



UNITED STATES ARMY

The Myths of Army Expansibility

A Study from World War I to the Present

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A study of the US Army's mobilization and demobilization experiences in from World War I to the present provides historical context to the emerging debate on the future expansibility of the Army.

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Executive Summary (EXSUM): An Analysis of Army Expansibility

Facing the realities of fiscal constraints that will require force reductions while the world remains a volatile and dangerous place, defense documents and Army policies are full of terms like “reversibility” and “expansibility” to explain how the smaller service will be able to deal with major contingencies. However, those terms are rarely if ever clearly defined. There is an obvious assumption that the Army will be able to conduct major wars.¹ A detailed analysis of those situations reveals that the capacity for growth was based upon institutions and practices that no longer exist or are extremely degraded, bringing into question the viability of the concept. With the demise of the draft and significant reductions in both the industrial and training bases, the bulk of assets for growing active forces will have to come from the Reserve Components, a course of action generally avoided in the past.

Background

This study analyzes the US Army’s experiences from the twentieth century to the present, given the demands of modern war and associated structures, including political, industrial, and military.² These examples generally mirrored those from earlier wars. Broadly speaking, United States defense policy has relied upon a small regular army (RA), expandable upon the outbreak of war. That expanded army then largely demobilized upon war’s end. Reliance upon state militias to augment the regular army in the American Revolution of 1775-83 and the War of 1812 to 1814 changed to volunteer troops vice militia in the Mexican War of 1846-48 and the American Civil War of 1861-65. The war with Spain in 1898 was then a sobering experience in preparedness, especially strategic deployment and logistics. The United States had in essence inherited and perpetuated major aspects of English, then British, military policies, given traditional political suspicions of standing armies. American practice has been to assume strategic, operational, and tactical risk at the start of a conflict, whose history has become associated with the theme of “America’s first battles.”³ One enduring theme that stands out among all the conflicts studied is the lack of preparedness for immediate action, driven either by strategic surprise or lack of popular and political will. World War II provides an exception because of preparatory steps taken prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the declaration of war still found the US Army ill-trained and ill-equipped to take the field immediately.

World War I

Participation in two world wars demanded the explosive growth of the Army to unprecedented size. This massive expansion filled the ranks using three broad approaches:

¹ For example, Secretary of Defense, *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, D.C.: OSD, 2012), 4 and 6 regarding “Deter and Defeat Aggression” in the context of two regions, and the conduct of even much scaled-back stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

² This study capitalized upon great effort across the Army in the last three years. Special mention goes to Dr. John Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, Center for Strategic Leadership and Development (CSLD), US Army War College.

³ Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., *America’s First Battles, 1776-1965* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986).

bringing the regular army to authorized strength; the federalization of the National Guard, formerly the Organized Militia; and the use of draftees to fill new reserve formations. The results were astounding. The pre-WW I regular army possessed some 75,000 of its authorized 100,000 when America declared war on Germany in April 1917. By late 1918 the total force boasted over 3 million men in 62 divisions, of which 43 were overseas.⁴ The interwar years saw the investment in intellectual capital, e.g. education, planning staffs, and war plans. Nonetheless, drastically-reduced funding affected the training and equipping even of a smaller peacetime force.⁵

World War II

World War II often appears as an example of past victories and a template for future ones. National pride in overcoming such long odds and defeating multiple enemies in widely separated theaters is justified, and some cause for the confidence to tackle the many more complex and difficult tasks the world has presented since the end of the Cold War. Yet the overweening focus on V-E Day and V-J Day, has obscured the tremendous difficulties the Army overcame to make those events possible. Moreover, that distraction continues to distort current planning nearly seven decades later. The Army is often governed by the precept that whatever it did in the past was what it meant to do.

Even with an early mobilization and the beginning of the draft in 1940, US Army units did not see action until November 1942 -- 11 months after Pearl Harbor drove American entry into the war. The size and scale of the World War II mobilization is difficult to fathom: from some 200,000 soldiers in 1939, the Army grew to over 8 million by 1945. This 4,000 percent increase in manpower required a concomitant expansion of infrastructure and war production, and the methods the Army used to expand were often at odds with its own requirements. Such expansion may appear as a model for the future, but detailed analysis reveals that the process produced many problems which hindered the Army's deployment.⁶ Following VJ-Day, the Army executed a typical, post-war demobilization, but on as grand a scale as the expansion. From a high of 8 million in 1945, the Army again reduced to 591,000 by 1950, a 93 percent reduction.

Korean War

The Army's end strength, balanced against its worldwide commitments, was the key issue facing the service in 1950. In this "come as you are" war, the US Army suddenly found itself committed to a land war in a country that, prior to the initial attack, had received no strategic priority. In what was to become the pattern for nearly all conflicts to follow, the Army's involvement in one theater, while maintaining presence in others, consumed nearly all its available resources worldwide, not just in the combat theater. The Army juggernaut of World

⁴ See Tab 1: Army Expansion for World War I.

⁵ See Tab 2: Interwar Army Preparation, 1919-41.

⁶ See Tab 3: The Army in World War II.

War II had been reduced in five years, through slashed defense spending and strategic drift, to a shadow of its former self.⁷

Vietnam War

The Vietnam War was largely a fight for an expanded Regular Army as Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson hesitated to mobilize the RC. Three policy decisions affected the Army's ability to execute its missions: the decision not to activate reserve components; the liberal draft deferment policy; and the individual replacement policy for Vietnam. The Regular Army grew from 16 divisions and 6 separate brigades to 19 divisions and 8 separate brigades and from 969,000 to 1,570,000, primarily with draftees and regular Army cadre. There were significant second- and third-order effects which this course of action created. A generous draft deferment policy reduced the overall quality of the conscript pool, and the large influx of draftees onto active duty sorely taxed the training base. The one-year individual tour replacement policy wrought havoc on non-deployed active Army units, as they became the replacement pool. As had been the case during the Korean War, the Army was forced to balance its combat requirements against its ongoing commitments to NATO and elsewhere and the necessity of keeping a General Reserve.⁸

Gulf War

The Gulf War began as strategic surprise, but unlike in times past, the Army was at an unparalleled state of readiness. The large defense budgets of the 1980s had yielded a well-trained and well-equipped Army designed to operate with NATO in high-intensity combat operation, and it proved a formidable opponent for Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Army. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War had brought the "peace dividend" of sharply reduced defense budgets and dwindling end strength. The Army had begun its drawdown, but paused it when the emergency arose and conducted a deliberate mobilization and deployment. The active Army saw no end strength increases, but it required a major mobilization of RC assets, including Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and individuals in the Selected Reserve. These aspects require further research with potential for future expansibility.⁹

OEF/OIF/OND

Post September 11, 2001 operations in Afghanistan and Iraq coincided with the transformation of the Army to the Modular Force. Two areas are of especial relevance for this study, and merit deeper investigation. First, the expansion of the AC from 480,000 to a peak 569,000 constituted the major case study in bona-fide expansion of a regular army, though not all numbers reflected new troops. Second, both campaigns revealed challenges in "troop-to-task" responsibilities of the Army's higher headquarters.¹⁰ As war has grown more complex, the

⁷ See Tab 4: Korean War.

⁸ See Tab 5: Post- Korean War and Vietnam.

⁹ See Tab 6: Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

¹⁰ See Tab 7: Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn (OEF, OIF/OND).

Army's responsibilities have grown accordingly. Simple ends strength reductions do not account for ongoing headquarters coordination responsibilities.

Other Areas of Recommended Study

This analysis also highlights other, critical factors regarding expansibility, frequently subsumed due to narrow emphasis on units. These topics are not new, but merit recognition here, understanding that previous studies have dissected them, and ongoing analysis continues.

Personnel. Current discussion should focus broadly and deeply, but the concept of expansibility rests upon personnel expansion of the AC. The most obvious recourse is to recruit a larger active Army. The Army's most-recent example merits additional study. The transformation to the modular force ca. 2003 to 2011 replaced some thirty (30) Army of Excellence (AOE) brigade equivalents with forty-five (45) more-robust and hence far more capable modular BCTs. A comprehensive analysis of this experience would be beneficial. This recent experience obviously took place in the midst of waging two large-scale conflicts.

Sourcing senior and mid-grade leaders for new formations in general has been problematic. The Army historically has used the RA as cadre, most notably in WW II, but using cadre from one division to fill another created its own problems. Future Army expansion using cadre elements, with the already reduced end strength, may not be practical.¹¹ Multi-component manning is an option for individual RC personnel utilization, but there are difficulties discussed here as well.¹² First, recourse to Multi-Compo AC units must account for the differences in 21st-century peacetime, garrison operations compared to pre-2001, especially with the explosive growth in Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) activities. Second, exploration of other options to integrate individual RC personnel must take careful account that AC, USAR, and ARNG are subject to different legal authorities, personnel management, and financial systems. This reality yet challenges effective integration and synchronization, along with the topic of rapid deployability.

Another option, with frankly a poor historical track record, is the IRR, perhaps the greatest tool available for genuine expansibility. The Army has used the IRR since 1990. Its use, advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses are not well documented, but deserve further study. An in-depth study of IRR use since 1990 is warranted.¹³

Army EAB HQ. Army operational headquarters are a zealously-favored target during force reductions. The most recent cuts have been no different, i.e. the 25 percent reduction. Significantly, these 25 percent cuts are in truth far deeper, as they follow earlier reductions in authorized personnel. The Army needs to address fundamental aspects of the modular force transformation of corps and division HQ. Their large growth from AOE TO&Es allowed each

¹¹ For example, see US Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), "Reversibility and Expansibility Construct Approach: Discussion with HQDA, 2 April 2012" and subsequent work. This brief is FOUO.

¹² Ibid., and work on corps and division HQ. These sources are FOUO.

¹³ More recent studies exist in US Army War College student research projects (SRPs). See the listing at: <http://usahec.polarislibrary.com/polaris/search/searchresults.aspx?ctx=1.1033.0.0.1&type=Advanced&term=IRR&relation=ALL&by=KW&term2=student%20papers&relation2=ALL&by2=SE&bool1=AND&bool4=AND&limit=&sort=PD&page=0&searchid=1>

headquarters to assume much wider responsibilities over a much larger geographic area deployed theater in today's joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment. These responsibilities include mission command for up to six modular BCTs, rather than three AOE brigades, and the potential duties of a Joint Task Force Headquarters. Given personnel eliminations and/or grade-plate reductions, the Army must plan how it will posture these HQ for crisis response, OPLAN implementation, and steady-state engagement, such as potential mission-command responsibilities for RAF activities.

The current posture of the individually-tailored ASCCs is cause for further, and perhaps greater concern, the more so given the general lack of appreciation and ignorance among Services and the Joint Staff of the ASCC mission. The ASCC is the embodiment of the Army's commitment to the joint force, especially to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC). The ASCC as Theater Army has three (3) major roles with nine (9) key tasks.¹⁴ Most occur daily during steady-state operations. Implementation of a phased OPLAN or crisis-action scenario, would be in addition to ongoing actions throughout the entire Area of Responsibility (AOR). Current events highlight the sheer breadth and depth of steady-state activities and additional crisis actions.

In brief, the continued reduction of Army headquarters for short-term personnel savings provides fleeting results: the rapid cut in personnel numbers. The short-, mid-, and long-term efforts will most likely impact overall Army capability and credibility significantly. Expectations of "an agile, responsive tailorable force capable of responding to any mission, anywhere, anytime," as prescribed in the 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, are problematic.¹⁵ Mission command for the Army's current and projected worldwide commitments necessitates long-term, sustained investment in capable HQ. The historical analysis in this document highlights the effect of short-sighted personnel and budgeting policy decisions.

Army EAB Force Structure. Army leaders recognize that the Army must provide critical capabilities to the joint force, units collectively at echelon above brigade (EAB) which are the joint enablers for a theater.¹⁶ As of August 2014, the Army is responsible for 47 of 90 Component tasks as DoD Executive Agent (EA).¹⁷ The identification and echelonment of the right balance of combat forces, support forces, materiel, protection, and mission-command elements to conduct sustained operations effectively in and AOR or joint operations area (JOA) in accordance with the Combatant Commander's (CCDR's) vision and a Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) requirements will tax any ASCC. A CONUS-based force will challenge GCCs and ASCCs to a far greater extent, given the limited number of forward-deployed assets. Army units across the Army's warfighting functions (WfF) and the joint functions at EAB are far fewer, especially for force sustainment (FS). The Army has previously deactivated both capability and capacity during the decade ca. 1990-2000. Institution of the modular force cut

¹⁴ HQ, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (Washington, D.C.: US DA, April 17, 2014), 1-4 to 1-6. Pages 2-1 to 2-4 then outline fifteen (15) overall tasks.

¹⁵ HQ, Department of the Army, *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁷ See Tab 11: DoD Executive Agent Tasks, from Department of Defense Executive Agent website, available at: <http://dod-executiveagent.osd.mil/agentList.aspx>.

EAB capability and capacity further by embedding more active structure organically to the BCTs. The lack of capability and/or capacity in both the AC and RC could require fallback to contracting, which is potentially problematic in the future environment.

Future scenarios must confront adversarial recourse to anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies, most likely in austere environments with little infrastructure. Due to the drawdown of overseas bases, the ASCC will receive most forces from a CONUS-based force. This causes additional logistical implications for future deployments. Deploying forces must acclimate rapidly to a more austere environment, quite unlike most Soldiers' recent experience with established forward operating bases (FOBs), with considerable materiel to receive from a predecessor unit via relief in place/transition of authority (RIP/TOA). The 21st-century environment could provide a harsh case study for a "come-as-you-are" war.

The RC's major contribution to the Total Army after 2001, i.e. from strategic reserve to operational force, were formed units bringing capability and/or additional capacity, generally ARNG division HQs and BCTs and USAR EAB enablers in the form of C2 HQ and separate companies. A detailed assessment of RC unit effectiveness during this decade of augmentation is needed.¹⁸ Planners need to understand what specific constraints and restraints concern RC unit deployment, including which will be unavailable due to long-term commitment to defense of the homeland.

Infrastructure. Future plans for expansibility must account for associated planning requirements to implement expansibility, comparing and contrasting capability and capacity at present, proposed structure, and their growth to execute expansibility. These aspects are particularly crucial for the entire generating force, and the training base in particular. The divestiture of Army installation real estate and base closures have affected the Army's capacity to expand quickly or effectively. Future planning must address this infrastructure deficit, and potential funding for this support. Installation planning must also consider how military and civilian personnel cuts affect CONUS installations as genuine power-projection platforms, both for manning for the immediate requirement and the depth of knowledge required to support these operations.

Defense Industrial Base (DIB). A singular imponderable is the posture of the current defense industrial base (DIB), very different from its 20th-century predecessors. Latent American productive capacity could not supply the AEF in the Great War for the bulk of its heavy combat vehicles. Its accomplishments in World War II were outstanding. However, holistic analysis must account that the prodigious American effort was not enough in the short term. There was also a similarly-massive critical, complementary effort by Britain throughout the British Isles, Empire and Commonwealth.¹⁹ The greater takeaway is that, while the combination of the world's two greatest economic juggernauts was sufficient to wage a three-front war, it was insufficient to deter or defeat Japan, Germany and Italy in the short term. The Allies could not

¹⁸ See Also: Army Heritage and Education Center-Historical Services Directorate (AHEC-HSD), "The Question Not Asked: Comparisons of Active and Reserve Component Effectiveness" (Carlisle, PA: AHEC, June 2012).

¹⁹ Aside from the official histories, see David Edgerton, *Britain's War Machine: Weapons, Resources, and Experts in the Second World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

man, train, and equip sufficient combat power in time for a “short” war. The interwar period from 1919 to 1941 appears the most similar scenario to today, but is deceiving given the existence of considerable untapped capacity. The materiel shortcomings during the Korean War are also instructive, as that conflict was localized against a minor power. Detailed analysis of materiel shortages for OEF and/or OIF is required. However, there remain also questions as to the condition and posture of the DIB a half decade after the 2008 recession, response to a contracted Army and DoD, and prognosis within the specific nature of the economic recovery.

This study has analyzed Army expansibility through historical examples from 20th and 21st century conflicts. In general, the authors believe deeper analysis of the period 2001 to 2011 is warranted. Army expansion to the Modular Force while waging two conflicts with an intervening major economic recession will likely provide many more insights.

Tab 1: Army Expansion for World War I

World War I. American intervention in World War I in April 1917 generated a “cold start,” virtually from scratch. The Regular Army averaged ca. 75,000 in 1902-11, some 25 percent short of its authorized strength of 100,000, in 30 infantry and 15 cavalry regiments; there were no formed divisions. A now-federalized National Guard, the former Organized Militia, and a draftee National Army grew to a total force of 3,685,458 in 62 divisions, of which 43 were overseas.²⁰ Allied tensions for their immediate commitment became pressing. The Allied Supreme War Council’s planning assumption on January 30, 1918 was that American divisions needed nine months’ home training and six months in France.²¹

In the short term, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) G-3 had provided a conservative estimate on February 18, 1918 that fielding US infantry divisions, “*with proper proportion of army corps and army troops*” [emphasis added] would begin with one by April and increase to thirteen by December. The AEF as of December 4, 1918 numbered 1,932,154 troops, of which 681,515 formed 28 divisions, or 35.27 percent. It required further training in theater due to its rapid mobilization.²²

The need for competent senior officers became critical. Gen. John J. Pershing wrote to the War Department, encouraging the deployment of division commanders fit to endure the rigors of warfare on the Western Front. Pres. Woodrow Wilson authorized Pershing to relieve officers in theater, unless members of the Regular Army or under Regular Army temporary appointment. Pershing further requested consultation before implementing CONUS-based promotion approvals. The Army also quickly found itself short of trained and capable staff officers. Pershing’s AEF staff itself was small and ad hoc, with very modest additions. The need for staff officers became so great that the Army established a staff school at Langres, France.²³

The AEF depended upon its allies for the bulk of its combat equipment, but used American-produced tactical vehicles. The gradual production of American artillery and ammunition stocks provided materiel for only CONUS-based training.²⁴

²⁰ Maurice Matloff, *American Military History*, Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1956; reprinted., 1989), 351-52, 376.


²¹ US Army Center of Military History, *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919, Vol. 2: Policy-Forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces*, CMH Pub 23-7 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1948; reprint ed., 1989), 123-24, 132, 148-49, 165, 186. Training of the AEF has been the subject of analysis. One volume of the Army’s official history of World War I covers training overseas: US Army Center of Military History, *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919, Vol. 3: Training and Use of American Units with the British and French*, CMH Pub 23-8 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1948; reprint ed., 1989).

²² CMH, *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919, Vol. 2: Policy-Forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces*, 213, 649.

²³ *Ibid.*, 76-77, 79, 148.


²⁴ *Ibid.*, 95-96.

Figure 1 -- Post-WWI Division Inactivations



Source: John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Center of Military History.

Figure 2 -- Army Post WWI Strength/Drawdown



Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2*. Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce.

Tab 2: Interwar Army Preparation, 1919-1941

On January 10, 1920, six months after the Paris Peace Conference and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the German diplomat Harry Kessler remarked that “a terrible era begins for Europe, like the gathering of clouds before a storm, and it will end in an explosion probably still more terrible than that of the World War.” In the immediate wake of World War I, the American public perspective was to the contrary, the onset of formal peace being “a burst of sunshine.”²⁵

Whereas the public sentiment favored continued isolationism, the War Department had kept a close and continuous watch on potential threats since the turn of the century. There was definitive investment in intellectual capital. The War Department General Staff (WDGS) developed color-coded war plans during the 1930s to address specific countries or regions and the particular threats in each. These “Color” plans provided possible courses of action in case of war with any of a series of potential threats, including Mexico and Canada. Of these, war with Japan seemed the most dangerous, and War Plan “Orange” was reviewed and revised frequently during the 1920s and 1930s. The Army War College (AWC) had analyzed threats from Japan since its victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and grew concerned by Japan’s proximity to the recently-acquired Philippines. The AWC also monitored Germany in the case of a breach of the Monroe Doctrine.²⁶

Historian Henry Gole argued that the era’s army was a “third-rate outfit” of roughly 140,000 troops that former Chief of Staff Peyton March, speaking in 1932, declared “impotent.” The National Defense Act of 1920 had authorized an Army end strength of 280,000 enlisted men, which it did not reach during 1920s or early 1930s. Gen. Douglas MacArthur as Chief of Staff, Army from 1930-1935 was concerned that the Army lacked a force for prompt readiness for small emergencies. For instant readiness, MacArthur arranged an elaborate plan whereby each RA officer was designated to fill a specific slot upon mobilization. MacArthur also wanted to maintain several regular Army divisions at higher readiness and to strengthen several National Guard divisions. Unfortunately, this concept required an active force of at least 25,000 more soldiers than the Army had, numbers that neither the President nor Congress would support.²⁷

In 1939 the US Army was a force clad in World War I hand-me-downs that even Gen. George C. Marshall called “ineffective.” It lacked manpower, training facilities, bases, weapons, and ammunition, and suffered from public disinterest. Harry Hopkins, aide to Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, would later proclaim that America’s competence in World War II was a “miracle” considering the “shameful” neglect of its nation’s army.²⁸

²⁵ Henry G. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 3.


²⁶ *Ibid.*, xv-xviii.

²⁷ *Ibid.*; Russell Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 406-7.

²⁸ Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, xv.

Unfortunately, training was also inadequate. Units lacked tactical and technical expertise up to divisional level, including inadequate combined arms skills for integration and synchronization. The Army conducted large-scale, corps on corps, maneuvers in 1940, the first exercises of that scale. Furthermore, in general, equipping the force had not kept pace with technical development. The widespread, often-partisan military debate over the form of future warfare contributed to the turmoil.²⁹

Figure 3 - Regular Army Strength, 1920-1939



Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2. Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce.

²⁹ Ibid., 31, 33-34.

Tab 3: The Army in World War II

The Army in early 1939 consisted of fewer than 200,000 soldiers. Beginning with the mobilization in the summer of 1940, the Army grew to over 8,000,000 soldiers by August 1945. This 4,000 percent increase in manpower required a concomitant expansion of infrastructure and war production. The War Department focused on the division as the building block for the Army, and planning for manpower typically centered on building the right numbers of divisions. The “Victory Plan,” developed in the fall of 1941, originally called for a Troop Basis of 213 divisions, but competing pressures, and eventually battlefield success, led Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall to limit the number to 90 in 1943.³⁰

Figure 4 - Regular Army Divisional Strength as of Feb. 2, 1939

Division	Actual Strength	Peace Strength	War Strength	Peace Shortage	Units Short
1 st Inf.	8,800	14,000	20,000	5,200	1 Inf. Bn., 8 FA Btrs., 12 Spec. Co.
2 nd Inf.	10,000	14,000	20,000	4,000	6 FA Btrs, 13 Spec. Cos.
3rd Inf.	8,500	14,000	20,000	5,500	1 Inf. Bn., 8 FA Btrs., 14
4th Inf.	4,400	14,000	20,000	9,600	4 Inf. Bn., 5 FA Btrs., 20 Spec. Co.
5th Inf.	3,800	14,000	20,000	10,200	6 Inf. Bn., 16 FA Btrs., 25 Spec. Co.
6th Inf.	3,400	14,000	20,000	10,600	6 Inf. Bn., 16 FA Btrs., 26 Spec. Co.
7th Inf.	3,500	14,000	20,000	10,500	7 Inf. Bn., 15 FA Btrs., 25 Spec. Co.
8th Inf.	4,200	14,000	20,000	9,800	8 Inf. Bn., 15 FA Btrs., 17 Spec. Co.
9th Inf.	2,500	14,000	20,000	11,500	7 Inf. Bn., 16 FA Btrs., 23 Spec. Co.
TOTAL	49,100	126,000	180,000	76,900	

Source: Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212, *History of Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1955), 550, Table 57. The “Special Companies” consisted of the signal, tank, medical, ordnance, engineers, supply and other support companies of the division base.

Moreover, the existing Army structure did not allow for rapid expansion and mobilization. The “forces in being” on June 30, 1939 (end of the fiscal year at that time) consisted of nine active divisions still in the World War I era “square” configuration (two maneuver brigades with two infantry regiments each), but all understrength (See Fig. 4). When Marshall assumed the office of Chief of Staff, Army, on Sep. 1, 1939, he had immediately recommended to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the Regular Army end strength be increased to 280,000, and the National Guard to 475,000. The President balked at these figures but agreed to moderately higher strengths of 227,000 (17,000 additional troops) for the regular

³⁰ Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, United States in World War II series* (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 216; Maurice Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield repr. 1987 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1958), 373-74.

army and 235,000 (43,000 additional troops) for the National Guard. Roosevelt told Marshall that the public was not yet ready for such large increases, but told him to quietly plan for further increases as conditions allowed.³¹

The war in Europe threatened to involve the United States by 1940, and the War Department began planning for possible mobilization. Given the training time required for reserve formations, President Roosevelt mobilized the National Guard for training. The eighteen National Guard divisions ordered to active duty for one year beginning in September, 1940, also arrived with significant shortages (See Fig. 5). The War Department ordered those divisions to begin conversion to the new triangular configuration as well. All National Guard divisions had federalized by March 1941, but conversion of all the divisions consumed another year.³²

Figure 5 - National Guard Divisional Strengths as of Dates of Federalization

Division	Actual Strength	Peace Strength	War Strength	Peace Shortage	Units Short
26th Inf.	9,081	14,000	20,000	5,726	
27th Inf.	11,389	14,000	20,000	3,305	Tank Co.
28th Inf.	11,318	14,000	20,000	3,395	Service Bn, QM Co.
29th Inf.	9,865	14,000	20,000	5,065	
30th Inf.	9,918	14,000	20,000	4,767	Tank Co.
31st Inf.	12,484	14,000	20,000	2,355	
32nd Inf.	11,602	14,000	20,000	3,072	Tank Co.
33rd Inf.	11,716	14,000	20,000	3,095	
34th Inf.	12,279	14,000	20,000	2,507	
35th Inf.	12,059	14,000	20,000	2,719	Tank Co.
36th Inf.	12,362	14,000	20,000	2,371	
37th Inf.	9,632	14,000	20,000	5,019	Tank Co.. 2 Med Cos.
38th Inf.	9,054	14,000	20,000	5,699	
40th Inf.	10,873	14,000	20,000	3,912	
41st Inf.	12,372	14,000	20,000	2,335	
43rd Inf.	12,092	14,000	20,000	2,723	
44th Inf.	10,822	14,000	20,000	3,830	Tank Co.
45th Inf.	9,499	14,000	20,000	5,236	Tank Co.
TOTAL	198,417	252,000	360,000	67,131	

Source: Annual Report of the National Guard Bureau: 1941

³¹ Merton G. Henry and Marvin A. Kreidberg, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, DA Pam 20-212 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1955; paperback reprint as CMH Pub 104-10, 2006), 554-55.

³² Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 433.

The federalization of the National Guard coincided with the beginning of the nation's first peacetime draft, which allowed the Army to start filling the shortages in both the Regular Army and National Guard divisions. Marshall had begun eliminating overage officers, and that took out many key leaders. The Guard continued to experience losses as many men classified as critical to the war effort returned to their civilian jobs. Between June 1940 and June 1941, the National Guard lost over 91,000 enlisted soldiers, released from active duty for either family dependency or defense-related jobs.³³

The Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) in 1940 did not have the structure of today's USAR. Units existed only on paper, and the ORC was largely a pool of reserve officers subject to recall. Reserve officers received their unit assignments on Mobilization or "M" day. The incremental nature of the mobilization, however, disrupted this plan and thousands of reserve officers were ordered to active duty to supplement RA officers.³⁴

Other force structure changes affected the Army's ability to build units as well. While the divisions served as the Army's "building blocks" at War Department level, they competed for troops with the Army Air Corps and the service forces, each with large, legitimate, and growing requirements. The summer of 1940 brought additional end strength increases for the Army, but the President also ordered an increase in the Air Corps. The War Department deferred filling the last active infantry division to make those slots available for flying cadets and enlisted men.³⁵

As the mobilization continued, however, political pressure began to build on the War Department to release soldiers, especially the National Guard, from active duty. The war in Europe seemed to have hit a lull in fall and winter of 1940-41, and many legislators began to call for the Guard's release. Moreover, Roosevelt had won an unprecedented third term in office, against stiff isolationist opposition, based on the assurance that the United States would not enter the war. By the fall of 1941 the President had reversed his previous position and ordered General Marshall to begin reducing the Army. The War Department developed plans to inactivate units and reorganize them to meet the reductions; only the attack on Pearl Harbor prevented the plans from being executed.³⁶

With the active and reserve component force structure completely filled, the Army had 36 divisions on active duty at the end of 1941. The pre-war "Victory Plan" with its 213 divisions soon proved to be unworkable. With limited training space and the time required to train a division to full proficiency, plus additional manning challenges due to competition with defense industry and the Air Corps, the War Department scaled back the original estimates. The War Department activated only 38 divisions in 1942. These divisions were built from scratch, with no infrastructure to fill them.

In order to organize those divisions quickly as possible, the Army introduced the "cadre" concept. As each "new" division, 1942 and later, activated, it received "cadre" or officer and NCO leadership from an "old" or "parent" (pre-1941) division. The divisions activated on a

³³ Michael D. Doubler, *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, DA Pam 130-1 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 197-98.

³⁴ Henry and Kreidberg, *History of Mobilization*, 565-66.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 571.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 594-96.

sequential schedule, and the “parent” divisions provided cadre for divisions activating later. Each new division received 172 officers and 1,190 NCOs and soldiers prior to activation, and then received the balance of its “filler” soldiers directly from the reception centers, as the Replacement Training Centers were not yet fundamentally ready to function to train large numbers of soldiers for the divisions. As the 1942 divisions activated, they became “parents” to 1943 divisions as well. This wrought havoc with unit training plans, as “old” divisions struggled to fill their own vacancies, and then provide adequate cadre to a new unit. The War Department activated 38 divisions in 1942 and 16 more in 1943, bringing the total activated for the war to 90 (see Fig. 6).³⁷

Figure 6 - Divisions activated by year and component

Component	1917-1921	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	Total
RA	5	2	6	3	0	1	17
NG	0	0	10	8	0	0	18
OR	0	0	0	0	26	1	27
AUS	0	0	0	2	11	15	28
Total	5	2	16	13	38	16	90

Source: Adapted from Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 489-91.

The Army’s Planning Guidance 2012 forecasts a flexible force that will be able to support both deployment and training:

The Army possesses a lean Generating Force, but as Army force requirements change, uniformed members will return to that Generating Force. This creates an advantage for future expansibility, and an opportunity to leverage combat experience in training new Soldiers and educating leaders.³⁸

This concept contradicts the Army’s experience during World War II. There were significant challenges to training a division then, including the time required to do so. With no TRADOC as we know it today, each division trained its soldiers using a year-long training plan published by the War Department. Inductees needed first to be medically screened and tested for aptitude, which eliminated a percentage of soldiers. When the units were finally full (a couple of weeks to a couple of months after activation), the divisions began individual training, followed by small unit training, large unit training and finally combined arms training. The division tested

³⁷ Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 216; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 1947), 434-38 and Chart 1. The number of officers was later increased to 185 and finally 216, while the number of NCOs increased to 1,460. The 2nd Cavalry Division was inactivated before deployment, therefore 89 divisions are counted as the number raised in World War II.

³⁸ “2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” p.12.

at each phase before moving to the next. The divisions lost personnel through the training process, and to fill levies for cadre for other divisions in addition to Air Corps and OCS.³⁹

Of the 89 divisions deployed overseas during World War II, 63 were regular infantry divisions. Fifty-five of these divisions experienced significant training disruption for 30 days or more due to personnel turbulence, and two others lost up to 60 days for other circumstances. On average, those 55 divisions lost 7 months of training due to personnel turnover, with a high of 20 or more months for two of the divisions. Fifteen out of the fifty-five divisions (27 percent), lost twelve months or more. The divisions averaged 4 months lost for Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), 5.8 months for Officer Candidate School (OCS), 7 months for personnel losses between 20 percent and 50 percent, and 1.6 months for personnel losses over 50 percent.⁴⁰ The 89th Infantry Division provided one of the more extreme examples. It activated in July 1942, but did not deploy until January 1945 due to personnel losses throughout 1944.⁴¹

During World War II, the War Department used the Army General Classification Test (AGCT), comparable to today's Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), as a tool for determining soldier fitness and trainability. The test results placed soldiers in one of five categories, with officers and some NCOs to come from Category I, NCOs from Categories II and III, and the remainder of the soldiers in Categories IV and V. The Army, then as now, sought to limit the number of soldiers in the lowest category. In the early part of 1942 as the draft began and post-Pearl Harbor enlistments grew, the Army received 6.9 percent of its inductees in Category I, 26.8 percent in Category II, 31.1 percent in Category III, and the remaining 35.2 percent in Categories IV and V. After March 1942, however, the percentages in the higher categories dropped while those in the lower categories increased, a pattern maintained through the rest of the war. The aptitude testing revealed educational deficiencies that sometimes could not be corrected and soldiers washed out of training at various stages. Injuries and illness sidelined many as well. All of these disruptions and constant personnel turbulence affected the units' ability to train.⁴²

The high percentages of men with low test scores or inadequate education, combined with the levies of the higher-scoring soldiers for the Air Corps and other programs, plus the requirement to provide large numbers of experienced cadre to new divisions, made each division's training challenges all the more difficult. Though the World War II divisions took a year to mobilize and train, it was not a technologically advanced fighting force as we have today. Some divisions had special skills and equipment, such as the airborne and armored divisions, but the infantry divisions were essentially all the same. Using the military's standardized testing, it is easy to compare the World War II draftee with today's volunteer Soldier (See Fig. 7).

³⁹ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 435, 442-48.

⁴⁰ John Sloan Brown, *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), App. 1.

⁴¹ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 433-35, 489-93.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 15-20. The Army was segregated during World War II, so these numbers reflect only white soldiers. The numbers for black soldiers were considerably worse.

Figure 7 - AGCT Scores comparing Army averages for World War II and today

Category	WWII Army Average	Today's Soldier
I	7 percent	7.7 percent
II	24 percent	41.6 percent
III	38 percent	50.6 percent
IV	24 percent	0.14 percent
V	7 percent	0.0 percent

Source: Adapted from Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*. US Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1966); Fred Kaplan, "The False Promises of a Draft: Why Conscription Won't Improve the Military," *Slate*, June 23, 2004. Accessed Feb. 6, 2013 at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2004/06/the_false_promises_of_a_draft.single.html

In contrast, the end of the draft has left a much more capable force. Political scientist and journalist Fred Kaplan argues that "the aptitude of US military personnel now exceeds that of American civilians."⁴³

The nation's industrial plant in 1939 was hardly the giant war machine required to wage war. After World War I, most of the Army's facilities disappeared as it tore down buildings on leased property and returned the land to the owners. War mobilization plans developed during the 1920s and 1930s did not envision requirements for new construction. The War Department depended upon civilian industry to re-tool their plants for war production, but most were unable to do so without government funding. Some facilities, such as critical weapons plants, needed to be owned and operated by the War Department. This left the nation woefully unprepared when it needed to mobilize again. For instance, the Army did not own enough semiautomatic rifles to equip the entire Army before mobilization and existing armories could only produce 200 weapons per day. There was no capacity to produce tanks, large guns and other newer materials at all.⁴⁴

⁴³ Fred Kaplan, "The False Promises of a Draft: Why Conscription Won't Improve the Military," *Slate*, June 23, 2004. Accessed Feb. 6, 2013 at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2004/06/the_false_promises_of_a_draft.single.html.

⁴⁴ John B. Wilson, "Facilities for Mobilization in the Twentieth Century," *Historical Survey of Mobilization: Eight Topical Studies of the Twentieth Century*, ed. David F. Trask (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1983), 10-11; R. Elberton Smith, *The War Department: The Army and Economic Mobilization* (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1959), 438, 458, 497.

Tab 4: Post-World War II

Post-WWII Demobilization, 1946-49.

After the end of World War II, the War Department faced tremendous political and public pressure to “bring the boys home.” The American public did not see the utility of a large standing army, yearned for the troops to be demobilized. Among those who had served and remained overseas, “hysteria” took over, and they called for expedited demobilization. Civilian industry, re-tooling to meet new peacetime requirements for consumer goods, clamored for access to this large potential workforce. Moreover, President Truman and a parsimonious government looked to slash budgets as a cost-saving measure. This pressure forced the Army to shrink quickly and drastically, as it had done after the First World War (See Fig. 8). Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall later remarked that, “It was not a demobilization, it was a rout.”

With the bulk of the Army deployed overseas, the availability of transportation became the primary demobilization driver, rather than considerations of the future force and its missions. By June 1, 1946, the military juggernaut that had fought to victory in three theaters had been reduced to only 17 divisions on active duty. Of these, four remained in Germany (one reorganized as a constabulary division), four in Japan, two in Korea, and one each in Austria, Italy, and the Philippines. The remaining four divisions had returned to the United States. Congress authorized permanent end strength of 600,000 in 1947, but postwar turbulence and the Berlin Crisis drove temporary end strength increases to 850,000 the following year. By the end of 1948, the emergency had largely passed and President Truman again cut the Army end strength to 677,000, a large number but a fraction of its peak wartime strength.⁴⁵

On September 3, 1946 the 79th Congress released a document entitled *Investigation of the National Defense Program: Additional Report*. It recalled the complacency of various branches of government, as well as the military, in regard to national defense in the twenty years preceding WWII: “the support of our national defense [was] reduced to a dangerous minimum . . . This Nation should not again make the same costly error.”⁴⁶ In June 1947, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces Technical Liaison Staff buttressed this statement, remarking that:

Limited mobilization of resources, a commitment of only the surplus manpower and productive capacity, the imposition of military on top of civilian requirements without serious disturbance of the latter are simply invitations to disaster.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready? The Eighth US Army on the Eve of the Korean War*, Williams-Ford Military History Series No. 129 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 23; John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series, CMH Pub 60-14 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1997; paperback reprint, CMH Pub 60-14-1, 1998), Table 17, 209-10; Garry L. Thompson, “Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War II, Vietnam and a Comparison to Recent Army Downsizing,” MMAS Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), 28.

⁴⁶ Henry and Kreidberg, *History of Military Mobilization*, 541.

⁴⁷ Louis Hunter, *Problems of Industrial Mobilization* (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Technical Liaison Staff, 1947), 13.

After V-J Day on September 2, 1945, the US Army began to atrophy due to internal and external elements. Public protests demanded the return of soldiers still abroad, calling for expedited demobilization. The US Army lacked sufficient manpower throughout the post-WWII period. The rush to demobilize after World War II had denuded the Army of critical capabilities. By 1950 only ten divisions remained, and of them only the 82nd Airborne Division had a full MTOE complement. In June of that year, the US Army stood at 591,487 soldiers, lacking 40,000 of the 630,201 authorized total. The Selective Service Act of June 1948 had raised the ceiling from 542,000, but budgeting issues still crippled the armed forces. General of the Army Omar Bradley claimed that his failure to argue more forcefully for a greater defense budget in 1948 and 1949 “was a mistake . . . perhaps the greatest mistake I made in my postwar years in Washington.”⁴⁸

The immensely over-expanded industry struggled to remain afloat given peacetime demands. In addition to excess capacity, the industries faced unforeseen competition when the Army had, in the years following WWII, sold machine tools obtained from the War Assets Corporation for cut-rate prices, effectively enabling certain businesses to survive while causing others to fail that had been successful during the war. Furthermore, other booming industries such as the automobile lured in the most highly-qualified craftsmen and engineers. The US maintained most of its industrial facilities after World War II, to avoid the problems encountered during the mobilization. Whereas “the objective in a war economy is the full and efficient use of all of the nation’s resources,” a feat requiring “careful planning and close coordination,” the Army was unable to secure proper funding, hamstringing their capacity and competence in the Korean War.⁴⁹

President Harry S. Truman had tried to focus his post-World War II government on fiscal constraint, with a distrust bordering on disdain for the military. Determined to balance the budget, Truman slashed Pentagon budgets in the wake of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1949, which unified the services and created the Department of Defense. Historian Paul G. Pierpaoli argued,

The issue revolved around the capacity and willingness of the United States to match its military capabilities with its new-found superpower status. The overriding concern here was how much the nation could afford to spend on defense without increasing budget deficits, piling up debt, driving up taxes, bankrupting the treasury, slashing social welfare programs, and imposing regiment[ed] government controls.⁵⁰

Truman was also concerned about the amount of influence military leaders wielded, and he saw mobilization and defense planning as ways to increase that influence. He saw National Security Council Report -68 (NSC-68), which drove the US policy of containment against global


⁴⁸ Hanson, *Combat Ready?*, 21; Wilson, “Facilities for Mobilization in the Twentieth Century,” 7, 13, 23.

⁴⁹ Maj. Gen. William R. Reeder, “Korean Ammunition Shortage,” Office of the Center of Military History (OCMH) files, 11; Wilson, “Facilities for Mobilization in the Twentieth Century,” 21-22; Louis Hunter, *Problems of Industrial Mobilization*, 13.

⁵⁰ Paul G. Pierpaoli, “The Price of Peace: The Korean War Mobilization and Cold War Rearmament 1950-1953” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1995), 3, 27.

communism, as an unnecessary strategy requiring large defense budgets, in a time when the country was attempting to recover from a postwar recession. This disagreement among government officials led to a degree of strategic drift, as the civilian leadership failed to identify and prioritize potential threats, and failed to fund military training appropriately.⁵¹

Figure 8 - Demobilization After World War II



⁵¹ Ibid., 3.

Tab 5: Korean War

The Army's end strength, balanced against its worldwide commitments, was the key issue facing the service in 1950. The American response to the North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950 resembled previous experience at the start of a war, i.e. unpreparedness and initial defeat. However, the crux was not the famous Task Force Smith, which fought credibly against great odds. North Korea, a fourth-tier opponent, had exposed a hollow Army far worse than at the start of World War II. The force reductions had continued, with only 10 divisions remaining on active duty. According to historian Russell Weigley, Americans assumed "that infantry warfare was a thing of the past." The four divisions on occupation duty in Japan had been scattered on constabulary missions and reduced in strength. Only the 1st Infantry Division in Germany was near authorized strength; economies had reduced the other divisions so that infantry regiments contained only two battalions and artillery battalions only two batteries, most understrength. The National Guard, by contrast, possessed some 29 divisions and 325,000 personnel; divisions had 100 percent of officers and 80 percent of enlisted men. The Organized Reserve had 185,000 personnel in 25 divisions in three tiers of readiness, including 9 at full strength and 9 at cadre strength; the latter would not be ready until late spring 1951. The difficulties in mobilizing and training these reserve formations remained, however.⁵²

Korean War.

With US foreign policy on Korea wavering, DoD had begun to draw down forces on the peninsula in 1948. President Truman put the matter to rest in April 1948, approving the policy document that defined US intents on the peninsula:

The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a "casus belli" for the United States.⁵³

The Pentagon accordingly shifted its attention to Europe. Defending Japan was the only priority in the Pacific, so forces elsewhere in the region were allowed to wither even further. At the time of the policy change, the Far Eastern Command's US Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK) had on hand only 45,651 men (of whom only 26,494 were combat troops) of the 87,215 authorized, spread over five divisions. Of these, the 25th Infantry Division had two regiments with fewer than 250 men each.⁵⁴ The Army very nearly inactivated one of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's divisions

⁵² Weigley, *History of the US Army*, 506-9; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 239-47.

⁵³ Quoted in James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), 50.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

in late 1949 due to ongoing budget problems, but decided to keep it after MacArthur strenuously objected. The personnel problem continued to worsen, so by June 1950, the Far East Command (FEC) had dwindled to 108,500 troops.⁵⁵

Of the recruits who did join the Army in the years prior to the Korean War, many were unprepared for the stresses of military life abroad. An Eighth Army second lieutenant described his trainees as “almost right off the streets... three to four weeks away from home, no training.” In response to this problem, the Eighth Army established a training center in Atsugi, Japan in 1947. The need for auxiliary training centers can be attributed to the shortening of basic training to as few as eight weeks in January 1946 from thirteen weeks at the end of WWII. The Army shortened the training “in an attempt to meet the ravenous appetite for replacements in the occupied areas,” as soldiers with combat experience sought a way home while those stationed in the Far East and Japan saw themselves as glorified tax-collectors. This paradigm changed, however, on April 15, 1949, when General Douglas MacArthur reoriented the philosophy of the military presence in Japan from “stern rigidity” to “friendly protective guidance” to promote economic cooperation and political accord. Nonetheless, basic private salary was more than sufficient for “poorly educated, partially trained unintelligent youngsters of 18 and 19” in an economically crippled Japan, as immaturity and irresponsibility gripped those of lower rank while those of higher “had little desire to do more than serve out their time while waiting for separation, retirement, or acceptance as a Regular Army Officer.”⁵⁶

In 1949, Lt. Gen. Walton Walker took command of Eighth Army and tried to return it to combat readiness. He produced Eighth Army’s Training Directive Number Four, which focused attention on this crossover from postwar inertia to activity. The guidance stipulated that training “must stress that *every soldier*, regardless of assignment, has as his primary duty the obligation to fight or support the fight.” Brig. General W. W. Dick, the acting commander of the 25th Division Artillery, noted that “rather than soft, we were weak -- peacetime weak.”⁵⁷

When the North Korean attack came on June 25, 1950, the Army’s end strength stood at 593,167, a little over 37,000 soldiers short of its authorized strength of 630,000. Having ended the Korean occupation and largely withdrawn to Japan in 1949, the Army found itself with only 485 soldiers in Korea, assigned to the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). The bulk of the 108,786 soldiers stationed in the Far East were assigned to four under strength divisions in Japan. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions were scattered throughout the Japanese home islands on occupation duty. Eleven of the twelve divisional infantry regiments lacked one battalion; the segregated 24th Infantry Regiment retained all its battalions but none at full strength. Each of the twelve artillery battalions (105 mm) lacked one firing battery, and none of the regiments had their tank companies. The divisional tank and anti-aircraft battalions had been reduced to one company/battery of each, with the tank company fielding the M24 light tank instead of the M26 medium tank used in the rest of the Army. The divisions lacked any sort of division troops, such as reconnaissance, military police, replacement,

⁵⁵ Ibid., 53.

⁵⁶ Hanson, *Combat Ready?*, 15-25. 25. Ibid., 15-21.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 18.

medical companies and band. General Walker's training plan had been implemented, but the units had not yet reached a level of combat proficiency.⁵⁸

The Army's General Reserve, the active Army not deployed in Europe or Asia, stood at 140,000 when the war began. As the Army began rushing to fill MacArthur's requirements, the strength dropped rapidly; the General Reserve had been reduced 90,000 only one month after the invasion. Senior military leaders were also concerned with the steady drain of troops from the General Reserve. Pres. Harry Truman authorized an increase of 50,000 on July 6 to 680,000, and another 60,500 a few days later to 740,500. A third increase by July 19 of 93,500 brought authorized Army end strength to 834,000. These numbers constituted a total troop strength raise of 203,000, over 32 percent, in two weeks.⁵⁹

President Truman authorized increases to the end strength in July to bring the Army up to 834,000, but lacked enough volunteers to fill all the slots. The Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 allowed the Army to begin involuntarily recalling Inactive and Volunteer Reservists, those who were not assigned to drilling units. Individual call-ups quickly became problematic as the Army had no real idea how many of its over 416,000 individual reservists were physically qualified for duty, since periodic physicals had been suspended in 1947 due to budget cuts. Few records existed for Reserve officers, and none for enlisted men. The Army involuntarily recalled nearly 20,000 officers and 109,000 enlisted soldiers in the first four months of the emergency, which also caused friction in the press and the populace.⁶⁰

Army Chief of Staff Gen. J. Lawton "Joe" Collins was reluctant to call up National Guard divisions until he had exhausted all other options. He was concerned about the economic and morale impact on the home areas of the selected divisions. He also contended that getting the units ready for combat would take awhile. Nevertheless, by August the need became clear and Truman authorized the call-up of four National Guard divisions: 30th, 40th, 43rd, and 45th, plus the 196th and 278th Regimental Combat Teams. They were to be filled with draftees to war strength by Nov. 1, 1950, and be ready for employment by April 1, 1951.⁶¹

The issue of underage soldiers quickly complicated the National Guard call up. Army regulations prohibited anyone younger than age 17 in federal service, but the Guard had addressed postwar recruiting problems by recruiting 16 year olds. The 45th Infantry Division therefore discharged 23 percent of its enlisted strength in underage recruits and those under 18 who had not graduated high school. The 40th Infantry Division lost nearly 13 percent of its enlisted strength in the same way. Physical exam failures lost the divisions, on average, another 6 percent of their strength.⁶²

After President Truman ordered partial mobilization to meet the crisis in Korea, the Army began to expand or rehabilitate ten former or National Guard posts, at a cost of nearly \$500 million. In order to create more housing, the Army reduced the amount of space allocated to each soldier to 60 square feet. Besides personnel, most of the units had critical shortages of

⁵⁸ Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 239; Hanson, *Combat Ready*, 18-22.

⁵⁹ Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 118-119.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 120-122.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁶² William M. Donnelly, *Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard During the Korean War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 34.

equipment including radios, vehicles, and gun tubes. The units did not receive complete fill in time for training, and most units did not reach their full MTOE until they reached the port. Most therefore arrived in Korea very poorly prepared.⁶³ Historian William M. Donnelly noted:

Of all the Guard artillery units mobilized, eleven would serve in Korea: five self-propelled 105mm howitzer battalions, two self-propelled 155mm gun battalions, three towed 155mm howitzer battalions, and one observation battalion. These field artillery units varied in proficiency and degree of readiness upon mobilization, but all shared the characteristics of the Army Guard in 1950: shortages of equipment; personnel turbulence among junior enlisted men; and a small core of technically qualified personnel supporting a larger number of personnel with little experience or Army service school training in their specialties.⁶⁴

The artillery provides one crucial example of the problems the post-World War II Army faced in gearing up rapidly for war. The inactivation of the corps headquarters and associated units in Korea in 1948 and 1949 had stripped EUSAK of all non-divisional artillery units. This supporting artillery was critical to the Army's doctrine, made more so by heavy artillery losses early in the war and the relatively weak infantry forces available. Republic of Korea (ROK) divisions also had very little artillery, so the EUSAK needed to support the ROK units as well. MacArthur requested 25 Field Artillery battalions for EUSAK in July, 1950. The General Reserve had only seven such battalions available, but sent four of these, plus some lighter weapons, to Korea immediately. In order to get these units up to war strength, however, the Army had to strip most of the other artillery units in the General Reserve.⁶⁵

Part of the reluctance to mobilize Guard units came from the fear of stripping the General Reserve of capabilities in case Korea turned into World War III. In addition to the divisions, the Army mobilized many non-divisional units, including artillery, AAA, and support units, to replace the Echelons Above Division (EAD) infrastructure that had been cut out of EUSAK. During the conflict, the Army called up a total of six divisions, and ninety-eight battalions of various types, in addition to numerous other smaller units and headquarters. Most went to General Reserve (See Fig. 9).⁶⁶

Figure 9 - National Guard units activated during Korean War

Units	Far East	Europe	General Reserve	Total
Divisions	2	2	2	6
FA Battalions	10	4	12	26

⁶³ Ibid., 124.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 121-122.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 72-76.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 23, Appendix A.

FA Observation				
Battalions	0	0	4	4
MP Battalions	0	1	4	5
Engineer				
Battalions	6	2	8	16
Tank Battalions	0	2	2	4
AAA Gun				
Battalions	3	0	40	43

Source: Adapted from William M. Donnelly, *Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard During the Korean War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), Appendix A.

As units received notification for deployment, they began requesting fill of their shortages. Since these were urgent requirements, the Army filled the openings based on rank without regard to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). William Donnelly cites the case of the 300th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, a National Guard unit alerted for Korea. The unit arrived at Fort Lewis in September 1950, received its required fillers, and began training. The post Adjutant General, however, began stripping the 300th to fill shortages in other units deploying earlier, including non-artillery units. The battalion lost 40 percent of its enlisted strength before the post staff began replacing them with anyone available on post. These soldiers, stripped from other units at Fort Lewis, included musicians, firefighters, and soldiers straight from basic training. Despite this glaring MOS-mismatch, and over the battalion commander's objections, the battalion deployed as scheduled. By June 1953, the Army end strength had grown to 822,362, a nearly 39 percent increase in three years. The number in Korea had grown to 246,583, nearly equal to that in all of Europe and the North Atlantic.⁶⁷

The lack of readiness of understrength, over-tasked AC units became clear with the planned deployment of the 3rd Infantry Division in September 1950. The division retained only half its authorized troops. The only alternative was the 82nd Airborne Division at 85 percent strength. In order to reach combat strength, the division cannibalized one of its infantry regiments to fill the other two. The 65th Infantry Regiment from Puerto Rico joined the 3rd Infantry Division as its third regiment after arrival in Korea.⁶⁸ To operate training centers, the Army activated six more Regular divisions in 1950, including one to replace a division deploying to Europe. Four more National Guard divisions were federalized in late 1950 after Chinese entrance into the war in October, but they served primarily as replacement and training units. One more Regular division was activated in 1951, the 1st Armored, but it went to Germany. Ultimately, ten Regular training divisions were also used. Eight Army divisions went to the Far East, Japan and Korea, including the National Guard's 40th and 45th. The two ARNG divisions deployed to Japan in April 1951, after some seven months CONUS training, and committed to Korea only after additional training in late 1951. In addition to Korea, the nation committed ground forces to NATO. The Army deployed four divisions to Germany from May to

⁶⁷ Ibid., 53-54; "Deployment of Military Personnel by Country;" June 30, 1950; June 30, 1953; Personnel and Procurement Reports and Data Files, Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD), US Department of Defense, www.siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil, accessed Feb. 5, 2013.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 131-33.

November 1951 to augment 1st Infantry Division and the Military Constabulary: the 4th ID, 2nd AD, and the National Guard's 28th and 43d. The USAR contributed over 244,000 personnel, but no divisions.⁶⁹

The readiness of operational Army HQ was an issue to rival that of trained combat troops. The Army had to institute major ad-hoc actions in response to the strident calls from MacArthur as theater commander to overcome deep-seated unpreparedness to deploy two corps HQ and enablers for the initial intervention in Korea in 1950. In three years the Army had to add one Theater Army, one Field Army, and seven Corps HQ. The Army had the Continental US Armies (CONUSAs) to provide mission command for expansion in CONUS.⁷⁰

The outbreak of the Korean War underlined severe shortages in materiel, besides readiness. The most-cited was the lack of an effective counter to North Korean T-34/85s and the inadequacy of American light tanks; the M-4 Sherman series, even the M-4A3E8 76mm; and the 2.36" bazooka. The delayed solutions were 90mm-equipped Pershing series and the 3.5" bazooka. Once the war had begun, industrial responsiveness at all levels became a problem. As during World War II, the lead-time between negotiation, manufacture, and delivery of basic equipment was approximately eighteen months -- and longer for advanced items, such as tanks. Despite production line efficiency, the quality and safety of all equipment was of utmost concern, lengthening production time of even the most seemingly basic "precision instruments" of war.⁷¹

Artillery ammunition constituted the most serious shortage during the war. Commanders noted the shortages by October 1951, and theater stocks were not adequate until early 1953. Theater concerns with artillery ammunition stockage levels originated in August-September 1951 during operations against Bloody Ridge, then Heartbreak Ridge. First, objectives took longer to subdue. Second, seemingly-lavish artillery expenditure saved lives. Third, smaller guns, especially 105mm, had to substitute for the lack of heavy artillery with concrete-penetrating rounds in bunker busting. Fourth, the far smaller allocation of guns in Korea than WW II necessitated many more fire missions. The ammunition projections were based on the presence of the much-higher scale of artillery, which calculated to fewer rounds per gun. The US also provided the bulk of the artillery for UN forces, the South Koreans having none.⁷²

The shell shortage rested upon several factors:

- World War II stockpiles were plentiful in the aggregate, but unbalanced in specific quantities by type.
- Hasty demobilization released qualified Ordnance Department personnel, civilian and military, which prevented proper oversight over peacetime training expenditures and quality inspection in long-term storage.

⁶⁹ Weigley, *History of the US Army*, 508-9; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 239-47.

⁷⁰ Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 134-36.

⁷¹ Maj. Gen. William R. Reeder, "Korean Ammunition Shortage," Office of the Center of Military History (OCMH) files, II-4.

⁷² D. M. Giangreco, *Artillery in Korea: Massing Fires and Reinventing the Wheel*, Korean War Anthology Series (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, n.d.), 13, 14-15 & 20-21 endnotes passim.

- The cost of ammunition and the belief in a short war encouraged a reliance on existing stocks. American industry in turn was focused on supplying pent-up domestic demand, not expanding munitions production.
- Congress approved the first, large appropriation for ammunition in January 1951, which translated to ammunition stocks in theater by late 1952 or early 1953. Billions of dollars in obligated contracts still required six months or longer to see rounds in theater.
- The development of static warfare in Korea accelerated the demand for artillery munitions.⁷³

The “estimating requirement,” or prediction of necessary resources, was also an imprecise science that contributed to the problem. Brig. Gen. Everett Hughes, Chief of Ordnance, challenged the accepted method of calculation, based on the WWII concept of “day of supply.” It calculated requirements based on the soldier or unit’s average daily use. General Hughes claimed that the calculations for an all-out war exceeded the United States’ production capacity. Furthermore, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (G4) Maj. Gen. William R. Reeder noted, the Army Field Force “day of supply” concept was inapplicable due to the ranging nature of war; soldiers could go weeks without firing their weapon or engage in elongated firefights that required multiple days’ worth of ammunition. Reeder personally deliberated with the Army Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Wade Haislip, explaining that the Dept. of Defense had interpreted the “critical” needs of soldiers’ differently than the Army itself. The Dept. of Defense leadership believed that the large stocks of ammunition already on hand, albeit disproportionate, made further procurement “unjustifiable.”⁷⁴

This annual ammunition procurement amounted to an average of less than \$30,000,000. In a postwar case study titled, *The Korean Ammunition Shortage*, developed for use in the Army’s Comptrollership Program at Syracuse University, then-retired General Reeder judged ammunition manufacturing in years following WWII as being “virtually shut down,” comparing it with the residual post-war ammunition value of approximately \$8,000,000,000 and noting the 1953 ammunition program amounting to just \$8,000,000. As late as 1949, General Hughes proposed a budget of \$1,200,000,000 for the manufacture of ammunition. Reeder argued, “The Army calculated the reserve required and it endeavored to set aside its assets against the need of the war reserve – with one exception, ammunition.” By the outbreak of the Korean War, he continues, “The wartime ammunition industry had been demobilized and disbanded and was non-existent.”⁷⁵

Historian Maurice Matloff, general editor of the Army’s official history series on the Korean War gave perhaps the best epitaph of the Army’s experience in that “come-as-you-are” war, and a succinct description of the secondary effects such a mobilization caused: “The action

⁷³ Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, US Army in the Korean War Series, Stetson Conn, gen. ed., CMH Pub 20-3 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1966; paperback reprint, CMH Pub 20-3-1, 1992), 224-29.

⁷⁴ Reeder, “Korean Ammunition Shortage,” II-4.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-7.

in Korea fell far short of global war, but proved big enough to involve the greater portion of the nation's active ground forces by the end of the first month of fighting.”⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 119.

Tab 6: Vietnam War

The Vietnam War. The Armistice ended open warfare on the Korean Peninsula, but Army presence remained. The permanent basing of troops in Europe for NATO became the Army's main effort. US military leaders eyed the French military activities in Indo-China (Vietnam), but Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower vetoed any US military action there, stating on February 10, 1954: "No one could be more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States in a hot war in that region than I am." Then-Senate Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) supported Eisenhower in his opposition to air strikes and thereafter ground forces. The Army nonetheless began developing contingency plans in response to a Communist threat as early as 1954. President John F. Kennedy ordered military troops in small numbers to advise the Army of South Vietnam under the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV).⁷⁷

The US-sanctioned coup of Pres. Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963 did not bring greater stability to South Vietnam in 1964. Escalation grew with the famous Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. Estimates of Viet Cong (VC) strength grew significantly from 23,000 to 33,000 between January and December 1964, and the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) commenced attacks around the country.⁷⁸

A small battle in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965 proved to be the turning point for America's growing involvement in the Vietnam war. This large-scale conflict, the first in which US regular troops faced North Vietnamese regulars, convinced President Johnson to deploy troops in greater numbers.

Despite a robust National Guard force structure of 23 divisions and 7 separate brigades, with an additional 6 divisions and 4 separate brigades in the Army Reserve, President Johnson decided, primarily for domestic political reasons, not to mobilize the reserve components. Instead, the Regular Army end strength grew from 969,000 to 1,570,000, primarily with draftees and regular Army cadre. The escalating situation in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968 drove additional force structure changes which the increased end strength had enabled. From 16 divisions and 6 separate brigades in 1965, the Army grew to 19 divisions and 8 separate brigades by 1968.

These increases necessitated yet more structure, doubling the training base to receive and train the simultaneously activating units. Despite the increased end strength, the Army's methods of fielding units and replacements nearly "broke" the Army. The one-year, individual replacement system turned units not in Vietnam into mere replacement depots for US Army, Vietnam (USARV). While some units, such as the 6th and 9th Infantry Divisions and the 11th and 196th Infantry Brigades, activated and were filled from scratch using draftees and volunteers, others used the "cadre" concept previously utilized during World War II. The 198th Infantry Brigade activated at Ft Hood, TX using cadre from the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions there, and the 199th Infantry Brigade activated at Ft Benning, GA with cadre from US Army Europe (USAREUR). Due to an urgent request from USARV, it deployed less than six months after its activation. The stripping of the other units for cadre further weakened units already

⁷⁷ Ezra Siff, *Why The Senate Slept: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America's Vietnam War* (New York: Praeger, 1999), 8; John M. Carland, *Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966*, The United States Army in Vietnam Series, CMH Pub 91-5-1 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 2000), 8-9.

⁷⁸ Carland, *Stemming the Tide*, 11-13.

plagued by constant levies for individual replacements. These newly-forming units also employed a "train and retain" program, similar to that used in World War II, conducting Basic and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) in the unit to lessen the impact of limited mobilization on the training base.⁷⁹

One example of expansion remains controversial. The Americal, or 23rd Infantry Division, was formed in Vietnam in September 1967 from three expansion separate brigades. How much its ad-hoc origins with lack of lineage impacted its effectiveness generates much debate. Regardless, its combat record in theater was arguably the worst. For example, it was the subject of formal investigations following after some disastrous firefights, e.g. Co A, 3d Bn, 21st Infantry in August 1969 and the attack on Fire Support Base Mary Ann in March 1971, as well as the My Lai massacre in March 1968. The fire base incident resulted in the removal of the division commander.⁸⁰

After the Tet Offensive and the Pueblo incident in early 1968, President Johnson approved mobilizing two ARNG brigades, the 29th and 69th, but they never deployed as units.⁸¹

⁷⁹Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 323-330.

⁸⁰William M. Hammond, *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973*, The U.S. Army in Vietnam Series, CMH Pub 91-2-1 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1996), 193-96, 220-30, 505-9.

⁸¹Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 330-333.

Tab 7: Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm

The Iraqi seizure of Kuwait was a strategic surprise, heightened by the alleged dismissal of US concerns over Kuwait communicated to Saddam Hussein by the US Ambassador to Iraq.⁸² While CENTCOM and components had focused on a Cold War-related Russian move into Iran, they had also developed a contingency plan in which Iraq was a regional threat. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and Pres. George H. W. Bush ordered deployments to commence to defend Saudi Arabia five days later. The Army had begun drawing down in the years after the Cold War, reducing from 770,000 in FY1989 to 751,000 in FY1990 and further to 735,000 in FY1991. The Iraqi seizure of Kuwait raised concerns that the Army was too small to face the Iraqis in a protracted war. The Army suspended the drawdown temporarily and took the following actions:⁸³

- Halted scheduled deactivations of several existing divisions and brigades.
- Mobilized three (3) ARNG enhanced separate brigades (eSB) and began their 90-day, post-mobilization training.
- Mobilized 126,037 Selected Reserve, both complete units and individuals.
- Mobilized 13,170 Individual Ready Reserve (IRRs).

The Persian Gulf War marked the first involuntary call to active duty of both IRR members and Selected Reserve, individuals and units, since the adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973. The Army had not used the IRR since May 1968. Their training took place at Fort Knox under the 100th Division (Training). There were additional individuals in the Selected Reserve.⁸⁴

There has been limited research to date concerning the use of IRR soldiers in particular. The Army Research Institute produced a study in March 1992 titled, *The Mobilization of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Infantrymen during Operation Desert Storm*, but this experience warrants further comprehensive analysis in depth and breadth.⁸⁵

Despite these trends and the ever-growing requirements for headquarters staff, the Army continued to target these staffs throughout the 1990s as end strengths fell. Between FY90 and

⁸²Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Archives in the United States, George H.W. Bush (Sr) Library, "Saddam Invades Kuwait (24 Jul – 2 Aug 1990," cites the conversation as a potential misunderstood "green light," but dismisses any conspiratorial intent. Available at <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/us-bush.asp>

⁸³ Richard M. Swain, *Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 4-11; Frank A. Distasio, Jr., *Fiscal Year 2005 Army Budget: An Analysis* (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, 2004), 38.

⁸⁴Hon. Stephen M. Duncan, "Gulf War Was a Test of Reserve Components and They Passed," *The Officer* (June 1991) cited in Operations Department, US Naval War College, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm Employment or[sic] Reserve Component: Extracts of Lessons Learned," NWC 3074/WR-10, 29-31. The statistics do not break down individuals vice unit members of the Selected Reserve. Note that this source tends towards positive hyperbole. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/p162.pdf>

⁸⁵ Kenneth L. Evans et al., *The Mobilization of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Infantrymen during Operation Desert Storm*, Research Report 1610 (Arlington, VA: Army Research Institute, March 1992) is a good starting point, available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA250143>

FY99, the numbers dropped from 770,000 to 479,000, or 38 percent. Between FY1990 and FY2000, military personnel decreased another 30 percent, losing on average ~25,000 (24,636) Active Duty soldiers per year (taking into account the decrease of over 200,000 between FY91-92) (See Fig. 10). The Army National Guard and Reserve continued to decline until FY2005.⁸⁶

Figure 10 -- US Army Strength, 1990-2001



Source: COL Wolf Kutter et al., *Fiscal Year 2001 Army Budget – An Analysis*, 40.

The short combat period of the larger operation did not tax the US Army unduly, as the Iraqi Army proved to be much less a threat than at first believed. The scope of operations, however, highlighted critical shortfalls in higher headquarters staffs:

- Central Command (CENTCOM) was authorized 893 personnel and required some 625 additional staff.⁸⁷
- US Army, Central Command (ARCENT), as Theater Army, was authorized 825 personnel: 222 were AC, 54 Active Guard-Reserve (AGR), and 410 USAR Troop

⁸⁶ COL Wolf Kutter et al., *Fiscal Year 2001 Army Budget: An Analysis*, 40.

⁸⁷ Col. Frank J. Siltman, *Too Thin on Top: The Under-Resourcing of Headquarters in Force Design* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2006), 11.

Program Unit (TPU), and one general officer (GO), who was dual-hatted as Deputy CG of FORSCOM. By February 1991 ARCENT had required augmentation to over 1,000 personnel, including the addition of GOs as Chief of Staff and primary staff, as well as a functioning tactical command post (TCP).⁸⁸

Source: Adapted from Swain, *Lucky War*, 21.

Figure 11 -- ARCENT Headquarters Staff, 1991

AC Authorized	222
AGR Authorized	54
USAR TPU	410
Req'd not authorized	139
MTOE Total (1 Aug 1990)	825
Base TOE for Theater Army	894

⁸⁸Swain, *Lucky War*, 20-21.

Tab 8: Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn

The events of 9/11 astonished the world, but the key point is that the US military had no concept for a forthcoming operation half-way round the world in a land-locked country. Yet within three days Congress authorized the use of military force and President George W. Bush mobilized the RC. Army and joint forces deployed to Afghanistan and Uzbekistan within 26 days.⁸⁹ Following these initial deployments, President George W. Bush requested more than \$2.163 trillion in budget authority for FY 02-03, “the biggest increase in defense spending in 20 years, to pay the cost of war and the price of transforming our Cold War military into a new 21st century fighting force.” Bush’s plan included the forward-deployment of 250,000 troops abroad and 1.1 million (active and reserve components) within the United States. Further, it included the acquisition and R&D of various military technologies, e.g. unmanned combat aerial vehicles and armored vehicles.⁹⁰

Despite this large increase in funding, the active Army end strength remained flatlined at 480,000 for four years during FY00-04, realizing a modest increase of 2,000 to 482,000 in FY04 (See Figure 12, no. 1).⁹¹ FY2005-2010 demonstrated a reversal of this trend, with all components of the Army increasing in number:⁹²

- Active Duty Army +11%
- Army National Guard +7.5%
- Army Reserve +8.5%
- Civilian Component +8%

Extended operations in Afghanistan and Iraq while executing transformation to the Modular Force necessitated a longer-term plan to expand the AC. Gen. David Petraeus’ “surge” strategy in Iraq in 2007 drove an increase in Army end strength (See Figure 12, no. 2). The FY08 budget reflected a commitment to the “long and irregular war,” increasing the authorized land forces level as follows:⁹³

- Army Active → 482,400 to 547,400 by 2012 (+65,000)
- Army Reserve → 200,000 to 206,000 by 2013 (+6,000)
- Army National Guard → 350,000 to 358,200 by 2013 (+8,200)

⁸⁹ Donald P. Wright et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2010). 57.

⁹⁰ Frank A. Distasio, Jr., Lucinda M. Custer, and George E. Ehling, *Fiscal Year 2003 Army Budget: An Analysis*, 1-5.


⁹¹ Frank A. Distasio, Jr., *Fiscal Year 2005 Army Budget: An Analysis* (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, 2004), 38.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 60-1.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 4.

Though these increases represent a long-term commitment to the Global War On Terror (GWOT) and the President’s FY08 Budget themes of “Win the long war;” “Sustain the All-Volunteer Force;” and “Restoration Army forces,” they remain consistent with the gradual increase in troop numbers since FY2000.⁹⁴

Figure 12 -- US Army Strength, 2001-2012.



By FY2010, many of the Army’s scheduled FY2012 end strength goals were ahead of schedule (See Figure 12, no. 3).⁹⁵

- Army Active → +15,000, reaching 547,000 (two years ahead of schedule)
- Army Reserve → 205,000; no changes
- Army National Guard → +5,600, reaching 358,200 (three years ahead of schedule)

Such rapid increases reinforced the intent “to better pursue the war on terrorism, to reduce the excessive demands on land force units and to reduce the stress on soldiers, Marines,

⁹⁴ Ibid., vii, 57.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 62.

and their families.”⁹⁶ There were further projected end strength authorizations, vice actual numbers attained, of 547,000 for FY10 to 569,000 for FY11, the often-quoted + 22,000.⁹⁷ These late increases accounted for Soldiers on active-duty for various reasons, such as Wounded Warriors, those in the medical hold companies, and/or the Army Personnel’s growing Transients, Trainees, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account.

This most-recent Army experience in expansion merits further analysis. In particular, understanding how the Army accomplished the reception, training, and integration of these Soldiers, and the impacts on the training base and facilities could inform future planning. The preparations for OIF required the mobilization of over 34,000 individual Reservists.⁹⁸

Operations in two protracted conflicts highlighted again challenges for both Army and joint higher headquarters to perform all aspects of mission command, including elementary command and control (See Figure ___):

- When OEF commenced in 2001, CENTCOM was authorized 1,254 personnel with 1,199 on hand. The staff received an additional 1,246. Less than two years later, CENTCOM was still authorized the same 1,254. To execute OIF required an additional 1,387. In 2006 CENTCOM was authorized 1,395, had 1,599 personnel on hand, and still required another 962 augmentees to provide command and control AOR wide and for OEF, OIF, and operations in the Horn of Africa. ARCENT as ASCC has similar challenges.⁹⁹
- Initial conventional operations in Afghanistan for OEF in 2002 provide important insight. First, the confusion over the authorities of CJTF-Mountain vice CTF-Mountain curtailed effectiveness. The transition from CTF-Mountain to CJTF-180 with XVIII Airborne Corps and subsequent higher HQ consolidation aggravated personnel resourcing challenges of HQ amidst multiple, complex missions.¹⁰⁰
- The pronounced difficulty of V Corps in Iraq as CJTF-7 was the most publicized.¹⁰¹ Their challenge was one element in the turmoil between May 2003 and May 2004 when responsibility as the operational land HQ for OIF shifted from ARCENT to V Corps to Multinational Forces (MNF-I) with a subordinate Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) to assist.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 61.

⁹⁷ Frank A. Distasio, Jr., *Fiscal Year 2011 Army Budget: An Analysis* (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, 2010), 32.

⁹⁸ Col. (Ret) Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. Ed Degan, and Lt. Col. David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom through 01 May 2003* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2004), 72.

⁹⁹ Siltman, *Too Thin on Top: The Under-Resourcing of headquarters in Force Design*, 11-12.

¹⁰⁰ Wright, *A Different Kind of War*, 132-34, 189-93, 210, 238-239.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 42-44, 396-97; Col. Timothy Reese and Donald P. Wright, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–January 2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2008), 144-48, 157-65.

Figure 13 - CENTCOM Headquarters Staff, 2001-2006.

	2001	2003	2006
Authorized	1,254	1,254	1,395
On Hand	1,199		1,599
Added	1,246	1,387	962
Total Staff	2,445	1,387	2,561
% of Auth.	195	111	184

Source: Adapted from Col. Frank J. Siltman, *Too Thin on Top: The Under-Resourcing of Headquarters in Force Design* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2006), 11.

Army Col. Frank J. Siltman, then a student at the US Army War College, argued in 2006 that the personnel drawdowns have fallen much too heavily on headquarters staffs. His study is worthy of further scrutiny, and it included at Tab 9.

These experiences underline the increasingly-complex nature of operations and the paramount requirement for robust staffs manned with qualified and trained staff officers. The nature of the mobilization of the defense industrial base (DIB) as OEF led to OIF; protracted, simultaneous conflicts, and equipping an Army transforming to the Modular Force warrants further analysis. The DIB became a type of “arsenal of democracy,” retooling assembly lines in the mass production of current equipment and the rapid design and production of specialized equipment, such as Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles. An understanding of key challenges is necessary to appreciate future issues, e.g. small arms ammunition, especially in a post-2008 recession economy for DoD in steady-state operations prior to conflict.

Tab 9: USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TOO THIN ON TOP: THE UNDER-RESOURCING OF HEADQUARTERS IN FORCE DESIGN
by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Frank J. Siltman
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Headquarters in Force Design
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(UE_y)

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Transformation is a difficult and painful process guided by multiple factors. Critical among these factors in designing new forces should be warfighting headquarters' capabilities, but too often personnel and budgetary considerations outweigh those critical warfighting capabilities in building unit and force designs.

I intend to use this paper to show how historically the Army and OSD have regularly shortchanged their headquarters elements when designing unit structure, and subsequently have paid a price in effectiveness and capabilities at the initiation of conflict, and then had to scramble to augment those headquarters with unresourced assets in war. Consequently, instead of going to war with capable, trained teams that have working relationships and processes, the U.S. military has had to fight wars through ad-hoc headquarters, cobbled together with borrowed or newly acquired equipment and untrained augmentees, and that now in the recent design of the UE_x headquarters the Army is continuing to follow this model of inadequacy.

TOO THIN ON TOP: THE UNDER-RESOURCING OF HEADQUARTERS IN FORCE DESIGN

The U.S. military is undergoing one of the most extensive transformations in its history, and is simultaneously fighting a global war in multiple theaters. For the Army, this is most certainly the biggest conceptual change since the development of the “New Look” Pentomic Division of the 1950s. This is all occurring while it is simultaneously deployed in two separate combat operations fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While it is incredibly difficult to accomplish either task individually, the current environment makes it significantly so; requiring leaders to keep focused on the war and at the same time evaluating the transformation plans with a clear head and discerning eye while attempting to foresee future changes to warfare and potential enemy capabilities. Furthermore, transformation of any organization is a complicated process and is especially difficult in an organization that is inherently conservative in its nature, as is the U.S. Army.

While the U.S. Army has had many structural changes in its history, one constant that pervades the forces the Army designs institutionally is that the operational warfighting headquarters are inherently understaffed to accomplish the missions to which they are assigned. Many factors such as personnel strength, budgetary considerations, and technology influence Army structural design, but primary among these many factors in designing new forces should be warfighting capabilities. However, too often personnel and budgetary considerations outweigh those critical warfighting headquarters’ capabilities in building unit and force designs. This is primarily due to a lack of understanding of what warfighting headquarters do by those driving the design changes.

Historically the Army, the War Department, and subsequently its successor the Department of Defense have regularly shortchanged the headquarters elements when designing unit structure. They consequently have often paid a price in effectiveness and capabilities during peace and at the initiation of conflict, and then had to scramble to augment those headquarters with unresourced assets in war. The result has been throughout the historical record, instead of going to war with capable, trained teams that have working relationships and established staff processes, the U.S. military has had to fight wars through ad hoc headquarters, cobbled together with borrowed or newly acquired equipment and untrained augmentees. Now in the current transformation process under Task Force Modularity at Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters (TRADOC) and the Combined Arms Doctrine Division (CADD) at the Combined Arms Center (CAC), the recent design of the Unit of

Employment x (UE_x) as the new divisions and corps, and Unit of Employment y (UE_y) as the numbered armies, the Army is continuing to follow this model of inadequacy in headquarters design.

Historically, the Army has had difficulty changing. There was significant resistance and in the first half of the twentieth century to the establishment of the Army Air Corps, the mechanization of the Army, the “New Look” concepts of the 1950’s with the establishment of the Pentomic Divisions, and the development of the Air Assault division in the 1960’s. In each case, the Army was changing due to technological and operational advances in warfare and therefore, adapting structure and organization to meet the requirements of that emerging technology. The new realities resulting from these changes in technology and doctrine are reflected in the thinking of military theorist Martin Van Creveld, who proposed in his book Command in War that the complexity of modern war and the systems we employ require even larger and more capable staffs in order to be effective. While many of his proposals are in line with the concepts of modularity which we are employing in the current transformation process, the other side of the issue is that these deployable and modular units are very technologically and information dependent; and therefore either require more robust headquarters or the creation of a way to gain efficiencies in command and control (C2) and information management.¹ In the U.S. Army, we have a

tradition or rather a habit of cutting headquarters elements to gain efficiency, but not manning and equipping elements adequately for their required capabilities.

Unfortunately, the Army is not changing this precedent as it further transforms.

Origins of U.S. Army Staffs, Divisions and Corps

The history of development of headquarters and staffs in the U.S. Army is voluminous. The origins of American army staffs are found in the creation of the Continental Army and the efforts of George Washington to establish a true professional army in the model of contemporary European armies. As Commander in Chief, George Washington's headquarters staff was very typical of the age and Spartan by modern standards. His staff generally consisted of a small group of personal aides, including some notable men like Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton and the Marquis de Lafayette. The Continental Army also had former British officer Horatio Gates as Adjutant General and Major General Nathaniel Greene served as Quartermaster General.² However, Washington himself acted personally as the chief engineer and the head of intelligence.³ The concept of a large permanent staff serving a commander to perform planning and synchronization was virtually unknown.

The Army itself was primarily structured along regimental and brigade lines, and line staffs were often ad-hoc structures that most of the Continental Army simply made up as needed, depending upon existing militia organization or what the officers had observed from the British; No staff officers were included in the militia organization of any colony, nor were any considered necessary. Even in an eighteenth century professional army, staff officers existed only in time of war. Their omission in America from the militia organization did not imply that its officers were unaware of the positions occupied by staff officers in European armies. Their knowledge of staff organization, however, came largely from reading. Some colonists serving in the French and Indian War had observed British staff operations.⁴

Consequently, from the very beginning there was no strong tradition for maintaining a staff system for the U.S. Army to conduct planning and coordination for operations in peace or war. It would take until 1903 before the Army established a standard staff structure tied to professional military education for its officers.

In relation to armies, the term division has had different meanings throughout time, dependent on history and geography. While French and British armies used combined arms divisions as maneuver elements throughout the Napoleonic wars, it was not until the American Civil War that the corps and division both became critical organizational and battlefield tools in the command of both the Union and Confederate Army.⁵ The influence of Napoleonic warfare was pervasive in the U.S. Army, and so both sides adopted some of its structure and formations. The Union Army division was made up of usually three brigades and approximately 4000 to 6000 men, with a corps consisting of two or more divisions. The Confederate structure was approximately twice the size of Union formations, but for both armies, in all major battles this new structure became the primary means of employment of forces.

In the Ante-bellum period and at the beginning of the Civil War, the American army had an extensive staff system with many officers having served on staffs at small frontier postings, but very few had experience handling large, complex forces which was therefore a tremendous shortcoming. For the commanders in the field, the staff was a more ad-hoc and austere group of men who served commanders primarily on issues of administration and logistics, with some planning. These staffs generally consisted of a small personal retinue of aides, much like that of the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia Robert E. Lee's close circle of aides led by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Taylor. In 1862 Lee's whole staff

consisted of an assistant Adjutant General, a military secretary, five aides, five clerks, and some couriers.⁶ Often this also included an extended family of specialists like Colonel E. Porter Alexander, his chief of artillery, a signal officer, an engineer, an ordnance officer, and a quartermaster. These staffs were very different than our concepts today, and efforts by the Confederate congress to standardize and regulate staffs were generally unsuccessful.⁷

Lee himself felt there was a shortage of experienced staff officers from the former Regular Army in the Confederate Army, and believed that most existing staff models were inadequate for his needs. Therefore, Lee operated with very simple mission-type orders, relying on the leadership of subordinates and their understanding of his intent. He rarely, if ever verified reports or scrutinized his commanders in the execution of their duties. As a result, he determined the Confederacy had to operate with a decentralized staff system, and exercised very little control over any force beyond his own Army of Northern Virginia until 1864.⁸

The Genesis of the Modern Staffs and the Army Division

The origin of the modern staff in the U.S. Army began with the reforms instituted by Secretary of War Elihu Root at the turn of the twentieth century. He is the father of the modern U.S. Army General Staff, establishing a system in 1903 that gave the Army separate staff sections responsible for administration, logistics, intelligence, and planning which has become a model for staffs throughout the remainder of the century.⁹

The development of the modern division in the U.S. Army in the twentieth century originated in the dismal performance in the Spanish-American War, which led many in the Army to see a need for a better and more permanent system of command and control. The concepts for this organization rested in the Field Service Regulations which defined the division as, “a self-contained unit made up of all necessary arms and services, and complete in itself with every requirement for independent action incident to its operations.” Initially the Army designed a division with three infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment, a field artillery regiment, engineer battalion, and a signal company.¹⁰

These changes significantly altered the whole Army staff structure prior to World War I (WW I) and deeply influenced how the U.S. Army operated as an expeditionary force in a war unlike any other the U.S. had fought in the past. General John J. Pershing faced uncertainty about what he really needed in the field as the commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Pershing sailed for Europe in May, 1917 with a newly formed staff of only 190 to establish the American Expeditionary Force and build an army. This small number included drivers, clerks, and the planning staff, but fortunately Pershing had chosen his officers carefully and knew how to use them. Staff procedure and policies for the AEF were developed on the job, and along with this was the task of designing armies and corps. There was no U.S. experience for these organizations and they were designed based solely on the judgment of Pershing and the AEF staff. This caused some growing pains, as originally U.S. planners wanted each corps to be very large with six organic divisions assigned. However, they soon abandoned this concept as unworkable in favor of the French system where a corps consisted of a headquarters element, technical units, and artillery, and divisions were assigned as available or as needed for missions.¹¹

For tactical fighting headquarters in this new war, Pershing had the example of the U.S. division design, as well as British and French divisional designs which were much more robust. Ultimately he concluded that the U.S. needed a new design that was capable of prolonged combat, could seize and hold ground and also continue to advance. The result of this thinking was the 29,000 man “square division”. Even this robust organization was inadequately structured for command and control, synchronization of operations, and logistics support.¹² Some of his key staff officers, like Colonel George C. Marshall, learned their trade as part of this organization and that experience shaped their thinking later in their careers.

Following WW I, in order to correct deficiencies and create a versatile and effective structure, Army Chief of Staff Pershing had his deputy Major General James Harbord convene a board to recommend a staff organization for the Army. The board eventually recommended, and Pershing accepted, a staff structure designed along British and French models with a G-1 personnel section, G-2 intelligence section, G-3 operations and training section, G-4 supply section, and a War Plans Division.¹³ This “G-staff” structure became the standard basis for staffs from that time until today.

The build-up to WW II was the next major step in the evolution of the division and staff development in the twentieth century. General George C. Marshall as Chief of Staff began building up the Army staff in anticipation of its expansion and developing war plans. After the break out of war in Europe in 1939, Marshall rapidly initiated the establishment of several new organizations including armor divisions and airborne divisions. This rapid expansion of the many new organizations required numerous personnel and an immense amount of equipment for the Army, and immediately created a shortage of trained personnel, equipment, and shipping resources to get divisions in to the combat zone. As a result, in October of 1942 General Marshall directed a review of all structure and the Army Ground Force Reduction Board under the supervision of General Leslie McNair went to work. Even though the “triangular” design was already smaller than the “square” division, by March of 1943 the Reduction Board had developed a recommended design that reduced the infantry division structure by over 2000 personnel. As always, when looking at structure the headquarters became one of the primary targets;

The board also believed that the division headquarters and its headquarters company had grown too large. To reduce the size of the headquarters company, its strength was cut almost in half by eliminating the defense platoon and some vehicles, drivers, and orderlies. The band assumed the mission of protecting the divisional headquarters as an additional duty. Divisional staff sections remained the same, but the board cut some assistant staff officers and enlisted men. Total reductions in the division represented a 13.5 percent decrease in all ranks and 23 percent in vehicles.¹⁴

But the proposed new structure met challenges from commanders in the field. At Marshall’s direction, McNair and other members of the board traveled to the combat zone where corps and division commanders rejected the new designs as unacceptable, cutting division strength below minimum levels that they thought could perform effectively in combat. As a result McNair had to go back and re-design a compromise solution that satisfied the field commanders and was almost identical to the original design.¹⁵ There were a few more changes in armored division structure in 1942 and 1943, but the divisions fought throughout both theaters of WW II for the remainder of the war without any more major re-designs.

Much less attention was paid to the formal design of corps headquarters than was focused on division structure. While the corps was the primary headquarters for employing combat elements, controlling any number of divisions depending upon the situation, there was no real base design for a corps.¹⁶ Their composition varied constantly with army commanders like George Patton of Third Army shifting divisions as needed on the battlefield. Most corps officially consisted of only the commander, his immediate staff, and some organic headquarters and support units. However, the corps commander was primarily responsible for the tactical employment of the divisions, as well as controlling a large number of essential non-divisional combat units like corps artillery and engineers. After the war, former corps commander Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem said that the WWII U.S. Army corps was, “an amorphous, elastic tactical unit that expands and contracts according to the allocation of troops from higher headquarters based on the enemy, the terrain and the contemplated missions.”¹⁷ While the Army spent considerable effort to standardize the division in WWII, it virtually neglected the proper design and

organization of the corps, the organization vested with the tactical employment of divisions on the battlefield.

The appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe led to the creation of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), the first true joint and combined headquarters in U.S. Army history. This change in command structure brought together the two separate headquarters of Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

(COSSAC) and Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) to oversee theater combat operations.

Eisenhower directed Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith to develop the headquarters requirements, and fortunately Smith had the foresight to see the breadth of requirements for the organization. He understood that an Allied headquarters that was going to control all field operations would require a large, expanded staff and that the existing headquarters was inadequate.¹⁸

Under Smith's direction the SHAEF staff began to gather personnel, integrating British and U.S. officers, CASSOC and AFHQ personnel, as well in seeking out more talented officers throughout the theater. However, in doing so SHAEF drained many subordinate headquarters to the point that those commanders expressed concern that they would become unable to continue operations. The building of SHAEF was the reaction to an evolving requirement in war, resulting in creating an ad hoc headquarters, stripping subordinate organizations to create it, and integrating the different policies and procedures of CASSOC and AFHQ. It was fortuitous for the Allies that Bedell Smith had the foresight to see the need for an expanded staff to control the vast and expansive requirements to accomplish the mission, and took the required actions. The example of the creation of SHAEF under Eisenhower is a historical milestone in headquarters development, but most importantly a case where an adequate headquarters was built not by bureaucrats in Washington, but rather by the leaders in the field who understood the requirements.¹⁹

Division Design After World War II

Following the Korean War and with the proliferation of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Cold War, the U.S. Defense Department decided that the time of massive ground warfare was past. Instead they envisioned a battlefield dominated by nuclear weapons down to the tactical level, and reorganized the ground forces to reflect this new paradigm. This led to the design of the Pentomic Division under the "New Look" policy, and is certainly the most significant restructuring of the Army between WW II and current transformation. The New Look changed the traditional structure of the nation's military forces, shifting from costly and manpower-intensive conventional ground forces.²⁰ The genesis of this was in the fact that President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wanted to gain strategic initiative through selective response with nuclear weapons. Therefore, the services all sought a re-design, with the Army developing tactical nuclear weapons to support tactical operations on the battlefield.²¹

The result of this re-design was the Pentomic Division, built around these new concepts that the ground forces were intended to both survive a nuclear attack and also successfully employ tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The division headquarters was consolidated in to a headquarters battalion of 670 in an infantry division and 515 in an armored division. Overall the infantry division strength lost 4000 personnel, with five battle groups which were smaller than regiments but larger than battalions making up the combat force in place of the traditional three infantry or armor regiments.²²

Like many transformation experiences, the Pentomic Division was met with skepticism and resistance. However, the new design was adopted despite those reservations and the fact that the experimentation had indicated organizational inadequacies in the unit. General Maxwell Taylor drove much of the change, basing the concepts on the idea that manpower limitations and use of nuclear weapons by both sides would demand much smaller tactical forces. In retrospect, critics argue that this reliance on nuclear weapons caused the Army by the mid 1950s to lose its strategic direction and resulted in Army leaders seeking relevance with rocket and missile systems, effectively competing with the Air Force.²³ Clearly, the Army was predominantly concerned about relevance in the new world of nuclear warfare, and so had developed the concepts for the Pentomic Division to ensure a continued place at the table. However, CSA Matthew Ridgway was concerned that the U.S. had traded off its capability to fight a conventional war.

The Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgway, upon his retirement in June 1955, expressed his doubts cogently. As Soviet nuclear strength grew, General Ridgway maintained, a situation of nuclear parity would come into being, where neither side would have an advantage... If this should happen, the American military forces then in being would not be strong enough to meet the lesser Soviet challenge. General Ridgway put the case bluntly: "The present United States preoccupation with preparations for general war has limited the military means available for cold war to those which are essentially by-products or leftovers from the means available for general war."²⁴

General Ridgway's concerns were well founded and were wise counsel relevant not just for the Cold War, but even for today. In any force design, the military must be capable of carrying out the full spectrum of operations in war, against the worst case scenario with multiple adversaries. The Pentomic Division designs fell short of that requirement. Fortunately, the Pentomic design's inadequacies and shortcomings were evident to most senior leaders. By 1963 the Army concluded that the Pentomic Division had insufficient combat power to conduct ground combat in anything less than a nuclear environment. Amazingly and almost inexplicably, it also had concluded at the time that the division command and control structure was too large and complex. However, in fact the unit staffs,

...lost all administrative functions except those needed to maintain unit efficiency. Personnel for administration, mess, and maintenance functions were concentrated in battalion headquarters companies throughout. All staffs were minimal; the divisional G-1 and G-4 functions were reduced to policy, planning, and coordinating activities. Routine administrative and logistical matters were moved to the support command. Infantry divisions, similar to armored divisions, were to use task force organizations as situations required.²⁵

As one of the units directed to test and critique the concept the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, Major General George E. Lynch, concluded the Pentomic Division was inadequately structured and the Army should return to the traditional triangular division.²⁶ While leaders were clearly concerned about the combat power, it is also clear the staff structure was insufficient to handle the complexity of the division's operational requirements and the related information, communications and coordination.

Vietnam and the Cold War

As a result of these conclusions by Lynch and the assessment of most senior leaders, just prior to Vietnam the Army returned its divisions to a more traditional modified triangular division known as Reorganization of the Army Division (ROAD), made up of three brigades of three battalions each. The

concept provided a tremendous amount of flexibility, as battalions could be added or detached from the division to customize the structure for the mission. The involvement in the Vietnam conflict resulted in several structural changes for the Army, but it was able to utilize the flexibility of the ROAD division concept to design each division to meet the specific contingency requirements whether in Vietnam or Europe, almost presaging the current concepts of modularity.²⁷

In the 1970s the Army developed the Air-Land Battle Doctrine and as a result TRADOC began the Division 86 project, followed by the Corps 86 in 1979. The principle behind the design was to increase the division combat power, and thus added an aviation brigade, as well as increasing maneuver battalions to four line companies. This change increased the heavy division to almost 20,000. Unfortunately, this organization was large and cumbersome, requiring significant C2 capability and immense resources to deploy. At this time, the Iran crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan spurred a school of thought that the U.S. needed lighter, flexible, more deployable divisions.²⁸

By 1983, the new Chief of Staff of the Army General John Wickham directed TRADOC to develop a new globally deployable light division design of approximately 10,000 soldiers. This was the basis for the Army of Excellence (AOE) division and corps redesigns tied to a theaterspecific war plan. TRADOC used WW II historical lessons, sought input from each branch school, and from corps and division commanders and staffs on these designs. In the end, the new designs reduced the heavy division organic combat power and gave it strength of 17,000, while the light division was a very austere, yet mobile organization of 10,800. Critics of the AOE designs argued that the light division was too light to fight and too heavy to run, as it lacked tactical mobility once deployed. Even with reduced combat power, the heavy armored and mechanized infantry division was generally accepted because under the operational construct with a corps as the primary employment headquarters, the corps commander had sufficient combat power to be an effective operational-level force to compensate for those design issues. However, the support units were deemed insufficient by many critics, and so the Army was again taking risk in support elements of the division in an effort at efficiency, at the expense of effectiveness.²⁹

Despite its shortcomings, this AOE division structure was the force with which the U.S.

Army ended the Cold War, won Desert Storm, and defeated both the Taliban and Iraq in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and dominated Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While obviously successful, in each and every case, these organizations required significant augmentation in the headquarters and in support elements. Fortunately, we did not require the full deployment of all of our forces, as this augmentation was stripped from the non-deployed units.

The Creation and Employment of Unified and Functional Combatant Commands

In the 1980s a major change that occurred in U.S. staff organization was the establishment of regional and functional Combatant Commands (COCOM) and staffs. Among these headquarters today are Central Command (CENTCOM), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and others. These joint headquarters serve to provide regionally or functionally focused staffs with expertise relevant to the COCOM's specific mission set.

A clear and timely example of an understaffed headquarters is USCENTCOM. While as the most engaged Combatant Command headquarters since 1990, CENTCOM has a long history of being structured for peacetime. Consequently it has been unable to conduct war-time operations under peacetime manning standards in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, during the sustained operations

of Southern and Northern Watch, and other operations like Desert Thunder and Desert Fox. For the foreseeable future with OEF and OIF conducting sustained operations throughout the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), the CENTCOM headquarters remains understaffed and must be constantly augmented with temporary active and reserve component individual augmentees (IA) in order to oversee operations.

Just prior to and during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield, CENTCOM was authorized 893 personnel. In order to conduct the war, approximately 625 additional personnel had to be diverted from other jobs throughout the U.S. military to support the CENTCOM staff as IAs, and 186 Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) had to be mobilized. Just prior to the start of OEF in 2001, the CENTCOM staff was authorized 1254 personnel. For OEF, CENTCOM was assigned 1199 personnel, and again had to be augmented with 1246 personnel from all over the U.S. military to conduct operations, doubling its size. For the initiation of OIF in 2003, while authorized 1254 personnel, CENTCOM required an augmentation of 1387 personnel to the staff. Currently, as operations in both OEF and OIF continue, as well as support to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the CENTCOM staff is authorized 1395 personnel, is manned at 1599, and still requires 962 augmentees to conduct operations for the GWOT.³⁰

This perpetual problem of understaffing for CENTCOM creates a wide assortment of problems and issues. While we are engaged in a wide-ranging war that is different than any other we have fought as a nation, the headquarters responsible for the conduct of combat operations in OEF and OIF is perpetually experiencing shortages of personnel and requiring short term staffers to learn complicated and critical jobs quickly, only to be rotated back to their home station assignments after they master those jobs. This creates significant training issues for the staff, and tremendous frustration for the permanent party who must continually train the augmentees the headquarters needs to in order to conduct operations. Once they have this temporary staff trained however, they have to watch the Air Force augmentees depart after ninety days, the Army after one-hundred and seventy-nine, and Marines after two-hundred seventy days.

This under-staffing problem is not restricted to CENTCOM, but in fact extends to subordinate headquarters as well. Third Army, Army Central Command (ARCENT), which serves as CENTCOM's Army Service Component (ASCC), was the Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) headquarters during OEF and OIF. During OEF it was manned at the lowest authorized level at least through October of 2002.³¹ Subsequently it now serves both as the ASCC for the CENTCOM theater, and the Combined JFLCC conducting Reception, Staging, and Onward movement (RSOI) for OIF, and still requires individual augmentation for the ongoing GWOT operations.³² The wartime understaffing of a high priority headquarters like USCENTCOM and its subordinate headquarters is evidence of a recurring problem in force design that should be easily solved. Yet this problem persists with convoluted stop-gap solutions that provide a turbulent and temporary solution rather than a truly solving the problem with proper staffing that the organization requires to have full war-time capabilities.

Current Transformation: The UEx and UEy

In the current transformation process that began during Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki's tenure, the Army began transforming with the establishment of what is now the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and with the initiation of the Future Combat System (FCS) Unit of Action (UA). While these concepts were revolutionary in focus and design, they were restricted to the Army's cornerstone of warfighting, the brigade combat team (BCT). Under this transformation program, headquarters for the BCTs changed in minor areas, but the higher warfighting division and corps headquarters remained essentially unchanged except for General Shinseki directing some cuts in all

headquarters. This is despite the obvious recognition by the CSA that the way the Army was to employ forces and conduct combat operations was going to be much different in the future.

Under CSA General Peter Schoomaker, the Army subsequently began the Modularity transformation program; which established new constructs for armies, corps, divisions and brigades with the UEx and UEy, and heavy and infantry UAs.³³ The Army leadership has gone to great lengths to repeatedly explain in Army-wide programs that we face new enemies, new technologies, new challenges, and that forces must be agile, deployable, and survivable in order to meet the threats.

The current headquarters design of the UEx and UEy structures for division, corps and army staffs flows from an almost two year long process overseen by the CADD at CAC headquarters in Fort Leavenworth in concert with Task Force Modularity at TRADOC headquarters. In the summer of 2003 an initial design team composed of subject matter experts (SME) from each TRADOC center and school developed a straw-man concept for a headquarters in anticipation of the need for the UEx headquarters. In November of 2003, a UEx Working Group was formally convened to design the UEx headquarters staff under the direction of Colonel (ret) Clint Anker at Fort Leavenworth. The basis for the design was the UEx White Paper being written at the time by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Mike Burke. Burke briefed the team on the overall concept for the UEx, how it would fight, and what capabilities it required. Burke also discussed the general concept from the White Paper of how the staff should be organized. The division conceptually was to cover a 350 x 350 kilometer battlespace, a significant increase for division and a major C2 challenge.³⁴

Lieutenant Colonel Fred Svedarsky was the CADD lead for the UEx working group and his direction to the group was to design a headquarters based on capabilities within size restrictions close to current division headquarters. Immediately, the question was asked, "Aren't we doing this backward? Shouldn't we design a headquarters that meets the capabilities and requirements, and then review it for resources, and if too large, examine where to cut rather than telling us to design to a certain capability, yet imposing limitations?" The answer was that yes, that would be the preferred method in a perfect circumstance, but that the restrictions were established and the design had to remain within those parameters.³⁵

The resulting UEx division structure developed in November of 2003 was a significant paradigm change from traditional Army general staff (G-Staff) structure. It was based on a concept of Home Station Operations Center (HSOC) and two equally capable deployable command posts (DCP). The idea was that with technology, most of the planning, and command and control could be done from home station and the deployable command posts were the critical staff sections that would go forward to theater to provide the commander on the ground presence, but with limited detailed planning capability.

Compared to an AOE division headquarters which totaled 875 personnel including signal support, security and augmentation to perform missions as an Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters, the initial UEx design had 940 personnel. While on the surface there is an increase in personnel, there was also an increase in responsibilities. This headquarters was intended to be capable of performing as a Joint Task Force, and ARFOR headquarters, consisting of an HSOC, two DCPs, a plans section and a Mobile Command Group (MCG), and included a robust liaison officer (LNO) sections.³⁶

The subsequent designs in December 2003 with UEx design 5.0 and February and March of 2004 with UEx Design 5.3 re-aligned the concept with the traditional G-Staff structure. This resulted in significant changes to include creation of a special troops battalion and an exceptionally robust and capable LNO section of almost sixty personnel, providing a critical capability to send a variety of liaison teams to joint forces, multi-national, and inter-agency headquarter to ensure the flow of information and coordination of efforts across the spectrum of operations. This resulted in the UEx headquarters growing to 1114

personnel in UEx Design 5.3. Even with directions from TRADOC to limit size, another version of the UEx in the summer of 2004 would grow to 1242, including a band.³⁷

Later in the August/September 2004 timeframe, the working group reconvened to produce UEx Design 6.0. This design was specifically to reduce the size of the headquarters while maintaining the required capabilities, and the reductions cut 181 slots to bring it back down to 1061 in Design 6.0. The cost was the robust LNO section which lost fifty-one of fifty-nine personnel, as well as eighty-nine personnel from the tactical command posts, and a reduction of the Infantry company that provides security. Most cuts were in drivers and system operators, with all sections taking staff cuts, but the reality of 6.0 was that planners and battle captains would have to operate systems, therefore detracting from their staff responsibilities.³⁸

Another major problem with the modular designs rests in the perception of the rank and file that we in the Army are really being asked to do more with less. We are developing fortythree modular Brigade Combat Teams, but these BCTs consist of only two maneuver battalions as opposed to the current force three battalion BCTs. Also, while the brigade commander now commands his whole BCT as an integral unit and has many plug-in modular capabilities like Civil Affairs (CA), Information Operations (IO) and others, there is a major cost to the division headquarters. Under the UEx division construct, the division's organic supporting brigade headquarters of the Division Artillery (DIVARTY), the Division Support Command (DISCOM) and the Engineer Brigade no longer exist.

In place of the DIVARTY and DISCOM are modular support brigades which are specialized organizations intended to replace those formerly organic units. Among these are the Fires Brigades, the Sustainment brigades, the Maneuver Enhancement brigades, and others. These organizations are all intended to provide staffs to augment UEx headquarters so the division staff does not need to be as robust. The fallacy in this thinking, however, is although staff sections are bigger in the UEx than in the AOE division, the DIVARTY and DISCOM staffs were not replaced as organic elements. The critical problem and major disconnect with these cuts is that in the past, DIVARTY and DISCOM staff sections supported division staffs for planning and execution, but now are no longer part of the division structure. In contrast, the modular support brigades are not habitually associated with any particular division. Ultimately with the projected number of UEx headquarters, there are not enough support brigades for each division in the UEx design to have a Fires brigade and Maneuver Enhancement brigade. The concept is that support brigades are a shared resource among all UEx, so while UEx staff appears large and robust, the reality is that there is less capability without organic support brigade staffs. Consequently, due to the inadequate number of support brigades of all types in the Army structure, it is very possible that a UEx may deploy without a Fires Brigade or Maneuver Enhancement Brigade and therefore not have the proper support staff.

The final UEx Design 7.2, approved by the CSA is significantly different in design, but the capabilities requirements are the same, and yet the size much smaller. The UEx was cut to 953 personnel, the tactical command posts lost twenty-one, the Main CP gained thirty-nine, and the band was removed to create a separate organization not counted against the headquarters' size. Ultimately, this is a shell game with the gains predominately in drivers and operators to reverse 6.0 cuts, but relieving some planners and operations officers to perform primary duties from the diversion of operating computer systems.³⁹

With 953 personnel in final UEx Design for the new division, it is comparably larger and more robust than the 875 personnel for the AOE division, appearing that the headquarters is more capable to deal with increased complexity and responsibility. However, this is for a vastly expanded battlespace and a significant increase of responsibility for the division. While reorganized and augmented, the UEx divisional staff sections exist basically much as they did before, yet the related support brigade staffs that

supplemented those staff sections are not an integral part of the division. In modular units those support staffs now come only when deployed as part of a non-associated support brigade, which are consequently shared among several divisions. When considering the loss of the supporting brigades as an integral part of the division, the existing support staff in the UEx division structure in fact is significantly reduced and most likely inadequate, especially for extended, high-intensity operations. Additionally, under the UEx construct, the division staff will also be asked to combine the previous missions of corps and division staffs as we compress from three levels of division and above staff down to two levels of division and above staff.⁴⁰ In the end, we have combined echelons for efficiency, increased the staff's responsibilities, and will ask them to do more with less.

Unfortunately, it is clear that capabilities have not been the predominant considerations in our current transformation design work. The personnel and budgetary constraints have set limits on the organizations and taken precedence over capabilities and requirements. The Army's design process for the UEx division construct and the support brigades has been guided by these constraints, and although challenged as a process, it has dominated the design of these headquarters. Additionally, in many cases sound, substantiated, and well developed arguments for change were dismissed out of hand because they did not fit pre-conceived concepts that underlay the transformation process. While some parochialism may be at play, the impression among several branches of the Army is that unreasonable constraints have hampered the development of a capable and viable organization.⁴¹

Resistance to Change

While most leaders in the Army understand the intellectual impetus for transformation and the tremendous changes in Army structure, there is a significant amount of resistance and disgruntlement in the Army about transformation. It is clear that some of this resistance is due to poor communications from the Army leadership on what exactly is occurring. Other causes of resistance include the Army's conservative nature, where the culture is virtually symbolized by the idiom, "if it isn't broke, don't fix it." Finally, some of the resistance is due to honest disagreement with the decisions made in the transformation process on both force structure and organization. Because of the nature of the military culture, in the end the Army will get what Peter Senge in The Fifth Discipline describes as grudging compliance. However, as Senge argues in his concept of visioning; regardless of the reasons for the dissent, the Army leadership needs to gain the commitment and enrollment of its officer and non-commissioned officer corps in its future vision and the continuous nature of the transformation process that is the future of our Army.⁴² Currently, the Army in general does not understand and is not comfortable with the decisions that have been made.

Much of the criticism centers around arguments that the leadership is planning for the last war by cutting traditional heavy forces, and headquarters elements, and shifting traditional conventional organizations like Air Defense Artillery (ADA) and Field Artillery (FA) in favor of CA and Military Police (MP) units which have proven essential in both the Balkans and in the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The main point of the criticism is that this transformation planning is short sighted, ignoring potential future conflicts with the more conventional forces of China, Russia, or North Korea. So ultimately, the issue is that the leaders may have been able to convey their vision, but many subordinate leaders see a fallacy in this vision, and feel their ideas and concerns have been ignored; thereby endangering the Army and the nation in more conventional contingencies. The current vision for transformation is problematic because it is a top-down vision that has given little consideration to the concerns of lower tiers of leaders in the organization.⁴³

Another aspect of the criticism of the process is that while there is clearly and justifiably a tendency to concentrate on combat forces at expense of headquarters, it may be a reasonable approach, but it is not a smart approach. Balance is required in formulating these transformed unit designs, with equal emphasis on combat power as well as the ability to command and control those elements. We also must design the staffs with a robust nature to take on the added responsibilities under the UEx divisional construct. When these issues were raised to the design team at the CADD and TRADOC, these concerns were dismissed. When raised to the TRADOC Commander by school commandants, they were again dismissed. The argument against these concerns centered on making the headquarters more agile and deployable, but in fact failed to consider requests for review based on the additional tasks and responsibilities under the compressed C2 designs. In fact, after a General Officer In-Progress Review (GOIPR) at Fort Leavenworth in early 2004, and after further CADD review, the staffs were cut even more in size and scope without any consultation of the proponents. With a decision making process so lacking in participation, the branches and proponents for the staff sections and support elements cannot see themselves as a part of a team whose views are considered during the decision process.⁴⁴

Conclusion; A Better Solution

As Martin Van Crevald argues, as war becomes more complex and the battlespace expands with immense amounts of information provided by technology, armies must either have large, robust staffs or find technology based methods to better manage the information and synchronization requirements. The issues with the current transformation of the U.S. Army is that capabilities requirements are not the driving factors in designing the staffs to support our new UEx divisions and corps, but rather personnel and budgetary considerations have taken precedence. It is clear that in this process the Army is either unaware of, or has chosen to ignore the historical lessons of headquarters design. Staffs must be robust and capable, properly manned, trained, and resourced to manage the new challenges of the UEx's expanded battlespace and overwhelming amounts of technology and information.

In the near future, we will certainly find that our UEx staffs involved in combat operations will require significant augmentation just as our division and combatant command staffs have required over the past fifteen years since Operation Desert Storm. Rather than addressing the real capabilities and requirements for the UEx headquarters, we have once again ignored history and committed the error of placing the design requirements we really need in order to establish a viable combat headquarters in a distant second place to cost considerations. We must hope that that cost savings does not result in the cost of lives in future combat operations.

The Army leadership must also deal with the criticism and resistance to the changes occurring under the transformation process. When General Shinseki initiated transformation, both he and subsequently current CSA General Schoomaker looked ahead and enunciated a vision. The problem is these are top-down developed visions with very little input from the rest of the Army. While these actions did set a tone for realization that change was imperative, inevitable, and unavoidable, the leadership did not get buy-in and possibly can be accused of arbitrarily forcing changes to the very essence of the Army identity, and they consequently have met significant resistance. The nature of the Army is that the leaders set the vision and subordinates will comply, however, to gain consensus the Army leadership needs to conduct some form of the participative decision making process that the officer and non-commissioned officer corps perceive as truly considering valid concerns and criticisms of the new structure.⁴⁵ This needs to be done much as General Marshall did in sending General McNair to the combat zone in 1943, and not only listening but acting on combat commanders' criticism of a new divisional structure. Without overcoming the perception that transformation lacks leaders' input and puts budget priorities over capabilities, the Army will continue to have resistance, will not achieve buy-in of the

current senior leaders of divisions and brigades, and will not get their commitment to the transformation vision.

In the final analysis, while personnel and budgetary concerns cannot be ignored, the DoD leadership must recognize that the military forces and warfare are not a business that can be tied to a cost driven bottom line of efficiency. Effectiveness of a force in war is paramount, and must always be the primary consideration over efficiency. Leaders at the highest levels must recognize that the force structure must be robust and capabilities driven, designed for the worst case scenario to always be able to fight and win the nation's wars.

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- ²⁴ Hermes, 574.
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- ³⁰ COL Michael Davino, Deputy J1, USCENTCOM, email message to the author, 25January 2006.
- ³¹ Conrad C. Crane, *The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle* (Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, 2002) 4.
- ³² LTC Rick Nieberding, CFLCC C-1, U.S.Third Army, email message to the author, 10February 2006.
- ³³ During the time frame of November 2003 to March 2004, I was a member of TRADOC's UEx working group under the direction of CADD at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Based on that work, and participation in all of the organizational design and planning, participation of GOIPR preparation for the

Commandant, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, and subsequent After-Action Reviews, I gained this knowledge about the UEx design process and issues. Additionally, I worked on the planning and design working group for the Support Brigades, and in October, 2004 participated in the first UEx Wargame at Fort Leavenworth, KS as the Fires Brigade commander, and the UEx commander's Effects Coordinator (ECOORD).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ The author was in the UEx Working Group briefing given by Mr. Anker and Mr. Burke, and asked the question about the process being flawed by determining size of the headquarters before the group identified the requirements that would be the basis of the design.

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⁴⁰ The author continued work as part of the UEx Working Group through April of 2004, and as Chief of Combat Developments for the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center through January 2005. Throughout the time I continued to be part of preparations for all UEx conferences, GOIPRs, and reviewed all UEx products. The conclusions drawn here are from that personal experience.

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Tab 10 – Army Expansibility Library Guide

U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

The United States Army War College Library

Amie Stone
Research Librarian
717.245.3660
usawc.libraryr@us.army.mil

13 April 2015

Books and Internet Documents

Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare. *The Army's Organic Industrial Base: Providing Readiness Today, Preparing for Challenges Tomorrow*. Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, 2013.
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Tab 11 – DOD Executive Agent List (Army)



August 08, 2014

AGENT LIST

 REFERENCE
 LIBRARY

POC LIST

LINKS

 EXTERNAL
 AGENCY LINKS

Agent List

Title	DoD Component	PSA	Modified
Active Duty Determinations for Civilians or Contractual Groups	Air Force	Pers & Read	12/16/2013 8:52:01 PM
DoD Detainee Operations Policy	Army	Policy	5/7/2014 12:43:24 PM
Armed Forces Entertainment (AFE)	Air Force	Pers & Read	5/14/2014 1:48:40 PM
Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO)	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 12:44:47 PM
Bulk Petroleum	Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)	AT&L	5/7/2014 3:25:11 PM
Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP)	Army	AT&L	5/7/2014 12:54:40 PM
Chemical Demilitarization	Army	Intelligence	5/14/2014 1:50:47 PM
DoD Combat Feeding Research and Engineering Program	Army	DDR&E	5/7/2014 1:02:20 PM
Common Data Link (CDL)	Air Force	DASD(C3 & Cyber)	5/14/2014 1:55:54 PM
Construction/Barrier Material	Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)	AT&L	5/7/2014 5:16:57 PM
CREW Technology	Army	AT&L	5/14/2014 2:04:44 PM
Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support (DANTES)	Navy	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 3:14:09 PM
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)	Air Force	Pers & Read	12/16/2013 9:17:27 PM
Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC)	Air Force	Pers & Read	12/16/2013 9:18:21 PM
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC)	Army	Pers & Read	5/14/2014 2:07:42 PM
Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III Program	Air Force	AT&L	12/16/2013 9:19:32 PM
Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI)	Navy	Comptroller/DoD CFO	5/7/2014 3:14:52 PM
Designating and Naming Military Aerospace Vehicles	Air Force	AT&L	12/16/2013 9:20:13 PM
DoD Level III Corrections	Army	Pers & Read	4/22/2014 4:34:42 PM
Explosives Safety Management	Army	AT&L	5/14/2014 2:24:05 PM
Federal Legal Information Thru Electronics (FLITE)	Air Force	Policy	12/16/2013 9:22:36 PM
Global Command and Control System (GCCS) - (Specific Modules)	Air Force	Intelligence	5/14/2014 2:25:37 PM
Global Positioning System (GPS) Program/NAVSTAR	Air Force	AT&L	12/16/2013 8:55:38 PM
Persian Gulf War Exposure Registry	Army	Pers & Read	5/14/2014 2:37:19 PM
High School News Service	Navy	Public Affairs	5/7/2014 3:15:15 PM
Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP)	Army	AT&L	5/14/2014 2:40:27 PM
DoD Immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 5:42:30 PM
Information Technology Standards	Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)	DOD-CIO	5/7/2014 1:34:28 PM
DoD Biometrics	Army	DDR&E	5/14/2014 2:45:38 PM
Intelligence Systems Support Office (ISSO)	Air Force	Intelligence	12/16/2013 9:23:36 PM
Law of War Program (Investigation and Reporting of Reportable Incidents Against U.S. Personnel)	Army	Policy	5/14/2014 2:47:28 PM

<u>Logistics Data Interchange</u>	Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)	AT&L	5/7/2014 5:38:55 PM
<u>Management of Land-Based Water Resources in Support of Contingency Ops</u>	Army	AT&L	4/22/2014 4:43:08 PM
<u>DoD Medical Examination Review Board (DoDMERB)</u>	Air Force	Pers & Read	12/16/2013 8:57:29 PM
<u>Medical Materiel</u>	Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)	AT&L	5/7/2014 5:25:09 PM
<u>Military Postal Service (MPS)</u>	Army	AT&L	4/22/2014 4:43:40 PM
<u>Contingency Fatality Operations</u>	Army	Pers & Read	6/27/2014 4:36:41 PM
<u>DoD Passport and Passport Agent Services</u>	Army	DA&M	4/22/2014 4:45:35 PM
<u>Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons</u>	Marine Corps	AT&L	5/7/2014 1:56:57 PM
<u>R-2508 Complex Enhancement Program</u>	Air Force	OT&E	12/16/2013 9:29:26 PM
<u>Recruiting Facilities Program</u>	Army	Pers & Read	4/22/2014 4:47:41 PM
<u>Regional Centers for Security Studies</u>	Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)	Policy	5/7/2014 1:47:04 PM
<u>Space</u>	Air Force	AT&L	12/16/2013 9:35:03 PM
<u>Space Test Program (STP) Management and Funding</u>	Air Force	AT&L	12/16/2013 9:38:27 PM
<u>Subsistence</u>	Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)	AT&L	5/7/2014 5:24:45 PM
<u>DoD Support to United Nations Missions</u>	Army	Policy	4/22/2014 4:48:26 PM
<u>Code of Conduct (CoC) (EA Status pending with JFCOM disestablishment)</u>	JFCOM	Policy	5/7/2014 3:04:48 PM
<u>DoD Civilian Police Officers & Security Guards (CP/SG) Physical Fitness Standards Program</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/14/2014 2:54:18 PM
<u>Administrative and Resource Support for the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM)</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/14/2014 2:57:01 PM
<u>USCENTCOM R&R Leave Program</u>	Army	Pers & Read	4/22/2014 4:52:59 PM
<u>USSOUTHCOM Counterdrug Forward Operating Locations</u>	Air Force	AT&L	12/16/2013 9:39:06 PM
<u>DoD Veterinary Services Program</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 12:19:05 PM
<u>Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)</u>	Army	Policy	4/22/2014 4:56:35 PM
<u>Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence (UXOCOE)</u>	Army	AT&L	4/22/2014 5:01:36 PM
<u>Military Immunization Program</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 5:43:11 PM
<u>DoD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program</u>	Air Force	Intelligence	5/14/2014 2:59:28 PM
<u>Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)</u>	Army	Policy	4/22/2014 5:04:48 PM
<u>Joint Medical Executive Skills Development Program (JMESDP)(Under Review)</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 12:39:47 PM
<u>Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)</u>	Navy	Policy	2/6/2014 3:43:41 PM
<u>Force Protection of Military Sealift Assets</u>	Navy	Policy	5/7/2014 3:15:39 PM
<u>Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) Sinai</u>	Army	Policy	5/14/2014 3:03:09 PM
<u>Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)</u>	Army	CJCS	5/14/2014 3:04:05 PM
<u>Medical Research for Prevention, Mitigation, and Treatment of Blast Injuries</u>	Army	AT&L	5/14/2014 3:11:57 PM
<u>Security of DoD Personnel at U.S. Missions Abroad</u>	Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)	Intelligence	5/7/2014 1:36:59 PM
<u>National Science Foundation's (NSF) Polar Programs - Support to</u>	Air Force	Pers & Read	12/16/2013 9:41:07 PM
<u>Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP)</u>	Navy	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 3:16:05 PM
<u>Customs and Border Clearance Program (CBCP)</u>	TRANSCOM	AT&L	5/7/2014 3:12:38 PM
	Defense Threat		5/7/2014

<u>Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Elimination Operations</u>	Reduction Agency (DTRA)	Policy	1:56:18 PM
<u>Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST)</u>	Army	AT&L	4/22/2014 5:12:12 PM
<u>Contract Foreign Language Support to the DoD Components</u>	Army	Pers & Read	4/22/2014 5:12:50 PM
<u>DoD Foreign Clearance Program (FCP)</u>	Air Force	Policy	5/14/2014 3:13:39 PM
<u>Modeling & Simulation (M&S) Objectives in the Air and Space Natural Environment (ASNE)</u>	Air Force	AT&L	5/14/2014 3:18:16 PM
<u>Financial Disclosure Management (FDM) - Ethics Reporting System</u>	Army	Comptroller/DoD CFO	5/14/2014 3:19:10 PM
<u>Printed Circuit Board Technology</u>	Navy	AT&L	5/14/2014 3:20:16 PM
<u>Support for Non-Federal Entities Authorized to Operate on DoD Installations</u>	Army	Pers & Read	4/22/2014 5:19:20 PM
<u>Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC)</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 5:55:17 PM
<u>Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)</u>	Air Force	DOD-CIO/USD AT&L	12/16/2013 9:47:11 PM
<u>Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)</u>	Army	Policy	5/14/2014 3:21:34 PM
<u>Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program</u>	OUSD(P&R)	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 3:04:31 PM
<u>Georgia-U.S. BioSurveillance & Research Center (GUSBRC)</u>	Army	DDR&E	5/14/2014 3:23:44 PM
<u>Forensics</u>	Army	AT&L	5/7/2014 5:41:55 PM
<u>Coordination of Contracting Activities in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)</u>	Army	AT&L	4/22/2014 5:35:08 PM
<u>Civilian Personnel Management for Joint Task Force National Capital</u>	TRICARE Management Activity	Pers & Read	2/6/2014 3:50:51 PM
<u>Operation of After Government Employment Advice Repository (AGEAR)</u>	Army	General Counsel	5/14/2014 3:25:34 PM
<u>Armed Forces Medical Examiner System (AFMES) and the National Museum of Health and Medicine (NMHM)</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 5:41:16 PM
<u>Anthrax Vaccination Immunization Program (AVIP)</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 5:40:54 PM
<u>Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE)</u>	Army	Pers & Read	5/7/2014 5:40:20 PM
<u>Classified DoD EA</u>	Army	Policy	4/22/2014 5:40:35 PM
<u>Classified DoD EA</u>	Army	Policy	4/22/2014 5:40:55 PM