Prepared Statement to the
National Commission on the Future of the Army
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United States Transportation Command
Director, Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center
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On behalf of General Paul Selva, Commander United States Transportation Command, thank you for the opportunity to address the commission. I'm Bruce Busler, Director of USTRANSCOM's Analysis Center and Gen Selva asked that I address strategic mobility topics as you study the future of the Army. As the director of USTRANSCOM's analysis center, we work closely with others in the Department on the mobility capabilities necessary to support the national defense strategy which is the expertise I bring to you today.

I see in your agenda that later today you have the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation addressing the commission on the most recent mobility study, the 2013 Mobility Capabilities Assessment, and I'll try to avoid duplication with that presentation, but will be consistent with the findings of that study. That study concluded that, in general, the PB13 planned mobility capabilities support the objectives of the 2012 national defense strategy ..., with some challenges evident in specific scenarios. However, as we look to the future there are some areas that have increased interest. I have a few prepared slides to structure my presentation and plan on leaving about two-thirds of the allotted time for questions that you may have.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states "ground forces will be responsive and capitalize on balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which conflict may occur." From a mobility perspective, the Department's ability to support the stacked demands for "defeat/deny" with homeland defense creates the most demanding transportation challenge to project the Army as the nation's dominant land force.

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review further states that the three pillars of the defense strategy are built on the ability to protect the homeland, build security globally and project power and win decisively, which includes the ability to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. For these missions, the ability to strategically deploy the Army is essential for the Army's relevance in the future.

In fact, power projection capability will continue to be central to the credibility of our Nation's overall security strategy. When it comes to rebalancing the force to Project Power and Win Decisively, the QDR report states "sustaining superior power projection forces – enabled by mobility capabilities including airlift, aerial refueling, surface lift, sealift, and prepositioning – will remain a top priority for force planning and development even in an austere fiscal environment."

The Army's ability to rapidly deploy and fully leverage the nation's mobility capacity is the primary focus of my presentation to the commission today. The Army's ability to deploy rapidly is critical, but so are the joint force capabilities necessary to deploy the Army anywhere in the world and sustain the Army until the mission is complete. The Army and USTRANSCOM are inextricably linked together to

successfully meet combatant commander needs as we deploy and sustain forces with the right capabilities, to the right places, at the right time. Together, we must deliver on this commitment as we grapple with the mobility/logistics challenges we contemplate in the future.

I understand the commission will assess the depth and scalability of the Army to meet current and anticipated requirements of the combatant commands and also evaluate tradeoffs among readiness, efficiency, effectiveness, capability, and affordability. Within this context, I have two main points I'd like to impress upon you as you contemplate the future of the Army, and I will amplify these points in my classified discussion.

First, the Department has evaluated the end-to-end mobility capabilities and capacities necessary to deploy the Army within the acceptable timelines to meet the Department's defined planning scenarios. All these elements must work together to deliver the Army to destinations in the theater and in many cases, other Service capabilities are essential to ensure the Army arrives on-time and in the configuration necessary to support the combatant commander's objectives. We maintain these capabilities in a state of readiness to support the immediate out load of Army's unit equipment in a configuration to support immediate integration into combat-ready formations. Looming capacity issues for both military and commercial transportation, specifically strategic sealift, may challenge the ability to deploy the Army in a timely manner if not addressed as a joint capability in the near future. Recent mobility capacity was assessed as adequate with 91 ships to deploy forces by sealift; 65 of those are DOD owned ships from either prepositioned locations or surge sealift from CONUS and the remainder roll-on/roll-off commercial vessels. We've already had three U.S. flagged commercial ROROs leave the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement program for DOD support in the last three years; merchant mariners that we count on to man the total sealift fleet, military and commercial, are in decline; and 9 of the 50 ROROs in the DOD surge fleet will age out by 2023 necessitating recapitalization efforts to sustain current capacity. Other capabilities, such as commercial railcars are decreasing as they are retired from commercial service which will require some kind of action in the future if we are to maintain our ability to move to our surface ports of embarkation in a timely manner. Additionally, the ability to sustain the necessary levels of subscription to voluntary commercial transportation programs such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is an area we're watching closely. In time of conflict, 95% of all passengers, a majority of them Army soldiers will deploy on commercial aircraft.

Why is this important to the future force structure of the Army? We continue to hold firm on the necessary capacities for airlift, sealift and surface lift to ensure the Army has the ability to project power globally in the timeframes that make the Army relevant to combatant commanders -- and the Army's success is dependent on these mobility capabilities that should be part of how you think about the future of the Army. Additionally, any changes in Army force structure that would alter this calculus in either a positive or negative way must be considered in how the Army gets to the fight, which is my second point.

As I'll show in my classified presentation, the timeline to deploy the Army is aggressive, the ability to flow forces to ports of embarkation are measured in days not weeks or months. The ability to support

deploying units from garrison as they load railcars, trucks or self-deploy becomes critical. The ability to support operations at the ports of embarkation and debarkation is also critical, and during a major contingency we would be loading Army unit equipment from the east, west and gulf coast ports simultaneously. In the past 13 years, many of these activities have shifted to very deliberate, largely contracted operations to support modest, routinely scheduled force rotations known well in advance. Using a similar approach for short-notice, large scale contingency deployment of forces would be severely challenged. Instead, the scope and timing of requirements associated with this type of major movement would stress the Army's organic capabilities to conduct these necessary deployment activities. Depending on what and how much is available as ready forces in the active or reserve component may directly impact the ability to support timely deployment operations. Another point for Army deployment activities is the dominant focus on Brigade Combat Teams. As I'll illustrate in the classified briefing, BCTs comprise a relatively small percentage of the overall Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) when compared to other required supporting/enabling capabilities. Efforts to decrease the size and footprint of BCTs to enhance the deployability of the Army may have the appearance of improving the posture of deploying forces, but if simply shifted to other required units doesn't improve mobility overall. While reducing the actual footprint of the Army is desirable, there may be other non-material approaches that would contribute to faster, lighter organizational design. Additionally, material options to enhance the Army must be synchronized with the lift to deploy Army units. For example, a reduction in the weight/size of TPFDD equipment may require significant investment that may be proportionally addressed with a commensurate investment in sealift capacity. On the other hand, weight growth to enhance survivability complicates the ability to deploy the Army; specifically the projected weight of enhancements for the M1A1 Abrams tank may approach the physical limits of transportation assets such as the C-17 and C-5 aircraft as well as the ramps of several roll-on/roll-off vessels. The point being, that as the Department contemplates the size and structure of future Army formations, the ability to deploy the Army must be addressed as a critical element of those decisions.

Finally, as USTRANSCOM looks to the future we are increasing our focus on the ability to deploy and sustain forces in increasingly contested environments, commonly characterized as the ability to operate in the face of Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities. The increased sophistication of potential adversary weapons will complicate the deployment challenge, and we must grapple with the pragmatic aspects of how to conduct these operations to avoid putting not only mobility assets at risk, but deploying Army forces while they are in transit as well.

This concludes my formal presentation, I welcome your questions and on behalf of General Selva, thank you for the opportunity to allow USTRANSCOM to address the commission on this important topic.