up any misconceptions.

As we were preparing for this Commission we put together a pamphlet that contains data that we think will prove interesting and helpful.

I'm providing a copy for you and copies for your support staff. I believe it is the definitive look at the Army National Guard today, while establishing our historical foundations. I hope you refer to it frequently. I'm confident you will find it useful in your deliberations. Each of these issues and more are discussed in the pamphlet.

I want to make it clear right up front—I'm not an expert on the Army National Guard.

I *am* an expert on the Kentucky National Guard, but I might not have all the answers to all of your questions with regard to the Guard at large.

I have with me Maj Gen Glenn Curtis the TAG from Louisiana and a senior TAG Army Force structure leader to assist me as we proceed. I do promise that any answers we can't provide, we will get you an answer very quickly from our guys in the field.

OK -- First let's talk **ACCESSIBILITY**. When studying this very topic the Air Force Commission found that the Active Component sometimes QUOTE, "skewed the numbers to support an end state not supported by the facts." END QUOTE.

Now ---- I'm certain those skewed numbers were completely unintentional, but just in case we have some flawed accounting of our own in the Active Army, let's talk reality.

Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows **FULL** access to the Guard through a robust suite of activation authorities. Governors have constant, direct access to their Guardsmen via State Active Duty.

When political will demands access to the Guard, the law allows access to the Guard. ----- End of story.

So let's talk Utilization of the Total Force and the infamous 1 to 5 Mobilization to Dwell ---- which seems to be generating a little discussion and a lot of angst. Some have argued that this

policy limits access to the National Guard. As Paul Harvey would say, “Let’s hear ----- the rest of the story.”

First of all, these mobilization to dwell ratios are merely planning objectives, not strictly enforced law. A recent Rand Study found that fully one half of Army Guardsmen with six years of service have exceeded the 1 to 5 planning objective.

Not only were the objectives not met with anything approaching regularity, they are actually rendered moot in times of a national emergency. Gen Grass’s “**All In**” memo commits the Guard up to the “maximum limits of presidential or congressional authorities, when required to meet the needs of **any** national emergency.”

That means you can mobilize as many Guardsmen as you need for as long as you need them. The Guard is simply not going to rotate home for a break in the middle of – God Forbid – the next World War.

This fact is freely acknowledged in the language establishing the Commission which directs you to evaluate a structure for the Army that avoids exceeding operational tempo goals of 1 to 5 for “**Peacetime rotations**.” It says nothing about maintaining 1 to 5 during national emergencies.

So it is patently misleading to apply ANY mob-to-dwell ratios when discussing national emergencies and when calculating force structure requirements to meet those emergencies.

Even when it's *not* a national emergency, the Army Guard wants to be involved. The Air Force Commission discovered that the Airmen they interviewed—from the most senior to the most junior—told the Commission of untapped potential in the Guard.

They repeatedly said they'd provided what they'd been ***asked*** to provide --- rather than the full limit of what they ***could*** provide.

This was demonstrated perfectly recently in the Army's response to the Ebola crisis in Africa. The 34th Division from Minnesota and the 38th from Indiana and Kentucky were ready to deploy. Instead someone made the decision to send America's only Air Assault Division, Kentucky's 101st Airborne Screaming Eagles into the midst of a pandemic while a perfectly capable, highly-trained Army National Guard unit waited at the altar.

Makes no sense to me --- but come to think of it --- deploying a National Guard unit at that time probably didn't fit the Active Component's narrative.

If the Army Guard is available ---- but not called upon--don't claim it's because the Guard is not accessible.

In addition to all of the things I've already mentioned, the very concept of mobilization to dwell is misleading due to a poor understanding of the definition of "dwell."

For the National Guard, accessibility does not end when dwell begins. Dwell does not imply inactivity—at least not for the National Guard. Let me describe what dwell looks like to a soldier in the Army National Guard.

The other day I was hanging out with about 175 thousand of my friends at a place called Churchill Downs. Behind the scenes were a hundreds of Kentucky Guardsmen helping to ensure the safety and security of the folks attending the Kentucky Derby.

Those Guardsmen were in dwell.

The 145 Guard soldiers on duty today to help secure our SOUTHWEST borders—in dwell.

The helicopter crew that plucked the stranded hiker off of a mountain in Oregon—they were in dwell.

The 1578 full-time Army Guardsmen on the Counter Drug Task Force—dwell.

The Wisconsin and Iowa Guardsmen currently responding to the Avian Flu outbreak—dwell.

The 500 plus Guardsmen performing Key Asset Protection today—they're all in dwell.

The 300 Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana Guardsmen currently fighting devastating floods across Texas – they are in dwell

The Guardsmen that supported over 700 State Partnership Program events—many of them conducted overseas—for our 74 partner nations—they were in dwell—even while overseas.

The thousands of Guardsmen that responded to Super Storm Sandy, and Hurricane Katrina, and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and the California wild fires, and the Boston Marathon bombing, and the rioting in Baltimore and Ferguson—that's all dwell.

Any Guardsmen not involuntarily mobilized is considered to be in dwell. Tell those Guardsmen they are inaccessible. Tell the people whose lives they saved and whose families they protect that the Guard is inaccessible.

In 2009 Kentucky had a no-notice full mobilization of the National Guard in response to a historic ice storm that cut off 85% of all of the electrical service in the state --- all while in dwell.

Tell Governor Beshear that his Guardsmen are inaccessible --- in dwell --- during any of the 18 presidentially declared disasters during the past 7 ½ years of his administration. They all might disagree with that assessment.

The Guard is accessible—all you have to do is ask—we’ve never said “No.”

The last thing I’d like to say about the 1 to 5 policy is that we didn’t ask for it. I know it was well-intentioned and probably designed to prevent overuse of the Guard or possibly avoid “abuse” of the Guard during prolonged conflicts.

But just like the Air Force Commission discovered -- I can confirm that our Guardsmen are not telling me they’ve been deployed too often as a peacetime rotation force.

Honestly, we’re not tired. When we are --- we’ll say something—I promise.

Engagement with the TAGs will provide an opportunity for a meaningful dialogue on what the proper mob to dwell ratio is, and we look forward to having that dialogue.

Now that we've cleared up the accessibility myth, let's talk **AFFORDABILITY.**

This one is simple, and the Air Force Commission has already done the work that unearthed the obvious and stated it as one of their six foundational conclusions.

Part time force structure is less expensive than full-time force structure.

Reasonable people can debate just how much cheaper, but in 2013 the Department of Defense said that a drilling Guardsman is about 15% the cost of an Active Component Soldier.

Even when being used (in Title 10 mobilized duty), a Guard soldier only costs 80 to 95% as much as an Active Component Soldier. These are not my calculations, these are **DoD's** numbers.

Claims that the Active Component provides less expensive *output*—actual boots on ground time—are wildly misleading because those notional savings would only be realized **in a specific set of circumstances -- that includes sustained**

operations over a long period of time and are therefore not particularly relevant to any other scenarios.

Another intrinsic value of the Guard not captured by any of these calculations resides in our dual, state and federal roles. The skills and equipment that enable a brigade to succeed in Iraq enables that same brigade to respond to a natural disaster in the homeland.

From medical tents and radios to high-wheeled vehicles and helicopters, our equipment includes thousands of assets that play a pivotal role in domestic operations.

Affordability? We all agree that we live in an increasingly dangerous world --- Ask any successful businessman --- If you could buy combat proven capacity and capability to provide America the needed security - **for 25 -30% of** the cost of a full-time force --- which -- at current force levels... given the nation's fiscal situation -- is unsustainable ---

Why would you not do it??

Which brings us to CAPABILITY — the quality of the force.

Our stance on this issue is simple: Upon deployment, Army National Guard capability matches that of its Active Duty counterpart.

Claims that the Army National Guard is not as capable as the Active Army because we haven't performed full-spectrum operations are deceptive and disingenuous.

1. We did everything **asked** of us and we're prepared then and are prepared now to do more.

There's an obvious and critical distinction between not being *asked* to perform a mission and not being *capable* of performing a mission.

The Army Guard has successfully completed every assigned mission. Period.

Since the Guard is clearly more affordable, fully accessible, and fully capable—the discussion moves to **READINESS**.

How quickly can the Army Guard get to the fight?

Using a brigade as an example, the Department of Defense says it takes between 50-80 days to go from company level to brigade level proficiency. I won't argue those numbers. I assume they're based off of historical trends and anticipated training requirements.

Comment [DU1]: DoD, Unit Cost and Readiness for the AC and RC, page 25

I will suggest that if I was studying post-mobilization, pre-deployment timelines, I would look at ways of compressing that timeline without—and this is important—without detracting from the quality of the force upon deployment or lowering the proficiency standards by one iota.

There are a variety of methods of doing that and no doubt, you will be examining those methods. The logic of this problem simply leads you to that discussion.

I will point out that in the event of a “No strategic warning, all hands on deck” emergency—the kind of scenario often used when calculating force requirements—I believe we can safely eliminate redundant and/or unnecessary training requirements based upon actual conditions in the theater of operations.

A 2015 Rand Study discussed this very issue and found that in AARs, both the Active and Reserve Components often mentioned the lack of relevance of pre-deployment training to current conditions in theater.

Comment [DU2]: RAND: page xiii AC
Responsibility in RC pre and post mob
training—2015.

I like to think of it this way—if Godzilla is stomping on cars and pushing over buildings in downtown Seattle—a “No strategic warning, all hands on deck” scenario if ever there was one—perhaps we can safely forego our Trafficking in Human

Personnel training --- until we get the wayward reptile under control. Just a thought.

You have to ask yourself *why* the Active Army was so adamant about *not* having a Commission to review these matters. The energy expended in preventing you 8 Commissioners from ever meeting and deliberating these issues --- was nothing short of monumental.

Why would anyone *not* want an unbiased second opinion? It's because – I believe -- they're afraid of the answer. The Air Force Commission studied these issues and recommended entrusting as many missions as possible to the Reserve Components. They stated it is entirely feasible to grow the Air National Guard by more than twenty-two thousand Airmen—an increase of over 20%.

But wait a minute—“Not so fast,” they'll say.

The AC will direct you to page 67 of the Air Force Commission report where you'll find the additional view of Commissioners Brownlee and Harrell, who pointed out they believed that the report's findings and recommendations are not **directly** applicable to other Services.

I quote, “The primary difference between the Army and the Air Force underlying the foundational conclusions cited in this

report is the level of readiness and responsiveness the Air Force accords to its Reserve Component units.” End quote.

Secretary Brownlee personally said to me at the release event of the Air Force Commission (in answer to my question about the possibility of an Army commission) “be careful what you ask for.” He was alluding to the difference in Readiness between the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard.

So—it all boils down to readiness and responsiveness.

I define responsiveness as the speed with which a unit can demonstrate proficiency to deploy following mobilization.

Obviously, the higher the baseline readiness level, the quicker the responsiveness of a given unit. Increased readiness equals speedier response.

The ability to deploy Guard units more quickly reduces the need for Active Component end strength.

Any Active Component formations that cannot be readied for deployment or received in theater before Army Guard units are ready to deploy are an **unnecessary expense** and could be transferred to the Army Guard and operated there for a fraction of the cost.

That simple truth is why the Active Component—although fully aware of and counting on the impact of the additional view of Brownlee and Harrell—did not want this commission.

I would be remiss if I didn't briefly discuss the Aviation Restructuring Initiative. The 54 TAGs look forward to an independent recommendation regarding the transfer of Apache aircraft from the Army National Guard to the Regular Army.

There is a wide spectrum of possible solutions to the Army Aviation solution. We strongly support a look at *all* options regarding Army Aviation, not just a verdict on the existing Army and Guard Bureau plans.

Speaking of which, this provides a nice segue back to our desire to have an unbiased look at all of these matters.

The GAO recently released a report that examined the Army's analysis of ARI versus the Bureau plan.

The report was basically an analysis of an analysis, and I certainly don't intend to dispute the GAO's findings.

What I do dispute is this. “GAO Favors Army Aviation Plan Over Guard’s.” This is the headline of the April 29 article by Joe Gould in Defense News and Army Times—

Major General Cheek is quoted in this article as saying he agrees with the GAO’s assessment that ARI is QUOTE “cost effective and better supports homeland defense, and better meets the demands of our classified war-fighting scenarios.” END QUOTE.

Now I suppose that’s one way to look at it. Or you *could* look at it the way the GAO report **did** when they stated, “The analytical results **did not** provide a meaningful basis for choosing between the two force-structure proposals.”

Perhaps General Cheek missed that particular line. He must have missed this one too. **Quote** “The **Bureau’s proposal** better addressed foundational mission requirements.”

And this one where the GAO reported that the Army’s analysis lacked “sensitivity analysis that could have been beneficial to decision makers.”

Maybe he skimmed over the line that said the Army's cost estimates "did not reflect uncertainties about personnel, operations, or readiness" and were therefore of QUOTE "limited value for projecting the actual implementation or annual costs of the Army's proposal." END QUOTE.

I didn't read where General Cheek acknowledged that the GAO was not charged with challenging any of the Army's assumptions—several of which the Bureau disagreed with and which would have fundamentally altered the outcome of any analysis.

In fact, when the Army didn't get the results they wanted from one set of assumptions they simply changed them to better suit their desired outcome.

And what concerns us most is the loss of dedicated ground support aircraft—particularly as the potential loss of the A-10 looms on the horizon—a combined loss of fixed and rotary wing aircraft that increases risk to our troops in the field.

Nowhere does the report acknowledge that the Bureau's plan maintains 24 ARBs as compared to 20 ARBs under ARI.

In light of what's happening with Russia, ISIS, North Korea, and Iran, common sense dictates this might not be the best point in

time to decrease Attack and Armed Reconnaissance formations and aircraft.

It's all there in the GAO report—you just have to read it instead of relying upon the Active Army and their media minions to misinterpret their findings.

A full subjective analysis of the GAO report is contained in the National Guard “bible” that you have in front of you ---

I have also provided a link to the video of the CSIS National Guard ARI Panel discussion held on Feb 27. I am confident that viewing it or reading the transcript will provide a compelling testament for maintaining attack aviation in the Guard.

One other quick thought, then I'm going to wrap up. I've often heard this question asked. “Why does the Guard need Apaches?” Or, “Why does the Guard need tanks? Or in the Air Guard, why does the Guard need F-15s?”

My answer might surprise you. The Guard doesn't need Apaches any more than we need tanks or F-15s. The truth is this country needs the Guard to have Apaches and tanks and F-15s because maintaining combat power of *all* sorts in the National Guard allows the country the highest possible combat capacity for the least possible cost.

Our enemies can count. They're watching us to see how far we draw down our forces.

Do you think they looked at the million man army and said, "Yeah, but a lot of that is the National Guard?"

No. Some of them had their asses kicked by the Guard in Iraq and Afghanistan and they want no part of the United States Army whether it is Active, Reserve, or Guard.

The Guard has Apaches and tanks and F-15s because it's what's best for our country and our numbers help deter our enemies.

Now, I can see it's time for me to jump off of my soapbox.

I'm going to do something that some people would tell you is not in my nature.

I'm going to apologize. I know I've taken some shots at the Active Component and perhaps I could have tempered my testimony to be slightly less cynical.

I probably should have.

Obviously, I'm passionate about the Guard. I've given pretty much my entire adult life in its service. That entitles me to a little sarcasm I suppose.

So let me publicly acknowledge that I believe my comrades in the Active Component are **equally passionate—equally patriotic—equally devoted**. I value and appreciate the sacrifices they've made in the course of their service. And I think the TAGs desire for a Total Army - in the best interest of the United States -- is a goal we all share.

Obviously we have some differences of opinion about just what that Total Army looks like. That's natural, because we approach the question from differing viewpoints.

I freely acknowledge that I bring my own unique biases to the bargaining table—we all do—it's simply an unavoidable part of human nature.

What this Commission offers is the hope of an impartial, balanced look at the critically important decisions before us.

Our Nation needs your impartiality, your careful analysis and your collective wisdom.

Regardless of what this Commission recommends, it is my sincere hope that when this is all over the Regular Army and

the National Guard can begin to develop a better working relationship --- one where both sides recognize and acknowledge the unique capabilities of the other.

As I mentioned earlier, I have been greatly heartened in the progress made in the interactions between the Active Air Force and the National Guard—progress evidenced by our visits with Secretary James and General Welsh.

We even went to the Hill together within the past few weeks to resolve an issue that was “right for America” and right for the Total Air Force. I think we even have a resolution to a decade old nightmare we shared -- because of the robust, healthy and transparent partnership that has evolved.

Let me remind you all -- as much as we all dislike it --- **Sequestration is the law of our land.** It has never been more important for our nation to get the biggest bang for the defense buck.

That’s why I believe, as do my 53 TAG contemporaries -- that the **Army National Guard is America’s Ace in the Hole.**

God-speed in your endeavors. Thanks you for your time and your attention

I would like to invite the commission to meet with a panel of Adjutants General during our summer meeting in Atlanta the third week in June much as the Air Force commission did with the TAGs in 2013. It proved to be an excellent use of that commission's time. Now General Curtis and I would be happy to answer any of your questions.